JAPAN AND THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM: BILATERALISM, MULTILATERALISM OR SUPPLEMENTALISM?

Glenn D. Hook

1. INTRODUCTION

The nascent security order in East Asia is evolving in the historical context of a region suffused by hierarchical relationships amongst a hegemon or dominant powers and the weaker nations of this part of the world. Whether we take the case of the Chinese World Order or the regional orders established through Western imperialism, Japanese imperialism or U.S. bilateralism, all have been characterised by vertical more than horizontal relations between the big and the small. For the weaker members of the region, the legacy of this top-down, asymmetric structure is twofold: first, these nations share a common sense of vulnerability in the face of the big powers, whether it be the United States, China, Russia or Japan; and second, they have sought in multilateralism a means to enhance intra-regional security and solidarity. Whereas the first has constrained their actions the second has offered them opportunities to mitigate the influence the big powers can exert on their own security. As illustrated by the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), during the Cold-War era multilateralism in East Asian security emerged amongst the nations of Southeast Asia, without any big power participation (on the ASEAN role in security, see Leifer 1989). In contrast, the big powers developed bilateral security relations within the context of the East-West Cold-War confrontation, as exemplified by the “wheel and spokes” security system of American bilateralism centring on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Indeed, the much more complex relationship amongst these powers in East Asia, the earlier start to the process of the Cold War’s ending but the later end to that process in this region, with a divided China and Korean peninsula still remaining, and the sea-based rather than land-based nature of the regional threat system has led to security relations in East Asia being dominated by bilateralism. Thus, in contrast to the European wing of the global security order, where multilateral security initiatives seeking to reduce tensions were institutionalised even during the Cold-War confrontation, as in the case of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), East Asia remained locked in bilateralism. Such multilateral initiatives that were put forward by the big powers, as
with President Mikail Gorbachev’s 1986 Vladivostok proposal, tended to be interpreted within the region as part of the wider global confrontation between capitalism and communism and, accordingly, viewed sceptically as splitting the Pacific, namely, weakening the bilateral security structure established by the U.S. It is as a consequence only with the Cold War’s ending that a multilateral approach to security which involves both the big and small powers of the region has begun to be institutionalised in the form of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

The promotion of multilateral security initiatives is part of the wider restructuring of the security order in Asia Pacific and more narrowly in East Asia in the post-Cold War era. The setting up of the ARF in 1994 followed the proposal by Japan’s Foreign Minister, Nakayama Tarô, at the 1991 ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference. Eighteen founding members attended the first meeting\(^1\). The ending of the Cold War, the ending of war in Cambodia, the warming of relations between Russia and China, and changes like the normalisation of Sino-South Korean, Sino-Indonesian and Sino-Singaporean relations, have provided fertile ground for dialogue on security to be fostered across many of the divides which existed during the Cold War. These developments draw to our attention the need to take into account external factors, especially the nature of the region’s security environment, in seeking to come to a deeper understanding of Japanese security policy in the post-Cold War era. At the same time, however, if we take the ARF to be an example of how Japan is seeking to carve out a new role for itself in East Asia and Asia Pacific in the post-Cold War world, then Japanese policy-makers will have faced the internal as well as the external implications of that policy choice. The anti-militaristic norms at the base of the concepts of security in civil society (Hook 1996b), together with Japan’s identity as an “Asia-Pacific” or “East Asian” power, are of particular relevance in this regard. In other words, identity and norms also need to be addressed in seeking to under-

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1 The membership of the ARF was eighteen at the first meeting in 1994, made up of the six ASEAN members (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand); ASEAN’s seven dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, European Union [EU], Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United States); two consultative partners (China and Russia); and three observers (Vietnam, Laos, and Papua New Guinea). In 1995 Cambodia, and in 1996 Myanmar and India, joined. New ASEAN members automatically become members of the ARF. The geographic scope of the ARF is determined in terms of a “geographic footprint”. This “geographic footprint” will cover all of East Asia, both Northeast and Southeast Asia, as well as Oceania. In the shorter term, it would not be wise to expand this geographic scope for the key ARF activities (ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM 1996: 1). For more information about the ARF and for details of the ARF Meetings, refer to the following website: http://orpheaus.dfat.gov.au/arf/arfhome.html.
stand the direction being taken by Japanese security policy in the post-Cold War era.

The triumvirate of bilateralism, multilateralism, and supplementalism are used in order to shed light on the degree to which Japan remains constrained by the Cold War’s legacy of bilateralism, is taking advantage of the post-Cold War opportunities for multilateralism, or is simply using multilateralism to supplement bilateralism. Bilateralism is understood as the Japanese policy of prioritising bilateral relations with the United States during the Cold-War era. It is meant to suggest the ideological power of these bilateral ties to continue to constrain Japanese security policy. Multilateralism is understood as a policy of seeking answers to security questions in a multilateral rather than bilateral or unilateral framework. The multilateral framework of the ARF is seen as an opportunity for Japan to break out of bilateralism. The term supplementalism has been coined in order to suggest how Japan’s commitment to ARF multilateralism can be understood as a supplement to the bilateral security relationship with the United States. A central question addressed here is the extent to which the bilateralism of the Cold-War era continues to constrain Japanese security policy in the post-Cold War era, despite the opportunities offered by multilateralism.

Given the above focus, this article will pay little direct attention to the historical background to the emergence of the ARF, as developed through Japanese-ASEAN relations; the political economy of security; the influence of the recent currency turmoil on security; or the role of non-state actors, such as multi-national corporations or non-governmental organisations, in building a new regional security order in East Asia and Asia Pacific. Insofar as the scope of that order is concerned, moreover, suffice it to say that, in a narrowly geographic sense, we seek in referring to “East Asia” to embrace both Northeast and Southeast Asia, particularly Japan, China, the Korean peninsula and ASEAN, whereas in referring to “Asia Pacific” we widen our sights to include the United States. In this geographic sense, although the ARF includes as members the European Union, India, Papua New Guinea, and so on, our concern is primarily with the Japanese role in relation to the other states of “East Asia” and “Asia Pacific”. Thus, while we will remain alert to the contested nature of the regional identities, “Asia Pacific” and “East Asia” (for a discussion, see Hook 1996a), our main focus is on the domestic as well as international factors which have influenced how Japanese policymakers have responded to the opportunities of the ARF within a process constrained by bilateral relations with the United States, especially the 1996 “reconfirmation” (redefinition) of the Security Treaty and the 1997 revision of the U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defence Co-operation (hereafter, Guidelines).
Given the lack of multilateral security frameworks in this region during the Cold-War era, the post-Cold War creation of the ARF naturally has stimulated scholarly interest in the forum’s origins, function, and meaning, as in the case of representative works by LEIFER (1996) and ACHARYA (1997). However, although such writings often refer to the Japanese role in the ARF, only a limited amount of work deals specifically with this topic (as with KAWASAKI 1997 and SOEYA 1994). In a narrow sense, then, this article seeks to add to our understanding of the Japanese role in the ARF. Before addressing this topic directly, however, let us first set the scene by discussing the Japanese role in the regional Cold War.

