

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE TŌYŌ KYŌKAI AND THE NAN'YŌ KYŌKAI

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INTRODUCTION

While a vast storehouse of academic research has been accumulated on Japan's prewar political history and its relations with the rest of Asia, the majority of the research has coagulated around well-known individuals and well-recognized institutions of the modern nation-state, such as political parties, governments, and individual ministries. There have been several works which have studied economic relations through private sector institutions such as individual zaibatsu, industry associations, and chambers of commerce, while a growing number of studies on international conferences or Japanese overseas communities have been produced of late. However, analysis of other avenues of interaction, such as voluntary and non-governmental associations, has been comparatively neglected.

In fact, the pages of archives and history books are littered with an assortment of names belonging to geographically specific foundations, associations, and organizations—Tōyō Kyōkai, Nan'yō Kyōkai, Chūō Chōsen Kyōkai, Kokuryūkai, Tōhō Kyōkai, Nichi-Doku Bunka Kyōkai, Nichi-Man Jitsugyō Kyōkai, Nichi-Ro Kyōkai, Nikka Jitsugyō Kyōkai, Nihon-Biruma Kyōkai, Nichi-In Kyōkai, Nichi-Ran Kyōkai, Fuirippin Kyōkai, Nichi-Gō Kyōkai, among many others. In addition to the seeming proliferation of such associations, several of them had long organizational life spans. The Tōyō Kyōkai existed from 1898–1945 (forty-seven years) while the Nan'yō Kyōkai lasted from 1915–45 (thirty years). This longevity is comparable to more familiar organizational entities such as the Sei-

¹ See for example, Namikata Shōichi, ed., *Kindai Ajia no Nihonjin keizai dantai* (Tōkyō: Dōbunkan, 1997), especially Hashiya Hiroshi, "Tōnan Ajia ni okeru Nihonjinkai to Nihonjin shōgyō kaigisho," 215–36; also Yoshikawa Yōko, "Senzen Filipin ni okeru hōjin no 'kanmin sekkin' no kōzō," in *Tōnan Ajia to Nihon*, ed. Yano Tōru (Tōkyō: Kōbundō, 1991), 129–46; and Mizuno Naoki, "1920 nendai Nihon-Chōsen-Chūgoku ni okeru Ajia ninshiki no ichidanmen-Ajia minzoku kaigi o meguru sankoku no ronchō," in *Kindai Nihon no Ajia ninshiki*, ed. Furuya Tetsuya (Tōkyō: Ryōkuin Shobō, 1996), 509–48.

yūkai ([Jiyūtō 1881] 1900–1940); Rikken Dōshikai (1913–40), Kyōchōkai (1919–46), or the Women’s Suffrage League (1925–40).

Despite the proliferation and the longevity of these legally incorporated voluntary associations, few academic works have focused on the role of these organizations in prewar Japanese domestic and foreign affairs. The aim of this paper is to analyze the roles of two geographically specific associations, the Tōyō Kyōkai and the Nan'yō Kyōkai, and establish their significance in domestic Japanese politics and in interactions with Asia in the prewar period.

Tōyō Kyōkai (East Asia Association) and Nan'yō Kyōkai (South Seas Association)² were active in political, economic, educational, and cultural projects. In terms of foreign affairs, due in large part to their networks and resources, both associations were able to engage in data collection and research, publication, and educational activities regarding other countries in Asia. In domestic politics, personal networks allowed for effective lobbying in cases related to Japan-Asia interactions, while having positions with such lobbying organizations kept the names of some of the executives in political prominence.

Most importantly, Tōyō Kyōkai and Nan'yō Kyōkai were concrete embodiments of the cross-institutional political interlocks and coalitions undergirding the surface politics of Nagata-chō. Previous scholarship has contributed greatly to a clearer understanding of workings in official and private sector institutions by analyzing one institution, or by establishing detailed taxonomies of factions and subdivisions within a given ministry, party, or military body. Distinguishing the leanings of one bureau in the Home Affairs Ministry from another, or one faction in the army from another is important for establishing the dynamics and channels of power within the political system. However, official institutions can be julienned only so far. While cliques and divisions within government institutions and political parties were important, these were not the only avenues for forming interest coalitions. The constituents of the Tōyō Kyōkai and the Nan'yō Kyōkai were bureaucrats, scholars, politicians, military officials, and industrialists, cutting across formal departmental lines and organizational hierarchies. I do not argue against the importance of official affilia-

² Previous works which have focused on Tōyō Kyōkai or Nan'yō Kyōkai are Akashi Yōji, “Nan'yō Kyōkai, 1915–45,” *Shakai Kagaku Tōkyū* 40, no. 2 (December 1994): 1–29 (502–30); Go Kōmei, “Kindai Nihon no Taiwan ninshiki: ‘Taiwan Kyōkai Kaihō’ to ‘Tōyō Jihō’ o chūshin ni,” in *Kindai Nihon no Ajia ninshiki*, ed. Furuya, 211–42. Akashi’s article is a solid description of the association’s activities, while Go’s article deals with the contents of the journal published by Tōyō Kyōkai rather than the organization itself.

tions, but rather examine dimensions of foreign relations and policy-making not adequately captured through analyses of official institutions.

In Japanese, the term that most accurately captures associations such as Tōyō Kyōkai and the Nan'yō Kyōkai is *hanmin hankan dantai* (semi-private, semi-public organizations). To avoid the rather awkward translation, I use the term “voluntary associations” in this paper. The term “voluntary association” is commonly used in anthropology and sociology. While the definitions for the concept are still being debated among organizational theorists, one point that is agreed upon is that these are not merely synonyms for “volunteer organizations.” The basic point is that in a voluntary organization, the majority of its members are not paid, and that it is not the primary place of work for the majority of its members. The antonym for voluntary associations are not “selfish” organizations, but governments, corporations, ascriptive organizations and social divisions, such as tribes, classes, ethnic groups, and families. My definitions of the term for the purposes of the paper is as follows:

Voluntary associations are formally organized ... groups, most of whose participants do not derive their livelihoods from the organizations' activities, although a few positions may receive pay as staff or leaders. A substantial proportion of associations consist of organizations or persons with economic interests, such as trade associations, professional societies, and labor unions, while many others promote the non-economic concerns of their members. Association boundaries are often fuzzy and porous, since many involve episodic supporters and passively interested constituents who can be mobilized under exceptional circumstances to provide financial or political sustenance.

³ There seems to be much confusion over terms such as “voluntary associations,” “NGOs,” or even “organizations.” To clarify the terminology used in this paper, I should state that NGOs are not, as is often construed in Japan, volunteer organizations concerned with promoting international harmony overseas (in Japan, for some reason, domestic social welfare associations are not included among NGOs), nor must they be environmentally concerned groups such as Greenpeace or the Audobon Society. “Non-governmental organization” means not officially part of the government. “Voluntary association” and “*hanmin hankan dantai*” are not legal terms, but sociological ones. The legal definitions for voluntary organizations vary according to country. For example, in France, non-profit organizations are called “*association*,” while those which are profit-oriented are labeled “*société*,” whereas in Japan, foundations are divided into various types of “juridical persons” (*hōjin*), such as *zaidan hōjin*, *shadan hōjin*, *gakkō hōjin*, etc.

⁴ Adapted from David Knoke and David Prensky, “What Relevance Do Organizational Theories Have for Voluntary Organizations,” *Social Science Quarterly* 30, no. 3 (March 1984): 3–4.

There are various types of organizations that fit the definition, for example chambers of commerce, industry associations, political campaigns, academic associations, labor unions, religious organizations, and grassroots neighborhood organizations among others. The members of such associations can include average citizens and heads of states, depending on the objectives and boundaries of the group.

Part I of the paper details the structures and resources of each organization and their activities in gathering and disseminating information on other parts of Asia. Part I, section two, profiles the educational activities which served as an important conduit for information and images about Asia. Part II, section one, outlines specific lobbying activities undertaken by Tōyō Kyōkai and Nan'yō Kyōkai, while section two analyzes the role of personal networks in lobbying. Part III addresses the impact of generational change among the core leadership of the organizations, and the resultant organizational decline in the 1930s.

PART I: RESOURCES AND INFORMATIONAL ACTIVITIES

Information Dissemination and Organizational Profiles

This section outlines organizational birth, boundaries, formal goals, legal status, and resources of Tōyō Kyōkai and Nan'yō Kyōkai. Financial resources, scale, legal environment, and other empirical factors defined the extent to which each organization could conduct research, hold lectures throughout Japan, publish periodicals and booklets, and sponsor conferences and exhibitions. With enough resources for regular publications and connections to sponsor and attract forums and lecture tours, both Tōyō Kyōkai and Nan'yō Kyōkai served as key non-official channels for shaping images of Asia in prewar Japan.

Tōyō Kyōkai

Tōyō Kyōkai originated from the Taiwankai, an informal group for those who had either worked in or traveled to Taiwan. At its second meeting in Tōkyō, the motion to turn the Taiwankai into a formal organization was accepted, and the Taiwan Kyōkai was established in April 1898 to support the development of Taiwan. The first president of the association was Katsura Tarō,⁵ and the treasurer Ōkura Kihachirō. The executive included

⁵ Katsura's (1848–1913) interest in Taiwan stemmed from his brief days as the governor-general of Taiwan, 2 June–14 October 1896. Katsura spent a grand total of nine days in Taiwan (June 12–20) during his term.

Taiwan Government-General officials, such as Mizuno Jun (first Taiwan Government-General Civil Affairs Department Head), Izawa Shūji (first Taiwan Government-General Education Department Head), Maki Bokushin (first Taiwan Government-General Internal Affairs Department Head), and business figures, such as Ōtani Kahei and Inoue Kakugorō. Political figures, such as Sakatani Yoshirō, Sone Arasuke, Kaneko Kantarō, and Taguchi Ukichi, also numbered among the directors.

Taking its cue from its European counterparts, the Taiwan Kyōkai had no explicit and specific statements regarding political policies and platforms in its charter. Its mission was to promote economic interest and provide information for the grand new colonial project in Taiwan. Other stated objectives of the organization included sending researchers to Taiwan; gathering Taiwanese goods; expediting travel between Taiwan and Japan; assisting Japanese conducting business in Taiwan; creating opportunities to learn and practice Taiwanese language; establishing the Taiwan Kaikan for Taiwanese visiting Japan; developing the association; holding lecture series on Taiwan; and supervising and caring for Taiwanese students in Japan.

