

## KEY NOTE SPEECH: VALUE CHANGE IN JAPAN AND GERMANY

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I am very honored to be invited to give an opening talk on the subject of value change in Japan and Germany, particularly given the fact that I am not an expert on Germany. I have a generalized knowledge of Germany, but not a specific, detailed knowledge of the development of Germany since the end of World War II. I wish I did have that, because I think the making of comparisons or the placing of the problem of change within a comparative context is extremely important. Obviously I have implicitly in mind a comparative context with the United States; how applicable that may be, I am not entirely sure. If I sound strange at some times, it may simply be because that perspective makes its appearance. I hope you forgive it.

The conference will deal with many detailed studies of value change. Therefore it does not seem worthwhile for me to go into the detailed studies or areas of value change as that would be unnecessary duplication. Perhaps the most valuable function of my performance is to provide some context and some general considerations that seem to me should be taken into account in making such studies.

The first general consideration we have to pay attention to is where we speak of value change. How do we distinguish between value changes per se and changes in the structures of the institutions of society? What is the relationship between the two of them? For example, we often combine or even confuse the two sets of terms when we talk of family values. We cannot really talk about family values apart from structural considerations of the family. So in many respects we are talking about a very intimate relation between structure and value, and sometimes the value affects the structure of the institution. Sometimes it is the structure of the institution that affects the value. There is a constant interaction here. This is very important to keep in mind. As a social anthropologist my tendency would be to speak of cultural change. But in my last years I have been a member of the Sociology Department at Columbia University and therefore my course which used to be called "Culture Change" is now called "Social Change." So it is important to keep in mind that we are essentially dealing with an interaction in which one has to be defined in terms of the other. In that respect the family is the very best example.

The other consideration we should keep in mind when we speak of change, is that we must have implicitly or explicitly some point of reference in mind. Change by comparison with what? With yesterday, ten years ago or twenty years ago, a thousand years ago? We do have something implicit in mind; given the subject of this symposium the changes since 1945 are the most appropriate; in some cases that is a decisive change point, in other cases it is not so decisive. For Japan it is certainly a decisive turning point in many key respects. What was Japan like in 1945? What is our starting point?

The first thing to remember is that Japan was – to use a currently fashionable term – a mid-developing country. It was not really an advanced industrial country and it was not an undeveloped country; it was a mid-developing country, and you can see that by many indices. For example, in 1945 approximately 49% of the labour force of Japan was engaged in the primary industries – agriculture and fishery. By census definition in 1945 and 1946 two thirds of the population of Japan lived in what we would characterize as “rural areas”, one third in urban areas. Today you have a complete reversal. At that time, somewhere between one and two percent of the male population graduated from higher education, i.e., from university-level education. The life expectancy in Japan at that time, quite apart from the effects of the war, was about 48 years. Japan did not reach the 50-year level until 1948. At the present time, Japan has the highest life expectancy in the world, having several years ago overtaken that paragon among advanced nations, Iceland, and some of the other Scandinavian states.

There are other areas where the changes have also been decisive; for example, one half of the cultivated land in Japan was owned by people who did not do the cultivation, in other words, by landlords. One half of the land was cultivated by people who did not own the land they were cultivating. Now at that time, in 1945, you realize that was a very serious issue of land reform or agrarian revolution in many countries in the world, particularly in Asia. In China and in parts of South East Asia it was becoming a major issue. So Japan in that respect was not too different. There are some differences, but you had a potentially similar situation.

Now in all of these respects Japan has changed enormously. First, at present the percentage of the labor force engaged in primary industry as agriculture, fishery and forestry is well under 10%. There are some problems of definition here, but it is roughly 8% overall, but even that is misleading. The reason is that contained within that 8% there are three different categories. One category is of more or less full-time farmers, the next, farm households that receive a significant or large percentage of their income from farming as distinct from non-farming activities. The third cate-

gory consists of farm families who live on farm and may do some cultivation, but receive the overwhelming bulk of their income from non-farming activities, to the point where the head of the household may work in a factory or work in an office in the nearby town and the wife may have some kind of a white-collar or a factory job. The actual farming is left to older people who can still maintain it with the help of children on weekends. So if one examines those figures in some detail, then instead of 8% of the population of the labor force of Japan engaged in agriculture, today you are talking about more like 1% or 2% of the labor force, approximately 10–15% of the so-called farm population of Japan. That's roughly in line with the full-time farming population of most of the other advanced industrial countries.