2. JAPAN IN THE REGIONAL COLD WAR

The role Japan played in East Asia during the Cold War was affected profoundly by both internal and external factors: the lessons of the War of aggression in East Asia and the U.S. nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of the Pacific War, expressed in popular support for antimilitaristic norms and the new Constitution; the legacy of the Empire’s aggression in East Asia, symbolised by regional fears of a recrudescence of Japanese militarism; the military integration of Japan into the Western bloc, embodied in bilateralism centering on the U.S.-Japan security system; and the actual role of Japanese bases and U.S. troops in the region, as seen in preparation for nuclear war, conventional wars and military interventions, are here of crucial importance. What we wish to emphasise, however, is how the dynamic linkage between the internal and the external is the key to explaining Japan’s security role in East Asia during this period. This might sound cacophonous to Realist ears, which prefer the clean sound of clicking billiard balls in the classic balance of power metaphor to the complexity of internal-external links. But the balance of power is not simply a metaphor, given that, as a last resort, states can appeal to the force of arms in order to restore the balance. In this respect, the normative preference of Japanese opposition political parties and civil society for a non-military role and identity in East Asia served forcefully to constrain the policy options of the government, precluding a purely balance-of-power approach to security. The impact of normativity and a non-military identity can be seen in the attempts to promote a wider concept of security than “military” security as well as in the restrictions imposed on the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) in order to constrain their role as a military instrument of state policy (on the role of norms, see Hook 1996b; Katzstein 1996).

Externally, the Korean and Vietnam Wars have lain bare the cruelty of the balance of power metaphor for Asians, highlighting the difference with Eu-
rope, where the division between the East and West was a “cold war” (despite war within the two blocs). For the people of the Korean peninsula and Vietnam, in particular, the East Asian regional security order was hardly maintained by a Cold-War “balance”. Whether “hot” or “cold”, however, the Japanese government tended overwhelmingly to co-operate with U.S. security policy, playing a supportive role in prosecuting conventional wars, as in Korea and Vietnam; providing infrastructural and other support services in preparation for nuclear war; and permitting the stationing of U.S. military forces as part of a grand strategy to maintain a regional balance of power and political stability.

Against a background of hegemonic decline, the general framework of U.S. foreign policy towards East Asia during the Cold War was to maintain a regional balance of power and political stability, but to do so by shifting a growing proportion of the defence burden onto regional allies, especially Japan. The 1969 Nixon Doctrine gave shape to this policy. Thereafter, respective U.S. governments have put pressure on Japan to boost defence spending, offer “sympathy payments” (host-nation support) to cover increasingly more of the costs of stationing U.S. forces in Japan, build up the SDF to complement U.S. force deployments, and take on a more prominent role as a supporter of the U.S.’s regional and global policy. This has gone hand in hand with pressure to expand the geographical scope of the defence relationship, reflecting a flexible interpretation of the “Far East”, the amorphous area referred to in both the original 1951 and revised 1960 security treaties. In this process, the Japanese government has not only come to accept Taiwan and the Korean peninsula as part of its security interests, but also agreed to patrol the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) up to one-thousand nautical miles from Japan. The United States has continued to exert pressure on Japan to play a greater regional security role in the 1990s, as we will see below.

At the same time as Japan has been pressured by the United States to play a fuller role in regional security, the East Asian victims of Japanese aggression, who have remained fearful of military big powerism in Japan, have acted as an alternative external pressure, this time to constrain the Japanese role in regional security. During the Cold-War era, pressure was exerted by East Asian nations, especially China and South Korea, in two main areas. The first was by criticising increases in Japan’s military spending, the expansion in the scope of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and other aspects of the Alliance. However, such criticism was double-edged, as the Security Treaty also has been regarded as a means for the U.S. to control Japan’s military ambitions (as discussed below), and such criticism has waxed and waned as the international situation has changed, as with the waning of Chinese criticism following their fears of “Soviet hegemony”. The second major
pressure from East Asia can thus be regarded as the more important, name-
ly, criticism of Japan’s failure to shoulder fully its responsibility for the War. In essence, the governments and peoples of the region did not find sufficient
evidence of Japan apologising and repenting for prosecuting a war of ag-
gression. As a result of Japanese government leaders’ legitimising Japanese
colonialism as “beneficial”, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro and other
political leaders paying their respects at Yasukuni Shrine, where Japanese
War criminals are interred, the Ministry of Education’s “certification” of
school textbooks which whitewash Japanese aggression, and the govern-
ment’s refusal to apologise for the War, East Asians have continued to fear
that the seeds of militarism may once again sprout in Japanese soil. As we
will see below, in reorienting Japan’s security policy towards East Asia in
the post-Cold War era, the policy-making elite needed to address the ques-
tion of War responsibility more squarely, as this remained a major source
of distrust in the region.

Internally, these twin pressures from the outside were used in the political
battle over Japanese identity and norms, which were reproduced in the pol-
itical economy of the “1955 system” and the alternative strategies put for-
ward by the opposing camps in pursuit of security in the Cold-War
environment. In terms of political economy, this struggle pitted the ruling
anti-communist, pro-capitalist Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) against the
anti-capitalist, pro-socialist Japan Socialist Party (JSP), making the choices
plainly understandable in the bifurcated epistemology of the Cold War. In
terms of security, however, the alternative scenario proposed by the social-
ists did not follow this simple bifurcation, but sought a third way as an al-
ternative to U.S. bilateralism and the Security Treaty, namely, unarmed neu-
tralism. So although the LDP’s commitment to the free market and big
business was matched by the JSP’s commitment to state intervention and the
worker insofar as political economy is concerned, the party’s security alter-
native was not to rearm as part of the communist bloc, but to pursue an in-
dependent policy rooted in an identity for Japan as an unarmed, neutral
state, based on the norms of the Constitution and the normative preference
in civil society to reject military answers to human questions. In this attempt,
the socialist opposition and a range of peace and anti-war movements
sought to prevent the government’s involvement in war, constrain its active
support of the U.S.’s regional and global security strategies, and preserve a
peaceful regime in Japan.

From this dual perspective Japanese policy-makers thus appear sand-
witched between the pressure from the United States to take on a more ac-
tive role in regional security and the pressures from East Asian victims, the
political opposition, and civil society to remain militarily constrained and
to seek non-violent answers to security questions. It is in this context of Ja-
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pan as a sandwiched state that policy-makers responded to multilateralism in Cold-War East Asia. On the one hand, the opposition forces used the voices of the Asian victims in their struggle to push the government to make a formal apology for the War, and to oppose militarism, the militarisation of U.S.-Japan relations, and an expanded military role for Japan in East Asia. This provided them with external legitimacy for the policy of unarmed neutralism, which served to constrain the government’s own security policy as well as to bolster the legitimacy of their own policies in civil society. On the other hand, the policy-making elite viewed any attempt within the region to promote multilateral security initiatives not only as a challenge to the bilateralism at the heart of the government’s security policy, but also as sustenance to the socialist alternative of unarmed neutralism. Thus, even a proposal by the small powers of the region, as in the case of the 1971 ASEAN proposal to establish a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), was resisted firmly by the government. Its total commitment to the structure of the U.S.-Japan security system, even if certain quarters of the ruling party did not support fully the process of militarisation embedded in bilateralism, as seen, for instance, in the Miki government’s introduction of constraints on military spending, precluded serious consideration of proposals likely to erode both the international and domestic Cold-War orders. As we will see below, with the crumbling of the internal Cold-War order in the wake of the ending of the external Cold War, a crucial difference emerged between the domestic meaning of multilateralism in the Cold-War and post-Cold War eras.