Reflecting the expansion of Japanese interests in Korea and Manchuria, Taiwan Kyōkai changed its name to Tōyō Kyōkai in February 1907, and⁶ the organizational charter was revised to include Korea and Manchuria. The dissemination of information regarding Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria, conducting research on the socioeconomic conditions of the three areas, training of personnel to work in private and public sectors in the three areas, publishing its organ paper, holding lectures, and collecting research materials were some of the goals in the revised charter. The expanded roster of directors included business figures connected to the Mitsubishi zaibatsu, (e.g., Iwasaki Yanozuke, Toyokawa Ryōhei) and the Mitsui zaibatsu (e.g., Hayakawa Senkichirō, Fujiwara Ginjirō, Ariga Nagafumi), while younger bureaucrats and politicians, such as Gotō Shinpei, Machida Chūji, and Sekiya Teizaburō, also joined the association.

In terms of its boundaries and scale, Tōyō Kyōkai had five branches by 1907. It established branches in Taipei (January 1899), and Ōsaka (April 1899),⁷ while the Seoul and Manchurian branches were both started in

⁶ Katsura's speech on the occasion of the name change is reproduced in full in Tokutomi Sohō (Iichirō), ed., *Kōshaku Katsura Tarō den*, 2 (konkan) (Tōkyō: Ko Katsura Kōshaku Kinen Jigyōkai, 1917), 916–22.

⁷ The Ōsaka branch was started up in 1899, but was dissolved due to lack of interest. It was revived again under Gotō Shinpei, with long-time Ōsaka city mayor, Ikegami Shirō, as the branch head. See *Tōyō Kyōkai-Ōsaka shibu kiyaku narabi meibo* (Tōkyō: Tōyō Kyōkai, 1924); and "Tōyō Kyōkai shohōkoku," *Tōyō* 28, no. 9 (September 1925): 2.

May 1907.⁸ In membership numbers, at its inception in 1898, the association had around 80 members, but this expanded to over 1,700 by the end of 1899. By September of 1923, its membership had grown to 2,994. However, the numbers began to decline after 1929, so that in 1936, the organization had 1,904 members, and by 1944, 1,840 members. General membership fees for the Tōyō Kyōkai were ¥50 per month, while one became a special member by donating more than ¥100 or ¥1,000 at a time. Honorary members did not have to pay fees, but had to be recommended by the association president. Commonly, several members of a branch in the start-up phase made large contributions in their own name, or in their company name. These funds constituted the initial branch endowment.

For regular operations and special projects, these membership fees constituted only a small percentage of the association funding source. Initial endowment at establishment in 1898 was solicited from individual executives of the top zaibatsu, as well as from individual politicians and bureaucrats. In legal terms, Tōyō Kyōkai was initially a *zaidan hōjin* (a juridical foundation) but changed to a *shadan hōjin* (a corporate juridical association)¹⁰ in July 1914. This change in status made it possible to sell advertisement space in its journals, invest in stocks, and generate revenues from the activities of its individual members. Tōyō Kyōkai owned stocks and real estate, and held long-term savings accounts in several banks. For its research division, the association received subsidies from the Taiwan Government-General on specific projects, while special exhibitions and the like garnered endowments from the Government-General¹¹ of Korea, Taiwan, South Manchurian Railway, and Karafuto Office.

Nevertheless, the funding situation was not always stable, especially after Katsura's death in 1913, and the resulting decline in political pull during second president Komatsubara Eitarō's tenure (1913–19). By the post-First World War slump, there were even suggestions at the executive meetings that the monthly periodical, *Tōyō*, should be discontinued as it

⁸ *Takushoku Daigaku 60 nenshi* (Tōkyō: Takushoku Daigaku, 1955), 105.

⁹ Membership numbers are listed in the annual reports in *Tōyō Jihō* and *Tōyō*.

¹⁰ The difference between a *zaidan hōjin* (*Stiftungsperson*) and a *shadan hōjin* (*Körperschaftsperson*), in principle, is that a *zaidan hōjin* operates on an endowment, whereas a *shadan hōjin* operates from the assets of its members and can generate profits through activities of its members. These distinctions were generally derived from German civil law. The basic articles relevant to *zaidan* and *shadan hōjin* are articles 37–39 of the Japanese Civil Law Codes, established in 1896. For further details, see, for example, Hayashi Toshiji, *Zaidan-Zaidan hōjin no kenkyū* (Tōkyō: Shōnandō, 1983).

¹¹ *Takushoku Daigaku 80 nenshi* (Tōkyō: Takushoku Daigaku, 1980), 181.

¹² See for example, the "Tōyō katsudō shashinkan shūshi kessan," section of "Tōyō Kyōkai shohōkoku," *Tōyō* 26, no. 9 (September 1923): 21–22.

was a financial drain despite the sales of subscriptions and advertisement space.¹³ Generally, however,¹⁴ the association was able to keep out of the red in its annual accounts.

Tōyō Kyōkai's main publication was a monthly journal which was intended to provide information on events in Taiwan and the rest of East Asia. *Taiwan Kyōkai kaihō* was published from 1898 to January 1907 for volumes 1–10. The name was changed to *Tōyō Jihō* (1907–21) for volumes 11–24, then¹⁵ to *Tōyō* (1921–July 1944) from volume 24 for a total of 47 volumes. A typical issue of *Tōyō* covered Taiwan, Korea, Russia, China, and occasionally Brazil or Central Asia, and some fiction. Most of the articles dealt with economic issues, but there were occasional articles on art history, travelogues, the role of cows in human history, and political opinion pieces. Despite the fact that Taiwan was no longer the novelty colonial project that it was at the time of the Tōyō Kyōkai's birth, the monthly featured regular contributions from and on Taiwan. Tōyō Kyōkai also published a weekly newspaper, the *Tōyō Weekly*, the academic journal *Tōyō Gakuhō*, a forum for disseminating research findings concerning¹⁶ East Asia, and over fifty separate research booklets on a variety of topics.

Tōyō Kyōkai-sponsored events were one of few non-governmental forums for disseminating information about Asia within Japan. For example, in February 1923, the association sponsored a China Customs Exhibitions Hall in Tōkyō in which clothing, transportation, foods, wedding ceremonies, school uniforms, shoes, and other items and scenes of China were presented in dioramic displays for a month. In the same year, a nationwide lecture tour on overseas events drew average audiences of around one thousand for each lecture. Annual tours of Taiwan and South China, and occasional tours of Korea and Manchuria, with complete itineraries—including visits to the office of the Governor-General of Taiwan—were also run by the association. At ¥550 per person, and a ceiling of forty people, these tours were not intended to generate profits through mass-marketing tourism to Taiwan, but they were intended to make Taiwan more accessible to those with money to invest or political power to wield.

¹³ "Tōyō Kyōkai shohōkoku," *Tōyō* 28, no. 9 (September 1925): 2–3.

¹⁴ See, for example, the balance sheets for 1936 or 1944. "Kaimu hōkoku," *Tōyō* 32, no. 12 (December 1936): 180; and "Kaimu hōkoku," *Tōyō* 46, no. 3 (March 1943): 53.

¹⁵ Go Kōmei mistakenly states that *Tōyō* was published until December 1942. Go, "Kindai Nihon no Taiwan ninshiki," 212.

¹⁶ For a listing of the research booklet titles to 1943, see the back of *Shina seiboku rūtogaiken* 51 (Tōkyō: Tōyō Kyōkai, 1943).

The success of Tōyō Kyōkai, a non-profit association, in maintaining publishing activities for some forty-six years was in large part due to its membership. With executives representing a wide range of business and political interests, Tōyō Kyōkai was able to attract funds from various governmental and private sources.

Nan'yō Kyōkai

The genealogy of the Nan'yō Kyōkai can be traced back to the Nan'yō Kondankai,¹⁷ established in 1912 by president of the Nan-A Kōshi, Inoue Masaji,¹⁸ head of the Taiwan Government-General Civil Affairs Department, Uchida Kakichi,¹⁹ president of Malay Gomu Kōshi, Hoshino Shakuo,²⁰ and a number of Japanese entrepreneurs operating in Southeast Asia and officials of the Taiwan Government-General.²¹ In late December 1913, the members of this group established the Nan'yō Kyōkai to further facilitate contacts between Taiwan Government-General officials and Japanese businessmen operating in Southeast Asia. This first incarnation of

¹⁷ Born in 1877, Inoue graduated from Waseda, then went to the University of Berlin, where he studied colonial administration and economics. As a member of the Tōa Dōbunkai, he was sent to Korea to be financial advisor to the Korean government, and later secretary to the Ministry of the Imperial Household of Korea in 1905. In 1911, after consulting with a number of people, among them Makino Nobuaki, Den Kenjirō, Akashi Motojirō, Yamagata Aritomo, and Ōkuma Shigenobu, he established Nan-A Kōshi with financial help from Morimura Ichizaemon, Nagami Shichirō, *Kōa ichiro Inoue Masaji* (Tōkyō: Tōkō Shoin, 1941), 514–15, 527–28.

¹⁸ Uchida was born in 1866 and graduated from the Imperial University of Tōkyō. After serving in the Ministry of Telecommunications, he became the director of Civilian Administrator in the Taiwan Government-General under Governor-Generals Sakuma and Andō. He was in the post from 22 August 1910 to 19 October 1915 and was appointed vice minister of telecommunications in 1917 under Den Kenjirō. Uchida was appointed to succeed Den as governor-general of Taiwan and served in the post from 6 September 1923 to 1 September 1924. He became the first president of Japan Telegraphic and Wireless, Co., in 1925. Other directors of the firm included Shibusawa Eiichi, Nakajima Kumakichi, Wada Toyoji, Gō Seinosuke, and Hara Tomitarō. Uchida died in January 1933. See *Kokusai denki tsūshin kabushiki kaishashi* (Tōkyō: Kokusai denki tsūshin kabushiki kaisha, 1949), 9–10; and Uchida Makoto, *Chichi* (Tōkyō: Sōgabō, 1935).

¹⁹ Hoshino was born in 1853 and is best known for promoting small and medium enterprises. Among various posts, he was president of Manshū Nichi Nichi Shinbun, director of Nihon Seitō, and was vice president of the Tōkyō Chamber of Commerce from 1907–17. He was president of the Nihon Jitsugyō Kumiai Rengōkai, from 1908, and also active in various other organizations. Hoshino Shakuo Ō Kanshakai, *Hoshino Shakuo ō den* (Tōkyō: Hoshino Shakuo Ō Kanshakai, 1935).

