STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS UNDER FOREIGN PRESSURE:
TWO CONTRASTING CASES IN THE JAPANESE FISHERIES POLICY COMMUNITY

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1. INTRODUCTION

The question of state autonomy vis-à-vis foreign pressure is of great importance in the age of globalization: “The increasing interdependence of national economies in trade, finance, and macroeconomic policy conflict[s] more and more with domestic economic and social priorities” (Gilpin 1987: 389). Furthermore, the importance of this topic is not restricted to economic trade issues in an era of “ecological interdependence” (MacNeil, Winsemius and Yakushiji 1991: 4). At the end of the Cold War, the global environment emerged as an international political issue area, critical not only to the prosperity of states but also to the survival of humankind. A number of important international meetings focused on various aspects of the issue area, including deforestation, ozone depletion, global warming, and biological diversity. At their Paris summit meeting in 1989, the Group of Seven leaders devoted one third of the Economic Declaration to the environment (Starke 1990: 14). In June 1992, international political enthusiasm for the global environment peaked at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro. In this international process, Japan came under severe foreign pressure, called gaiatsu in Japanese, from other countries and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to stop some of Japan’s economic practices in favor of wildlife protection.

Most notably, Japan was pressured to end research whaling and the use of large-scale drift nets for squid and tuna fishing operations on the high seas. In 1987, Japan started scientific research on the minke whale in the Antarctic Ocean right after entering a moratorium on commercial whaling, which Japan had agreed to in 1984 largely as a result of economic threats from the United States. From the start, the scientific research program was criticized for being a disguise for commercial whaling because

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1 A state’s autonomy is the ability to transform its interests into policy and to implement it. See Smith (1993: 49).
Japan was allowed to kill some 300 minke whales a year for research and sell the meat. Despite continuous criticism of the practice, however, Japan has not given it up yet. The other practice for which Japan was criticized is large-scale drift-net fishing on the high seas, which began in the late 1970s. In 1989, “the year of the earth” according to Time magazine, this practice suddenly drew much opposition from abroad. The drift-net fishing issue became the first case in the history of the United Nations (UN) in which Japan and the United States introduced conflicting draft resolutions to a committee of the UN General Assembly (Asahi Shinbun 4.11.1989: 3). In November 1991, Japan announced its cessation of drift-net fishing all over the world from January 1993 (Nihon Keizai Shinbun 26.11.1991: 1, 19). These are cases where “Sometimes gaiatsu works, and sometimes it doesn’t” (Schoppa 1997: 18).

In this paper, I address the question of Japanese state-society relations under foreign pressure by examining the two cases mentioned above. A study of this relationship offers a forum for analyzing domestic structures in the “reactive state”, as Calder (1988) calls Japan. This paper mainly draws on Smith’s (1993) concept of a policy community consisting of an industry and its supervising government agency. Smith sheds light on the resistance of a policy community to external pressures, which seems to be helpful in understanding the effect of foreign pressure on the domestic policymaking process. This paper then undertakes case studies of how foreign pressure affects a policy community and policy outcome. The final part briefly concludes the paper and suggests further research.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The traditional analysis of democratic states often focuses on societal actors and takes a pluralistic view. Recent studies, however, reject this assumption. In other words, they do not assume that national interests are

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2 Research whaling is defined here as “to kill, take, and treat whales for purposes of scientific research subject to such restrictions as to number and subject to such other conditions as the Contracting Government thinks fit” (Article 8.1 of the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW)).

3 A large-scale pelagic drift-net (hereafter referred to simply as a drift-net or a high seas drift-net) is defined in a United Nations General Assembly resolution as “a method of fishing with a net or a combination of nets intended to be held in a more or less vertical position by floats and weights, the purpose of which is to enmesh fish by drifting on the surface of or in the water”. This resolution points out that “large-scale” driftnets “can reach or exceed 30 miles (48 kilometers) in total length” (UNGA 1989: 147–148).
the mere aggregation of the interests of societal actors. More scholars are taking state autonomy vis-à-vis societal pressure into consideration (NORDLINGER 1981; EVANS, RUESCHEMeyer and SKOCpol 1985). By contrast, many traditional works on foreign policy processes employ a state-centered approach such as the bureaucratic politics model (ALLISON 1971; COHEN 1994). The omission of societal actors in foreign policymaking analysis, however, is also questionable. Societal actors play more important roles in contemporary international issues such as the global environment and human rights. Accordingly, it is increasingly necessary to analyze state-society relations in the making of foreign policy (SKIDMORE and HUDSON 1993: 4–5). As a seminal work on Japanese state-society relations in this category, MIKANAGI (1996) deserves special attention.

Mikanagi analyzes the domestic conditions under which foreign pressure affected trade liberalization in Japan in the case of the Market-Oriented Sector-Selective (MOSS) trade negotiations between the United States and Japan in 1985 and 1986. She focuses on domestic factors because she has found that “the amount of pressure applied to the Japanese government and the degree of achievement do not correlate” (MIKANAGI 1996: 52). Mikanagi rejects the macro debate about elitism, pluralism, and corporatism which characterize the whole Japanese political system. Instead, she employs a “ministry-centered approach” based on the proposition that each ministry is different in terms of its objectives, its level of autonomy, and the scope of its policy instruments—all of which affect its capacity to respond to foreign pressure. In addition, she regards the type of relationship between a ministry and the private sector as an important factor in Japan’s responsiveness to foreign pressure. This approach avoids the over-simplification of a macro approach to the Japanese policymaking process and overcomes defects in pluralism and the bureaucratic politics model.

It is possible to improve Mikanagi’s approach by introducing the policy communities approach taken by SMITH (1993) in his analysis of British and American politics. Like Mikanagi, Smith focuses on the autonomy of a government ministry and its relationships with economic and social groups. This approach differs, however, most notably in the following three aspects. First, it goes beyond Mikanagi’s simplistic typology and helps in examining the relationship between a ministry and the private sector more closely within the structural and historical context of the policymaking process. Second, it allows for the possibility of a

4 In contrast, political studies of Japan, which perceived the country as a “strong” state, had a long tradition of a statist approach, which a more pluralistic view challenged only later (SAMUELS 1987).
positive-sum game. As Smith points out, “By working together, a group and a state agency can increase each other’s autonomy in relation to other parts of the state” (Smith 1993: 54). This seems particularly true where both actors cooperate to resist external pressure. Finally, it is a flexible approach which also incorporates an analysis of political intervention (Smith 1993: 7).

