

# THE JAPANESE ROLE IN THE EMERGING ASIA-PACIFIC ORDER: A ROLE FOR STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS?

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## 1 INTRODUCTION<sup>1</sup>

A striking feature of the nascent post-Cold War order in Asia-Pacific is the emergence of new regionalist, subregionalist and microregionalist projects in the context of ongoing globalization and regionalization processes. In this paper, we will address the ways in which, in the wake of the Cold War's ending, the Japanese state and non-state actors are giving shape to the emerging order in Asia-Pacific on different spatial scales. Whether we take the regional scale of Asia-Pacific, the subregional scale of East Asia, or the microregional scale of the Japan Sea Rim Zone, we find the state and a range of non-state actors playing a role in reconfiguring these spatial orders through their political, economic, security and cultural activities. This is evidenced by the government's promotion of dialogue on regional security through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) and dialogue on the regional economy through the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC); in responding to the Malaysian proposal to establish the subregional grouping of East Asian states, the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC); and in the initiatives taken by prefectures and cities to establish microregional, cross-border zones of cooperation, as in the case of the Japan Sea Rim Zone. In this way, post-Cold War regionalist projects are being pursued on different spatial scales, embrace a wide range of issue areas, involve an array of actors, and vary greatly in their degree of institutionalization (Hook and Kearns 1999). What is more, post-Cold War regionalism is often contested, as with APEC and EAEC, which represent quintessentially an ideological struggle to construct a regional versus a subregional identity as the core of the emerging order, with the United States now taking the lead in promoting an 'Asia-Pacific' order, and Malaysia seeking to promote an 'East Asian' order (Hook 1999). In terms of identity, these states can be said to be seeking to reproduce the 'imagined community' (Anderson 1991) at the heart of the nation-state at the regional and subregional lev-

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els, which is thereby generating overlapping, patchwork regionalisms on different spatial scales.

The difference between regionalism and regionalization is here crucial. We draw a distinction between regionalism and subregionalism as ideological projects, on the one hand, and regionalization and subregionalization as processes, on the other. The former are driven forward by actors, such as states, which are strategically motivated to construct a 'region' or 'subregion'. These regionalist projects differ from regionalization processes, which are driven forward by actors, such as corporations, which do not necessarily harbour such strategic motivations. More specifically, regionalism is rooted in strategic motivations to promote a regional identity, ideology, and order, whereas regionalization is a non-motivational process emerging out of economic and social activities. The link between the two is political: regionalization processes provide the economic and cultural ingredients for the ideological construction of regional and subregional identities. The complex overlapping of regionalist projects and regionalization processes is central to the statist attempts to construct 'Asia-Pacific' and 'East Asian' identities and orders. For these are two rival projects seeking to impute space with different identities in the wake of the ending of the Cold War and the search for new regional and subregional orders. However, it has been the activities of corporations in particular that have created the regionalization processes at the heart of the attempt to impute space with trade and investment data as sources for a new 'Asia-Pacific' identity, linking the Pacific with Asia, contrasted with a more circumscribed 'East Asian' identity rooted in both economics and culture. In this we can see the need to examine the role of the state as well as the market in shaping the emerging regional and subregional orders.

By paying attention to both the state and the market we are drawing on certain insights from two of the dominant approaches to the study of international relations, namely realism or the more contemporary variant, neo-realism (e.g. Morgenthau 1978; Waltz 1979), and liberal or neo-liberal institutionalism (e.g. Keohane 1984; Baldwin 1993). The realist's focus on the state and its material capabilities alerts us to the continuing importance of these features of international relations, whereas the institutionalist's interest in the way economic actors strengthen the potential for regional cooperation highlights the need to analyze actors other than the state in our examination of the Japanese role in the emerging Asia-Pacific order. At the same time, however, our reference above to the role of the soft aspects of power, such as ideology and identity, and the emergence of multi-layered regionalism on different spatial scales, involving a plurality of actors going beyond the state and the market to include sub-state po-


litical authorities, suggests we should not be restricted solely to drawing on the insights of these two approaches.

Thus, in order to illuminate the complex and overlapping layers of activities carried out on different spatial scales by a range of Japanese actors, we will also pay attention to the role of 'soft power', ideology and identity (see Cox 1996; Checkel 1998), as well as to the international role of sub-state political authorities (see Alger 1990). In particular, in the final section we will turn our attention to the least studied scale of regional activity, microregionalism, in order to elucidate how the Japan Sea coastal prefectures and cities of the archipelago are seeking to give life to a microregional project by linking together sub-national parts of North East Asia, with the microregion embracing areas of Japan, the Russian Far East, North East China, South Korea, and North Korea (see map below). Although the idea for this project dates back to the 1960s, as during the Cold War the bilateralism at the heart of Japanese security policy directed attention towards the Pacific, links across the Japan Sea were severely constrained, for any attempt to cross the sea, either physically or ideologically, could have been tarred with the red brush of communism. With the ending of the Cold War the 'frozen sea' now is being transformed into a pacific link between Japan and other parts of North East Asia, with sister-city agreements, business activities, and cultural exchange centring on the Japan Sea helping to give shape to the new regional order. In this respect, sub-state political authorities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other actors in civil society, not just the state and corporations, can be seen to be playing a role in the emerging Asia-Pacific order, further 'de-stating' international activities.