²⁰ Nagami, *Inoue Masaji*, 611–12; and Nishioka Kaori, *Shingapōru no Nihonjin shakai-shi* (Tōkyō: Fuyō Shobō, 1997), 49.

the Nan'yō Kyōkai was dissolved due to lack of interests and funds. Inoue himself was busy managing Nan-A Kōshi in its initial stages of operation, and could not devote much time to the organization.

The second and more lasting incarnation of the Nan'yō Kyōkai was formed in January 1915 by the same combination of Inoue Masaji and Uchida Kakichi. Due to the explosion in exports to Nan'yō and Southeast Asia in 1914–16, Inoue and Uchida were able to accumulate support for a new association devoted to conducting research on Southeast Asia and disseminating the results. Eighteen prominent figures from politics and business, including Den Kenjirō, Ogawa Heikichi, Yamamoto Teijirō, Shibusawa Eiichi, Ōtani Kahei, Wada Toyoji, Hayakawa Senkichirō (Mitsui Bank), Fukui Kikusaburō (Mitsui Trading), and Kondō Yasuhei (NYK), gave their endorsements to the new organization. Financial support was provided by the Taiwan Government-General, the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the Commerce and Agriculture Ministry. The executive of the Nan'yō Kyōkai consisted of one president, two vice presidents, one executive director, one general manager, one treasurer, and an unspecified number of directors.

At its inaugural general assembly, Uchida stated in his opening remarks that the Nan'yō Kyōkai “harbors no political ambitions, and consequently will not have connections to any political party or political faction. Furthermore, our association will not directly manage any enterprises.”²¹ Describing the Tōyō Kyōkai as being primarily concerned with Sinic cultures, the Nan'yō Kyōkai specified that the territory that fit under the rubric of “Nan'yō”²² (South Seas) included Southeast Asia, as well as the South Seas Islands. Among its other various missions, the association was to conduct research on Nan'yō and promote mutual understanding between Japan and the area; research-specific industries, systems, societies of Nan'yō; introduce the research results to Japanese; disseminate information about Japan in Nan'yō; train personnel for in-

²¹ *Nan'yō Kyōkai 10 nenshi* (Tōkyō: Nan'yō Kyōkai, 1925), 4.

²² *Nan'yō Kyōkai 10 nenshi*, 2, 6. My use of the term for this paper will also cover both areas. The terms Inner and Outer Nan'yō were used to differentiate between the Japanese mandate islands in Micronesia, and also Southeast Asia in general. My use of the term Nan'yō includes all of Southeast Asia and the South Seas. In 1940, after “Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere” became part of the official lingo, “Nanpō” became the primary term for the area. For a more detailed discussion of the definitions of the term, see, for example, Yano Tōru, “*Nanshin*” no keifu (Tōkyō: Chūō Kōronsha, 1975), 6–8; Yano Tōru, *Nihon no Nan'yō shikan* (Tōkyō: Chūō Kōronsha, 1979), 112, 123–24; and Shimizu Hajime, “Senkanki Nihon-keizaiteki “Nanshin” no shisōteki haikei,” in *Senkanki Tōnan Ajia no keizai masatsu*, ed. Sugiyama Shin'ya and Ian Brown (Tōkyō: Dōbunkan, 1990), 13–44.

dustries operating in the area; sponsor lectures about the area; and set up a Nan'yō museum and library.²³

The first president was Yoshikawa Akimasa,²⁴ while Uchida Kakichi was elected to one of the two vice presidencies. The treasurer was Hayakawa Senkichirō, and directors included Den Kenjirō, Fukui Kikusaburō, Gō Seinosuke, Hoshino Shakuo, Inoue Masaji, Nitobe Inazō, Ogawa Hei-kichi, Tokonami Takejirō, Shibusawa Eiichi, and Wada Toyoji. When Yoshikawa Akimasa, whose interest in Southeast Asia was not particularly ardent, became ill, Den Kenjirō was elected in his place in May 1919. Hayakawa took over as vice president after Yoshikawa's death, and when Hayakawa died, the post was filled by Wada (1923), then Fujiyama Raita (1924). In 1920, Inoue Masaji was appointed as executive director, while another core member, Iizumi Ryōzō, became general manager of the association in 1921.

At its conception in January 1915, the organization had 79 members. By December 1915 it had grown to 360 members, including members of the Taiwan branch. By 1923, Nan'yō Kyōkai had grown to 1,450 members, and by 1929, it had 1,386 members.²⁵ Nan'yō Kyōkai started out with three major centers of operation in Tōkyō, Taiwan, and Singapore. The Tōkyō headquarters was first temporarily located in the Taiwan Government-General's Tōkyō office, then it was moved to a building in Yaesu. By the end of 1944, the association had branches in Tōkyō, Taipei (est. 1916), Singapore (1916), Java (Batavia, 1921), Kansai (Ōsaka, 1923), Micronesian islands (Palau, 1923), Manila (1924), Tōkai (Nagoya, 1924), Davao (1929), Sumatra (Medan, 1929), Kanagawa Prefecture (Yokohama, 1941), Hiroshima (1942), Yamaguchi Prefecture (1944), Thailand (Bangkok), and an office in Saigon for its members in French Indochina. The branches in Japan received donations and subsidies from prefectoral and city governments²⁶ and generally had similar operating budgets of around ¥10,000 per year.

While the branches received subsidies from local governments, the head branch in Tōkyō was fueled by large donations from the Taiwan Government-General. Membership fees were ¥6 per year but required the introduction of at least two members. A supporting member had to do-

²³ *Nan'yō Kyōkai 10 nenshi*, 7–8. For a slightly different translation, see Akashi, "Nan'yō Kyōkai," 4.

²⁴ Yoshikawa Akimasa (1841–1920) was a politician who, after a tenure as Tōkyō governor, served as minister of education, home affairs, justice, and communications during the period between 1890 and 1903.

²⁵ Annual numbers and detailed breakdowns by branch can be found in the annual summary reports presented by the association vice presidents in *Nan'yō Kyōkai 10 nenshi*, and annual reports in issues of *Nan'yō* and *Nan'yō Kyōkai Zasshi*.

²⁶ See for example account sheets for the Kanagawa and Hiroshima branches, *Nan'yō* 28, no. 2 (February 1942): 155, and *Nan'yō* 28, no. 10 (October 1942): 140.

nate ¥50 at one time, while an honorary member had to be recommended by directors and approved by the president of the association.²⁷ By 1944, the fees had changed to ¥12 year, or a ¥200 donation in lump sum, or a ¥500 donation in lump sum. Unlike the Tōyō Kyōkai, Nan'yō Kyōkai started as a *shadan hōjin*, then became a *zaidan hōjin* in January 1939. This change made the association even more dependent on funds from the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the Colonial Ministry.

Nan'yō Kyōkai also operated commercial museums in Singapore (est. 1918) and Surabaya (est. 1924). The Singapore museum was started at the behest of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, (which provided five-eighths of its operating budget). According to the association's statistics, in its first year of operation²⁸, the museum in Singapore drew an average of 170 people per day. A student center, which also served as a hotel for Japanese businessmen traveling through Singapore, was housed in the same building as the museum. The Nan'yō library in the organizational charter had collected 930 volumes by 1920.

The association also supported temporary exhibitions, lecture series, and conferences. Members of Nan'yō Kyōkai lectured in various places within Japan, and a lecture series was held on a weekly basis at numerous lecture halls in Tōkyō. In 1920, Nan'yō Products Exhibition, organized by the association with the help of the Dutch East Indies Government-General and the Java Bank, toured the major cities of Japan, displaying customs and products of Nan'yō. A conference on exchange rates was sponsored jointly with the Nichi-In Kyōkai and two other organizations. Another conference Nan'yō Kyōkai organized was the Conference on Nan'yō Economic Affairs, held from 14–22 September 1939 in Tōkyō and Ōsaka.²⁹ Similar to Tōyō Kyōkai, Nan'yō Kyōkai organized regular tours of the Nan'yō area. In 1926, Nan'yō Kyōkai and Tōyō Kyōkai jointly sponsored an inspection tour of Nan'yō industries.

Unlike Tōyō Kyōkai, much of the research activity of Nan'yō Kyōkai was left to the branch offices. The Taiwan branch was especially active in all areas, including language training, publishing, and conducting research on Taiwan and surrounding areas. Each branch surveyed natural resources in its area and reported back to the Tōkyō head branch. In Oc-

²⁷ *Nan'yō Kyōkai 10 nenshi*, 7.

²⁸ *Nan'yō Kyōkai 10 nenshi*, 50.

²⁹ For details on the Surabaya museum, see *Nan'yō Kyōkai 10 nenshi*, 206–10. For budgetary details see 94–97. Branch museums were established in Medan and Batavia.

³⁰ Nan'yō Kyōkai, *Nan'yō keizai kondankai hōkokusho* (Tōkyō: Nan'yō Kyōkai, 1940). Vice President Hayashi Kyūjirō and Executive Director Iizumi Ryōzō were particularly active in organizing the event.

tober 1942, Nan'yō Kyōkai set up the Institute for Living Conditions in the Nanpō (Nanpō Seikatsu Kenkyūjo) ³¹ in Java to conduct research on health and health economics in the region. This institute published a monthly journal, *Nanpō Seikatsu*, in addition to conducting its research on medical science relevant to the tropics. Specific research projects on emigration possibilities in North Borneo, Cameron Highlands, Siam, and other places were also undertaken.³² Even as late as 1943, much of the rhetoric surrounding Nan'yō clung with amazing tenacity to the perennial dream of the undiscovered tropical emigration paradise of endless natural resources and low population density.³³

The publication activities of the association were as prolific, if not more so, than those of the Tōyō Kyōkai. Nan'yō Kyōkai's monthly was first called the *Nan'yō Kyōkai Kaihō*, then changed to *Nan'yō Kyōkai Zasshi*, and lastly to *Nan'yō*. The periodical was published monthly from January 1915 to October 1944 for a total of thirty volumes. Detailed statistical information on various industries and travelogues were featured in the monthly. From 1919–25, the Singapore branch published a separate monthly entitled *Nan'yō Keizai Jihō*, which was eventually incorporated into the main publication, while the Java branch published the *Ranryō Indo Jihō*. As with the Tōyō Kyōkai, the Nan'yō Kyōkai published a continuing series of research booklets which totaled over fifty. Most detailed the conditions of a specific industry in one area, such as agriculture in the Philippines, or commercial laws pertaining to the Dutch East Indies.