Smith bases his argument on Marsh and Rhodes’ (1992b) approach of policy networks, defined as continuous but changeable structural relationships between a government ministry and interest groups at the sectoral or sub-sectoral level. In this model, policy networks are seen as “political structures which constrain and facilitate actors within the network” and which thereby affect, but do not determine, policy outcome (Marsh 1995: 2–4). The policy networks approach has great descriptive power with respect to global environmental politics, since it can cover a wide range of sectors and sub-sectors, each of which involves a different set of actors in the policymaking process. Moreover, it can be extended to transnational networks in global environmental politics (Garner 1996: 155). This approach is also equipped with a useful typology of policy networks in which tightly integrated “policy communities” and open “issue networks” are regarded as the end-points on a continuum. The typology is based on the dimensions of membership (number of participants and type of interests), integration (frequency of interaction, continuity and consensus), resources (distribution of resources within a network and within participating organizations), and power (Marsh and Rhodes 1992a: 251).

Smith contributes to the policy network literature by shedding light on the resistance to external pressure of policy communities. Smith (1993: 76) assumes that a policy community “prevent[s] change by excluding threats to the dominant interests”. In this way, he argues that the degree to which a policy network can withstand external pressure largely depends on the character of the network. In other words, the closer a policy network is to the ideal type of policy community, the more resistant it becomes to external pressure (Smith 1993: 98).

According to Smith (1993: 59), a government ministry is motivated to form a policy community as a means of extending its autonomy. In cooperation with an industry, a ministry can enhance its ability to form and implement policy in a relevant policy area and protect its own interests from external threats, including political and interministerial intervention, by isolating the policy process. Non-governmental participants also find it beneficial to form and maintain a policy community because doing so institutionalizes their access to the policymaking process and creates a mechanism to resist external threats. In his analysis of Japanese energy markets, Samuels (1987) calls the political interdependence of the state
and the private sector the politics of “reciprocal consent”. This mutual dependence is further strengthened by “functional cooperative relationships” between a ministry and each industry under its jurisdiction (Ôtake 1996: 254–257). In such relationships, they share fundamentally the same perspective; the ministry tries to see political issues and social situations through the eyes of an industry, and the ministry’s interest in enhancing its authority in the government is closely linked with an industry’s interest in self-development. For a ministry, maintaining this type of relationship is rational. Kato (1994: 36) argues that a ministry simultaneously tries to pursue “two objectives: increasing their (organizational) power and reflecting ‘social welfare’ considerations in policymaking where social welfare is determined by the officials’ technocratic ideas and specialized knowledge”. Such ideas and knowledge seem to be shared by a policy community. Consequently, “social welfare” tends to be defined from the community’s perspective. In a policy community in which ministerial and industrial interests are fused, the ministry may take the initiative in resisting foreign pressure even without an explicit request or pressure from the industry (Ôtake 1996: 254–257).

Smith (1993: 91–98) also considers the dynamic aspects of the policy community. When new ideas, issues, or groups manage to enter a policy community, the nature of the community, such as strong consensus and exclusiveness, gradually changes. Consequently, it moves toward the issue network end of Marsh and Rhodes’ continuum, and the community thus becomes more subject to external pressure. In this context, Smith explains the implications of the entry of other government ministries into an existing policy community:

If a community contains more than one actor with political authority then the ability of the community to withstand external threats is likely to be less. In this situation conflict can develop between the decision-making institutions and this leads to conflict over territory, the politicization of the issue area and the inclusion of an increasing number of groups. Consequently the community is destroyed (Smith 1993: 98).

Thus, if a government ministry supporting external pressure intervenes in a policy community, it is more likely that the pressure will bring about policy change that is against the interests of the original community. Smith also points out that “If controversy develops, well resourced political actors like Presidents or Prime Ministers can become involved in the policy arena and thus remove decision-making from the community” (Smith 1993: 98). In other words, inter-ministerial or political intervention into the industrial policy community may reduce the community’s
autonomy. This “participation expansion” (Schoppa 1997: 40–42) broadens the definition of national interests from the mere protection of the industry in question to a complex of various interests, including the avoidance of isolation in international society. The transformation of the community may also bring greater attention to the identity and international role of the nation and thus strengthen the constraining effect of identity on national behavior (Klotz 1995: 166–169).

There are other factors in the dynamism of a policy community. New ideas from outside may change the cost and benefit calculations of a rational policy community (Goldstein and Keohane 1993). International norms may constitute the new identity of a policy community and thereby reshape the interests of the community (Wendt 1992 and 1994; Katzenstein 1996). The ideas and norms embedded in domestic structures may, however, affect the extent to which a policy community accepts new ideas and international norms (Risse-Kappen 1995: 281). For example, an industrial policy community internalizing the wildlife conservation (or sustainable utilization) norm would hardly accept the wildlife preservation (or no human utilization) norm.

In sum, this paper uses the policy communities approach to examine the structures of state-society relationships at the sectoral or sub-sectoral level. In this approach, an economic ministry defends its own interests by protecting its supervising industry whose interests are expected to be jeopardized by foreign pressure. This cooperation can be seen as the protection of both interests by an industrial policy community—an exclusive policymaking institution consisting mainly of a ministry division and trade associations, sometimes interfered with or reinforced by politicians. It is also argued that when the politicization of an issue brings more actors into the policy making process, and when new environmental ideas and norms affect an industrial policy community, state autonomy declines vis-à-vis foreign pressure. The analysis of an industrial policy community requires dy-

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5 On the other hand, the community’s autonomy may also be enhanced by political intervention. Zoku [policy tribe] politicians can play the dual role of representing the interests in their respective fields and of coordinating their interests with others in the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC). In the case of zoku politicians specializing in commerce, agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, they are more likely to enhance the autonomy of their relevant industrial policy community by playing an intermediary role between a ministry and interest group.