In civil society norms in favour of a non-military approach to security and popular support for multilateral institutions like the United Nations went hand in hand with backing for the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which from the mid-1970s has enjoyed support from approximately two-thirds to three-quarters of the pollies in national surveys (Hook 1996b: 119–122). Still, this pro-Treaty attitude did not translate into all-out support for the military dimension of the Treaty, especially in terms of nuclear weapons, Japan’s participation in a U.S.-led war, or the adoption of military solutions to human problems. A normative preference remained for non-military solutions in a multilateral framework, such as the United Nations, with UN forces seen as an alternative to U.S. forces in protecting Japanese security (Sakamoto: 1959). So long as the government did not seek to play some kind of proactive military role in the region, remaining as a supporter of the U.S.’s forward deployment strategy, popular opinion was prepared to back both the Treaty and the normative preference for non-violence, as seen in the dual support for the Treaty and the Constitution. In this situation, policy-makers could brand multilateralism in Southeast Asia or multilateralism from below as “unrealistic”, as in the case of the policy of unarmed neutralism proposed
by the socialists, and reject it in favour of bilateralism with the United States. Of course, the legacy of the War meant that the elite had to make some response to the East Asian victims of Japanese imperialism, but this could be dealt with economically, through reparation payments and Official Development Assistance (ODA), rather than politically, through support for initiatives like ZOPFAN. Thus, although difficulties occurred in the process of Japan reshaping its Cold-War relationship with East Asia, these did not undermine the basic structure of that relationship. For that relationship took shape within the constraints of the bilateral security links with the United States, which during the Cold War did not require Japan to play an overtly, proactive military role in the region.

The domestic political reasons for Japanese policy-makers’ resistance to multilateralism during the Cold War, as outlined above, puts their external explanation for the lack of multilateral institutions in this region in context. This is that the region’s diversity and heterogeneity in comparison to Europe helps to account for the weakness of multilateralism in East Asia. Not only was this “difference” trotted out at the cusp of the Cold War’s ending as a way to explain the lack of progress on multilateralism in East Asia, but the “difference” of Asia was said to be behind earlier resistance to a regional security conference, as in the case of Prime Minister Nakasone’s opposition (Asahi Shinbun 14.1.1987: 1). But this political position is diametrically opposed to the pre-War imperial ideology of “similarity” at the base of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and of the post-War economic ideology of Asia as one. Indeed, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MOFA) first Diplomatic Blue Book issued in 1957 emphasises precisely the similarity between Japan and Asia (TAMAKI 1995: 235), as part of the ideology of Japan as a member of Asia. Nevertheless, whatever the difference in civilisation, culture, religion, stage of economic development, or even political system or threat perception, the political will behind thirty-years of ASEAN and the gradual institutionalisation of the ARF suggest that diversity and heterogeneity, per se, were not the main impediments to support for multilateralism in Japan. More to the point, shoring up the Security Treaty’s framework of legitimacy by emphasising diversity and heterogeneity as an impediment to multilateral, co-operative forms of security, along with the Soviet threat, offered Japanese policy-makers another arrow to fire against the opposition’s alternative to the Alliance. It was thus precisely the lack of institutional security frameworks which policy-makers put forward as a key reason to maintain the regional security system embedded in U.S.-Japan bilateralism.

Now, even though the Soviet threat has disappeared and the ARF has come into existence, the U.S. Japan security system still remains intact. How did Japanese policy-makers come up with another way to legitimise the Treaty’s existence in the new, post-Cold War environment? In other words,
despite the ending of the Cold War and the strengthening of multilateralism in such a heterogeneous region, how have Japanese policy makers sought to maintain a security policy centering on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty system?

3. JAPAN IN THE POST-COLD WAR

The ending of the external Cold War engendered fears amongst the Japanese policy-making elite that this would bring an end to the domestic Cold War, too, whereby the ruling LDP would be replaced by a new government committed to radically changing if not abolishing the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, as the socialists regularly had declared. At the same time, however, the outbreak of the Gulf War generated renewed interest in multilateralism, with military action against Iraq involving the United Nations as well as the United States – the dual symbols of multilateralism and bilateralism in Japanese eyes.

Following the end of the Cold War the United States re-evaluated its policy towards East Asia. As in the Cold-War era, this has meant continuing to pressure Japan to increase its contribution to regional security, as defined by the United States, at the same time as the U.S. has reduced its own military deployments in East Asia. At present, a more prominent Japanese role in regional security is taking shape within the context of the 1996 “reconfirmation” (redefinition) of the Alliance and the 1997 announcement of the new Guidelines (for full details, see HAGAIKI 1996 and SEKAI, Bessatsu 1997).

Briefly, in the post-Cold War era the SDF are being equipped and trained in order to take on a more prominent role in support of U.S. policy in a wider and deeper regional context. This widening can be seen in the expanded scope of the Alliance. Whereas during the Cold War the Japanese government sought in some way to tie the scope of the Alliance to the “Far East”, the 1996 “reconfirmation” – more precisely, redefinition – of the Treaty between the United States and Japan does not mention the “Far East” at all, but instead makes a dozen references to “Asia Pacific” (JAPAN-U.S. joint Declaration on security: 1996). Of course, as with the “Far East”, the scope of “Asia Pacific” is more a question of politics than geography, but geographically speaking the Treaty can be said to have expanded as far as the Middle East, despite denials by government and MOFA officials (ASAI 1997: 175–179). At the same time, the new Guidelines suggest Japan will co-operate with the United States in dealing with “situations in areas surrounding Japan” – that is, an emergency, conflict or war in e.g. the Korean peninsula (on the implications of this expression, see ASAI 1997: 173–178).
As far as the deepening of the Alliance is concerned, the new Guidelines highlight how the Japanese role in regional security will expand to include full logistical and other support for U.S. forces and will mean an increasing financial burden for Japan. The April 1996 Agreement Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services allows the militaries of Japan and the United States to take joint action in emergencies. At the same time, the two militaries are co-operating by improving the flow of defence information, joint planning, interoperability of equipment, carrying out war games, and so forth. The financial provision of host-nation support now goes hand in hand with a more formal, rather than ad-hoc, commitment to help finance the maintenance of Asia-Pacific security.

The important changes brought about by the redefinition of the Alliance and the new Guidelines can be seen from the following summary of Japan’s emerging role.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Vietnam War</th>
<th>Gulf War</th>
<th>New Guidelines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>co-operation in fighting</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>partial (ichibu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>co-operation in logistics</td>
<td>partial (ichibu)</td>
<td>partial (ichibu)</td>
<td>full</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 1: Military co-operation with the United States in times of emergency in surrounding areas (shūhen yûji)


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Vietnam War</th>
<th>Gulf War</th>
<th>New Guidelines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.-Japan burden sharing</td>
<td>U.S. taxes</td>
<td>Japanese taxes</td>
<td>Japanese taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>institutions and people deployed</td>
<td>private only (including railroads, ports, airports)</td>
<td>state, local governments, private (no legal enforcement)</td>
<td>state, local government, private (legal enforcement being prepared)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>implementa- tion plan/ organisation to implement</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Security Committee announces major emergency situation. As a stopgap measure advance co-operation plan and response mechanism decided</td>
<td>Implementation plan- prepare in advance Organisation-Decision- making- Setup in advance. Operational: permanent (if an emergency situation is expected to emerge, the operational unit starts to work based on the implementation plan)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: The system and burden sharing in logistical co-operation in times of shūhen yûji

In this way, the significance of the redefinition of the Security Treaty and the new Guidelines is that Japan is set to play a much fuller military role in support of the United States in the Asia Pacific region, which could extend to not only logistical and financial support of the U.S. in a regional war, but partial Japanese support in fighting a war, too.