That change has had, of course, many implications. One is an enormous demographic shift of the population out of the rural areas into the cities, or into the big towns. But that has also meant the emptying out of the institutions that exemplify the traditional values. Villages disappear, they become emptied out or they are left with nothing but older people. What happens to the traditional value systems within those communities? They are no longer applicable. The same is true of farm families where one of the traditional values was the authority of the head of the household, absolute obedience to him.

All of these things tend to become less applicable when the number of farm families decreased because there was no longer a real economic future for people in such occupations except for a very small number. Thus the physical basis for the traditional values is simply disappearing. It remains on to some extent, but if you look at the numbers there is very little left.

These general trends play a very important role. Since the end of World War II Japan has gone through a number of phases and it may be useful to keep them in mind when thinking about different stages of value change. At the end of the Second World War there is a society where many of the traditional values remained rather strong, in terms of people's thinking, in terms of what there was indoctrinated in the schools, in terms of the institutional structures and in terms of the laws of the country. For example, many laws reinforce the values or institutional structure of the family, such as laws on divorce, regarding the place of women and the authority of the head of the household. There was a sort of a projection of the prewar traditional society for a period of time. When this situation changed is very hard to say. But somewhere around the 1960s Japan starts to show very serious growth. Some people would put it at about the time of the Korean War, the early 1950s, but somewhere in the late 50s, early 60s Japan became a major growth society which was symbolized by the holding of the Olympics in Japan in 1964.

From the 1970s on you have a really new Japan, a new high-technological advanced industrial society, rapidly catching up with its co-equals in Europe and in the United States. That starts off in the 1970s, so we have very rapid changes. Starting with the late 70s or early 80s we are talking about still another stage, a stage that is not unknown in the other advanced industrial countries, something that Prof. Daniel Ballance characterized as the post-industrial society. We have a lot of fashionable terms for this post-industrial society; there's a term in Japan that's rather popular: post-modern society. In any case there is a shift of the bulk of GNP from the manufacture of objects to the service, or non-manufacturing sector. That began to take place in Japan roughly in the late 70s and the early 80s.

This series of stages and the structural modifications brought about by these changes do then affect the values that are appropriate to the particular structure of the phases. With these tremendous changes many of the traditional values become inappropriate or require change. So we have to think of that as another very important social change. Now, from where do these changes come?

Nobody would disagree that economic development or economic growth has been a major source of change, because it has placed a different set of demands on society. With rapid economic development you simply don't need so many farmers; there is no point in people bothering to go to agricultural schools if they are not going to become farmers. There is no point in many of the institutions that were associated with farming. The elder sons who would normally have gone into farming no longer find farming an attractive occupation, move into other areas, and this requires preparation. Preparation is essentially education. So education comes to play an extremely important role in the process. As I suggested to you before, at the end of the Second World War not more than 1-2% of the male population of Japan finished university. Although there were two institutions that were called women's universities, in fact they were not full universities in the sense of the male universities. They represented a kind of a junior college rather than a senior college. So you might say that women did not go to universities in Japan until after the Second World War. The proportion of the age group in university today in Japan is roughly, depending on the definition of particular institutions, somewhere between 34 and 40%. That's a little bit less than the United States, but next to the United States it has the largest university population in the world. More important, before the end of the Second World War only 10% of the males went on to advanced secondary education. Today the rate of graduation from the secondary school level in Japan is between 95% and 96%. That is far higher than the United States because we have large numbers of dropouts; we have maybe 90% who enter, but we have only about 70%