6 As Sato (1989: 71) argues in his case study of US–Japan textile friction, the degree of politicization can be measured by four indicators: period of conflict, government department in charge of negotiations, position of a chief negotiator, and links with other issues.
dynamic data regarding the number of participants, exclusiveness, and the size and type of interests; the frequency of interaction, continuity, and consensus; and principles, norms, and identities embedded in the community.

3. THE DRIFTNET FISHING POLICY COMMUNITY IN JAPAN

The authority of the fisheries administration in the Japanese government lies in the Fisheries Agency, located within the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF)\(^7\). In the Fisheries Agency, the Off-Shore Fisheries Division and the International Affairs Division dealt with the issue of high seas driftnet fishing. The trade association for the fishing industry of Japan is the Japan Fisheries Association (JFA: Dai Nippon Suisankai). As of 1991, members included 148 fishery associations, 152 major Japanese fishing companies, and other entities belonging to related industries such as marketing, processing, shipbuilding, and gear and net manufacturing (JFA 1991: 32). The JFA, established in 1882, supports various fisheries negotiations between the Japanese government and foreign nations, sponsors private fisheries delegations, and conducts international public relations and labor management. The president of the Japan Fisheries Association, Uchimura Yoshihide, was a former Fisheries Agency Director-General and then Administrative Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (Nihon Keizai Shinbun 28.5.1987: 9). The tie between the government and the industry was close at the time of this issue.

In the summer of 1989, the Japanese government had no intention of changing its practice of driftnet fishing. In a consultation on South Pacific albacore fisheries management in Fiji in June 1989, Japan refused a request from representatives of South Pacific countries to reduce its driftnet fishing operations (SPF 1991: 11). On 11 July 1989, the South Pacific Forum (SPF) meeting unanimously adopted the Tarawa Declaration “deeply regretting that Japan and Taiwan have failed to respond to the concerns of regional countries about this most serious issue”. Japan, however, opposed the Tarawa Declaration and instead promised to place the South Pacific driftnet fishery under a notification system from August and to freeze Japan’s driftnet catch at current levels pending a scientific study of the practice (Nihon Keizai Shinbun 15.7.1989: 4). On 14 September 1989, however, the Japanese government announced its first major concession with regard to driftnet fishing in the South Pacific in order to reduce foreign

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\(^7\) The Fisheries Agency is headed by a Director-General who is not a Minister of State but a bureaucrat ranking lower than an Administrative Vice-Minister.
pressure. Japanese officials stated that they would dispatch research and monitoring vessels to the South Pacific and limit the number of driftnet vessels in the 1989–90 season to 20 or less, i.e., the level that Japan had maintained in the 1980s before this was sharply increased to 65 vessels in the 1988–89 season (SNHI 1990: 90). This concession, however, could not stop the growing foreign pressure against the practice.

On 17 July 1990, Japan announced that it would cease driftnet fishing in the South Pacific from the next fishing season (between November 1990 and March 1991) (SPF 1991: 13). The Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations stated:

Japan has made this decision taking into account, in particular, grave concerns that the South Pacific island countries still have with drift-net fishing in the region, as these countries, whose economic base depends, to a large extent, on marine resources, have strong intentions to develop the albacore fishery for their own economic development in the future, through this decision. Japan wishes further to promote good relations with the South Pacific island countries (UNGA 1990: 2).

The South Pacific was one of the few attractive fishing grounds left for the Japanese pelagic fisheries (SUISANČO 1992: 26, 201). The Japanese government timed the cessation in the South Pacific one year in advance of the date set by UN resolution 44/225 in a desperate attempt to continue drift-net fishing in the North Pacific (Nihon Keizai Shinbun 18.7.1990: 24).

For the Japanese fishing industry, the North Pacific squid driftnet fisheries were much more important than the South Pacific tuna driftnet fisheries. The former produced an annual yield of 141,263 tons in 1989 (SNHI 1993: 294), while in the South Pacific in the 1988–89 season the Japanese driftnet fleet caught approximately 10,000 tons of albacore tuna (Asahi Shinbun 29.7.1989: 4). The latter was a “secondary crop” to the former (Nihon Keizai Shinbun 18.7.1990: 24). In other words, the cessation of South Pacific driftnet fishing did not affect employment significantly. Japan’s national report to UNCED emphasized the importance of the flying squid fishery:

Squid is among the favorite seafood of the Japanese, but the volume of surumeika, a sort of squid particularly liked by the Japanese, available in the seas around the country, has been stagnating at a medium to low level in recent years. Consequently, aikaika or red squid [flying squid] caught in the high seas of the North Pacific constitute valuable fishery resources for the Japanese (GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN 1991: 47).

Among fishery products, squid accounted for the largest share of annual household consumption: 1,657 grams per capita in 1989 (JFA 1991: 15). The North Pacific driftnet fishery caught 145,342 tons of flying squid, which
was equivalent to 25.7% of the total Japanese squid catch in 1990, 565,000 tons (SNHI 1993: 294 and 305). Moreover, the Japanese government had previously taken initiatives in the North Pacific driftnet fishery. The government had encouraged Japanese driftnet fishermen to switch to the North Pacific squid fishery when they were excluded from the salmon and trout fisheries in the foreign Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in the late 1970s (Nihon Keizai Shinbun 26.11.1991: 19).

Nevertheless, squid caught with driftnets was still a very small part of the Japanese entire fishing industry: only 1.3% of the total yield of 11,051,735 tons. The fishery produced a yield worth 43,906 billion yen in 1990, which accounted for only 1.6% of the total fisheries yield worth 2,724,328 billion yen (SNHI 1993: 300). In 1991, 454 vessels and some 8,000 people belonged to the Squid Driftnet Fishery Association (GAIMUSHO 18.6.1992: 3). They amounted to 0.1% and 2.3% of the entire Japanese fishing industry respectively (SNHI 1993: 321). The driftnet fishery was conducted by small and medium-sized companies, some of which were also engaged in other fisheries (NRSS 1993a: 2–3, 86–88; NRSS 1993b: 60–67).