At the same time as bilateralism has remained at the core of Japanese security policy, the Cold War’s ending and the outbreak of the Gulf War have served to give increasing salience to multilateralism. As a result, the latent problems inherent in the way security had been approached in Japan during the Cold-War period have been brought to the surface of the security debate. To start with, while the ending of the Cold War posed a problem for policy-makers in continuing to legitimise the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, given the disappearance of the Treaty’s premise, the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of the Gulf War also posed a problem for the supporters of unarmed neutralism. For in the same way the premise of unarmed neutralism – that nuclear war is the greatest threat to security and that the overseas despatch of Japanese troops is inherently linked to “militarism” and “aggression” – no longer remained valid. In the context of the international community’s (U.S.’s) shrill demand for Japan to make an “international contribution” to the Gulf War under the umbrella of a multilateral institution, the United Nations, rather than the bilateral Security Treaty, the socialist’s mantra of unarmed neutralism and playing no role in security operations, smacked of isolationism and free-riding.

Although Japan’s contribution to the Gulf War remained largely financial, by the time of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations (PKO) in Cambodia greater support had emerged in civil society as well as amongst policy makers for the overseas despatch of the SDF. This was facilitated by the Cambodian call for Japanese participation in PKO. In this way, the demands for a Japanese contribution from both inside and outside of the region served to erode the domestic consensus on the extent to constrain the SDF’s regional as well as global role. In other words, the normative issue was now not “never send the SDF abroad”, but “where, and in what capacity, should the SDF be sent abroad”. What is more, with the subsequent collapse of the domestic Cold War in 1993, and the emergence of a new, non-LDP government, the struggle over identity and norms in terms of political economy lost whatever meaning still remained – the socialist’s alternative was dead. With Prime Minister Murayama’s later rise to power and his announcement of the socialist party’s acceptance of the constitutionality of the SDF and support for the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the alternative of unarmed neutralism also lost meaning as a policy option at the core of an alternative Japanese identity, if not as an anti-militaristic norm with popular appeal.
For those policy-makers still committed to bilateralism centering on the U.S.-Japan security system, irrespective of changes in the external security environment – the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the end of the war in Cambodia, and even the major structural transformations of the regional system implied by “the end of the Cold War”, Sino-Soviet *rapprochement* and subsequent changes like the normalisation of relations between South Korea and Russia and China – the key task was not so much to take the lead in promoting multilateralism as to prevent the erosion of support for the U.S. presence in the region. This is not to go so far as to say that the ending of the Cold War engendered absolutely no change in the behavioural pattern of Japanese policy-makers, as the ARF initiative makes clear. It is rather to emphasise that the ending of the Cold War was not so much viewed as an opportunity to take a leadership role in promoting multilateralism in East Asia, except insofar as such multilateralism could function in support of the wider security structure based on the U.S.-Japan security system. Nor was the Cold War’s end regarded as a signal to realise the normative values of the anti-militaristic Constitution, as the socialists sought to do during the Cold War. In short, the cataclysmic changes reshaping the international system were seen more as a challenge to maintaining the legitimacy of a Cold-War security system based on bilateralism, reflecting the tendency of the conservative regime and especially the MOFA to treat the U.S.-Japan security system as an inviolable, new *kokutai* (“national polity”), as the emperor system was the *kokutai* in pre-War and wartime Japan (Sakamoto 1997: 62).

Thus, the need arose for the supporters of the new *kokutai* to find other external sources of legitimacy to replace the now defunct Soviet threat. This emerged gradually in a number of forms, but at first the reaction was denial – a deep reluctance even to accept that the Cold War had ended. As a former diplomat observed in 1992 (Asai 1992: 180): “I think that probably in the whole wide world only Japan’s Liberal-Democratic Party administration still clings to the idea of the Soviet threat”. As in the Cold-War era, moreover, the “difference” between Europe and Asia was harped upon constantly, with the “diversity” of East Asia in comparison with Europe now being bolstered by the “difference” in the Cold War’s ending (on the Defence Agency’s view on diversity, see Asahi Shinbun 13.3.1995b: 2). Thus, the “diversity” of the region and the slower melting of the Cold-War structures in East Asia was seen patently as a reason to maintain the Security Treaty system and Cold-War vigilance.

Next, when the end of the Cold War became undeniable even for frozen cold warriors, an emphasis on “instability” (or “uncertainty”) as a source of the threat to Japanese security came to take a more central role in legitimising the continuation of the Treaty system. This instability was at times tied specifically to “difference” and “diversity”, such as the potential for insta-
bility to arise out of differences in the regional understanding of human rights or democracy; at others, it was part of the lament about generic instability in the wake of the ending of the “stable” bipolar system. For the MOFA and the Defence Agency, maintaining the U.S. presence was paramount given the diversity and instability of Asia-Pacific (MOFA 1996: 6, 11, 190; DEFENCE AGENCY 1997: 46–47). Thus, the Cold War ideological blinkers, which conduced policy-makers to think of security overwhelmingly in military terms, made them purblind to other threats to security in East Asia, such as those recently generated by the Financial Crises of 1997.

Finally, the gradual use of the “North Korean nuclear threat” or “Chinese threat”, rather than the “Soviet threat”, emerged in the Japanese security discourse as a way to legitimise the Treaty system in the new regional environment. Given the sensitivity of the China issue, the targeting of China has occurred at the same time as the government has issued sharp denials of targeting its giant neighbour. In this environment, the Chinese “war games” prior to the Taiwanese presidential election and the testing of nuclear weapons acted as grist for the anti-Chinese mill emerging in Japan. The “China threat” has thus appeared as a way to bolster support for continuing the Alliance in the new, post-Cold War security environment.

Of course, none of the points mentioned above is meant to deny that the ending of the Cold War in Europe and Asia was different, that conflict can emerge out of difference, that instability can pose a threat, or that North Korea and China do not give cause for concern. Rather, the point here is to highlight the need of a policy-making elite committed to bilateralism to present a new, viable external source of legitimacy for the Alliance to replace the Soviet Union. This was the sine qua non in order to meet the challenge of those domestic forces calling for a new security policy more in keeping with the realities of the post-Cold War era, in other words, a policy which could lead to the transformation if not the ending of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty system at the heart of bilateralism (for a proposal, see KYÔÔ TEIËN 1994).

Nevertheless, the ending of the Cold War clearly was bringing about undeniable changes in East Asia, transforming the preconditions for regional co-operation in Southeast Asia, such that Southeast Asia as one (the ASEAN 10) was soon to be almost within reach (only the 1997 coup in Cambodia prevented the Association’s inclusion of the tenth member). The withdrawal of Russian troops from Vietnam, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Philippines, and the restructuring of Japan’s role in the Alliance, all pointed to the emergence of a new regional security environment. Similarly, although the possibility of nuclear war had receded, the potential for other types of wars and conflicts had increased in the wake of the Cold War’s ending. In this situation, dialogue and exchange could play a vital role in pro-
motoring security amongst potential enemies, as even the Defence Agency recognised from around 1992 (Yomiuri Shinbun 24.9.1995: 27).

In order to respond to these international and regional changes effectively, the government needed to come to grips with the question of Japan’s War responsibility. For without taking into account the experience of the victims of Japanese imperialism, it would remain difficult if not impossible for the government to carve out a new security role in the region and convince East Asian sceptics that the SDF is different from the pre-War military. In other words, unlike in the Cold War, Japan’s War responsibility could no longer be regarded as a problem of the past; it needed to be tackled as a problem of the present and future. This helps to explain the different “apologies” Japanese leaders have made following the collapse of the 1955 system and the fiftieth anniversary of the War. What is important to note here, however, is not only the split over offering an apology within Japan, which was salient during the Cold War, but the split in the response to these apologies in East Asia, which was not. This can be seen, for instance, in the contrast between the dissatisfaction over the apologies still remaining in China and on the Korean peninsula and Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir’s lack of understanding of “why the Japanese government keeps apologizing for things that happened 50 years ago” (Far Eastern Economic Review 24.8.1995: 37). This difference also can be seen in the greater Chinese and Korean concern over the despatch of the SDF on PKO as well as in the more forthright support for Japan’s participation in the United Nations Security Council on the part of ASEAN (Asahi Shinbun 15.9.1994: 2). Such differences in attitude can be seen more widely in society, too. In a 1995 poll, for instance, a regional survey asked polltees if Japan had become a country trusted by Asian countries. The difference in attitude between Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia was marked, with eighty-five per cent of polltees in Beijing and sixty-one per cent in Seoul stating “no”, compared with seventy-nine per cent in Bangkok and eighty-five per cent in Jakarta stating “yes” (Asahi Shinbun 13.8.1995: 1). In this sense, less resistance exists in Southeast Asia than in Northeast Asia to Japan playing a more active role in regional security.