Educational Activities

One of the most important methods of information collection and dissemination was the training of personnel to work abroad in China, the colonies, and the Southeast Asia-South Seas. Mark Peattie's statement that Japanese colonialism had "no specialized colonial service or colonial school, like those in Britain and France, to provide particular training in colonial administration,"³⁴ is accurate in the sense that there were no institutions devoted solely to the production of a colonial bureaucracy. However, his remarks give the misleading impression that there were no

³¹ "Hon kyōkai ni Nanpō seikatsu kenkyūjo o setchi," *Nan'yō* 28, no. 12 (December 1942): 140; Iizumi Ryōzō, "Nanpō seikatsu kagaku kenkyūkai no kaisetsu," *Nan'yō* 28, no. 10 (October 1942): 1.

³² For details, see Hara Fujio, *Eiryō Maraya no Nihonjin* (Tōkyō: Ajia Keizai Kenkyūjo, 1986), 66–115.

³³ See for example, Iizuma Ryōzō, *Nan'yō* 29, no. 5 (May 1943): 2.

³⁴ Mark Peattie, *Nan'yō: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885–1945* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988), 71.

private institutions of higher education which explicitly focused on overseas Japanese and Western colonies in Asia.³⁵ Although both associations trained significant numbers of students in area-specific knowledge and language, Tōyō Kyōkai's educational projects had more impact in that they trained a greater number of students and operated their educational facilities longer than did those of Nan'yō Kyōkai.

Tōyō Kyōkai

If one takes the Marunouchi subway line from Tōkyō to Myōgadani station, in addition to the better-known Ochanomizu Women's University, one can find the legacy of Tōyō Kyōkai's educational project, originally started in 1900. Takushoku University³⁶ was intended to train people to work in the public and private sectors in the colonies and overseas. As Mizuno Jun put it, British bureaucrats in India spent two years learning "Indian," then spent two years³⁷ in India for further training before stepping into their permanent posts. The objective was to train people to work in Taiwan, either as public officials or in the private sector.

Katsura was one of the strongest advocates of developing Taiwan as a gateway for expansion of trade in Southeast Asia and South China. To administer Taiwan and conduct business in the area, Japanese with Taiwanese language ability would expedite development. The second president of Tōyō Kyōkai and the school, Komatsubara Eitarō, in a speech to the incoming class of April 1917, emphasized Taiwan and its links to Nan'yō,

³⁵ The best-known of the area-specific training schools was the Tōa Dōbun Shoin in Shanghai, founded by the Tōa Dōbunkai, which trained China specialists. For details, see, for example, Daigakushi Hensen linkai, *Tōa Dōbun Shoin Daigakushi* (Tōkyō: Koyūkai, 1982); and Kurita Hisaya, *Shanghai Tōa Dōbun Shoin* (Tōkyō: Shin Jinbutsu Jūraisha, 1993). Another school, Daitō Bunka Daigaku, was founded in 1923 by the Daitō Bunka Kyōkai, an association of peers and Diet members. The president was Count Ōki Enkichi, and the vice president, Ogawa Heikichi. Another example was the Nichi-Ro Kyōkai's higher commercial school operating out of its Harbin Commercial Museum, established in 1918 to further trade with Russia. See for example, Nagami, *Inoue Masaji*, 618; Gotō Shinpei, "Tairiku hatten no tame ni," *Tōyō* 28, no. 6 (June 1925): 2–3; "Tōyō Kyōkai kinji," *Tōyō* 28, no. 7 (July 1925): 178; and *Daitō bunka daigaku 50 nenshi* (Tōkyō: Daitō Bunka Gakuen, 1973). There were other Japanese higher schools in foreign cities that were not related to area training, such as the medical school founded in Shanghai by the Dōjinkai.

³⁶ The school went through numerous name changes. It was first named Taiwan Kyōkai Gakkō, then Taiwan Kyōkai Senmon Gakkō. When the Taiwan Kyōkai became the Tōyō Kyōkai, the school name was changed to Tōyō Kyōkai Senmon Gakkō, then to Tōyō Kyōkai Shokumin Senmon Gakkō, then to Takushoku Daigaku. There was yet another change to Tōyō Kyōkai Daigaku in 1922, then back to Takushoku Daigaku in 1926.

³⁷ *Taiwan Kyōkai Kaihō* 1, no. 8 (20 May 1899): 3.

Korea, and its gateway position to Manchuria and Siberia. Noting the high enrollments in the school for Chinese, Komatsubara noted that Taiwanese and Korean were the school's areas of competitive advantage and encouraged students to take up the latter two languages.³⁸ Aside from the aforementioned languages, English, Russian, economics, statistics, commercial, colonial, and constitutional law, classical Japanese, writing, Asian history, and mathematics were some of the other subjects in the school curriculum. During its first thirty years, some notable names taught as faculty at the school, among them Ariyoshi Chūichi, Baba Eiichi, Izumi Tetsu, Nitobe Inazō, and Ōkawa Shūmei.

Of the first graduating class of 1903, 21 out of 45 went into the Taiwan Government-General. But by the third class, the geographic distribution of graduates had become more varied. By 1919, of the total 1,075 graduates of the school, 85 were in Taiwan, 336 in Korea, 146 in Manchuria, 75 in Central China,³⁹ 8 in Southern China, 8 in Siberia, 17 in Nan'yō, and 353 in Japan. According to its survey in 1929, 908 of its alumni were in Japan, 75 in Taiwan, 288 in Korea, 197 in Manchuria, 89 in China, 17 in Nan'yō, and 27 in other foreign countries. Of these 1,128 were in the private sector, while 168 were public officials employed by one of the ministries or in a colonial administration.⁴⁰ The notable decline in graduates who entered official colonial administration was primarily due to the systematization of staffing procedures for the colonial governments, where bureaucrats from the various ministries, especially the Home Ministry, came to be rotated in and out of the colonies.

In April 1919, succeeding Katsura and Komatsubara, Gotō Shinpei became the third president of the university and Tōyō Kyōkai. He held both positions until his death in April 1929. In 1922, the school received approval from the Ministry of Education in its change from a technical college (*senmon gakkō*) to a university. According to Ministry of Education regulations, a new university had to possess a ¥500,000 endowment to be given university accreditation. The subsidies from Taiwan Government-General to the school had stopped during Komatsubara's term, and Tōyō Kyōkai could only afford to give the school ¥200,000 in real estate and liquid assets.⁴¹ In this pinch, Gotō called upon his connections to persuade a number of sugar manufacturing companies operating in Taiwan to donate the ¥500,000 in 1921.

³⁸ *Takushoku Daigaku 80 nenshi*, 196.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 211, 272.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 270–73.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 311.

⁴² *Takushoku Daigaku 60 nenshi*, 253. For details on Gotō's policies on sugar during his days in Taiwan, see for example, Tsurumi Yūsuke, *Gotō Shinpei 2* (Tōkyō:

Naga^{ta} Hidejirō, who had followed on Gotō's heels as the mayor of Tōkyō,⁴³ also succeeded Gotō as the president of the university in April 1929 after Gotō's death. Unlike his predecessor, Nagata was not concurrently president of Tōyō Kyōkai, but its vice president under the fourth president Mizuno Rentarō. Mizuno had not been associated with the university previously, whereas Nagata had served as a director. In 1932, to cope with the increasing number of students, the school moved to a new campus, the location of the present-day campus in Myōgadani. In 1940, another campus was⁴⁴ opened in Kodaira (Hanakoganei) for university preparatory students.

The Tōyō Kyōkai provided limited number of scholarships to students of Takushoku University. For example, starting in 1936, three students recommended by the school were given scholarships of ¥35 per month, while another six recommendees were sent on all-expenses-paid research trips, two each to Manchuria and China, and one each to Taiwan and⁴⁵ Korea, to study customs, traditions, and educational systems of each area.⁴⁶ In September 1943, the French Indochina Academy (Futsu-In Gakuin) was established on the Takushoku University campus. The academy conducted instruction in Vietnamese (Annamese) and French for fifty students.⁴⁷

After Nagata's death in September 1943, Ōkura Kinmochi, who was the university dean, took over as president on a temporary basis. In March 1944, Ugaki Kazushige was appointed by the board of directors as the new university president. Although the school had 3,367 students enrolled for the 1943 academic year, with many of the senior students mobilized into labor teams in farms and coal mines, the president⁴⁸ and the school board of trustees had few educational issues to address.

Tōyō Kyōkai also operated other educational and research institutes. In 1907, it established a branch campus of the college in Keijō (Seoul). The Keijō branch became independent of the parent school in 1918 and was taken over by the Government-General and renamed Keijō Higher Com-

Keisō Shobō, 1937–38, reprint 1965); and Nonaka Fumio, *Nan'yō to Matsue Shunji* (Tōkyō: Jidaisha, 1941), 105–10.

⁴³ Gotō was mayor from 17 December 1920–28 May 1923, while Nagata was mayor from 29 May 1923–7 October 1924.

⁴⁴ *Takushoku Daigaku 80 nenshi*, 320–21.

⁴⁵ "Kaimu hōkoku," *Tōyō* 39, no. 8 (August 1936): 177.

⁴⁶ "Kaimu hōkoku," *Tōyō* 46, no. 7 (July 1943): 107.

⁴⁷ Ōkura Kinmochi (1882–1968) is better known as a director of South Manchurian Railway from 1906 to 1931, or for his role in formation of the aborted Ugaki cabinet, or as the executive director of the National Policy Research Group (Kokusaku Kenkyūkai).

⁴⁸ The 1944 board of trustees consisted of Ugaki, Ōkura, Akaike Atsushi, and Mizuno Rentarō.

mercial School in 1920.⁴⁹ This school was one of the few avenues of upward social mobility for Koreans under colonial rule, as the top graduating students from each class were virtually guaranteed jobs in the private sector.⁵⁰ In Taihoku (Taipei), the association operated the Taiwan Higher Commercial School, established in 1919. As with its counterpart in Korea, almost two-thirds of the students were Japanese,⁵¹ but the Taiwanese who graduated from the school had considerably better employment prospects than those of other schools.⁵² In September 1910, Tōyō Kyōkai established the Dairen Commercial School with 379 entering students, with a women's education section that was eventually spun off into a separate school. Also in 1910, the Tōyō Kyōkai Ryojun (Port Arthur) Language School was opened with 255 incoming students,⁵³ while the Shinkyō (Shinjian) Language Research Center was started up in Manchuria in 1932. Additionally, the association provided housing for a limited number of Taiwanese students in Japan in the Taiwan Kaikan, and kept track of the number of Taiwanese and Korean students in middle school and higher educational institutions in Japan.