The wider fisheries policy community feared that the success of banning the use of driftnets would lead to campaigns to ban other fishing methods, such as round haul nets and trawl nets, that could also cause incidental catches (SUISANCHO 1992: 128; Nihon Keizai Shinbun 18.7.1990: 24). This fear, however, did not become a serious concern in the community because other developed countries were also using round haul nets and trawl nets on the high seas. Accordingly, the degree of politicization of the policy community was relatively low.

3.1. Dynamics of the policy community

Environmental NGOs failed to intervene successfully in the industrial policy community. In March 1990, Greenpeace Japan with four other NGOs submitted protest letters concerning the Japanese South Pacific driftnet fishery to Foreign Minister Nakayama, Fisheries Agency Director-General Kyōtani, and President of the Japan Fisheries Association Uchimura (Asahi

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3 In addition, Japan had conducted large-mesh driftnet fishing in its waters for tuna and tuna-like species for more than 100 years. The fishery that expanded onto the high seas was placed under a limited entry licensing system in 1990, which allowed more than 200 boats. At the beginning of 1992, a moratorium was introduced in this fishery as well (GAIMUSHO 18.6.1992: 1).
Shinbun 10.3.1990: 3). Although Greenpeace played an important role in forging international pressure against driftnet fishing, the NGO was known to the Japanese government as a radical group, and thus Greenpeace Japan seems to have had little direct policy impact on the government (AKAO 1993: 38). Moreover, domestic NGOs did not have much interest in the driftnet fishing issue. In September 1990, the 20th national conference on nature conservation could not pass a resolution calling for a driftnet moratorium due to strong opposition from people engaged in the fishing industry (Nihon Keizai Shinbun 25.9.1990: 18).

In the autumn of 1991, the politicization of the driftnet issue at the inter-state level brought the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) into the policy community (Yomiuri Shinbun 5.11.1991: 10). MOFA urged preparation for a driftnet ban (Asahi Shinbun 28.9.1991: 3). In contrast to MOFA, the Fisheries Agency emphasized the importance of devising effective driftnet methods for resource management in order to avoid a ban (Asahi Shinbun 18.10.1991: 11). Driftnet fishing and rice were expected to be the major issues on the agenda of the US-Japan summit meeting scheduled in late November (Yomiuri Shinbun 30.10.1991: 2). In the preparatory process in Washington DC, a MOFA official implied on 1 November, that Japan might accept a driftnet ban before US President George Bush’s visit (Mainichi Shinbun 2.11.1991: 2). The President sought to ban driftnet fishing because he was planning to emphasize “environmental protection” in his presidential election campaign in 1992 (Nihon Keizai Shinbun 5.11.1991: 7). Meanwhile, MOFA (the Second North America Division rather than the Fishery Division) gave priority to the maintenance of the amicable relationship between the two nations over the driftnet fishery. The MOFA stance, however, offended the Fishing Agency, which argued that a concession to an “unscientific US argument” was not an official government policy (Mainichi Shinbun 2.11.1991: 2).

In the final stage, internal divisions split the fisheries policy community. The 26 November announcement by the government of Japan’s acceptance of a driftnet ban reportedly took the fishing industry by surprise (Independent 27.11.1991: 1). Although the Japan Fisheries Association opposed a ban on high seas driftnet fishing on 3 and 18 October 1991, the industry itself, however, was not united (Nihon Keizai Shinbun 4.10.1991: 7). According to the Squid Driftnet Fishery Association, large fishing companies were not strongly opposed to a driftnet ban (Nihon Keizai Shinbun 11.5.1991: 3). Moreover, the majority of Japanese small and medium-sized fisheries also had no direct interest in the issue since they were not engaged in driftnet fishing at all. For example, the Kesennuma Distant-water Fisheries Cooperative, which was mainly engaged in the long-line fishery,
had opposed drift net fishing as wasteful since the late 1970s (Asahi Shin-bun 6.1.1990: 3)\(^9\).

Squid drift net fishermen strongly resisted the moratorium. The drift net fishing method was regarded as most appropriate for flying squid because they do not migrate in schools and are too heavy and too fragile to use hooks. The North Pacific drift net catch accounted for 93.8% of the Japanese total flying squid catch in 1990 (SNHI 1993: 294, 297). Moreover, it was not easy for drift net fishermen to move to other fisheries since there was little space for newcomers under the Japanese licensing system for commercial fish stocks (Nihon Keizai Shinbun 26.11.1991: 19). In the latter half of October 1991, a delegation from the Squid Drift Net Fishery Association headed by President Imura Koji visited Washington DC and New York to appeal to US government officials and representatives to the United Nations to accept drift net fishing as a reasonable practice (Yomiuri Shinbun 22.10.1991: 22). On 29 November 1991, after the government agreed to comply with the drift net moratorium, approximately 3,000 people involved with drift net fishing held a national rally. They unanimously adopted a Sendai declaration seeking a way to continue drift net fishing and requesting that the government secure their right to life (Mainichi Shinbun 30.11.1991: 3). In 1992, the Fisheries Agency and prefectural governments conducted research on alternative methods of fishing for flying squid, but the new methods caught less than one fifth of the average drift net catch (Nihon Keizai Shinbun 23.3.1992: 19). The poor results of this research led to the inclusion of a compensatory package for drift net fishermen in a draft supplementary budget for FY 1992 worth 16.3 billion yen. The Fisheries Agency estimated that some 300 drift net fishing vessels would be scrapped with the cessation of drift net fishing on the high seas (Asahi Shinbun 15.9.1992: 5).