Without going into the domestic reasons for the government’s inability to offer an apology likely to dispel distrust throughout East Asia, the difficulty faced in so doing called for other approaches to the problem. Two, in particular, deserve attention. First, as in the Cold War, the U.S. presence in Japan and in the region more generally was used as a way to dispel that distrust. This is the argument, used by Japanese policy-makers as well as U.S. policy-makers and others, which suggests that U.S. forces play a role in controlling Japan – the “cap in the bottle” metaphor used by the then U.S. marine corps commander in Okinawa (Washington Post 27.3.1990: A 14). Or, more broadly, “[t]he perception that the alliance and forward deployment
of U.S. forces is stabilizing and checks the emergence of Japanese militarism [which] has been shared by China as well as by nearly all other regional states” (Garrett and Glader 1997: 384). Of course, this is not to deny that the U.S. does seek to control Japan’s military ambitions within boundaries acceptable to U.S. national interests. Clearly, these interests, whether they are to keep Japan “down”, expand the market economy, or peddle American-style democracy and human rights, will determine the level of the U.S. presence in East Asia, irrespective of Japanese determination to keep the U.S. in the region. Nor is it to disagree necessarily with the point that the U.S.-Japan security structure enjoys at least some regional support, as in the case of the Philippines, though hardly in the case of Vietnam and Laos.

Nevertheless, not all the East Asian states support the militarisation process embedded in that structure, which is changing the nature of the Alliance to much more of a militarily focussed arrangement as far as Japan’s role is concerned. That such a role still engenders distrust in the region can be seen by the negative reaction of China and South Korea to the redefinition of the Treaty and the introduction of the new Guidelines. What is more, members of ASEAN, who are often portrayed as supporters of the U.S. presence in the region, are not necessarily so, despite claims to the contrary (Furukawa 1998). In the case of Malaysia, for instance, Prime Minister Mahathir has stated: “There is no reason for China or Japan to attack Malaysia, so we have no need for an American presence. The reason Malaysia accepts military training from foreign countries and participates in combined training is in order to obtain the transfer of military technology for the improvement of our military capabilities. This is not the same thing as recognising U.S. military bases”. Indeed, rather than seeing the U.S. presence as a means to maintain a military balance in the region, Malaysia agreed to port calls by the U.S. aircraft carrier Independence, because it is a good thing as “a larger number of sailors come ashore and spend money” (cited in Furukawa 1998: 72–73).

Whether in terms of the structure or process of the Alliance, then, the “cap in the bottle” argument should be turned on its head. The U.S.-Japan security treaty system at the heart of bilateralism is in fact the key source of Japanese militarisation, as with pressure from the United States to play a greater regional role, and even Japan’s obligation under Article III of the Security Treaty to build up its military might. For those domestic forces seeking to normalise the military as a legitimate instrument of state policy, U.S. pressure has proven politically efficacious in making a military build up more acceptable in civil society – the power of gaiatsu (foreign pressure), or more precisely Bei-atsu (American pressure). In the context of our discussion, therefore, the point to emphasise is the instrumental function of the “cap in the bottle” metaphor for those political forces seeking to gain acceptance of
an expanded military role for Japan in the region and in seeking to minimise concern over a U.S. withdrawal. And it is precisely within this context that the new Japanese support for multilateralism and the initiative to establish the ARF should be understood.

4. JAPAN AND THE ARF

What we are suggesting, then, is that when we examine the ARF initiative from the perspective of an external explanation, it appears as part of a strategy to ensure a continued U.S. presence in the region and the acceptance of a greater Japanese regional security role. As suggested by the Japanese Center for Strategic Studies (Nihon Senryaku Kenkyû Sentâ), which is under the leadership of Ozawa Ichirô, Japan should carry out a variety of roles in the ARF, such as constraining the regional influence of Russia and China, “while preventing the potential withdrawal of the United States” (NIHON SENRYAKU KENKYÛ SENTÂ HEN 1994: 207–208). For other realists like NISHI-HARA, it is precisely because “the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is at the base of the ARF that dialogue on multilateral co-operation is possible” (1996: 36). These quotes are not meant to insinuate that the sole motivation for the Japanese proposal was simply to keep the U.S. in East Asia; rather, the point is to emphasise the supplementary role multilateralism plays in supporting Japan-U.S. bilateralism within the ARF process. This is the same role the ARF plays in U.S. policy, as suggested by the statement of U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher at the 1996 meeting of the ARF (quoted in Ô WA 1996: 43).

Now, with the redefinition of the Alliance and the introduction of the new Guidelines, the supplementalism at the heart of the ARF proposal is even clearer. To adopt President Bill Clinton’s metaphor, the ARF dialogue “can function like overlapping plates of armour … covering the full-body of our security concerns” (Washington Post 27.7.1993: A 12. On the Japanese influence on the U.S. support of multilateralism under Clinton, unlike under President George Bush, see SATÔ 1995: 273). This commitment to the Alliance also helps to explain the Japanese resistance to other multilateral initiatives, such as those by Australia and Canada in 1990 to establish an Asian-edition of the CSCE, which at the time were seen as possibly eroding the security order in East Asia and weakening the “Asian” element in multilateralism. In other words, the ARF serves the purpose of Japanese policy-makers in seeking to keep the U.S. involved in regional security as well as in carving out a new security role for Japan, which in essence can only be achieved with the understanding of both the U.S. and ASEAN.
Thus, when interpreted in classical realist terms, the change in the regional power constellation following the Russian withdrawal, U.S. force reductions, the closure of U.S. bases in the Philippines, and the potential for the Clinton administration to pull out completely from the region can be said to have ignited East Asian fears of the emergence of a “vacuum” and the breakdown of the regional “balance”. BALL (1993: 59), for instance, posits that such fears were behind the willingness of Indonesia and Malaysia to allow the United States to use bases in their countries, despite a declaratory commitment to “nonalignment” and ASEAN’s Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) of 1967, “which [affirms] that all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed consent of the countries concerned…. “ (LEIFER 1989: Documentary Appendix, 160).

As far as Japanese policy-makers are concerned, the inclusion of the United States in the ARF similarly helps to keep the U.S. in the region, precisely because fears exist amongst the weaker nations of East Asia, and concern exists even in the United States, that not only China may move to fill the vacuum, but also Japan. Of course, in the actual case of a U.S. withdrawal, a sense of vulnerability might indeed lead to a psychological need in Japan to support a larger military establishment, but nothing in U.S. force structures or deployments make this necessary, as the conventional defence of the nation is in the hands of the SDF, not U.S. forces. American troops are deployed in Japan to protect and realise American interests, and only incidentally Japanese ones. On top of this, the realist idea of a “vacuum” being filled by Japan ignores completely the power of antimilitaristic norms in civil society to constrain the government’s security policy, as touched on above. But neither discussion of force structures nor support for antimilitaristic norms serves the task of policy-makers grappling with the problem of how to maintain the U.S.-Japan security system in a changed world. So instead of clearly putting forward a case to demonstrate why Japan would not fill such a “vacuum”, Japanese policy-makers have rather emphasised how the ARF can help to keep the U.S. in the region. In this way, the forum can be portrayed as helping to keep Japan “down”, but in fact facilitates it taking on a greater security role in the region as part of the newly invigorated U.S.-Japan security system. Needless to say, it also facilitates Japan’s emergence as a regional player in establishing a new security order in East Asia, a point of particular concern to China (ZHANG 1997: 454–456).