Nan'yō Kyōkai

The Nan'yō Kyōkai's educational undertakings were conducted on a far smaller scale and in a more sporadic fashion than those of the Tōyō Kyōkai. The association began several language courses soon after its establishment, but did not start an official school of higher learning until 1942. Through its fragmented but numerous educational programs, Nan'yō Kyōkai promoted the image of Nan'yō as a land of opportunity, with infinite resources for those who wanted a tropical adventure. In addition to providing information, it was later able to provide capital assistance for would-be entrepreneurs, further reinforcing the images of tropical paradises and limitless natural resources.

⁴⁹ Government-General of Korea, "Revised Educational Regulations for Chosen" (1922), 3.

⁵⁰ The top five of a graduating class from the Keijō Higher Commercial School generally entered one of the major banks, while the next ten or so entered trading companies. Usually, 600 or so Koreans applied for 60 slots for each year. Japanese students constituted the other 120 for each year. Interview with Choe Dae-suk, class of 1938, Seoul, 13 July 1996.

⁵¹ For example, in 1925, 229 out of the total 547 students were Japanese, while in 1936, 238 out of 573 were Japanese.

⁵² See George H. Kerr, *Formosa: Licensed Revolution and the Home Rule Movement, 1895–1945* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1974), 178; Yanaihara Tadao, *Teikokushugika no Taiwan* (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 1929, reprint 1988) 154–59.

⁵³ *Takushoku Daigaku 60 nenshi*, 113.

Recognizing the need for foreign languages in conducting business, Nan'yō Kyōkai conducted ⁵⁴Dutch and Malay language courses from 1917 to 1941 at its Tōkyō branch,⁵⁴ with a hiatus between 1931 and 1936 due to a shortage of funds and a gradual drop in enrollments. The association's Taiwan branch held Dutch, English, and Malay language courses from 1916 to 1931. Regularly scheduled lectures on Nan'yō provided another informal forum for learning about the natural resources and cultural customs of the Nan'yō area.

Inoue and Nan'yō Kyōkai started a training program to supply businesses operating in Southeast Asia with personnel equipped with area knowledge. The Taiwan Government-General gave ¥15,000 for the project, while Foreign Affairs Minister Ishii Kikujirō donated ¥3,000, and Agriculture and Commerce Minister Kōno Hironaka gave ¥2,000. Mitsui, Kuhara, Mitsubishi, Furukawa, NYK, and other large firms contributed another ¥140,000.⁵⁵ The one-year training took place in the Singapore Commercial Museum with the first class starting in September 1918. The program, called the Commercial Practical Training System, which included training in Dutch, Malay, and English, was discontinued after the second class graduated (1st class 20 students, 2nd class 11) in 1920, due to a shortage of operating funds and lack of corporate interest. Some of the problems in managing the program are reflected in Nan'yō Kyōkai executive director Ishikawa's annual report to the general assembly in 1919, in which he directed criticism at the Ministry of Education for its lack of interest in promoting education related to Nan'yō in Japanese schools, and the Ministry of Agriculture and ⁵⁶Commerce for its overemphasis on technical and vocational training.

In 1929, a similar program, the Nanpō Practical Commercial Training Program (Nanpō Shōgyō Jisshūsei Seido) was started up on a larger scale in response to demands voiced by business. With financing from the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the program was free of charge for those accepted, and moreover, provided help with capital for those who completed the course and remained in Nan'yō and opened their own business. This program proved to be more successful. By 1943, Nan'yō ⁵⁷Kyōkai had trained some 798 people, of whom 669 remained in Nan'yō.

In 1942, the association launched its first official school, the Nan'yō Gakuin Technical School in Saigon. Under the supervision of the Foreign

⁵⁴ Malay was started in 1922.

⁵⁵ Nagami, *Inoue Masaji*, 616–17. Kondō Renpei was the head of the fund-raising drive.

⁵⁶ *Nan'yō Kyōkai 10 nenshi*, 64–65.

⁵⁷ Akashi, "Nan'yō Kyōkai," 16.

Affairs Ministry, and funded by the ministry to the tune of ¥278,752, its day-to-day management was subcontracted to the Nan'yō Kyōkai. According to one alumnus of the Nan'yō Gakuin, the school was placed in Saigon to fortify relations with the Vichy Government-General.⁵⁸ It is also likely that as the area was not under direct Japanese control, it was not feasible to simply send Japanese teachers to local schools. This was possible in areas such as Singapore, where the 25th Army recruited local Japanese schoolteachers to train local schoolteachers in Japanese language education.⁵⁹

Several army and navy officials from the General Staff Office were present at the opening ceremonies for the Nan'yō Gakuin, symbolizing the strong interest of military in school. All military officials present stressed the importance of Nanpō for its oceans of oil, rubber, and minerals that found no equal in Manchuria or China.⁶⁰ The school provided housing, books, food, and everything else for the price of donations of ¥360 twice a year by the parents of the students who were accepted.⁶¹

In its three years of its existence, Nan'yō Gakuin trained 112 students. Only the first class completed the three-year course. The third class was to arrive in May 1944, but due to attacks on transport ships by the American naval fleet, the students did not arrive until mid-July.⁶² The third class, as most were still under eighteen, did not serve in the army in 1944–45, but the first and second classes were all drafted into the army as were many of the teachers. Thus, though most of the first graduating class found jobs with well-known firms, their actual time of employment was minimal to nil, due to onset of the war.⁶³ Although the contribution of the school to Japanese commercial ventures was negligible in the prewar period, the school did provide the army with a number of Japanese who could speak some French and Vietnamese.

The association also operated the Kōa Japanese Language School in Jakarta, which operated Japanese classes attached to Kōa Cultural Center. The center, established at the behest of the 16th Army in Java, also taught Bahasa Indonesia for resident Japanese. Some of the special exchange students from Southeast Asia who came to Japan in 1944 stayed at a dormi-

⁵⁸ Kameyama Tetsuzō, *Nan'yō Gakuin* (Tōkyō: Fuyō Shobō, 1996), 18–19.

⁵⁹ The teacher training school was called the Shōnan Nihon Gakuen. Nishioka, *Shingapōru no Nihonjin*, 226; see also Akashi Yōji, "Nihon gunseika no Maraya, Shingapōru ni okeru bunkyō shisaku, 1941–1945," in *Tōnan Ajiaishi no naka no Nihon senryō*, ed. Kurasawa Aiko (Tōkyō: Waseda Daigaku, 1997), 293–332.

⁶⁰ Kameyama, *Nan'yō Gakuin*, 33–34.

⁶¹ Kameyama, *Nan'yō Gakuin*, 308–9. Not 110, as stated by Akashi, "Nan'yō Kyōkai," 21.

⁶² Kameyama, *Nan'yō Gakuin*, 108.

⁶³ For details, see Kameyama, *Nan'yō Gakuin*, 115–93.

tory managed by Nan'yō Kyōkai for a limited time,⁶⁴ but generally, the Nan'yō Kyōkai had less contact with foreign students in Japan than the Tōyō Kyōkai.

PART II: LOBBYING AND NETWORKS

Lobby Cases

In addition to training people, gathering and disseminating information, and expanding its boundaries, Tōyō Kyōkai and Nan'yō Kyōkai conducted lobbying activities using its resources and networks. Although the two voluntary associations did not succeed in obtaining all policy goals, they were generally able to bring issues to the attention of various ministers and ministries. This was especially the case in the 1920s, when the presidents of the associations, Tōyō Kyōkai's Gotō Shinpei and Nan'yō Kyōkai's Den Kenjirō, were two of the most prominent political figures of the day.

Both associations concerned themselves with a variety of issues over their organizational lifespans. For the Tōyō Kyōkai, Taiwan and its potential trade connections to Nan'yō constituted its lobby domain until the focus moved toward continental policy prior to the Russo-Japanese War. Generally, Tōyō Kyōkai concentrated on China, Russia, the formal colonies, and occasionally Nan'yō, while Nan'yō Kyōkai's province was Taiwan, the Micronesian islands, Thailand and the colonies of the Western powers. The territories of the two associations overlapped considerably over Taiwan, but there were no disputes over territory.

Nan'yō Kyōkai

Nan'yō Kyōkai was most active in lobbying cabinets to negotiate with the governments of colonies in Nan'yō, and obtaining financial aid for investments in Western colonies. Executive director Inoue Masaji persuaded Kuhara Fusanosuke to purchase a rubber plantation in 1916 in North Borneo for settling Japanese emigrants.⁶⁵ The venture itself turned out to be an emigration failure as the land yielded poor harvests, but it did continue to function as a rubber plantation. The failure of the project to attract emigrants had absolutely no effect in dampening Inoue's dreams of emigration. In 1917, the British introduced an ordinance prohibiting foreigners

⁶⁴ For more details, see, for example, Kurashawa Aiko, *Nanpō tokubetsu ryūgakusei ga mita senjika no Nihonjin* (Tōkyō: Sōshisha, 1997).

⁶⁵ Nagami, *Inoue Masaji*, 566; Hara, *Eiryō Maraya*, 155.

from owning more than 50 acres of land in Malaya. Nan'yō Kyōkai, as well as Kuhara, submitted several petitions to the Foreign Affairs Ministry, and sent Inoue and association vice president Uchida Kakichi to meet with Foreign Affairs Minister Motono Ichirō to urge that the government address the issue.⁶⁶ The ministry negotiated with the British but to no avail.