4. THE WHALING POLICY COMMUNITY IN JAPAN

The Japanese whaling industry has a 400-year history, and some scholars maintain that Japan has a whaling culture. KALLAND and MOERAN (1992:

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\(^9\) Many Japanese also disapproved of the wasteful practices. According to a survey of Japanese people outside of the fishing industry, conducted by Dr. Kawai Tomoyasu in a fisheries research institute of the Fisheries Agency, 41.8% of the surveyed opposed the incidental catches of marine mammals and sea birds while 44.5% of them were unconcerned about the incidental catches of marine mammals and sea birds. In contrast, only 6.7% objected to the eating of whale meat while 89.1% upheld the diet of whale meat (KAWAI 1994: 86–99).
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134–173), for example, argue that a Japanese whaling culture exists at two levels. At the village level, local whaling cultures have been formed along with the development of local community identities consisting of religious rituals and beliefs about whaling and the diet and gift giving of whale meat. At the national level, local cultures have been integrated into a national whaling culture by whaling companies’ recruitment of employees from across the country and by linkages between whaling companies through mergers, acquisitions, and joint operations10. The Japanese whaling policy community has emphasized the Japanese traditions of whaling and of eating whale meat to legitimize the continuation of whaling11.

This argument, however, became less persuasive in the 1980s and 1990s. After the Japanese whaling industry was at the height of its prosperity the early 1960s, even before Japan’s compliance with the moratorium, whaling had become economically less important for the Japanese fishing industry (YAMAMURA 1996: 25–37). The number of people directly employed by the whaling industry fell below 1,000 in the latter half of the 1980s, and the Japanese whaling culture was on the verge of extinction. Although Japanese people outside of the industry also ate whale meat, the meat had become “a minority taste” (Independent 6.7.1992: 18). Until the end of World War Two, whale meat was consumed in local communities. After the war, consumption spread nationwide as an ingredient in school lunches (NAKAJIMA 1994: 27). In the first half of the 1960s, some 200,000 tons of whale meat annually came onto the wholesale market nationally. Nevertheless, the annual supply of whale meat was on the decline, due to the stricter catch quotas set by the International Whaling Commission (IWC), well before the moratorium went into effect in Japan in 1987. For example, the annual supply dropped to 24,000 tons in 1979, and 18,000 tons in 1986, and plunged to a level of 1,000 tons in 1989. This was indeed a tiny proportion of the total catch of Japan’s fisheries in that year of 13,341,000 tons (SNHI 1993: 317). According to a survey of 200 housewives in Tōkyō and Ōsaka, four-fifths answered that they would not be in unduly troubled if whale meat became unavailable (Nihon Keizai Shinbun 28.7.1987: 13). In short, by the late 1980s, the cultural and eco-

10 Regarding rituals, whalers and their families went to shrines “to give thanks for good catches and for whalers’ protection at sea” and to temples “to pray for the souls of killed whales” (KALLAND and MOERAN 1992: 188). A service for dead whales was also conducted annually for pelagic commercial whaling in the Antarctic at Zojō Temple and others until Japan ceased the whaling under the moratorium (NAKAJIMA 1994: 29).

11 Since the IWC accepted aboriginal subsistence whaling as a new non-commercial category for cultural reasons, the Japanese delegations stressed a cultural aspect in Japanese small-type coastal whaling so that it might be accepted as aboriginal whaling (KALLAND and MOERAN 1992: 1).
nomic necessity of killing whales had already declined in Japan. Neverthe-
less, the whaling policy community demonstrated a high degree of autono-
my against foreign pressure to stop its scientific research.

In Japan, the Fisheries Law grants jurisdiction over whaling to the Min-
istry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF). GRESSER, FUJIKURA and
MORISHIMA (1981: 371–372) elaborate on this jurisdiction:

Under art. 52, ‘persons desirous of operating any fishery by vessel’
must ‘obtain a license for each vessel’. By Cabinet Order, whaling has
been designated a ‘fishery’ requiring a license. Other ministerial re-
gulations identify the whale species that may be killed and those that
may not, impose quotas on the number of whales to be taken, specify
hunting seasons and time periods, hunting areas on the high seas and
areas deemed off limits, approved hunting methods and equipment,
and methods of disposing of whale carcasses. The rules also require
the industry to report each whale killed to the Minister of Agriculture,
Forestry, and Fisheries.

Located within MAFF, the Far Seas Fisheries Division of the Fisheries Agen-
cy is in charge of whaling administration. As for treaties, including the In-
ternational Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) and other in-
ternational agreements, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has
jurisdiction. In MOFA, the Fishery Division of the Economic Affairs Bureau
follows the whaling issue from the perspective of international relations.

In 1987, the Japanese whaling industry commercially hunted 2,790
whales (317 Bryde’s whales, 188 sperm whales, 2,245 minke whales, and
40 Baird’s beaked whales). In 1988, due to the commercial whaling mor-
atorium, it hunted only 192 whales (57 Baird’s beaked whales, 128 pilot
whales, and 7 killer whales) which were not covered by the ICRW (SNHI
1993: 298–299). Accordingly, the annual yield dropped from 12.93 billion
yen to 0.48 billion yen (NRSS 1993b: 3 and 225). In 1987, 930 people were
directly employed in the industry: 533 people in pelagic whaling, 303 in
large-type coastal whaling; and 94 in small-type coastal whaling (Shūgiin
Nōrinsuisan linkai Kaigiroku 28.7.1987: 4). While giving up large-type
coastal whaling, the Fisheries Agency sought the continuation of Japan’s
pelagic whaling in the Antarctic and its small-type coastal whaling in the
form of research whaling and subsistence whaling respectively, both of
which could be allowed under the commercial whaling moratorium
(Shūgiin Nōrinsuisan linkai Kaigiroku 28.7.1987: 20). It seemed unrealistic,
however, to obtain IWC approval for Japan’s small-type coastal whaling
as a subsistence occupation since it required amendment of the ICRW
Schedule. Given the anti-whaling mood of the IWC, it was difficult to at-
tain a three-quarters majority of votes for subsistence whaling of 210
whales (Shūgiin Nōrin-suisan linkai Kaigiroku 28.7.1987: 17). In contrast, research whaling was more promising since Article 8.1 of the ICRW gives the contracting governments the authority to issue special permits for research whaling. The Japan Whaling Association, therefore, placed its hopes on research whaling in the Antarctic (Shūgiin Nōrin-suisan linkai Kaigiroku 28.7.1987: 3).