who graduate. So what has happened is an enormous rise in Japan's educational level. The educational level is obviously important because of the acquisition of basic skills or the background skills necessary to take part in a modern economy. But I would like to suggest that this is not the only factor that causes a change of values. There are also changes in the self-image that people acquire as a result of going on to higher levels of education. These were levels that in the past were only for the elites, and by not achieving them, one remained in a lower position. So it affects also the attitudes towards traditional hierarchical systems, i.e., the attitudes towards birth status as against achieved status. Thus many of the people, many of the young farm boys who graduate from higher secondary schools and even go out to university have a very different attitude towards themselves, a very different self-image than those who ended their educational careers at the higher elementary school level that was much more traditional before the war in Japan. This has had enormous effects, because it has changed the attitudes people have towards themselves and therefore their attitudes towards the people around them. It affects the underlying hierarchical relations, the attitudes towards so-called superiors and inferiors.

Education also does something else that is very important: It opens new perspectives. You become aware of alternatives that did not exist before. You may change your mind about what is inevitable or essential, what has to be done. In one area in Gifu Prefecture, way off in the mountains, there are a number of villages that were very isolated and had in the course of time developed some very unique family institutions; for example, that second sons couldn't get married. Or if they were permitted to do so, they had to live in the family household under the authority of the elder brother. Many of these men were conscripted into the Japanese army in 1871 or 1872 when universal conscription went into effect and one no longer had to be a samurai to be a soldier. When they went into the army, some of them discovered that many of their fellows came from areas where they behaved in a different way. And when they went back to Gifu Prefecture, they put an end to that old system. They knew that it was not inevitable or necessary. They knew that there were alternatives, other people did different things. They came back and the old tradition just disappeared completely. I am sure that there must have been many areas in which the awareness of alternatives brought about totally new behavioral alternatives, attitudes towards the self, and new values.

We have talked about the demographic shift of population. This has had an enormous effect in altering the tightness of relations of families that were neighbours. In a village every family knew every other family, in fact many of them were interrelated and the interaction among them

was very high. When such families went into the cities, there tended to be a separation from their neighbors and kin. Let me add parenthetically that traditional cities already had elements of this kind of rural village atmosphere, for example in the *shitamachi* areas of Tōkyō. These areas often had some of the characteristics of the villages. But with the enormous growth and the spread of population, people coming up from rural areas tended to lose a lot of land unless special efforts were made to maintain it. And people already in place were joined by people coming from the outside, who were not their relatives. And so it changed much of the atmosphere of the traditional urban lower-class areas of the cities that used to have some of that rural character.

Now another very important consideration, of course, in the bringing about of the change of values is the enormous growth of science and technology. These require a higher educational level and require a different perspective; they also open up new opportunities and new possibilities for people who go through the system. These were not available before; they are now. And people see these in very different ways.

There is another factor that is very important to keep in mind – the awareness of alternatives that exist outside of Japan, i.e., affinity with the outside world. During the pre-Meiji period and in the Meiji period itself the knowledge of the outside world was limited to a small elite; a small number of people were able actually to go to foreign countries and see things with their own eyes. Whether they saw correctly or not is a different matter, but they could see the alternatives.

People otherwise acquire their knowledge of the outside world first through books. Japan probably has the largest number of translations of Western books of any country in the world. There is almost nothing that is published in the United States or Europe of any significance – even if it has no significance – that will not be published in Japan. There is an enormous amount of translations that is done; translation has become a major activity and a major academic activity. In the United States it is difficult to imagine a serious scholar who would spend any time translating. It used to be that sociologists translated Max Weber; that was about the extent of it. Compared to doing your own research, translating was considered to be an inferior activity. But in Japan translation is a major activity of many scholars now and was even more so in the past; even today if you get a scholar's *curriculum vitae*, there will also be in addition to his own work a list of the works he has translated. So the major mode of transmission of knowledge of the outside world except for the handful of the elite who were able to actual travel was by books.