## 2 THE BILATERAL COLD WAR SECURITY ORDER

These regional, subregional and microregional projects nevertheless are taking shape within the constraints imposed by the structural and ideological legacies of the Asia-Pacific security order established by the United States during the Cold War. It is true that, in comparison with Europe, the structural legacies of the Cold War can still be identified in East Asia, as in the division of the Korean peninsula and in the survival of the communist political regimes in China and Vietnam. Still, the military confrontation on the peninsula is not now so much a part of the Cold War regional confrontation as a reflection of North Korea's military isolation, and both the Chinese and Vietnamese regimes are pressing forward with economic liberalization and the introduction of the market economy. While this legacy continues to influence the shape of the Asia-Pacific order, the legacy of the

### The Sea of Japan Zone



Source: Postel-Vinay (1996, p. 491).

military confrontation between the East and West, which centred on the anti-communist bilateral security treaty system set in place by the US in the early post-war years, exerts a more profound structural and ideological constraint on Japan's role in the emerging Asia-Pacific order. This 'hubs and spokes' security system, which firmly ties East Asian allies to the United States, served structurally to divide the region along the Pacific fault line. What this means is that, in contrast to Europe, security issues in East Asia have been understood primarily through the ideological prism of bilateralism centring on the United States, rather than regionalism (on bilateralism,

see Hook 1996a). Thus no multilateral alliance system along the lines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) sank firm roots in East Asia. The most well-known attempt to embrace some of the East Asian nations in a regionally based multilateral security framework, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), ended in failure (on SEATO, see Buszynski 1983).<sup>2</sup> In essence, until the end of the Cold War, regionalism was suffocated under the overpowering ideological weight of bilateralism.

For the Japanese government, at the heart of bilateralism was a conception of security drawn from both the regional and global strategies of the United States. More specifically, the Cold War division of the world into 'two worlds', capitalism and communism, entangled Japan in a definition of the regional security order emanating from outside of the East Asian subregion. The role of Japan in shaping the Asia-Pacific order was thus as a supporter of the US's global and regional strategies through commitments under the US–Japan security treaty system as an 'Asia-Pacific', rather than an 'East Asian', power (on US–Japan security relations, see Funabashi 1997; Fujimoto and Akiyama 1998). This commitment was evidenced ideologically in the promotion of an 'Asia-Pacific' identity and functionally in the dual role of the archipelago as a global as well as a regional launch platform for the United States in the event of nuclear or conventional confrontations. It was essential in the emerging Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union for the United States to secure bases in Japan in order to prosecute and prepare for both these kinds of wars. This was achieved by the signing of the US–Japan Security Treaty in 1951, its renewal in 1960, and the location of the vast majority of US bases outside the main Japanese islands in Okinawa (on Okinawa's role, see THMSK 1997). The return of Okinawa to Japan in 1972 probably means that nuclear weapons no longer are stored in the archipelago, but part of the government's three non-nuclear principles of not to produce, possess or introduce nuclear weapons into Japan has been broken as a consequence of port calls made by nuclear-loaded US naval vessels (for details, see Hook 1996b, 45–73). At the same time, the use of these bases during the Korean War, the Vietnam War and the Gulf War highlights the pivotal role of Japan in conventional wars fought by the United States both inside and outside of the region. In this way, the security treaty with Japan has been at the heart of the US's pursuit of both its regional and global interests.

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<sup>2</sup> The Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) was a 1954 US attempt to graft Pakistan onto a pro-American 'Southeast' Asian military organization composed additionally of Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines, Thailand, and South Vietnam.

In the Cold-War environment, regional security regimes, regional security initiatives, and even regional security dialogue were unable to emerge from beneath the shadow of bilateralism. Regionalism implies multilateralism, which was interpreted both inside as well as outside of the region as a challenge to the bilateralism at the heart of the alliance structure linking Japan to the Pacific, both structurally and ideologically. Thus, attempts to promote regional or multilateral dialogue on security, as seen in President Mikhail Gorbachev's 1986 Vladivostok proposal, were interpreted by the Japanese policy-making elite as a means for the Soviets to erode the bilateral alliance structure, rather than as a genuine way to promote a multilateral security framework, nuclear-free zones, or security dialogue across the ideological divide (for Gorbachev's speech, see Gorbachev 1986). Even attempts by the capitalist authoritarian regimes of East Asia to promote multilateral initiatives on security, as in ASEAN's proposal to create a nuclear-weapons free zone, were resisted by Japan. The realization of this initiative had to wait until after the end of the Cold War, in December 1995, when the ASEAN heads of government and others signed a treaty to prohibit the production, storage, and testing of nuclear weapons.<sup>3</sup>

These structural and ideological constraints on regional security cooperation were reinforced by the legacy of the earlier attempt of the Empire of Japan to restructure the regional order through imperial expansion and violence. For East Asian policy-makers, the reluctance of post-war governments to accept squarely responsibility for the war, not to mention the predilection of leading members of the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) to legitimize the empire's aggression and imperialism (for details, see Wakamiya 1995; Habōhō Kenkyūkai 1995), raised fears over the possible recrudescence of militarism and a new drive to create a contemporary version of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere. In this context, 'security cooperation' in East Asia could possibly provide the former empire with the opportunity to dominate the subregion again. Finally, Japanese policy makers would often trot out the sheer 'diversity' of East Asia, as seen in the differences in political systems, level of economic development, culture, civilization, and so on, as an impediment to the promotion of even

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<sup>3</sup> The Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-free Zone (SEANWFZ or Bangkok Treaty) has been promoted by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since the 1970s, as a part of ASEAN's proposal to establish a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). The Bangkok Treaty was signed in December 1995 by the ten countries making up the zone – Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam – and came into force in March 1997. For further details, see [www.ask.or.jp/~hankaku/english/McCoy.html](http://www.ask.or.jp/~hankaku/english/McCoy.html).

dialogue on regional security. Whatever the constraining influence of 'diversity' may have been, however, it is precisely in this 'diverse' East Asia that security dialogue has come to life in the post-Cold War years.