The Institute of Cetacean Research has conducted Japanese research programs under government supervision since its inception in November 1987 (Asahi Shinbun 20.10.1987: 9). The institute is a non-profit foundation (zaidan hōjin) under the jurisdiction of MAFF. It receives government grants and entrusts whaling to a company called Kyōdō Senpaku, which judging from its history is the core survivor of the Japanese whaling industry. In 1976, Nihon Kyōdō Hogei (the Japan Joint Whaling Company) was established by integrating the whaling sections of three major fishing companies (Taiyō Gyogyō, Nihon Suisan, and Kyokuyō), and three smaller whaling companies (Hokuyō Hogei, Nihon Hogei, and Nittō Hogei). This merger was carried out under the direction of the MAFF Minister to prevent over-competition and potential failure (Shūgiin Nōrin-suisan linkai Kaigiroku 28.7.1987: 7). “The first president of the new company was the director-general of the Japan Whaling Association, a former director of the Fisheries Agency” (Gresser, Fujikura and Moreshima 1981: 372). To avoid the image of commercialism in its research whaling programs, Nihon Kyōdō Hogei was dissolved and reorganized as Kyōdō Senpaku, a smaller company with 320 employees, one factory ship, and three catch boats.

The whaling policy community included high-ranking officials and business executives of the wider fisheries policy community. Whaling had contributed to the rapid post-war development of major fishing companies such as Taiyō Gyogyō and Nihon Suisan. Although their whaling sections were detached in 1976 to form Kyōdō Hogei, the whaling industry remained controlled by the parent companies (Day 1992: 142). Whaling maintained its importance in the fishing industry, not only economically but also emotionally and politically. Yonezawa Kunio’s career record – IWC commissioner, Fisheries Agency Deputy Director-General, and Vice President of Nihon Suisan – symbolizes the importance of whaling in the fisheries policy community (Nihon Keizai Sanyō Shinbun 12.11.1990: 16).

The fisheries policy community feared that, if the preservation principle were established in the whaling case, it could be applied to other species in the future as well. Thus, the Fisheries Agency stressed the legitimacy of sustainable use (Shūgiin Nōrin-suisan linkai Kaigiroku 28.7.1987: 11). For example, Yonezawa argued:
For Japan to withdraw from the IWC might please extremists, but it would not necessarily help our concern for sustainable whaling or further our larger cause. The larger cause we stand for goes well beyond the immediate issue of whaling. It encompasses much broader questions, among which are the fundamental human right to use natural resources responsibly; mutual respect for divergent cultural and ethical values; and freedom from the tyranny of the majority (Japan Times 9.11.1994: 17).

In this sense, the whale became a symbol of conservation to the Japanese fisheries policy community, as a result of which the whaling issue became more politicized than would be expected from the economic size of the whaling industry.

The whaling policy community also included Suisan zoku, a specialist group of Diet members who represent the interests of the fishing industry. Its most active participants were Diet members who belonged to the whaling policy group established in May 1985 by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)\textsuperscript{12}. Since 1985, LDP Diet members had attended IWC annual meetings (Komatsu 1986: 94–108). At the 1987 meeting, for example, three LDP Diet members were present: Tamazawa Tokuichirô, Kikuchi Fukujirô, and Higashi Chikara (Shôgin Nôrinssusan linkai Kaigiroku 28.7.1987: 3 and 12). Opposition parties also participated in the whaling policy community. In 1987, the All Japan Seamen’s Union put pressure on MAFF to conduct research whaling through the Democratic Socialist Party (Sangiin Nôrinssusan linkai Kaigiroku 30.7.1987: 23). In 1991, not only Higashi Chikara and Matsuura Akira, both LDP Diet members, but also Niimori Tatsuo, a Diet member from the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), attended the IWC meeting (Asahi Shinbun 25.5.1991: 18).

The whaling issue was politicized in favor of the industry in Japan. The standing committee on agriculture, forestry, and fisheries of the Japanese House of Representatives, and its counterpart in the House of Councilors unanimously adopted a resolution for the implementation of research whaling on 29 and 30 July 1987 respectively\textsuperscript{13}. The identical resolutions have two points:

\textsuperscript{12} A well-known example is former Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkô, who was called “Mr. Fish” (Dai 1992: 128, 145–6).

\textsuperscript{13} Numerous committee members criticized MAFF and MOFA for having been weak-kneed in international negotiations on whaling, especially with the United States. For example, LDP Diet member Higashi Chikara stated “the stance of the Fisheries Agency on whaling has been weak. A certain amount of friction with other nations in fisheries diplomacy should be tolerated” (Shôgin Nôrinssusan linkai Kaigiroku 28.7.1987: 13).
first, to make maximum efforts to conduct research whaling in this fishery season, while seeking the understanding of relevant nations and being prepared, if necessary, to withdraw from the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling;

second, to take a proper measures on behalf of the fishermen and others who are forced to cease their business and to make special efforts to continue coastal whaling (Shūgiin nōrin suisan inkai kaiōroku 29.7.1987: 8; Sangiin Nōrin suisan inkai kaiōroku 30.7.1987: 29).

It was not easy to absorb 500 whalers (in 1988) into other fisheries although the entire fishing industry was much larger with some 392,400 fishermen (SNHI 1993: 321). The Financial Times (25.5.1991: 6) reported, “In Japan only 28% of those thrown out of work in large coastal whaling firms have found jobs since the moratorium; 18% have found part-time or temporary work”. President Doi Kazukiyo of the All Japan Seamen’s Union testified in the Diet that whalers were so specialized that they would have difficulties finding work in other industries (Shūgiin Nōrin suisan inkai kaiōroku 28.7.1987: 9). In the same committee meeting, Fisheries Agency Director-General Satake stressed the economic importance of whaling for some communities (Shūgiin Nōrin suisan inkai kaiōroku 28.7.1987: 17). The Japanese whaling policy community felt it necessary to continue whaling so as to alleviate the deteriorating employment situation in local whaling communities.