Since then, of course, there has been the development of modern technologies and they have blasted things open. The mass media – press, radio,

television – and now all the advanced communication technologies affected not only the elite but mass culture. In some respects knowledge of the outside penetrates the mass culture level before it penetrates the elite level. You can see that the consumer culture often hits the mass cultural level before it hits the elite.

Now I want to mention only one more thing that I think had a major influence on the development of value change in Japan. To some extent it is obvious, but to some extent it is not so obvious: That is the rule of the American Occupation of Japan. I am sure that the American Occupation of Germany had a very big influence on institutions and many features of German political life, but I would suggest that it probably had a more profound effect here in Japan than in Germany for a lot of different reasons. The Japanese ever since the Meiji period have retained a major objective of catching up, and therefore there was always a particular attentiveness to the outside, and most certainly the attentiveness to the victorious nation would be somewhat higher here than in the case of Germany. Now what were some of the ways that the Occupation had an effect? One of the important ways was in mandating changes in Japan that would otherwise not have occurred. The American Occupation brought about changes in the constitution, in the political system, in the voting system, in the educational system, in the family system, etc.

Is it not unreasonable to ask whether some of these changes would not have occurred in Japan anyway, even if there had been no Occupation? For example, the change in the position of women seems to be a universal tendency. Would that not have changed anyway, even without the stimulus of the Occupation? Starting in 1946, the Occupation introduced changes in the legal and constitutional position of women. It gave the women the franchise to vote, to run for public office and it stipulated a series of regulations that were designed to liberate women from the limitations under which they had been placed within the family, the factory, etc. For example, under prewar Japanese law women did not have the right to petition for divorce, but men could get a divorce very simply. After the war women were given the right to petition for a divorce as well. It may not seem like a very serious matter but symbolically it was very important. Women did not have the right to vote before the war; after the war they were given that right. Now that's not unlike some European countries where women only acquired the right to vote late and in some cantons of Switzerland it is only fairly recently that they finally – without the American Occupation – have given in to the trend. You may say that the trend was there, but the Occupation laid the institutional basis for changes.

I would suggest that among the changes affecting women, the most

decisive was the increase in their educational level. Before the war women did not go to university. Those who had serious academic interests went abroad to study. The United States was the favorite port of destination for Japanese women who wanted to study. It was easy to get into American colleges and they felt more comfortable there. But if they wanted to study in a Japanese university, they could not do it. Secondly, the general level of educational attainment for women in Japan was much lower than in most of the advanced countries. For example, in Japan before the war you had two separate channels after the elementary school level, one for males and one for females. So you had secondary education institutions only for men and only for women. And the women's channel ended at the junior-college level, the men's channel could lead to the university level. The general level was very much lower. I suggest that the rise in the educational level was probably, combined with the awareness of a women's movement developing in the United States and in Europe, decisive in bringing about the turning-point. There is a certain point where we reach a critical mass and that critical mass has just about been reached in Japan so that one can expect much more rapid changes in the future than in the past.

One of the most important of the changes brought about by the American Occupation was land reform. I mentioned to you earlier that a good one half of the arable land was cultivated by people who did not own the land. Now the American Occupation initiated a land reform. It was carried through deliberately as rapidly as possible in a two year period in order to avoid things hanging over and being argued about. The result of this reform was that the traditional landlord class disappeared in Japan. Cultivating landowners were allowed to retain small pieces of land, but the reform fundamentally changed the balance of power in rural areas. That change was a very decisive one. The question again is would that have happened without the American Occupation? I suggest that it probably would have not, or at least not in as efficient a manner as it happened. Simply because the balance of forces for and against a reform was of such character that the forces in favor of land reform probably could not have won very easily. There would have been constant warfare and a much less thorough land reform than that which took place under the American Occupation. The change in the structure of power, in the traditional class and hierarchical structure was enormous. Just the fact that tenants became owners had an enormous effect. I would say that the land reform was probably one of the most basic reforms carried out by the Occupation and that it affected the whole nature of rural life, family structure, the introduction of schools into rural areas, the increased demands of the owner-farmers for higher levels of modern satisfaction, etc.