### 3 POST-COLD WAR REGIONAL SECURITY

The reason is related to the Japanese response to the ending of the Cold War. It emerged gradually as a rethinking of security policy, despite an ideological resistance to the new thinking required by the Cold War's end. By 1993–94 policy makers had gradually come to accept that the global Cold War had indeed ended and that this called for the replacement of the 1976 Defence Outline with a new Outline (for details of the Outlines, see *Bōei Handobukku* 1997, 17–36). What is important to note about the new 1995 Outline, however, is the way the old Cold War structures and ideology continue to constrain thinking. For although the likelihood of war is seen to have been lessened as a result of the Cold War's ending, the Outline also recognizes the need to maintain the US–Japan security treaty system as regional instability can still pose a threat to Japan. In other words, although the US–Japan Security Treaty is rooted firmly in the Cold War confrontation between the 'two worlds' and the perceived threat from the Soviet Union, the Cold War's ending and the fading of the Soviet threat did not lead to the abandonment of the treaty; in fact, the security treaty system has been strengthened. In this we can see the continuing ideological influence of bilateralism on the policy-making elite in Japan.

What this means is that, instead of the rethinking of Japanese security policy taking place outside of the constraints imposed by the structural and ideological straightjacket of bilateralism, the security treaty system at its heart was accepted as the premise of, not a part of, that rethinking (for an attempt at 'new thinking' on Japanese security, see Kyōdō Teigen 1994). Given that, it is hardly surprising to now find the 'Chinese threat' appearing as a replacement for the 'Soviet threat', as an external threat serves forcefully to legitimize the continuation of the security treaty (on China as a threat, see Hasegawa and Nakajima 1997; *Far Eastern Economic Review* 1 July 1999, 21). Still, given the Chinese concern over the possible recrudescence of Japanese militarism, as surfaced during the 1998 visit to Tōkyō by President Jiang Zemin, the government has been reluctant to openly target China and has issued denials of regarding its giant neighbour as a threat (*Far Eastern Economic Review* 10 December 1998, 21). In this situation, China's decision to lob missiles across the straits just before the March 1996 presidential election in Taiwan, the testing of nuclear weapons, and the recent deployment of missiles targeting Taiwan (*Financial*

*Times* 11 February 1999), have provided needed ammunition for those in Japan seeking to promote the 'Chinese threat'. In this way, Japan's giant neighbour has begun to appear as the threat at the base of the US–Japan security treaty system, with the 'North Korean nuclear threat' and 'regional instability' providing additional grist for the bilateralist's mill.

The strengthening of the US–Japan security treaty system has been pushed forward through the April 1996 'reaffirmation' (redefinition) of the treaty and the September 1997 revision of the US–Japan Guidelines for Defence Cooperation. The security architecture being put in place is part and parcel of the US's attempt to play a pivotal role in shaping the emerging Asia-Pacific order. The US–Japan joint declaration redefining the treaty sought to ensure Japan remained firmly tied to bilateralism centring on the Pacific by expanding the scope of the treaty beyond the 'Far East' (Article IV of 1960 treaty), thereby redefining the treaty as an 'Asia-Pacific' security treaty. For instance, the joint declaration makes no reference to the 'Far East', but refers instead to 'Asia-Pacific' a dozen times (Japan–US Joint Declaration on Security 1996). Of course, the geographical extent of 'Asia-Pacific' is more to do with politics than geography, as became clear over the years through the government's flexible and expanding interpretation of the scope of the original 'Far East', but the treaty can now be said to cover as far as the Middle East, the Malacca Straits, and other areas of significance to Japanese security (*Yomiuri Shinbun* 18 May 1996). In this way, even after the end of the Cold War, the US–Japan security treaty system and the ideology of bilateralism remain central to Japan's own role in the emerging Asia-Pacific order.

The redefinition of the security treaty is taking on particular significance in the context of the agreement between Japan and the United States to revise the Guidelines on Defence Cooperation adopted in 1978 (on the revision, see *Gunshuku Mondai Shiryō* 1996, Yamauchi 1999). The various legislative measures required in order to implement the new Guidelines were brought before the Diet in early 1999. In general, the new Guidelines aim to bolster the alliance relationship between the two Pacific powers by integrating Japan more fully into America's war preparations and possible war fighting in Asia-Pacific (For a discussion, see Yamauchi 1999). Despite denials by then Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō, the reference made to US–Japan cooperation in meeting 'situations in areas surrounding Japan' has fueled Chinese suspicions of Japanese cooperation with the United States in any conflict over the Taiwan problem (on this expression, see Maeda and Henmi 1998). In this way, the 'Chinese threat', on the one hand, and the 'security treaty threat', on the other, are surfacing at the centre of the competitive attempts to reshape the Asia-Pacific security order in the post-Cold War era.



At the same time, however, Japanese policy makers are supplementing bilateralism with a multilateral approach to security, as seen in the promotion of multilateral dialogue on regional security through the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the promotion of economic dialogue through APEC. This highlights the complex and overlapping nature of the emerging order in Asia-Pacific, where traditional statist concerns with security through military might, alliances, and the balance of power are being complemented by multilateral initiatives involving politics, economics as well as security.

### *3.1 The ASEAN Regional Forum*

The ARF came into being following Foreign Minister Nakayama Tarō's proposal to create a forum to discuss regional security at the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference in 1991 (for details on Japan's role, see Kawasaki 1997). This took on life in 1993 when the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference agreed to set up the ARF, which held its inaugural working session in Bangkok in July 1994. The Japanese government has played a key role in both establishing and promoting the ARF but, as the name implies, even though Japan pushed the initiative at the outset, ASEAN now plays the central role in setting the framework for security dialogue, with one of the ASEAN nations hosting the annual meeting of the ARF. The initial meeting in July 1994 was the first region-wide dialogue on security to be held including the nuclear powers, USA, China, Russia, as well as Japan and the European Union (EU), with a total of eighteen participants at the first meeting.<sup>4</sup> In 1995 Cambodia, and in 1996 Myanmar and India, joined, bringing the membership to twenty-one. The fifth meeting of the ARF held in Manila in July 1998 was dominated by discussions of the India and Pakistan nuclear tests and the 1997 East Asian financial crisis. In this way, the ARF confirmed the importance of both financial and military security for peace and order in Asia-Pacific.