Also in 1917, when the British seized and ceased all telegraph services in the Dutch East Indies in June, Japanese businesses reported to Nan'yō Kyōkai that they could not conduct trade and shipping without communications. The association president Yoshikawa and vice president Uchida Kakichi met with Foreign Affairs Minister Motono, Agriculture and Commerce Minister Nakakōji Ren, and Nan'yō Kyōkai director and Communications Minister Den Kenjirō, to urge action on the issue. The ministers successfully petitioned with the British and managed to re-open telecommunications channels between Nan'yō and Japan in November of the same year.⁶⁷

Starting in July 1919, Nan'yō Kyōkai president Den Kenjirō urged successive prime ministers, foreign affairs ministers, and agriculture and commerce ministers to negotiate with the French in order to remove trade barriers to doing business in French Indochina. Since Japan had no commercial treaty with France, the highest tariff rates were applied to Japanese goods. In one of the petitions, Den stated that the French applied the lowest possible customs rates to European and American goods, and applied discriminatory high customs rates to Japanese goods. There was a Taiwan to French Indochina steamer service, run by Yamashita Steamships,⁶⁸ but due to the high tariff rates, no cotton and textile goods could be exported on the steamers. Possibly as a result of years of constant Japanese protests spurred by Nan'yō Kyōkai, the French Governor-General Martial Merlin visited Japan in 1924 to improve relations between the two countries.

⁶⁶ *Nan'yō Kyōkai 10 nenshi*, 115–16. Kuhara was seen by the British as the most significant lobbyist against the ordinance. See Yun Choi-ren, "Maraya ni okeru Nihon no gomu, tekkō tōshi," in *Senkanki Tōnan Ajia*, ed. Sugiyama and Brown, 50, 54–55.

⁶⁷ *Nan'yō Kyōkai 10 nenshi*, 27, 116. While the reasons for the British actions are not clear, it might have stemmed from concerns with the neutral Netherlands and its Netherlands Overseas Trust Company trading in contraband with Germany. See Erik Hansen, "Between Reform and Revolution: Social Democracy and Dutch Society, 1917–1921," in *Neutral Europe between War and Revolution, 1917–1923*, ed. Hans A. Schmitt (Charlottesville, V. A.: University Press of Virginia, 1988), 183.

⁶⁸ For details, see Katayama Kunio, *Kindai Nihon no kaiun to Ajia* (Tōkyō: Ochanomizu Shobō, 1996), 221–50, 278–99.

⁶⁹ As Den had injured his foot, he could not meet with Merlin at the scheduled time. *Nan'yō Kyōkai 10 nenshi*, 93–94, 118–20. An actual commercial treaty for Japan-French Indochina trade was not signed until May 1932.

The 12 February 1934 Dutch East Indies Import Ordinance put severe import quotas on Japanese goods entering the Dutch East Indies. Nan'yō Kyōkai, along with the Tōkyō Chamber of Commerce and other industry associations,⁷⁰ submitted petitions in support of government negotiations. On 10 March and 23 April 1934, Nan'yō Kyōkai appealed directly to the Dutch governor-general, the president and vice president of the Volksraad, and the minister of colonial affairs, urging them to rescind the ordinance. Inoue and general manager Iizumi Ryōzō, along with two other members of Nan'yō Kyōkai, Ishihara Hiroichirō and Matsue Shunji, were invited by the Foreign Affairs Ministry to participate in the Japan-Netherlands Trade Conference of June–December 1934.

Tōyō Kyōkai

While Tōyō Kyōkai was more active than Nan'yō Kyōkai in educational projects, in lobbying,⁷¹ especially during second president Komatsubara Eitarō's tenure,⁷² 1913–19, the organization generally was not particularly active. Komatsubara chose to concentrate on managing the school, but during Gotō Shinpei term as president, 1919–29, Gotō's policy views were reflected in the pages of its publications.

In debates over the fundamental principles of colonial governance, between self-rule and assimilation, most members of Tōyō Kyōkai were vocal advocates of assimilation. During the 1920s and 1930s, the editorials in *Tōyō* were filled with numerous opinion pieces and editorials against the Taiwanese self-rule movement and the post-First World War Taiwan legislature establishment issue.⁷³ However, not all members were avowed assimilationists. Tōgō Minoru, who contributed regularly to the

⁷⁰ Akashi, "Nan'yō Kyōkai," 12–13.

⁷¹ For details on the negotiations, see Murayama Yoshitada, "Dai ichiji Nichi-Ran kaishō-Nihon no yūwateki keizai shinshutsu no tenkanten," in *Ryōtaisenkanki Nihon-Tōnan Ajia kankei no shosō*, ed. Shimizu Hajime (Tōkyō: Ajia Keizai Kenkyūjo, 1986), 99–118; Adachi Hiroaki, "Kaisenzen no keizai kōshō-tai Ranin, Futsuin kōshō," in "*Nanpō kyōeiken*"-senji Nihon no Tōnan Ajia keizai shihai, ed. Hikita Yasuyuki (Tōkyō: Taga Shuppan, 1997), 101–34; and Kokaze Hidemasa, "Nichi-Ran kaiun masatsu no Nichi-Ran kaishō," in *Senkanki Tōnan Ajia*, ed. Sugiyama and Brown, 109–40.

⁷² Komatsubara (1852–1919) was a bureaucrat of the Yamagata Aritomo clique. He served as governor of Saitama, Shizuoka, Nagasaki prefectures, vice minister of justice, home affairs, and was the education minister and agriculture and commerce minister during Katsura Tarō's second cabinet in 1908. Aside from his political career, he devoted his energies to education administration, serving as Kokugakuin University's president in addition to his post in Tōyō Kyōkai.

⁷³ See, for example, the editorial in *Tōyō* 26, no. 5 (May 1923): 138.

periodical, was among a minority of *Tōyō Kyōkai* opposed to assimilation.⁷⁴

There were also some members who expressed support for anti-imperialists who were seeking refuge in Japan. Pan-Asianist tones vivified feature articles on Subhas Chandra Bose and Artemio Ricarte, while anger oscillated through⁷⁵ commentaries against British and American racism and arrogance.

There were also constant calls by some association members in Taiwan for more cargo freight trains cars and fewer luxury sleeping cars in Taiwan in order to improve the distribution of goods on the island from the ports, more convenient transportation linkages to the home islands and French Indochina, more freedom of the press, more education related to Taiwan in Japan, and other issues related to the administration of Taiwan.⁷⁶ Whether as a direct result or not, the number of freight train cars increased from around 5,000 to around 10,000 in Taiwan from 1920 to 1930.⁷⁷

Especially for the period between the Gotō-Joffe talks in the spring of 1923 to the normalization of relations in 1925, Russia-related articles were frequently featured. Such constant urgings for greater Russo-Japanese trade and cooperation were consistent with president Gotō Shinpei's foreign policy views regarding Russia.⁷⁸ Throughout the 1920s, the pages of *Tōyō* were filled with articles outlining the natural resources of the Russian Far East, and the potential economic benefits of normalization with post-revolution Russia.

⁷⁴ See, for example, Tōgō Minoru, "Shokuminchi seido no konpon hōshin," *Tōyō* 28, no. 11 (November 1925): 2–12.

⁷⁵ The features on Bose were unabashed and biting in its criticisms of Ishii Kikujirō and subdued but hardly ambivalent in its praise of Tōyama Mitsuru, Uchida Ryōhei, and Kōno Hironaka. See Nakayama Kei, "Indo no shishi, Bōsu shi," *Tōyō* 28, no. 1 (January 1925), 61–85; ibid. 28, no. 2 (February 1925): 51–66; ibid. 28, no. 3 (March 1925): 124–140; also Rasai Gakujin, "Dōjingo," *Tōyō* 28, no. 1 (January 1925): 92–97.

⁷⁶ See for example regular contributions from Taiwan by S. S. Sei, "Taiwan jihō—saikin no mondai," in most issues of *Tōyō* in the 1920s and 1930s in which these and many other issues are raised.

⁷⁷ Takahashi Yasutaka, *Nihon shokuminchi tetsudōshi ron* (Tōkyō: Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha, 1995), 30.

⁷⁸ For details, see, for example, Sakurai Ryōju, *Taishō seijishi no shuatsu-Riken dōshikai no seiritsu to sono shūhen* (Tōkyō: Yamakawa, 1997), especially 186–88; and Aizawa Kiyoishi, "Nihon kaigun no senryaku to sankoku dōmei mondai," in *Nihon no kiro to Matsuoka gaikō*, ed. Miwa Kimitada and Tobe Ryōichi (Tōkyō: Nansōsha, 1993), 41–45.

⁷⁹ See for example, Matsumoto Kunihira, "Sekai ni okeru Nihon gaikō no tachiba o ronji—Nichi-Ro-Shi sankoku dōmei ni tsuite," *Tōyō* 28, no. 4 (April 1925): 2–13; Gotō Shinpei, "Nichi-Ro kōkanfuku ni tsuite," *Tōyō* 28, no. 3 (March 1925): 1–14; Gotō Shinpei, "Tairiku hatten no tame ni," *Tōyō* 28, no. 6 (June 1925): 2–12; and Moriya Sakao, "Kakumei go no Roshia," *Tōyō* 28, no. 11 (November 1925): 2–18.

Networks and Effectiveness

Effectiveness in lobbying has been linked to organizational interlocks and personal connections. As noted in the previous sections, the executives of both associations were generally well-known bureaucrats and businessmen, a fact which facilitated their lobbying activities. Interlocking directorates and connections link organizations and their leaders to segments of the political and economic environment, usually with those of similar socio-political standing, or similar levels of “clout and grace.”⁸⁰ Factors such as age, position in politics, educational background, length of time in an organization, and personal values also lead groups and individuals into different coalitions, depending on the issue.

One type of interlock was with prominent political positions, such as cabinet posts. Proximity of organization executives to major public office facilitated policy access. From the latter half of the 1910s through the 1920s, Gotō Shinpei and Den Kenjirō were two of the most powerful cabinet ministers not to have become prime minister. Not coincidentally, of the numerous voluntary associations engaged in lobbying, Tōyō Kyōkai and Nan'yō Kyōkai were two of the most powerful during the 1910s and 1920s.

During the Terauchi Masatake cabinet (October 1916–September 1918), Gotō was known as the de facto power in the cabinet as he held successive posts as home affairs and foreign affairs minister. Den was appointed communications minister in the cabinet. In April 1918, Privy Councilor Itō Miyoji told Den Kenjirō that either Den or Gotō would most likely be appointed as the prime minister to succeed the Terauchi cabinet.⁸¹

In the Yamamoto Gonnohyōe cabinet (September 1923–January 1924), Gotō and Den were again placed in cabinet posts to balance power. Gotō was appointed home minister, while Den was assigned the agriculture and commerce post. Genrō Saionji Kinmochi feared that with Gotō as home minister, anti-Seiyūkai tendencies would become strongly reflected in the cabinet; thus, he hoped Yamamoto would favor Den more as Den was close to the Seiyūkai. Saionji even assembled a pro-Den, anti-Gotō group during the Yamamoto cabinet to block Gotō’s policy initiatives. In

⁸⁰ See Joseph Galaskiewicz et al., “The Influence of Corporate Power, Social Status, and Market Position on Corporate Interlocks in a Regional Network,” *Social Forces* 64 (December 1985): 423; and also Mayer Zald, *Organizational Change: The Political Economy of the YMCA* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

⁸¹ Jeffrey Pfeffer, *Power in Organizations* (Marshfield, Mass.: Pitman, 1981), 37.