The ARF also can be seen to provide a multilateral forum for security dialogue with China, and as a means to engage the Chinese in a new regional framework rather than as an attempt to “balance” the East Asian nuclear big power. Ensuring China’s participation in the ARF is as important to Japanese policy-makers concerned with issues of power as it is to the smaller Southeast Asian members of the forum. This policy of multi-
lateral engagement with China complements the development of bilateral security dialogue as seen, for instance, in the first official visit to Japan by the Chinese defence minister, which took place in early 1998 following a 1995 visit to China and South Korea by Japan’s own Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Far Eastern Economic Review 5.3.1998: 36). It can furthermore be seen in the various Track II events, i.e. meetings where government officials participate not in their official capacity, but along with academics and business representatives, in which Chinese and Japanese officials and scholars are involved. All in all, these efforts can be understood as part of a Japanese strategy to gain Chinese acceptance of the expanded role of the SDF in the U.S.-Japan security system. This is particularly important in the context of the redefinition of the Alliance and the new Guidelines, as although the Chinese leadership has expressed support for the structure of the Alliance, especially as a balance to the Soviet Union during the Cold War, this is not the same as support for the process now underway to redefine Japan’s role within that structure.

Similarly, from a different perspective, the ARF can be seen to have become possible due to the role Japan has played in the regional political economy, where financial, technical, trade and production links tie the Japanese and other East Asian economies together in a network of overlapping interests (for details, see Hatch and Yamamura 1996). The establishment of the ARF also has been facilitated by the gradual emergence of what Funabashi calls a “regional culture” (1993). The Japanese role in the ARF can in this sense be viewed as part of a strategy to protect Japan’s vested interests in the regional political economy, with policy-makers taking a broader view of the ARF process than as a means to promote military security, but also as part of a concept of security including economic security, albeit as a complement to, not a replacement of, the APEC. Certainly, Ozawa’s Japanese Center for Strategic Studies sees Japan in the ARF as playing a role in promoting economic restructuring in the region through “foreign direct investment and technical co-operation” (Nihon Senryaku Kenkyū Sentā Henshū 1994: 208), as do other politicians and policy-makers. The ARF, then, can be viewed as another means to try to ensure Japan’s vested interests in the region are protected, whether these interests are in the transportation of energy, the importation of natural resources, or trade and investment.

Nevertheless, as during the Cold War, Japan’s security policy and its role in the ARF can not be explained fully by the above references to the external environment. In the first place, the economic links and gradual emergence of a regional culture take on significance precisely because of the way the external links with East Asia have fed back into Japanese society. This has served to strengthen a sense of Asian identity within Japan and the need to play a regional role. As a consequence, policy-makers’ support for multilat-
eralism in the region has grown, but for multilateralism in a region which links together “Asia” and the “Pacific” as part of an “Asia Pacific” identity, not as an “East Asian” region and identity, as in the case of Mahathir’s proposal for an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) (for a discussion of EAEC, see Hook forthcoming). For MOFA, APEC and the ARF are important as both “foster a sense of identity in the whole region” i.e. Asia Pacific not East Asia, as with the EAEC (MOFA 1996: 12, emphasis added by the author). A similar perspective is adopted by the Defence Agency (Asahi Shinbun 13.3.1995a: 1).

Second, the ARF is especially important in the case of the present Hashimoto government, which has been placing increasing emphasis on East Asia in carving out a post-Cold War role for Japan. This can be seen, for instance, in Hashimoto’s declaration of a foreign policy designed to “capture the heart of Asia” and Kajiyama Seiroku’s emphasis on Japan as part of Asia, as outlined in the “Kajiyama Vision” (Kajiyama 1995). The ARF offers a place for Japan to develop a greater leadership role in East Asia, where dialogue can be used to help dispel any concerns over this emerging role by either the big or small powers of the region. This is no doubt particularly important in the case of Hashimoto: unlike Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo, who promised as part of the Fukuda Doctrine that Japan would not become a military big power, Hashimoto made no such commitment in his policy speech in Singapore in January 1997 (on the “Hashimoto Doctrine”, see Gaiako Forum Zadankai 1997: 15). As is clear from the Prime Minister’s decision to despatch an SDF air transporter in order to possibly evacuate Japanese nationals at the time of the 1997 Cambodian coup, which apparently was opposed by both the MOFA and the Defence Agency (Ogawa 1997: 71), Hashimoto is striving to normalise the military and use the SDF as an instrument of state policy.

Third, given the political difficulty inside Japan of trying to lay to rest the ghost of imperialism by making a full apology for wartime aggression, especially for Hashimoto, who during his time as prime minister made a visit to Yasukuni Shrine, the ARF provides a means to try to dispel distrust of Japanese motives. Without building up mutual understanding and a sense of trust with the Asian members of the ARF, the government will continue to face difficulties in carving out a new role in the region, especially as the redefinition of the Alliance and the new Guidelines imply a greater military role for Japan. In other words, policy-makers face the same task in promoting acceptance of bilateralism implying a new Japanese role in regional security as they face in promoting multilateralism – the build-up of trust. The ARF can act as a vehicle for the realisation of both goals, again facilitating the rise of Japan and its greater acceptance as a regional player in shaping the regional security order.
Finally, the government’s promotion of multilateral security dialogue is in keeping with the normative orientation in civil society and the support for a non-military role in the region amongst what were called the “progressive” political forces during the Cold War, now spread amongst the political parties, but perhaps best represented by the views of Hatoyama Yukio of the Democratic Party. For instance, Hatoyama has sought to respond to the end of the Cold War and the maintenance of the Security Treaty by proposing the Treaty should function without the permanent deployments of U.S. troops, which would be permitted to use SDF bases only in emergencies (for details, see TAKAOKA and JOHNSON 1997). A similar point was made recently by the Washington-based Economic Strategy Institute (Financial Times 18.6.1998: 2). The popular support for this option can be seen in the opinion polls, where support remains strong for the Treaty, as such, but not for the deployment of U.S. forces (Asahi Shinbun 12.5.1997: 1). The opposition to U.S. bases is even stronger in Okinawa. With the end of the Cold War and the SDF’s role in Cambodian PKO, less resistance now exists at the mass level to Japan playing a security role in the region, but this does not mean a change in normative preferences, which continue to favour placing constraints on the SDF, such as acting under the United Nations in PKO, and non-military contributions to international society. For instance, despite the end of the Cold War and the SDF’s role in various PKOs, little change has been registered in the popular attitude towards the action to be taken in case Japan is invaded by a foreign power. A 1978 poll showed that 6.8 per cent of respondents were in favour of participating in the SDF and fighting, 40.4 per cent for supporting the SDF by some means, 1.6 per cent for guerrilla resistance, 14.8 per cent for non-violent resistance, and 9.3 per cent for not resisting at all. In contrast to this, a 1994 poll showed that 4.6 per cent of respondents were in favour of participating in the SDF and fighting, 39.3 per cent for supporting the SDF by some means, 1.8 per cent for guerrilla resistance, 20.7 per cent for non-violent resistance, and 11.3 per cent for not resisting at all. Even with the SDF’s participation in UN PKO activities, moreover, nearly a third of pollsters still oppose the SDF’s participation in these activities (GEKKAN YORON CHÔSA 1997b: 35, 25). Again, despite an increase in the number of pollsters who support Japan playing a role in international society by contributing to the maintenance of international peace, with a rise from 31.4 per cent to 38.0 per cent between 1992 and 1996, the preference is still for making a non-military contribution to the solution of global problems, such as environmental problems, with 43.1 per cent favouring this role in 1996 compared with 49.7 per cent in 1992 (multiple choice answers, with a total of more than 100 per cent; GEKKAN YORON CHÔSA 1997a: 5). By playing a role in promoting multilateralism in the region, the government can seek
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5. **The Evolution and Function of the ARF**