4.1. Outside of the community

The Environment Agency was excluded from the whaling policy community. As Gresser, Fujikura, and Morishima put it, “since the Fisheries Law grants jurisdiction over whaling to the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, the Environment Agency is effectively excluded from important policy decisions” (GRESSER, FUJIKURA and MORISHIMA 1981: 372). According to the Law, the MAFF Minister is in charge of the conservation of whale stocks. In any case, Director-General Moriyama Mayumi of the Environment Agency and her successor Kitagawa Ishimatsu expressed

14 KALLAND and MOERAN (1992: 41) argue that the decline of whaling has made local whaling towns “more dependent on compensation paid by potentially polluting industries”. MIZUGUCHI (1996: 73-4) points out that many whaling towns are located near the actual or planned sites of nuclear power facilities. This fact shows that whaling towns are remote from populous areas.

Environmental NGOs were also excluded from the policy community. Japanese environmental NGOs were “muted in their opposition to whaling, which is perceived in the country [Japan] as a traditional ritual” (Daily Telegraph 22.6.1987: 13). Indeed, the major Japanese newspapers supported Japan’s research whaling (Nihon Keizai Shinbun 15.4.1987: 2; Yomiuri Shinbun 17.4.1987: 3)15. There was no strong public consensus about research whaling16. On the issue of whaling, Greenpeace was the most visible international NGO in Japan. In 1989, it established its Japanese branch “to get Japanese people involved in the ecology movement”, especially in the anti-whaling movement (Japan Times 23.12.1987: 3)17. In late 1989, two NGOs, Greenpeace Japan and Whale Issue Network, conducted a campaign against whaling in Sendai, Tōkyō, Nagoya, and Osaka (Mainichi Shinbun 17.11.1989: 26). Holding a whale watch meeting in November 1990, Greenpeace Japan argued that, since whaling destroyed the environment, it should be replaced by whale watching (Asahi Shinbun 8.11.1990: 27). Even internationally powerful Greenpeace, however, “lacked leverage with the Japanese government” (PETERSON 1997: 171).

Moreover, Greenpeace campaigns angered the Japanese whaling policy community. In the “Save the Whale” movement, Japan was singled out for attack because Japan not only conducted whaling but also had the largest market for whale meat (DAY 1992: 143). Anti-whaling activists employed several strategies in their campaigns. One effective strategy for publicity was direct action which was photographed or filmed in order to be viewed by current and potential members. For example, Greenpeace repeatedly obstructed the activities of the Japanese research whaling fleet in the Antarctic Ocean while filming the process (Asahi Shinbun 9.2.1989: 4; Mainichi Shinbun 6.3.1990: 9). The Japanese Institute of Cetacean Research condemned the deeds of Greenpeace as “terrorism in the guise of protecting the environment” (Guardian 10.2.1989: 9). In Japan, where its activities re-

15 One exception is an editorial in Asahi Shinbun (20.7.1987: 5) which argued that research whaling should not be conducted in consideration of strong international criticism. The next month, however, Asahi Shinbun (14.8.1987: 4) printed a pro-research-whaling article by one of its editors.

16 According to a public opinion survey sponsored by a US cetacean protection association and conducted by the Japan Research Center in January 1991, the Japanese public was divided over “Japan’s research whaling which was against the IWC’s recommendations”. In the survey, 53% of the respondents supported the whaling while 43% opposed it (Mainichi Shinbun 30.5.1991: 3).

17 The whaling policy community established and used a transnational network to promote its cause (PETERSON 1997: 180–1; STOETT 1997: 94).
lated to whaling attracted the most attention, Greenpeace was perceived as a radical group. Journalists Michael Brown and John May attribute the unpopularity of Greenpeace in Japan to the harmony-oriented society where people perceived the organization’s “direct activities” as violence (Brown and May 1995: 266). In 1993, the number of Greenpeace members in Japan was just 760 while in the United States its members numbered 2.3 million (Gifford 1990: 73; Asahi Shinbunsha 1994: 125). The Japanese public did not accept the NGO.

Another common strategy was to call the campaign the “Whale War” (Day 1992) and to highlight the difference between “us” (whales and whale-lovers) and “them” (whale-killers). Anti-whaling campaigners successfully personified whales and identified them as the mates of humans (Suwa 1996: 234–235; Economist 6.2.1988: 18). Kalland (1994: 163–164) argues that, since people know little about the whale, anti-whaling activists easily created the romanticized “super-whale myth” in which whales were described as “lovely”, “gentle”, “peaceful”, “graceful”, “magnificent”, “delightful”, “beautiful”, “playful”, “loyal”, and “innocent”, and that for those who believed the myth, “caring for whales became a metaphor for kindness, for being ‘good’.” Similarly, it was easy to depict whalers as “cruel”, “brutal”, “reckless”, “barbaric”, “insatiably greedy”, “butchers”, “savages” and “sadists” since the whalers were rare and unfamiliar to the public in anti-whaling nations. Peterson (1997: 155) also notes this identification strategy by environmentalists:

They mobilize for political action best when an issue can be framed in fairly simple terms indicating a clear policy preference without the need for a highly detailed explanation of why the chosen policy is better than others. The time-honored devices of making stark contrasts and dividing the world into “good guys” and “bad guys” work as well for the environmentalists as they do for other organizers of mass movements.

Anti-whaling activists focused on the protection of symbolic animals and turned public attention away from more ecologically more important issues such as mass consumption (Suwa 1996: 237). Meanwhile, whalers became “ideal scapegoats for environmental disasters and human cruelty” (Kalland 1994: 165). In such an antagonistic relationship between anti-

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19 Similarly, Greenpeace was not very popular in another whaling nation, Norway. The number of its members in Norway, about 2,000, was much smaller than those of non-whaling nations, for example, Norway’s neighbor, Sweden, which had 200,000 members (Asahi Shinbun 27.3.1992: 5).
whaling NGOs and the Japanese policy community, the latter guarded itself against the former.