During the past five years the ARF has emerged as the major forum for multilateral security dialogue in the region. In order to clarify the ARF's regional boundaries, the 1996 meeting introduced the idea of the ARF's 'geographical footprint' of the region, although this does not preclude

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<sup>4</sup> The eighteen members at the first meeting in 1994 were the six ASEAN members (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand); ASEAN's seven dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United States); two consultative partners (China and Russia); and three observers (Vietnam, Laos, and Papua New Guinea). New ASEAN members automatically become members of the ARF.

membership from states outside of this 'footprint'. As the Chairman's Statement declares, the ARF's "'geographical footprint" will cover all of East Asia, both Northeast and Southeast Asia, as well as Oceania', with the key criterion for membership being that only participants 'that directly affect the peace and security of the region are admitted' (Chairman's Statement Third ARF, Jakarta 23 July 1996). In other words, although the 'geographical footprint' of the region is East Asia and Oceania, the Pacific power, the US, the South Asian power, India, and the EU are accepted as members due to their impact on Asia-Pacific security.

Thus, as the United States is a member of the ARF, the bilateralism at the core of Japanese security policy during the Cold War era can be sustained within a multilateral, regional forum in the post-Cold War era. From this perspective, the Japanese concern over East Asian regionalism splitting the two wings of the Pacific, as evidenced in the government's resistance to fully supporting Malaysia's proposal to establish the EAEC (Hook 1999), has not arisen in the 'Asia-Pacific' context of the ARF. Rather, the forum functions as a supplement to the bilateralism at the heart of Japanese security policy (Hook 1998). From this perspective, the ARF can be regarded as a platform from which Japanese policy makers are able to launch an attack on any East Asian concerns that taking on a greater security burden under the revised Guidelines will lead to a revival of militarism.

At the same time, the ARF can serve as a platform for promoting a range of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) in the region, which can work to reduce the distrust of Japan as well as to promote the nation's security interests. For instance, the ARF seeks to promote transparency amongst the members, with Japan pushing for them to make available information on defence and security policies, albeit on a voluntary basis, and to participate in the UN Conventional Arms Register, again on a voluntary basis. In line with the ARF's agreement in 1995 to take a gradualist approach to security issues, moreover, the forum aims to move gradually from CBMs to preventive diplomacy to conflict resolution. Security dialogue is seen as part of confidence building, with the 1995 meeting taking up concrete security issues, such as the question of sovereignty over territory in the South China Sea. Finally, Japan has played the lead role in calling for a ban on anti-personnel mines, the clearing of laid mines, and cooperation amongst ARF members to train personnel in mine-clearing.

In addition to the annual meetings of the ARF, from 1995 onwards a number of intersessional meetings have been organized in order to deal concretely with a variety of regional security issues. The Workshop Series on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, the Intersessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures, the Intersessional

Meeting on Peace-Keeping Operations, and the Intersessional meeting on Search and Rescue Cooperation and Coordination were all held during 1996. These meetings are co-chaired by one non-ASEAN member as well as an ASEAN member and are not necessarily convened in an ASEAN country. In the case of CBMs, for instance, the intersessional meeting was held in Tōkyō in January 1996 under the co-chair of Japan and Indonesia. This was the first time for officials from both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defence Agency to take part in such a meeting. In line with the co-sponsorship of the meeting on CBMs, the second meeting was held in Jakarta in April 1996.

The third 1996 ARF meeting in Jakarta is important in pointing to the way the 'Pacific' side of the security equation is being addressed through the ARF process, as issues taken up are not limited to the military definition of security at the heart of Cold War security concerns. As the Chairman's Statement proposes, the 1997 meeting will take up 'drug trafficking and other related transnational issues such as economic crimes, including money laundering, which could constitute threats to the countries of the region' (Chairman's Statement 1996, 9). The role of Myanmar and other states in the region as the source of drugs to the US market links the American concern with the supply-side of the drug problem, as seen in the case of Latin America, with the widening conception of security in the post-Cold War era. With Myanmar accepted as a member of the ARF in 1996, and the East Asian states less concerned with the drugs problem than the United States, which has maintained a 'war on drugs' from the early 1980s, the security agenda in East Asia is clearly being influenced by the security agenda of the United States. In this sense, the link between the Pacific and East Asian security agendas, which during the Cold War era focused on the communist threat, is being reestablished by the addition of the drug and economic crime issues of growing concern to the United States in the post-Cold War era.

### *3.2 APEC and the East Asian financial crisis*

The ARF as a multilateral forum for addressing security issues in Asia-Pacific is playing a complementary role to APEC as the main forum for addressing economic issues, with both playing a role in shaping the emerging Asia-Pacific order (on APEC's wider role in the emerging Asia-Pacific order, see Kikuchi 1995). In comparison with the ARF, the APEC has established a greater institutional presence, especially after the upgrading of the APEC meetings to involve the political leaders of the members (despite problems over Taiwan's representation), as seen from the 1993 APEC meeting in Blake Island, USA. Despite resistance, the APEC has

emerged gradually as a tool for the US to promote the neo-liberal, free-market ideology at the economic heart of its conception of the Asia-Pacific regional and global orders. This is manifest in the attempts being made to liberalize the multilateral trading system, as seen in the proposals to bring down barriers to trade and investment in East Asia, and the promotion of the free flow of capital. The 1995 Ōsaka Action Agenda, for instance, seeks to address 'all impediments to achieving the long-term goal of free and open trade and investment' (Ōsaka Action Agenda 1995, 1). At times, this neo-liberal, globalist project promoted by the United States has met resistance in East Asia. At the 1998 APEC meeting in Kuala Lumpur, for instance, Japan refused to bow to calls to liberalize forest products and fisheries. Of course, domestic political factors help to explain this resistance, as the LDP is reluctant to erode its political base of support by opening these markets. In the wake of the 1997 East Asian financial crisis, however, the deep-rooted nature of the resistance to the neo-liberalist project has become much more salient.