The Occupation also introduced important reforms in the field of labor and the rights of unions which are still highly controversial – these matters are always highly controversial. Nevertheless these reforms had very considerable effects on the way industry had to deal with its own traditional methods. Given the fact that employees were no longer completely without competitive power, there was a difference in the way companies had to deal with the new structure of labor relations that were initially started by the Occupation. It was not really until the end of the 1950s or the early 1960s that the modern form of labor – management relations finally took shape in Japan, and Japan went through a period of considerable struggle before this was done. The last great strike at Toyota Motor Company was in the early 1960s, when they shut down for several months. Since then they have not had such problems. They finally had to learn how to cope with these new situations. Again parenthetically, I might say that you find the same situation in Korea today, because the labor movement has received legal and political support of a kind that never happened before and it has been very difficult for the big Korean firms to learn how to cope with that. And at the present moment, very few can. But if you think back on the Japanese experience, it seems to me that they will learn how to do so. The Koreans have a certain advantage in that there is a Japanese model that they can look at as they try to develop their solutions.

Some of these things, one can argue, might have occurred anyway, but basically what the American Occupation did was not so much to introduce purely new ideas, as to alter the balance of forces that were involved in achieving or not achieving any of these goals. It altered the balance long enough to bring about certain kinds of changes. It did not alter it long enough to bring about all the changes that were intended. Some simply failed. The Occupation just could not bring enough force to bear, the changes were not significant enough, there was not enough time, or the counter-forces were too strong.

What were some of the main areas of change? Well, certainly the rural village: A lot of them don't exist anymore, but those that remain are very different in character from those that existed in the past. The family system: There are some elements in the family system that remained and some families tend to remain dominant, but if you think of the traditional family structure in 1945 as 100%, what you have today is about 10% to 20%. This is a very considerable reduction in the persistence of traditional elements. Or you have profound modifications of the traditional elements themselves.

Another very important change that I would like to bring to your attention once again is the change in hierarchical attitudes. Every society

has structures of superiority and inferiority to one degree or another. And certainly Japan does today and did in the past. But if you compare the situation today with the past, then you see that there has been an enormous shortening of social distance. In the past, farmers would kneel with their hands and heads to the ground before the great landlord, something inconceivable now except as a joke.

These social distances have shortened. They have shortened because the actual differences among people are not so great anymore, to a great extent because of the educational system, but also because of the changes of self-image and self-awareness. Certainly within organizations you have a high degree of hierarchy, but if you examine hierarchy in the large institutions, there is a very important difference from the past: The hierarchy is based more upon status achievement than upon birth status or other non-achievement-related phenomena. Your position is not superior to others because you are the son or the relative of the owner, but because of genuine achievement. Certainly people who attain positions that can be attributed to their achievement are highly regarded and will receive a great deal of respect. In Japanese there is a term called *me-ue*, meaning people above one's eyes and *me-shita*, people below one's eyes. Certainly you see some of the old elements of deference, courtesy, etc., appear to be there. But if you examine them in detail, they are not quite the same thing, simply because the deference is to the position rather than to the individual. If that person loses his status, his subordinates no longer feel any obligation to respect him. They respected him when he was in the position, whether they liked him or not.

Very important changes have occurred in the structure of authority that are much more like the kinds of changes in the structure of authority taking place in the Western countries. But also in Western countries it is not the case that the elements of birth or non-achievement status have lost all influence. They still remain in one form or another, but they have diminished. In Japan you have very much the same situation.

One of the reasons for this is that at least since the 1970s Japan has come to face increasingly the same kinds of problems that other advanced countries face: The effects of the structural changes of industry, the enormous exponential growth of science and technology, and the interrelations of many of these different systems. Sometimes the details look different, but the problems that have to be confronted are the same. And they may play themselves out in a slightly different form in terms of the politics of the situation, but we are dealing with the same forms. I would suggest that this increasingly will be the case.