The perception that Japan’s whaling culture, especially the consumption of whale meat, was denied by foreigners promoted race identification and fueled nationalism. As KALLAND and MOERAN (1992: 194) put it, “since few other peoples eat whale meat, this habit also sets the Japanese apart from others” and constitutes a national identity. Japan’s IWC Commissioner Shima Kazuo, who was also Fisheries Agency Deputy Director-General, said that “The issue of whaling is a confrontation between the meat-eating race and the fish-eating race” (Asahi Shimbun 21.6.1992: 3). Similarly, Diet member Niimori Tatsuo (Japan Socialist Party) stated that “To argue that it is cruel to kill whales and dolphins while it is not to eat beef and pork is to impose the value of the meat-eating race on the fish-eating race” (Niimori 1991: 108). The Japanese whaling policy community perceived the ethical argument made by anti-whaling groups as cultural imperialism (Shōgiin Nōrinshisen Iinkai Kaigirōku 28.7.1987: 11 and 1420).

Some pro-whaling Japanese also believed that the issue of whaling reflected racist, anti-Japanese feelings in the West (KOMATSU 1986: 109; UMEZAKI 1987: 21). Anti-whaling nations – the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and the United States – had been enemies of Japan in World War Two, and many prisoners of these nations suffered in Japanese camps in and around the Pacific Ocean. Moreover, some of these nations were suffering from trade imbalances with Japan. Niimori Tatsuo called the first IWC resolution against Japan’s research whaling program “Japan Bashing” (Shōgiin Nōrinshisen Iinkai Kaigirōku 28.7.1987: 17). Assistant Director Okamoto Junichirō of the Far Seas Fisheries Division of the Fisheries Agency said, “The more the whaling issue becomes a racial or moral one, the more the Japanese will be unwilling to accept it … It has become a matter of international pride” (Guardian 17.3.1989: 12). It seems wrong, however, to argue that the anti-whaling campaign was “racist” since it “ignores the fact that if the movement is anti-Japanese, it must also be anti-Norwegian, anti-Icelandic and anti-Soviet” (DAY 1992: 140). Nonetheless, a sense of persecution played a role in enhancing the autonomy of the Japanese whaling policy community.

20 The whaling policy community also exploited this discourse to appeal for support on the whaling issue (DAY 1992: 140). In response to the anti-whaling movement, moreover, the community attempted to promote public awareness about the culture of Japan’s whaling and whale meat diet, for instance, by organizing whale meat parties and fund-raising meetings for research programs, and by designating whaling boat events in Mie Prefecture as intangible national cultural assets (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 18.5.1988: 31; Yomiuri Shimbun 10.6.1988: 25; Asahi Shimbun 28.1.1989: 30).
5. CONCLUSION

The economic interests represented by the two industrial policy communities under study were not critical to Japan’s national interests. Research whaling was conducted on a non-commercial basis by just one company, Kyōdō Senpaku, with some 300 employees. The Japanese squid driftnet fishery produced a yield worth some 40 billion yen and created about 10,000 jobs in the fishing industry and 50,000 in the fish processing industry. Despite their light economic weight, Japan initially resisted foreign pressure in both cases.

Between the two industrial policy communities, the whaling policy community showed a higher degree of autonomy vis-à-vis foreign pressure. This was partly because it was protected from the inside by politicians, high-ranking administrators, and business leaders of the wider fisheries policy community, who were concerned about the possible wider application of the preservation principle to other marine living resources. Ironically, the antagonistic “Save the Whale” campaigns by environmental NGOs, and the ethical argument against whaling, enhanced the autonomy of the policy community. In particular, discourse against eating whale meat identified the Japanese as a distinctive people and fueled nationalism among some Japanese who perceived the discourse as cultural imperialism.

The driftnet fishing policy community had lower autonomy and was less politicized than the whaling policy community because it was mainly composed of politically weak, small- and medium-sized companies. In addition, many driftnetters gained income from other fisheries when driftnet fishing was out of season. The fisheries policy community was not seriously concerned about the possible effects of banning the use of driftnets on other fishing methods, such as round haul nets and trawl nets, because they were being used by other developed countries as well. In the autumn of 1991, the fisheries policy community abandoned its commitment to protect driftnet fishing, a practice that accounted for a small portion of the industry. Around the same time, the politicization of the driftnet issue between Japan and the United States, and at the United Nations, also reduced the autonomy of the driftnet fishing policy community by increasing the voice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the policy community. Concern about foreign relations over fisheries meant that Japan became more subject to identity constraint as a member of the international community.

In conclusion, foreign pressure is more likely to lead to policy change when the autonomy of a policy community is low. The degree of autonomy is a function of the material, political, and emotional integrity of a policy community. Moreover, foreign pressure sometimes brings actors with
different interests into a policy community and reduces its autonomy. On the other hand, the imposition of an ethical view may provoke antagonism in an industrial policy community, thereby enhancing the emotional integrity of a community and thus state autonomy. In other words, foreign pressure itself may be a facilitating or constraining factor for policy change. Japan still catches approximately 500 minke whales for scientific research under the IWC regime in the hope of eventually resuming commercial whaling. Whether Japan will give up whaling as a whole in the early 21st century seems to depend partly on future trends within the whaling policy community in Japan.

This paper has focused on the effect of foreign pressure on the domestic policymaking process and has not addressed the question of foreign pressure itself. What is noteworthy in the cases examined in this paper is that international norms themselves, rather than the hegemonic power of the United States, were the main sources of foreign pressure. A prohibitionary norm on scientific whaling emerged within the IWC regime as soon as Japan decided to conduct scientific research on the minke whale, but it has been contested and defied by Japan as well as Norway and Iceland. In 1989, on the other hand, an international prohibitionary norm emerged against the use of large-scale drift nets on the high seas primarily at the United Nations General Assembly. Initially, Japan contested the newly emerging international norm but soon complied with it. It should be noted that the compliance did not mean Japan’s acceptance of the preservationist value embedded in the norm. The question now arises as to why Japan reluctantly came to comply with a non-coercive international norm that the state had initially contested because it was against Japan’s economic interests and ethical value. This question calls for further consideration of the legitimacy of international norms.

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