Indeed, the divergent responses of Japan and the United States to the crisis are central to understanding the inchoate, yet emerging contest over reshaping the Asia-Pacific order at the heart of the powerful neo-liberal, APEC project and the much weaker developmental state, EAEC project. It is illustrated specifically by the Japanese response to the crisis, the contrastive views of Japan and the United States over the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) role in the crisis, the evaluation of Malaysia's imposition of capital controls, and the role of IMF conditionalities. Starkly put, whereas the US sought to orchestrate all rescue efforts internationally through the IMF without putting much of its own money up front, Japan sought to orchestrate them regionally by establishing an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) and contributing both internationally to the IMF and bilaterally to the affected countries, the latter most lately as part of a 30-billion-dollars package under the Miyazawa Plan (on the Miyazawa Plan, see Montagu-Pollock 1999). Whereas US Treasury secretary, Robert Rubin, has praised the role of the IMF (*International Herald Tribune*, 6–7 February 1999), Japanese Minister of Finance, Miyazawa Ki-ichi, has criticized it (see Miyazawa 1998). Whereas Vice-President Al Gore lambasted Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia for his betrayal of the neo-liberal cause at the November 1998 APEC meeting (Gore 1998), Prime Minister Ōbuchi Keizō in December 1998 offered him 1.5 billion dollars of financial assistance as part of the Miyazawa Plan, despite the imposition of capital controls. Whereas the neo-liberal conditionalities imposed on the financial assistance offered to Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea, to which Malaysia balked, were supported by the US (on the ideological role of IMF conditionalities, see Feldstein 1998), the bi-

lateral financial assistance offered by Japan has not been premised on such conditionalities.

These differences are symptomatic of the more general resistance to the neo-liberal project in East Asia and the widening gap between the American and Japanese conceptions of the role of APEC in the emerging Asia-Pacific order. Quintessentially, they arise from the different models of capitalism promoted by Japan and the US. As is indicated by their respective responses to the financial crisis, the American role in promoting the neo-liberal project of the free-market economy and the free flow of capital at the heart of the Anglo-American model of capitalism is increasingly being challenged, albeit often in a low-key manner, by Japanese policy makers seeking to establish a stable financial and economic order in Asia-Pacific based on the continuing viability of the East Asian developmental state model of capitalism (on the latter in the context of the crisis, see Hughes 1999). For the Japanese policy-making elite, APEC is not a tool for realizing its own interests by promoting the neo-liberal, globalist project in East Asia, as with the United States, but a tool for realizing its own interests by promoting East Asian economic development and a stable regional order. The East Asian financial crisis revealed starkly and really for the first time the crucial need for Japan to play a role in establishing financial stability in order to achieve a viable order in Asia-Pacific. This perception of the role of economics and finance in shaping that order means that, in addition to the APEC being viewed as a way for Japan to promote or protect its own narrow economic interests, it also is seen to play a role in promoting the wider security interests of Japan. In this way, security is perceived as being much broader than the military security at the heart of the US-Japan security treaty system.

As part of the Ōsaka Action Agenda, for instance, the APEC economies are committed to 'pursue economic and technical cooperation in order to attain sustainable growth and equitable development in the Asia-Pacific region, while reducing economic disparities among APEC economies and improving economic and social well being' (Ōsaka Action Agenda 1995, 21). This aim of seeking to address economic disparities within the APEC framework is being promoted by Japan through the continuation of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and other forms of economic cooperation. At the same time, the government has offered for the next several years a maximum of 10 billion yen per annum for APEC-approved projects serving to liberalize and facilitate trade and investment in the region. This includes Japanese financial support for holding seminars on such topics as customs duties and industrial ownership as well as for carrying out research and surveys.

The view amongst the policy-making elite that the 'flying geese' model of development has proven successful in East Asia is at the heart of the link between the East Asian model of capitalism and regional order. Despite the lack of empirical support for the 'flying geese model' (Bernard and Ravenhill 1995; Korhonen 1994), the ODA, trade, investment and other links between Japan and the East Asian economies have given rise to disparities as well as helped reduce them. For Japanese policy makers, the efficacy of economic development in reducing if not eliminating the possibility of war in the region seems to be substantiated by the Japanese contribution to East Asian development in the post-war period, but the call in the APEC Leaders' Declaration 'to enrich the lives and improve the standards of living of all citizens' (*Japan Times* 26 November 1996), can be seen as a recognition that the question of economic disparities still needs to be resolved. This is even more the case in terms of the 'human crisis' at the heart of the East Asian crisis and the Japanese attempt to revive the economies through the Miyazawa Plan (on the crisis as a human crisis, see Bullard *et al* 1998). Given the history of many East Asian nations following the decolonization process, maintaining domestic order and peace is as much of a concern as is maintaining regional order and peace. The role of ODA, investment, trade and financial support in reducing the domestic sources of instability is an important motivation for the Japanese government to play a prominent role in APEC. In this respect, the Japanese support for the economic development of these states has tended to take precedence over the promotion of democracy and human rights in East Asia, with political voices inside Japan coming out in support of 'Asian values' (Ishihara and Mahathir 1996), on the one hand, and concern by government critics over the willingness of Japanese policy makers to promote human rights, on the other (Mushakōji 1997). As seen in the recent distribution of financial assistance to Malaysia, authoritarian developmental regimes charged with the suppression of democratic and human rights are as much a target of Japanese financial assistance as are those East Asian states making the transition to democracy and respect for human rights, as in the case of South Korea, which benefit from Japanese investments.