Japan shows many problems in the reform of its educational system that are being faced now in the other advanced countries. The same is

true with regard, for example, to the aging of the population. Japan is still a little bit behind, but if you look at the statistics, Japan is moving up rapidly, so that by the end of this century Japan will have the largest proportion of over 65-year olds in the world. That is a problem that Sweden and a lot of other countries have been facing. Now Japan is starting to face similar problems. I think that's true in almost all areas of life.

One of the autonomous elements in this development is the increased awareness of the outside. One effect in most of our countries is that gaps between older and younger generations tend to be rather considerable. There tends to be much more an international youth culture to which young people in each of the individual countries tend to respond, rather than simply to the historic institutions within their own society. Musical tastes, fashion, and hairstyles have become international rather than purely national. Increasingly, you have larger and larger areas of culture, particularly in mass culture, that are universal in character rather than national. This is also true if we examine the arts and music. It is very hard to speak of German music today. What is a German composition today? How is it different from a composition in France or Rumania? The same is true in the arts in general. The styles that develop are no longer related to national styles or they may deliberately seek out some such elements. But they are related to concepts, philosophies that are transnational in character. We see this particularly with young people, but increasingly in other sectors of the population as well. You find it among scientists. Scientists in many fields form their own international universe; they are more related to people in the same field working in similar areas of another country than they are with people in their own countries.

What happens to these traditional values? What does their change mean? Some of them disappear. People forget about them; they are not important. Some of them enter into new kinds of relations with some of the new ideas, as some kind of adjustment or kind of compromise takes place. You find that to some extent if you examine the history of labor-management relations in postwar Japan. Over time you will find various degrees of accommodation of some of the traditional ideas with some of the newer ideas. Some of them also will take a completely different form; they will become much more modern. Look at marriage ceremonies in Japan and you see some very strange things. The underlying concept is still there that you have to invite large numbers of people and spend a lot of money and exchange a lot of gifts. But if you begin to look at the details, part of it is very different. You may have the wedding ceremony taking place in a Shintō shrine, even though people do not believe in Shintō anymore. They will be dressed in traditional Japanese clothing and then they bow off the stage for a few minutes and come back completely dressed

in Western tuxedos and Western-style marriage clothing. After another change of scene they will come out wearing travel clothes, so that they can take an international trip. Some of the values change their forms even if some underlying concepts are still there. If you look at the underlying concepts of having the families and the appropriate people who were part of the life of the couple or the families attend, and at the exchanging of gifts, then a lot remains the same as earlier.

Some of these traditional customs become confined to a particular niche of the society or a particular sector of activity, so that some people will continue to live in closer accordance with traditional modes and standards than others. But this group tends to become increasingly small. Or some parts of life will be related to one or another traditional element. I just mentioned that people tend to get married in the Shintō service. Burials, or funerals, are almost invariably Buddhist. This in a country where interest in religion is very low.

Often traditional guidelines and traditional institutions are museum pieces, sometimes even caricatures. For example, it used to be that people went to Kabuki because they liked it, it was part of a lifestyle. You went to Kabuki as you went to *geisha* houses, you cared about certain actors, etc. Today you do this once in your lifetime, like a trip to Mecca, or maybe some people are more earnest than that and do it once a year. And certainly from all the rural areas of Japan and the provincial areas of Japan people must come to see Kabuki at least once in their lifetime. That is a kind of museumization of Kabuki.

Another example is that many of the traditional habits and structures of authority relations, obedience, staff-subordination, etc., are found in purest form not in any of the standard institutions of society but in the gangs: The traditional concepts of *oyabun* – *kobun* are most purely realized among gangsters. The techniques and demonstration of obedience and the system of transmission of authority, all these traditional customs that were historically associated with the landlords or with the *samurai*, you do find in some of the gangs. That might be considered a kind of caricaturization of the traditional system. But these tendencies represent some of the directions that the shift from traditional values and institutions have begun to take.