⁸² Den Kenjirō Denki Hensankai, *Den Kenjirō Denki* (Tōkyō: Den Kenjirō Denki Hensankai, 1932), 345–47.

⁸³ Matsumoto Gōkichi, *Taishō demokurashii ki no seiji* (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 1959), 256, 274–75.

1926, Den, along with Hiranuma Kiichirō and Uehara Yūsaku, was a top candidate⁸⁴ to form a new cabinet, but the task eventually fell to Wakatsuki Reijirō.

Having powerful figures as association presidents helped membership and fund-raising drives, attracted audiences for association sponsored lectures, and moreover, expedited lobbying. For example, in the aforementioned 1917 case of the British seizing telecommunications between Dutch East Indies and Japan, Den was at the time, a director of the association (Yoshikawa was the president, Uchida vice president) and concurrently, the communications minister in the Terauchi cabinet. Uchida Kakichi's appointment as governor-general of Taiwan in 1924 was also facilitated through his ties to Den. When Yamamoto Gonnohyōe offered Den the communications minister post while Den was back visiting Tōkyō from Taiwan, Den insisted on assurances that someone with previous experience in Taiwan would succeed him as Taiwan governor-general. Once Uchida Kakichi's appointment became official, Den drove out⁸⁵ to Ōmori, where Uchida lived, to congratulate him on the appointment.

Although Uchida's connection to Den through the Nan'yō Kyōkai was presumably not the sole reason why he was appointed, his lobbying activities as vice president of the association had kept him in contact with various prominent bureaucrats and politicians, and had kept Uchida's name on the political stage.

Even if the lobbying had no direct connection with the official posts held by association executives, the fact that the representatives of the association held major posts helped lobbying through simple cachet. For example, in the case of Gotō, while he was president of Tōyō Kyōkai (1919–29) he was also Tōkyō mayor (1920–23), and home affairs minister (1923–24), but he did not hold an official post related to foreign affairs (he was foreign affairs minister in 1918). Nevertheless, the association could take up the Russo-Japanese normalization issue with some effect due to Gotō's personal interests in the issue and his political influence. Gotō had obtained⁸⁶ approval from Prime Minister Katō Tomosaburō to negotiate with Joffe,⁸⁷ but met with unofficial resistance from other quarters. Ogawa Heikichi gave Kita Ikki money⁸⁸ to criticize Gotō, and openly criticized the talks with Joffe in the Diet. Tōyō Kyōkai served as a counter to such crit-

⁸⁴ Matsumoto, *Taishō demokurashii ki no seiji*, 301.

⁸⁵ Den Kenjirō denki, 528, 533.

⁸⁶ Tsurumi, *Gotō Shinpei*, 4, 385.

⁸⁷ Itō Takashi, *Daiichiji sekai taisen to seitō naikaku* (Tōkyō: Yamakawa Shuppan, 1997), 225–26.

icisms, with various prominent figures expressing their support for Goto's foreign policy initiative in print.

The associations provided one more base, in addition to political parties, on which bureaucrats and other candidates for official posts could maintain and develop links to political and business leaders. If not occupying a formal post, the presidency or directorship of a major voluntary association allowed bureaucrats and politicians to keep their names reasonably prominent, obtain information on issues of interest, and lobby under the name of the association.

These ties and cross-institutional networks were maintained through various methods. The first and most obvious strategy was to have individuals become members of the association. Another method was to form alliances with other similar organizations. Tōyō Kyōkai and Nan'yō Kyōkai had several interlocking directorates and memberships during its overlapping years of existence, 1915–45.⁸⁸ Often, business figures and retired politicians held memberships to numerous associations, facilitating informational exchanges and joint projects between the two organizations.

Another form of network maintenance and information exchange was hosting dinners and lectures with officials in key positions. For example, both Tōyō Kyōkai and Nan'yō Kyōkai regularly scheduled dinners with colonial bureaucrats, usually at the bureau chief or vice governor-general levels. For example, Tōyō Kyōkai invited vice governor-generals of Korea to dinners whenever they were back in Tōkyō.

Educational projects also provided opportunities for expanding networks. Prominent officials were frequently asked to give speeches at graduation ceremonies and school year opening ceremonies.⁸⁹ In 1938, Takushoku University adopted an advisory system. Rather than advisors renowned for their expertise in higher education, names such as Ugaki Kazushige, Hirota Kōki, Nagai Ryūtarō, Nakajima Chikuhei, Matsuoka Yōsuke, Yasukawa Yūnosuke, Shimomura Hiroshi, Kodama Kenji, Fukai Eigo,⁹⁰ Mizuno Rentarō, Fujiyama Raita, and Yūki Toyotarō filled the roster.

⁸⁸ Hayakawa Senkichirō, Ishizuka Eizō, Kondō Renpei, Ōhashi Shintarō, Ōtani Kakei, Magoshi Kyōhei, Masuda Masuzō, Ikeda Kenzō, Kamata Eikichi, Masuda Giichi, Wada Toyoji, Inoue Masaji, and Den Kenjirō were some of the overlapping directors and members of Nan'yō Kyōkai and Tōyō Kyōkai.

⁸⁹ See, for example, *Tōyō* 26, no. 5 (May 1923): 139; and *ibid.* 39, no. 7 (July 1936): 14–27, 146; also *Nan'yō Kyōkai zasshi* 15, no. 1 (January 1929): 108; and *Nan'yō* 25, no. 3 (March 1939): 76.

⁹⁰ *Takushoku Daigaku 60 nenshi*, 289.

Questions as to whether these associations represent collusion of politicians with big business or whether they represent the voice of private interests against governmental bureaucratic controls over the economy deflect attention from the fact that personal networks were the engines which drove these groups. It should be noted that not all genrō, politicians, and bureaucrats thought alike simply because they were Japanese, as is implied in the “uniquely Japanese cooperation between state and enterprise” clichéd construction invariably invoked from some quarters. Of course, despite the relatively large membership numbers, neither of the two associations were ever mistaken for populist or grass-roots movements.

These were elite coalitions and cliques which manifested themselves in voluntary associations. These networks created access and attracted funds. The divisions were along personal and policy lines, not along private-public, or inter-ministerial distinctions. It should be noted that the “government” was not composed of individuals who were always in power, but individuals who rotated in and out of cabinet posts, and vied for cabinet positions. A tool in this jockeying and lobbying process was a position within a well-known, well-connected organization, such as Nan'yō Kyōkai or Tōyō Kyōkai.

PART III: ORGANIZATIONAL DECLINE

Despite the paucity of research directly on voluntary organizations, there have been some views put forth regarding their impact and changing roles in prewar Japanese history in the context of the southward advance (*nanshin*). Most explain the decline in influence of these organizations during the 1930s in terms of changes in the external environment. However, I would argue that the internal changes within the associations have been overlooked in the existing literature. By focusing on generational change and the consequent deterioration of personal networks, the impact of internal dynamics on the decline of these organizations can be highlighted.

Of the environmental approaches, one of the more popular ones has been the “advance guard” view, which stresses the military significance of voluntary associations before the outbreak of the Pacific War. The Nan'yō Kyōkai is portrayed as an intelligence arm for later military expansion.⁹¹ Especially after 1936, the association did undertake several intelligence reports for the army and navy. From the beginning to the end,

⁹¹ See Eric Robertson, *The Japanese File: Pre-War Japanese Penetration into Southeast Asia* (Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia, 1979).

Nan'yō Kyōkai received substantial subsidies from the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the Taiwan Government-General⁹², and had many bureaucrats in its executive and membership. In terms of spy cases, there were cases involving employees of firms which were members of the Nan'yō Kyōkai, such as the one in December 1934, where Ishihara Sangyō Singapore branch head, Nishimura Yoshio, died in a British prison after having been arrested on spying charges.⁹³

Another view stresses the impact of the "Fundamental Principles of the National Policy" statement of August 1935 which explicitly outlined the importance of expansion into Nan'yō. During the tenures of successive governors from Den to Nakagawa, the Taiwan Government-General's southward advance activities had been limited to economic research, but now a renewed age of southward expansion began in 1935. The Taiwan Government-General, the Tōkyō government, Colonial Ministry, Foreign Affairs Ministry, and⁹⁴ the navy sought to obtain control over the southward advance policy. The navy successfully landed admiral Kobayashi Seizō in the Taiwan governorship (1936–1940). Kobayashi implemented new policies to promote industrialization, assimilation, and military preparedness. Reflecting this interest, Navy General Staff members began attending meetings of the Nan'yō Kyōkai beginning in July 1935.

Another argument emphasizes the economic environment in explaining the role of voluntary associations. Due to the proliferation of trade barriers against Japanese goods in the 1930s, voluntary associations became progressively closer to the Foreign Affairs Ministry as trade barriers necessitated increasing negotiations with foreign governments. In order to expedite their lobbying, the larger trading firms in particular used voluntary organizations to cooperate with the Foreign Ministry. For example, Nan'yō Kyōkai also counted Foreign Affairs Ministry officials such as Tōgō Shigenori and Shigemitsu Mamoru among its directors even prior to 1935. Hashiya Hiroshi argues that in 1938, when Nan'yō Kyōkai became a *zaidan hōjin*, it was in compliance with a move by the Foreign Affairs

⁹² From 1939 to 1941, the Taiwan Government-General gave ¥12,000 each year to Nan'yō Kyōkai, and another ¥6,000, ¥10,000 and ¥6,000 to the Taiwan branch. Kondō Masami, *Sōryokusen to Taiwan-Nihon shokuminchi hōkai no kenkyū* (Tōkyō: Tōsui Shobō, 1996), 110–11.

⁹³ Supposedly, he committed suicide by drinking poison. Nishioka, *Singapōru no Nihonjin*, 150.