#### 4 THE GROWING ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS

As we have seen above, the primary actor involved in shaping the emerging regional and subregional orders through the ARF and the APEC as well as in response to the East Asian financial crisis has been the Japanese state. By focusing only on the role of the state at the regional and subre-

gional levels, however, we miss the undercurrent of activities carried out by a variety of non-state actors on the microregional scale. By lowering our sights to the sub-state level we thus are able to discern more clearly how complex international relations in East Asia have become after the end of the Cold War. They refuse to fit neatly into either the realist's or the institutionalist's paradigm, involving as they do multiple actors, levels, dimensions, and scales. In other words, a range of actors at the state and sub-state levels can be said to be carrying out a variety of activities in the political, security, economic and cultural dimensions on the regional, sub-regional and microregional scales. Here we will limit our discussion to the role sub-state political authorities, prefectures and cities, are playing on the microregional scale, although this is not to deny the important role other sub-state actors, such as NGOs, are playing, too (see Yamamoto 1996). For over the years these authorities have played a crucial role both in challenging the bilateralism at the heart of Japan's state-centred international relations and in expanding the scope of international activities carried out at the sub-state level. The ending of the Cold War has created an even wider space for such sub-state actors to play a role in shaping the emerging regional order, as the ideological and other barriers dividing the 'two worlds' in East Asia have in the intervening years been largely removed.

The role sub-state political authorities have played in challenging the bilateralism at the heart of state-centred Japanese international relations already had emerged in the 1950s, when local, city and prefectural assemblies adopted a variety of anti-nuclear policies at odds with the central government. At different times during the Cold War era, cities as diverse as Nagasaki and Nagoya and prefectures as diverse as Hiroshima and Hyōgō passed resolutions calling for a ban on nuclear testing, the end to port calls by nuclear-armed US naval vessels, the promotion of disarmament, and carried out other activities opposed to American nuclear testing and the US–Japan security treaty. Later during the Cold War years, a nation-wide movement to promote nuclear-free zones emerged, when in the early 1980s one after another town, city and prefecture resisted central government pressure and declared themselves 'nuclear free' (for details, see Nishida 1985). These anti-nuclear activities demonstrate how, despite the overwhelming structural and ideological power of the bilateralism at the heart of the state's security policy, sub-state actors could still mount a challenge to the role Japan was playing in the US–Japan security treaty system.

In expanding the scope of international activities at the sub-state level, moreover, political authorities have taken the lead in legitimizing sub-state diplomacy. Through these activities the power of the state to totally control foreign policy and international activity has been gradually erod-



ed. Kanagawa prefecture's 'people-to-people' diplomacy, in particular, can be said to illustrate the erosion of the Japanese state's monopoly in this respect (Nagasu and Sakamoto 1983). Still, as with the state, the bilateral prism of international relations meant that, in forging sub-state links across national boundaries, Japanese sub-state political authorities mostly chose cities and other political authorities in the western half of the 'two worlds'. This is evident from the sister-city agreements signed, which overwhelmingly established links between Japan and the United States and Western Europe, rather than across the ideological divide with China and the Soviet Union (Nihon Toshi Sentā 1995).

Nevertheless, despite the structural and ideological constraints imposed by the Cold War, sub-state political authorities were able to play some role in forging links across this divide. For instance, the Hokkaidō city of Otaru signed a sister-city agreement with Nakhodka in Russia in 1966, and biennial meetings of Russian and Japanese mayors were inaugurated in 1970. It was not until the 1980s, and especially the 1990s, however, before China and Russia came to prominence in the sister and other relationships established by sub-state political authorities, suggesting how the ending of the Cold War enabled microregional cooperation to forge ahead. The break-up of the Soviet Union, in particular, gave the counterparts for Japanese sub-state political authorities greater flexibility in developing their own links with Japan, despite the continuing problems between Japan and Russia at the national level arising out of the conflict over the sovereignty of the Northern Territories and the absence of a peace treaty (on this outstanding issue, see Wada 1990; Wada 1999). In particular, the growing links between Japan and Russia can be seen from the increase in contact between the Russian Far East and the coastal prefectures and cities of Japan bordering the Japan Sea (Hokuriku Kokusai Mondai Gakkai 1993).

In this way, sub-state political authorities have adopted policies at odds with those of the central government as well as policies to complement them. Even though their degree of flexibility is limited by the financial control the state can exert over prefectural and city political authorities (Shindō 1994, 35–52), the policies and activities these authorities promote, despite being at odds with the state's policy, can help to shape the short-term as well as the long-term direction the Japanese state takes. Even during the Cold War, their opposition to nuclear weapons and testing can be regarded as one of the factors leading to the eventual ban on atmospheric testing and the Japanese government's adoption of the previously stated three non-nuclear principles. Although, as mentioned above, the last of these principles has been violated as a result of the Japanese government's commitment to the US–Japan security treaty system at the



heart of bilateralism, sub-state political authorities have continued to play a role in restricting its full operation. For instance, during the Vietnam War local ordinances were used in order to prevent the transport of US tanks for the war passing along city roads. More recently, in 1996 Ōta Masahide, the then governor of Okinawa, put pressure on the central government over the renewal of land leases for US bases, which forced a commitment from both the governments of the US and Japan to close Futenma Air Station (for details, see Takamine 1998). Even though Ōta was defeated in the 1998 prefectural election by Inamine Keiichi, the new governor also opposes the construction of an offshore heliport to replace Futenma, although he remains supportive of building a new airport for joint use by military and civilian aircraft.

At the same time, sub-state political authorities can provide the central government with a degree of flexibility in dealing with complex problems between states. In the case of Russo–Japanese relations, for instance, in spite of the outstanding problem of the Northern Territories, sub-state political authorities have been able to play a role in promoting closer relations with Russia, as we will see below in the case of Niigata prefecture.

#### *4.1 The case of the Japan Sea Rim Zone*

During the Cold War, the Japan Sea coastal region of the nation was constrained in seeking to promote links across the sea, as it faced the perceived ‘communist threat’. With the Japanese state’s conception of regional order rooted firmly in bilateralism centring on the US–Japan security treaty system, any attempt to promote links with communist neighbours across the Japan Sea were interpreted in the Cold War ideological mind set as a challenge to the bilateralism at the heart of the government’s security policy. The Japan Sea was seen through an ideological kaleidoscope which, when rotated, highlighted the sea as the possible site for naval warfare with the Soviet Union and obfuscated the sea as a historical trade route or as a possible link to business opportunities in the Russian Far East.