## DISCUSSION

**Question** (Kornadt): At the beginning you were talking about an unclear relationship between value change and change in itself. My simple question is, you were talking about a lot of changes, changes happening in Japan at important times, but I am not completely sure what your opinion is about the role values have played in these changes. Would you say it is possible to explain or to describe, at first to describe as you had done but also to explain all these changes without talking about values? Would it be possible? Are values maybe seen only as a kind of epiphenomenon of changes so that it is not necessary to think of values in a psychological sense? Or is it that you were talking about the status quo? Status can be given by birth or achieved and in such a case is not maybe the underlying value to have status, and is then not the question what means status, meaning to have power, the idea to have power or the idea to have responsibility or something else? So my question is what is the role of values in all these things you were talking about?

**Answer:**

Probably because I was speaking within a limited time frame, I hope I have not inadvertently given the impression that I think that values are epiphenomena. I do not think so. But I am suggesting that it is often difficult to disentangle one from the other. And had we more time, I would certainly have been very happy to try to suggest the relation between values and the institutions that were undergoing change. In many cases it was because the American Occupation insisted upon a change of values that some of these things changed. In other cases they insisted upon a change and many people then accommodated themselves to the change of values that were implied in it. Perhaps one of the best examples would be the nature of the labor-management relations where the effect of rising levels of education and change of self-perception on the part of younger people leads them to make demands within the industrial institution, within the corporation, that higher management then has to deal with somehow. And I think that is a very widespread process. So the change in the values of younger people entering the labor force was important for the labor force, and that in turn has an effect on changing the structure of labor-management relations, and often the productive process itself. People just don't like working on assembly lines anymore and many places have to start thinking of having more diversified assembly lines or doing away with them altogether. Which is correct, I don't presume to say. All I mean is that these pressures that result from changes in value will then have an effect and in many cases have an effect on the structure,

in this case the structure of particular industries or factories or enterprises. There's a great deal of this that takes place. I think that that's one of the clearest examples.

In other cases the change of the institutions makes the particular set of values that were historically associated with those institutions irrelevant. This takes many different forms. Sometimes, for example, the traditional form in a farm village was for the elder son to inherit the farm. With the rise in educational level there are more and more elder sons who don't want to inherit the farm. Now that's a change in attitudes. They don't want to inherit it; they'd rather do something else. The farm, then, has to make some accommodation. That's a very general consideration that occurs in many places. So I think you can find that, and perhaps I should have emphasized it, that there is always a very close relation between the changes of values and the structural social changes that occur. The opposite also occurs. Values don't stand by themselves and institutional changes generally don't stand by themselves. One causes the other, there is a constant interaction, I'd suggest. In which respect, of course, the pattern is no different from any other advanced society.

**Question** (Menkhaus):

It was also not an invention of the American Occupation that there should be equality between men and women. There was a legal reform going ahead in 1927 and 1934. This new law did not come into effect, however, because there was a war going on and there were other activities. This law quite clearly states the equality of women. So it's not all from the American Occupation.

We are dealing here with value changes and you mentioned a lot about the improvement of women's education in Japan. You mentioned that the percentage of women attending full universities was increasing after the Second World War. That's a fact that can hardly be disputed. But the problem we have to face here in our project is, what made them go there? In other words, are values they had in their minds responsible as motivations for higher education? That is the main point for us.

**Answer:**

You're quite right about the laws on divorce, but the grounds for divorce for women were very, very limited. It's very interesting because it was a case of adultery on the man's part. If there was adultery on the woman's part, a man could easily divorce. If there was adultery on the man's part, a woman actually had no right to divorce him. But while there were occasionally cases of women obtaining a divorce, generally the fact is that women could not get a divorce and usually didn't even bother to try because it was much too difficult.