As mentioned above, the 1991 proposal to establish the ARF originally came from the foreign minister of Japan, at least insofar as the formal, government-level proposal is concerned (on the track II background to the ARF, see Sekai, Bessatsu 1997: 160; Hernandez 1994: 16–18). At the outset, however, ASEAN was reluctant to support the proposal, because of a lack of trust and suspicion of Japanese motives, on the one hand, and the exclusion of the socialist countries from the ARF membership, on the other (Midford 1998). In this sense, as Singapore’s Mahbubani bluntly states, “the Japanese attempt to exercise leadership on region-wide security problems at the 1991 ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) failed” (1996: 54). Nevertheless, this initial resistance by ASEAN soon changed to support for a multilateral forum for security dialogue, with ASEAN playing the key role, as the name of the ARF suggests.

At the outset, the ARF can best be understood as a learning process of building confidence and mutual trust amongst the members rather than as a formal organisation with the resources to resolve regional conflicts. In this sense, the basic organisational structure is the institutionalisation of the annual meetings amongst senior government officials, usually the foreign ministers, which have been held since 1994 (in 1997 defence officials participated for the first time, following a new formula for participation of the foreign minister, one senior official, and one defence official); the Senior Officials Meetings (SOM), which are organised amongst high-ranking officials prior to the ministerial level meeting; the Inter-Sessional Support Group (ISG) meetings, which hold dialogue on CBMs in between the SOM meeting; the Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM) amongst lower-level officials (under secretary), which together with the ISG was agreed at the second meeting of the ARF in 1995; and the track II level meetings of officials participating in an unofficial capacity, along with academics and others, such as members of the ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN ISS) and the Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia Pacific (SCAP).

Within this overall learning process, which has only been institutionalised between the first meeting 1994 and the fourth meeting in 1997, the ARF has been gradually evolving from a forum established to build confidence and mutual trust to an institutional framework with the potential to play a role in preventive diplomacy. The possibility of the ARF taking on such a role was agreed at the 1997 meeting, which discussed issues lacking in con-
sensus, such as the domestic political situation in Cambodia after the coup, conflict in the South China Sea, and democratisation in Myanmar. In essence, then, the ARF can be viewed as a regional learning process centered on Asia Pacific, which acts as a symbol of the role East Asian states, especially ASEAN, are playing in shaping the new regional security order, and which provides some form of legitimacy for the interests of the weaker as well as the stronger in the region.

Insofar as Japan is concerned, a number of examples from the ARF process highlight how Japanese policy-makers are seeking to utilise this new layer of multilateralism in realising security goals and playing a more active role in the region under the umbrella of bilateralism. Such proactivity in Asia has roots in the diplomatic stance of Japan from the 1950s onwards, when the MOFA’s annual *Diplomatic Bluebook* gave voice to Japan’s “strong desire to capture a position as the leader of Asia” (TAMAKI 1995: 236). In the first place, Japan is seeking to use the forum as a way to exercise a certain degree of leadership in establishing a new security order in East Asia, but within the framework of bilateralism with the United States. As with the United States, Japanese policy-makers are concerned with the dominant role of ASEAN in the ARF, preferring the “A” to stand for Asia rather than ASEAN or for the ARF to match the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) with an acronym symbolising “Asia Pacific”, APRF. The attempt to gradually wrest some of the initiative from ASEAN, which is seeking to play a lead role in the restructuring of the regional order, can be seen in the proposal for what, after Chinese concerns with institutionalisation, became known as the ISM. Unlike the annual meeting, which is chaired by an ASEAN leader, the ISM is under the joint chair of an ASEAN and non-ASEAN member. As a result, Japan and Indonesia in 1996 co-chaired an ISG on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs).

Second, the ARF dialogue process is being used by Japan to ameliorate any difficulties arising, especially with China, which is sensitive to Japanese attempts to “represent Asia”. The ARF provides the Japanese government with a multilateral forum to complement the bilateral links with the Chinese government. This can be seen, for instance, at the 1995 meeting of the ARF, when the Japanese raised the issue of Chinese underground nuclear tests, which went ahead despite the May 1995 indefinite extension of the Test-Ban Treaty. At the same time, this stance is illustrative of the link between the anti-militarism in Japanese civil society and the stance taken by policy-makers in the ARF, with the call at the meeting to stop nuclear testing applying to France as well as China.

Third, Japan is seeking through the ARF process to promote mutual reassurance, confidence building, transparency, the exchange of ideas, the sharing of information, and so forth (*for details, see Asahi Shinbun* 13.3.1995a: 1).
This is illustrated by the proposal made by Foreign Minister Kōno Yōhei at the 1995 annual meeting, when he called on all members to voluntarily make available a defence white paper or concrete information on defence policy. It can also be seen in Foreign Minister Ikeda Yukihiro’s attempt at the 1996 meeting to soothe ASEAN concerns that, following the “reaffirmation” of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, Japan was taking on a new security role. Similarly, the attempt to set up a regional Arms Register, along the lines of the United Nations Arms Register that Japan and the EU proposed, provides another illustration of the Japanese interest in increasing transparency in the region.

Fourth, Japan is using the ARF to not only act as a bridge between the “West” and “Asia”, as in the classic view of Japan’s international role, but also between ASEAN and China. At the second meeting in Brunei, for instance, Japan proposed the South China Sea conflict for the agenda, apparently on the instigation of a member of ASEAN (SATÔ 1997: 178). This view of Japan as a link between different geographic spaces implies a bridge between different norms and values as, for instance, with Japan playing a role in promoting the understanding of different concepts of the “market”, “democracy”, and “human rights”. This points to how Japanese policy-makers are playing a role as a bridge between ASEAN and China as well as between the United States and China, and the United States and ASEAN.

Finally, the participation of Defence Agency officials in the SOM from the third meeting onwards, their role in the ISG and ISM, and their representation at the fourth annual ARF meeting under the new formula, points to the growing Japanese interests vested in the ARF security dialogue. This is complemented by a new active role in promoting regional dialogue on security, as seen by the Defence Agency’s convening of the first meeting of top-ranking defence officials from the ARF to hold dialogue on security (DEFENCE AGENCY 1997: 104). This also can be seen in the increasing contacts between the Japanese SDF and other militaries in East Asia, as in the first meeting of Japanese and South Korean defence officials in 1994, the despatch of Defence Agency officials to Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam in 1995 in order to promote trust, the Maritime SDF’s participation in the fiftieth anniversary of Indonesian independence in 1995, as well as the contacts with China, as mentioned above.