With the ending of the Cold War, the cities and prefectures of the Japan Sea coast have taken the lead in establishing links with their counterparts across the sea. This can be seen, for instance, in the opening of an air route between Niigata and Vladivostok in 1993, the growth in trade, and the strengthening of political and cultural links. These efforts reflect the change in both the global and the Japanese national political economies: on the one hand, the entry of the former socialist economies into the global market place offers Japanese enterprises, particularly small- and medium-sized enterprises, the opportunity to develop business on the other side of the Japan Sea (NKKKK 1992, 86–90). Now, instead of the sea being

viewed as a barrier to economic interaction, as in the Cold War era, the sea is regarded as a transportation link between these prefectures and a variety of economic opportunities on the other side of the sea (Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia, 1996). The potential benefits of economic complementarity are seen in tying together Japanese and South Korean capital and technology, Chinese labour, and the natural resources of the Russian Far East.

On the other hand, the domestic political economy is undergoing drastic change in the face of the worst economic downturn in the postwar era and the strident calls to push forward with decentralization (Matsushita 1996). From the Meiji period onwards, the economic development of Japan has centred on the Pacific coast, with the resultant over-development of the Pacific coastal region and the underdevelopment of the Japan Sea coastal region of Japan, the 'back' ('backward') part of Japan, or *ura Nihon* (Furumaya 1997). The proposal to develop the Japan Sea Rim Zone is thus emerging as part of a domestic reorientation away from the Pacific, not just as a response to the new international opportunities brought about by the end of the Cold War.

Nevertheless, the ending of the Cold War and the normalization of relations between Russia, China, and South Korea have opened up a greater possibility for sub-state political authorities on the Japan Sea side of the nation to play a role in shaping the emerging Asia-Pacific order (for details, see Hook forthcoming). The developing relations between Niigata and the Russian Far East are illustrative. Although Russia is not a target for Japanese ODA, Niigata in 1994 became the first prefecture to carry out 'local ODA', when it put together a blueprint for the maintenance of port facilities in the Russian Far East. Thereafter, a jointly organized project was carried out, leading to the publication of the results of a feasibility study in 1996 (Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia 1996, 19–20). This is an example of how, despite the lack of progress in resolving the territorial dispute and in signing a peace treaty at the national level, political authorities can use public funds in order to act in place of or on behalf of the state at the sub-state level. In turn, this can help to promote the microregional integration of sub-national parts of the two economies and help to shape the emerging order in the region.

In this way, sub-state political authorities and other sub-state actors can play a role in linking together the interests of sub-national parts of Japan and Russia in an emerging microregion. From this, shared interests and identities which cross state boundaries may in time evolve. It is the longer-term development of these shared interests and identities which lies at the heart of the link between sub-state actors and the emerging order in Asia-Pacific. For a regional order embracing a multitude of over-

lapping links and interests on different regional scales is fundamentally different to a regional order held in place by the structural and ideological force of bilateralism centring on the US–Japan security treaty system. In this sense, the increasing visits between prefectural and local politicians; the overseas investment by small-and medium-sized enterprises as well as the giants; the increase in the study of each other’s culture; and the promotion of a variety of activities seeking to promote links between civil societies, can in the longer term be seen to contribute to breaking down the centralizing power of the state and giving shape to a much more complex, multifaceted Asia-Pacific order.

## 5 CONCLUSION

In the Cold-War era, nuclear deterrence and the balance of power were the fount and matrix at the heart of bilateralism. In line with these principles, Japan played a pivotal role on the front line of the conflict between the ‘two worlds’, supporting the global as well as the regional strategy of the United States. Now, in the post-Cold War era, the bilateralism at the heart of Japanese security policy is being supplemented by a role in a multilateral, regional security fora. The ARF is emerging as the key institutional framework for dealing with a wide variety of security issues, including the threat posed to domestic stability by the flow of drugs as well as confidence building measures amongst states with little experience of participating together in dialogue on security issues. Thus, with the end of the Cold War, bilateralism has not been abandoned; instead, as we have seen with the redefinition of the US–Japan Security Treaty and the role of Japan in the ARF, it has been supplemented with a conception of regional security centring on Asia-Pacific. In this sense, the Japanese government is pursuing a twin track approach to security, bilateralism and supplementalism, with the US–Japan security treaty system and the ARF being at the heart of this approach to shaping the emerging Asia-Pacific security order.

Yet to only view the regional order through the prism of the bilateralism at the heart of the security treaty system and the concept of security in the ARF is to miss the importance of economic development and financial stability in contributing to the creation of a new regional order. In its approach to regional peace and order, the Japanese policy-making elite views economic development as crucial, with the APEC seen not simply as a way for the United States to promote the liberalization of trade and investment, but also as a way for Japan to address economic disparities, which can be a source of domestic and regional instability. The Japanese response to the East Asian financial crisis highlights the contested nature

of the regional order being promoted through the US's neo-liberal project. This suggests that the market as well as the state is helping to shape the Asia-Pacific order, with the struggle between the Anglo-American model of capitalism and the East Asian developmental state model of capitalism becoming much more salient in the wake of the East Asian financial crisis. Even if the state is playing a key role in promoting liberalization in the region, market forces are operating largely outside of the control of the state, as the hedge funds' attack on East Asian currencies amply demonstrated to Prime Minister Mahathir (*Far Eastern Economic Review* 11 February 1999, 31). The economic interlinkages in East Asia are tying the subregion together in a complex, overlapping web of investment, trade, and production networks, and these links are playing a central role in shaping the emerging regional order. Indeed, market forces can be said to have engendered a large measure of the incentive to create regional fora and groupings in Asia-Pacific and East Asia. In this sense, the market has given substance to neo-liberal and developmental state projects seeking to shape the emerging regional and subregional orders.