⁹⁴ Gotō Ken'ichi, "Taiwan to Nan'yō-Nanshin mondai tono kanrende," in *Kindai Nihon to shokuminchi*, ed. Ōe Shinobu et al., vol. 2 (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 1992), 147, 150, 153–54; also Hatano Sumio, "Kokubō kōsō to Nanshinron," in *Tōnan Ajia to Nihon*, ed. Yano, 147–65; and Hatano Sumio, "Nihon kaigun to 'Nanshin,'" in *Ryōtaisenkaki Nihon-Tōnan Ajia*, ed. Shimizu, 207–36.

Ministry to put the various semi-private and private organizations under its unified supervision.⁹⁵

An explanation slightly different from the above three is one that can be labeled a resource dependence view. Hara Fujio surmises that Nan'yō Kyōkai overextended itself in acquiring land in the Cameron Highlands for an emigration project in 1937. Twenty families moved in, but all but three left prior to December 1941. The jungle hillside conditions, poor harvests, and British and Chinese hostility all discouraged the emigrants from staying. As a consequence of the considerable financial strain, the only way for Nan'yō Kyōkai to realize the long-held dreams of successful emigration to Nan'yō and to continue other association operations was for the association to cooperate closely⁹⁶ with the military or whoever controlled the government purse strings.

All of the above views point out important factors in driving the decline of Nan'yō Kyōkai. Hara's assessment of the impact of financial dependency on the government funds points to one of the basic weaknesses common to most voluntary associations. Especially with Nan'yō Kyōkai and Tōyō Kyōkai, executives had used personal connections to solicit donations and endowments and had relatively little in the way of independent sources of funds. The 1935 declaration, economic barriers, and wartime intelligence also clearly had major impacts on independence and directions of the Nan'yō Kyōkai.

While acknowledging the environmental forces and limitations in resources, I would argue that the fundamental reason for the decline was due to generational changes in leadership within Nan'yō Kyōkai and Tōyō Kyōkai. Both associations had already undergone changes in platform and power by 1935, when the environmental changes peaked.

Organizations are not established in vacuums; therefore, vestiges of history influence structure and original power distributions. All organizations face problems of retention and diffusion of knowledge, skills, information, and political power. During the 1920s, Den and Gotō had been two of the most significant political figures, always being mentioned as possible prime ministers. By the 1930s, the de facto leaders of both organizations were not comparable in terms of political power, and perhaps more importantly, commitment to the associations.

The importance of leadership succession in the associations can be seen clearly in the case of Tōyō Kyōkai. After it was started by Katsura, the organization experienced a slight lull under Komatsubara. When Gotō inherited the presidency, he managed to revive it quickly with his personal

⁹⁵ Hashiya Hiroshi, "Tōnan Ajia," 213–36; also Yoshikawa, "Senzen Fuirippin," 129–46.

⁹⁶ Hara, *Eiryō Maraya*, 61–76.

networks and tireless lecture tours. During his term, Gotō used his personal networks to obtain funds from the sugar manufacturers association for the university, and also used his status as a former civil governor of the Taiwan Government-General to obtain funds from the Taiwan Government-General for specific research projects.

When Gotō became president of the association after Komatsubara's death, he asked his close friend Mizuno Rentarō⁹⁷ to become the vice president. Mizuno replied that he would⁹⁸ on the condition that Nagata Hidejirō be appointed executive director. When Gotō died in 1929, Mizuno was elected new president. However, Mizuno in the 1930s did not wield the same kind of power Gotō had in the 1920s. Mizuno had failed to impress Saionji during the collapse of the Kiyoura Keigo cabinet in June 1924. As Saionji put it, "... especially when Yamamoto (Gonnohyōe), Tokonami (Takejirō), and Mizuno come to visit, there is no point in talking to them." Furthermore, due to the scandal in 1928 when Mizuno first resigned, then rejoined the Tanaka Giichi cabinet as minister of education¹⁰⁰ when Kuhara Fusanosuke was appointed as communications minister,¹⁰¹ Mizuno himself was not as powerful a figure as he had been.¹⁰²

Unlike Mizuno, the new vice president, Nagata Hidejirō,¹⁰³ held cabinet positions in the 1930s, as colonial minister in the Hirota Kōki cabinet (March 1936–February 1937), and railways minister (November 1939–Jan-

⁹⁷ Mizuno (1868–1949) was vice home affairs minister under Gotō in the Terauchi cabinet, then became home minister when Gotō switched to foreign affairs. He was appointed vice governor-general of Korea in 1919, then served as home affairs minister in the Katō Tomosaburō and Kiyoura Keigo cabinets. He was appointed education minister in the Tanaka Giichi cabinet in 1928, but resigned to protest the appointment of Kuhara Fusanosuke as communications minister. Mizuno was the central Seiyūkai figure within the home ministry. In 1935, he left the party after he served on a deliberative council in 1935 for the Okada cabinet. From 1936, he was the head of the Kyōchōkai, and served as advisor to the Sanpō Hōkokukai and other wartime organizations.

⁹⁸ Mizuno Rentarō, "Nagata Hidejirō kun o omou," *Tōyō* 46, no. 12 (December 1943): 7.

⁹⁹ Matsumoto, *Taishō demokurashiiki no seiji*, 301.

¹⁰⁰ For more details on the incident, see, for example, Awaya Kentarō, *15 nen sensōki no seiji to shakai* (Tōkyō: Ōtsuki Shoten, 1995), 22–24.

¹⁰¹ Mizuno's decline in influence can be seen in the fact that in 1940 he had to struggle mightily to keep the Kyōchōkai (of which he was president) intact under government-mandated reorganizations of labor-related bodies. Takahashi Hikohiro, "Shinkanryō, kakushin kanryō to shakaisha kanryō-Kyōchōkai bunsōki no ichishiten toshite," *Shakai Rōdō Kenkyū* 43, nos. 1–2 (1996): 52.

¹⁰² Nagata (1876–1943) was Home Ministry police bureaucrat who was promoted by Mizuno and Gotō. He had two terms as Tōkyō mayor, in 1923–24, and in 1930–31.

uary 1940) in the Abe Nobuyuki cabinet, but had neither the stature, pull, nor clout that Katsura and Gotō had wielded.

The Nan'yō Kyōkai's top executive also changed drastically around the same time. Den died in 1930, and Uchida in 1933. Several other founding members, such as Nitobe Inazō, Inoue Junnosuke, and Ōtani Kahei, also died in 1932. Executive director Inoue Masaji enlisted Konoe Fumimaro to be the new association head, but Konoe's personal interest in the economic and emigration possibilities for Nan'yō were not strong. Starting in 1930, a new generation of Nan'yō businessmen, such as Ishihara Hiroichirō and Matsue Shunji entered the organization.¹⁰³ Ishihara had close ties to right-wing figures, Ōkawa Shūmei in particular. The spy cases in Southeast Asia involved Ishihara Sangyō employees as well as Nan'yō Kyōkai researchers, but all of these occurred after the deaths of Den and Uchida, and the decline in influence of Inoue Masaji, who had turned his attention in emigration projects in South America around 1932. In 1938, Inoue and Fujiyama Raita both retired as vice presidents. Inoue retained connections to Nan'yō Kyōkai as an advisor, while Kodama Hideo and Hayashi Kyūjirō became the new vice presidents.

This is not to assert that had Mizuno not reached his political peak in the 1920s alongside Gotō, Tōyō Kyōkai members would have become anti-war activists, or that had Den and Uchida lived longer, Nan'yō Kyōkai would not have engaged in intelligence operations or have rebelled against Taiwan Government-General and Foreign Affairs Ministry controls. However, the decline in independence arose not only from the pressure of external forces, but also from succession and generational change occurring in the key positions within the associations and also in elite ranks in general. Generational change among the elites also meant that the leaders of Tōyō Kyōkai and Nan'yō Kyōkai had fewer connections to active cabinet ministers, and the number industrialists who had been sources of non-governmental funds declined rapidly as such individuals as Magoshi Kyōhei, Shibusawa Eiichi, Asano Soichirō, and others died in the late 1920s and early 1930s.

As personal networks were based on ties between various individuals, these links could not be institutionalized and transferred very successfully. The internal changes in Tōyō Kyōkai and Nan'yō Kyōkai combined with generational change and environmental changes to produce the decline in independence and lobbying activities.

¹⁰³ On Ishihara, Ōkawa, the Meirinkai, and Jinmukai, see Akasawa Shirō and Awaya Kentarō, eds., *Ishihara Hiroichirō kankei bunsho*, vol. 1 (Tōkyō: Ritsumeikan Hyakunenshi Henshūshitsu, Kashiwa Shobō, 1994), 302–7.

CONCLUSION

The Tōyō Kyōkai and the Nan'yō Kyōkai conducted a wide-range of activities. Research on specific regions, information dissemination, education, lobbying, and other activities informed governments and private companies of specific conditions in other areas of Asia. In terms of interactions with Asia, the two associations gathered data and distributed information and images through lectures, schools, exhibitions, tourism, and publications. In terms of domestic politics, they lobbied on specific issues as well as served as a base of power for Gotō Shinpei, Den Kenjirō, and other political figures. The two organizations also displayed institutional isomorphism—similar organizational forms, internal demography, organizational scale, financial dependency, and other characteristics.

Although existing views stress the environmental changes to explain the roles of voluntary organizations, in the case of Tōyō Kyōkai and Nan'yō Kyōkai, leadership changes by the first half of the 1930s had considerably more impact in decreasing their lobbying power than changes in economic conditions, or even the national policy. When the role of personal networks operating within and without each voluntary association are emphasized, rather than the political and social system itself, the internal changes and the effects ¹⁰⁴ they engendered on organizational survival become more obvious.

Such organizations as Tōyō Kyōkai and Nan'yō Kyōkai were formalizations and manifestations of cross-institutional linkages that were at the core of most political bargaining and transaction in Japan. This is not to deny the importance of formal affiliations and hierarchies, but rather to point out that through these organizations, interest networks were formed and fortified, and these significantly affected interactions with other countries, while providing candidates for cabinet positions with an organizational base to draw on.

The analysis of elite cross-institutional networks and coalitions have been subsumed by the tide of nation-centered narratives which focus primarily on official structures and institutions of the nation-state. Although more work needs to be done on these types of elite associations and the personal networks, the examination of the role of Tōyō Kyōkai and Nan'yō Kyōkai in domestic politics and foreign interactions shows the importance of personal networks in shaping Japanese history.

¹⁰⁴ See Chester I. Barnard, *The Function of the Executive* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938); and Howard Aldrich, *Organizations and Environments* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1979), 281.