6. CONCLUSION

The above discussion of Japan and the ASEAN Regional Forum has sought to clarify the link between the domestic and international, on the one hand, and the link between the opportunities of post-Cold War multilateralism
and the constraints of Cold-War bilateralism, on the other. In the first place, the decision by Japanese policy-makers to support multilateralism in the post-Cold War era is linked to the normative preferences within Japanese civil society for a non-military approach to security as well as to the instrumental preferences of policy-makers to carve out a new role for Japan in re-shaping the regional order and executing its obligations under the redefined Security Treaty and new Guidelines. This is to suggest that, in seeking to legitimise the continuation of bilateralism centering on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty system, multilateralism has played a supplementary role in Japanese security policy. Externally, multilateralism is not a policy meant to replace bilateralism in the reshaping of the security order in East Asia. Rather, it is a policy meant to ensure that Japan plays a more prominent role in post-Cold War East Asia and carries out its required role within a redefined Alliance relationship. Internally, multilateralism seeks to ameliorate criticism of the continuation of a Cold War security policy, despite the radical change in the regional order following the end of the Cold War, the war in Cambodia, and so on. In this sense, multilateralism is at heart supplementalism – a policy meant to take advantage of the new opportunities of the post-Cold War era, but only within the constraints imposed by the legacy of the Cold-War era-bilateralism.

Second, the concept of security embedded in the ARF process is at heart the military security of the state. This is in marked contrast to the role of APEC in promoting economic security. As, even in the post-Cold War era, the state’s military security remains of central concern to Japanese policy-makers, the ARF can be seen as a “soft” process of confidence building, complementing the “hard” structure of the Alliance. Simply because the Cold War has ended does not mean that the sea-based threat to security has disappeared, even though fewer nuclear-tipped submarines now ply the waters of the Pacific Ocean and Ohsk Sea. Nor has the threat from intraregional territorial conflict, the possibility of war on the Korean peninsula or over Taiwan completely disappeared. In this sense, the Japanese role in the ARF can be understood as a way to help to reduce the tension likely to give rise to regional conflict and war, which under the new Guidelines would involve Japan more fully than at the times of the Korean, Vietnam or Gulf Wars.

Third, the ARF provides Japanese policy-makers with an opportunity to develop multilateral security relations, which can act as a counterweight to omnipresent bilateralism. Given the continual metamorphosis of the U.S.-Japan security system, no guarantee exists that the military security of the Japanese state will always coincide with that of the United States. A change in Sino-American relations, for instance, could exert a major impact on the security of Japan. In such a situation, the nation might be locked into a Cold-
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War Alliance not necessarily in keeping with its own interests. Multilateral dialogue, transparency in military affairs, exchange of information, and so on, thus provide Japanese policy-makers with the opportunity to differentiate their policies from those of the United States, even if the constraints of bilateralism prevent them from so doing at a particular historical juncture. Within this broader context, Japanese voices continue to be raised on behalf of a conception of security which goes beyond the military security addressed in the ARF and the economic security addressed in the APEC to include “human security” (e.g. human rights) and environmental security. As far as the environment is concerned, the MOFA official who has been “the intellectual force behind Japan’s official ARF policy around and after the Nakayama proposal of 1991”, Satō Yukio, supports the expansion in the scope of security issues dealt with in the ARF to include the environment and economy (KAWASAKI 1997: 492, original emphasis). Clearly, security conceived in broader terms related to human rights and democracy does not necessarily enjoy support amongst ASEAN members and states like China and Myanmar, and the commitment of Japanese policy-makers to promoting human rights within the ARF remains doubtful (MUSHAKOJI 1997; WATANABE 1997). Nevertheless, the ARF can serve gradually to multilateralise Japanese security policies and may in time come to serve as a forum for promoting a broader conception of security including human rights, democracy and the environment.

Fourth, the Japanese role in the ARF is one of a symbolic process as well as a political process. As a political process, the weakness of the ARF is apparent – for instance, as pointed out by LEIFER (1996: 57), the ARF has been unable to ameliorate the sour relationship between Japan and South Korea, as surfaced at the time of the diplomatic conflict over sovereignty of the Dakto/Takeshima islets in early 1996. Nor, more broadly, is the ARF seen as likely to play a role in resolving the China/Taiwan problem, given that Taiwan is not a member. For instance, the ARF did not address the March 1996 stand-off between Taiwan and China. Yet such a perspective ignores the symbolic process of building a new regional order in Asia Pacific and East Asia. Of course, the guns-bombs-and-tanks brigade has little time for talk of symbols, identities, norms, and other “soft” aspects of power, despite the growing literature (see KHONG 1997: 289–300, esp. 294). From the perspective of the symbolic world of politics, however, the ARF can be seen as the emergence of another layer of symbolic meaning between the asymmetric order of Cold War bilateralism and the multilateral order of the United Nations. In the same way that the “hot line” between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was regarded as a symbol of the commitment to avoid at least accidental nuclear war during the Cold War, not as a means to make threatening phone calls, and the recent decision of the U.S. and China to detarget each
other also was regarded as a symbol of the commitment to avoid accidental nuclear war, even though retargetting each other can easily be carried out, so security dialogue in a forum including what some may regard as potential enemies – e.g. China for Japan, or Japan for China – can be regarded as a means to routinise dialogue and non-aggressive patterns of regional interaction, not as a means to solve territorial or other intractable problems. Certainly, it is too early to declare that the symbolic process will spill over into a problem-solving process leading to the creation of a new layer of governance in East Asia, but the ARF at least has imputed new symbolic meaning into Japan’s relations with its neighbours. In this context, in assessing the significance of the ARF, the question of whether it serves to resolve outstanding territorial and other issues needs to be placed alongside the question of whether, over the long-term, the meaning of sovereignty is changing as the world adjusts to the Cold War’s end and new forms of governance begin to emerge. In the short-term, the symbolic meaning is to continue to link Japan to an “Asia-Pacific”, rather than an “East Asian” identity. For as with the APEC and unlike the EAEC, the ARF embraces both Pacific and Asian powers, and is not an “exclusive” East Asian identity as promoted by Mahathir (on the APEC and EAEC, see HIGGOTT and STUBBS 1995). The ARF is emerging as a key multilateral forum for Japan precisely because it does not have to choose between the U.S. and Asia.

Finally, the regional, subregional and micro-regional groupings emerging in Asia Pacific can be taken as a sign that the ARF may at some time in the future emerge as a new level of governance, with the Japanese role in the ARF being shaped by this larger transformation of the regional structures of governance. The gradual institutionalisation of APEC, the invigorated role of ASEAN, the possible emergence of subregional groupings such as EAEC, and the varied micro-regional yet transnational groupings now taking shape, as with the Japan Sea Zone or the Yellow Sea Economic Zone, are illustrative of the way economic links have given the impetus for the formation of new groupings, which might gradually become institutionalised as different levels of governance. In this sense, economic co-operation in the region can be seen to be spilling over into closer co-operation in security, where the role the ARF now is playing as a forum for security dialogue might continue to be widened and deepened. This is not to say that, as in the Cold War, we are witnessing the East Asian wing of the global order take on a similar form to the Western wing. As we mentioned above, the Cold War in Asia was “hot”, not “cold”, leaving a much more complex structural legacy to constrain the behaviour of states, as on the Korean peninsula. Nevertheless, the possibility that the ARF will emerge as a multilateral institutional framework for dealing with some of the more intractable problems impeding the creation of a new security order can not be
discounted. In this case, the ARF might be utilised by a new generation of Japanese policy-makers in search of multilateralism, not as a supplement to bilateralism, but as part of the process of reshaping the regional security order, where the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is demilitarised, if not abandoned, as well as redefined within a framework of co-operative security in Asia Pacific based on symmetric rather than asymmetric relations, and the anti-militaristic norms and identity at the heart of the alternative proposed by the opposition during the Cold-War era are embedded in the new forms of governance likely to emerge in the future.

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Glenn D. Hook