Finally, the pluralization of the actors contributing to the shape of the emerging Asia-Pacific order can be seen in the role played by sub-state political authorities, which are developing microregional links outside of the traditional framework of the state and the market. In this context, the anti-nuclear activities of a range of local authorities, along with the role played by Japanese cities and prefectures in promoting the Japan Sea Rim Zone, demonstrate the international role 'local' actors can play. In the latter case, the Japan Sea Rim Zone is playing a part in embracing the emerging market economy of the Russian Far East and elsewhere in overlapping economic and civic linkages with the Japan Sea coastal cities and prefectures of Japan. The role of these sub-state actors points to how, in addition to states and markets, sub-state political authorities, NGOs and other actors in civil society need to be taken into account in order to elucidate the complex nature of the emerging Asia-Pacific order. What this means is that, as a result of the transformation in the structure of the international system brought about by the end of the Cold War, a much more complex regional order is emerging. At one level, the state continues to be tied to concerns of sovereignty, national interest, national security, and so on, whereas, at another level, sub-state actors in Japan and other states in the region are building cross border links, penetrating each other's societies in the political, economic, security, and cultural dimensions. As a result, the regional order cannot be portrayed simply by reference to the billiard-ball view of international relations; nor can it be portrayed simply by reference to the market; nor, for that matter, can it be portrayed by reference to both the state and the market. It can only be portrayed in a much richer, complex

way by taking account of the role of sub-state actors on the microregional level.

Given these changes in the post-Cold War era, what relationship do we find between regionalism and the emerging regional order? How are we to understand the role of the state, sub-state political authorities, and other non-state actors? In a realist approach, as international relations are viewed as anarchic, with states involved in a struggle for power, regional cooperation has tended to be seen as a by-product of the international system. Thus, the new regional order in Europe to emerge after the end of the Second World War, which took shape in the West as the European Community (EC), has been largely attributed to the bipolarity of the international system. More specifically, as the Cold War was at heart a bipolar confrontation, where the Europeans were under the nuclear protection of the United States, the emergence of the EC has tended to be viewed as a by-product of the West's need to create a military balance of power against the Soviet threat. Yet, if the nature of the international system is the key, then the closer cooperation signified by the Maastricht Treaty and the 1999 launch of the Euro, which are being implemented after the collapse of the bipolar Cold War structure, is difficult to explain in realist terms.

In the case of Asia-Pacific, moreover, the recent emergence of new regional organizations such as APEC and the ARF suggests the growing importance of regionalist projects in the creation of regional order. In these cases, the members are seeking to embrace all the regional powers, rather than create a regional balance of power, as seen by the inclusion of China in these organizations. Indeed, any attempt to try to balance China is resisted in the region, especially by Malaysia (Furukawa 1996, 34). What is more, in both Europe and Asia-Pacific, the strengthening and emergence of regional organizations is occurring in the context of regionalization processes, which are linking the region together in complex ways. Yet these are links not forged by sovereign states, but by non-state actors, especially corporations, which are largely operating on market principles outside of the control of the state. In this sense, these actors are complementing if not eroding the centrality of the state in shaping the emerging regional order in Asia-Pacific.

Thus, the realist attachment to the state as actor and a balance of power premised on nuclear deterrence as a motivation for regional cooperation misses the role of the market in promoting regional cooperation. In this respect, liberal institutionalists do draw our attention to the importance of economic interests as an explanation for the rise of regional cooperation, where the market, rather than the state, takes centre stage. Regionalism, regionalization and regional cooperation are thus understood

with reference to the non-military sphere of international relations, where trade, investment, and production networks functionally link the region together, promoting the potential for a new regional order. True, through the promotion of liberalization the state is facilitating regionalization, but to a large extent the market is beyond the control of the state and seeks to maintain autonomy from the state. As seen at the 1996 meeting of APEC, in this the role of business is central: the leaders 'affirm the central role of the business sector in the APEC process' (Leaders' Declaration, *Japan Times* 26 November 1996).

Other approaches to regionalism do exist (Hurrell 1995), but none of them takes account of the various roles played by sub-state political authorities, NGOs and other actors in civil society. Such sub-state actors tend to be either downplayed or ignored. Although their role should not be exaggerated, with the end of the Cold War sub-state actors do seem to be growing in importance, with our discussion elucidating how prefectural and city governments along the Japan Sea coastal region of the nation have been seeking to link sub-national parts of Japan with other parts of North East Asia. Several other microregional projects exist (*e.g.* Ogawa 1995). In this sense, in seeking to draw attention to the complex nature of the emerging order in Asia-Pacific, sub-state political authorities, NGOs and other actors in civil society, as well as the state and the market, need to be taken into account. There are at least three reasons.

First, as in the case of Niigata's 'local ODA' to conduct a study in the Russian Far East, sub-state political authorities can carry out bilateral or multilateral activities not possible for the central government. This can serve to promote peaceful relations at a sub-state level, which can filter up to the national, subregional or regional levels. Second, the emergence of microregional as well as subregional and regional groupings suggests that, in the emerging Asia-Pacific order, sub-state actors are in the process of building transnational links which are complementing if not eroding the role of the state. In the case of the Japan Sea Rim Zone, for instance, the long-term result of these sub-state linkages may well be to gradually tie the Japan Sea coastal prefectures more closely to the economies across the Japan Sea than to the Pacific side of Japan. This can play a role in linking together the civil societies in the region, too, which can over time lead to the growth of shared interests and identities. Finally, the break-up of the Soviet Union and liberalization and democratization in Eastern Europe cannot be understood fully without taking into account the role of civil society in this process. The focus on the state by the realist school and the focus on the market by the institutionalist school neglects or fails to pay due attention to the role of civil society in the creation of new orders. In this respect, the development of transnational civil society may help to promote

democratization in East Asia and the creation of a more democratic regional order. Herein lies at least one reason for taking into account NGOs and other actors in civil society, not just the state, corporation and sub-state political authorities in seeking to shed light on the complex role Japan is playing in the emerging Asia-Pacific order.

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