On the question of the women's rights. Yes, but I think that was pretty far from law. It had a long way to go before it would become law. In many cases the American Occupation worked with elements from prewar Japan that were trying to move in that direction. The Occupation people who were dealing with the women's question were usually American women, and they were in constant contact with the Japanese women from the suffrage movement, etc. And they worked out a lot of the ideas based upon what these women had been trying to achieve. That's not at all uncommon in the Occupation.

Let me say also, for example, – to add to the examples that you give – that the land reform itself was not an American invention. A land reform program had been proposed in Japan before the war and it was almost up to the state of being incorporated into law when the war broke out. Now, it was not as thorough, that is the provisions were not quite as thorough as were those later proposed by the Americans. But it was not simply an American idea. The American Occupation came here and found that there was something like this and was in favor of it. Now what happened then was that experts got to work on it and many political influences got to work on it – and I am not only talking about within Japan, I am talking about the Soviet Union, Australia, Great Britain and China – who would insist upon a more radical land reform, with the result that the land reform originally been proposed before the war was redrawn to make it tighter. So you can argue quite rightly that the land reform itself was not an American invention. That's why what I said was that the Occupation altered the balance of forces, and that is what made the difference. It's not by any means clear that the bureaucrats, some of the farm leaders, some of the farm-union leaders who were in favour of a land reform program before the war had the political power to get it through. And that's true of many of the reforms. For many of them do have antecedents before the war in the sense that there were interest groups or elements trying to achieve some of these things in one form or another. And in many cases, I would say, the most successful reforms of the Occupation were those that built on the prewar situation and simply carried them to conclusion. I think you will find that in many cases. The many people who disagreed with the educational system had all kinds of ideas. They were not able to alter the structure of power when everything was controlled by the central government. The American Occupation lent its weight to the reform side and altered the balance of forces for a period of time.

Coming back to the women's question, there's a political aspect: Before the war only men over 25 years of age were allowed to vote. One major reform of the American Occupation was to lower the voting age to 20 and to allow women to vote and to be elected to office. In fact, a great outburst

of women's rights sentiments in 1946, as you know, led to the largest number of women ever elected to the Diet: 42. There hasn't been anything like that in Japan for a very, very long time. But I think the interesting subject is not the American Occupation itself, but that the American Occupation in many respects was most successful when it took a position for which there was already some preparation in Japan, for which there was already a constituency. It tended then to be much more effective than when it came from out of the blue with a totally different idea that nobody was interested in and nobody could quite understand. And that applies to the question of women's roles but to several other reforms as well.

What made women go to universities? At the end of the war when it became possible, there was a small constituency of women who really wanted to go to university. What percentage that is, I don't know. It was very, very small. A small number of women applied for entrance examination at some of the major universities. I think the first class that entered Waseda University was five women. I don't know how many applied, but five women passed at the required level in competition with the male applicants. A very small number went to Tōkyō University and several other universities. So in the first instance, what you had was already a constituency of younger women who wanted to go to university, so they were able to do that. That was the first wave. Then, I think, what happened after that is that the schools and the newly organized school-system tried to encourage women. Teachers encouraged students to go on to higher levels of education and in some cases were successful. And what you got was a rolling effect; some of those girls then grew up, got married and had children of their own and they already thought in those terms. That's why you had this progression over the years, over the different periods. So it didn't all happen at once. It happened through a series of steps. Once the original group of women who wanted a higher education had already taken advantage of the situation, then it was the role of the schools to try to persuade and convince younger women that they should go on, some of whom did. Some didn't, but when they grew up and had children, girls of their own, they often encouraged them. Economic conditions also improved, making it more possible for them to go. So you had a succession. It's only recently that you reached what I would consider to be the critical mass. It's only in the last seven or eight years, I would say, that a critical mass has been reached that will probably have an effect on that situation. Actually, it took a lot of time, if you think of it that way. It didn't all happen at once as soon as the schools were opened to women. Even today, I think, in the major universities the proportion of women is very, very small. And you also have many women who go into the two- and three-year junior colleges or into the less well-known, less high-ranking private institutions.



But the proportion of women in the highest-ranking public institutions plus a handful of private universities is pretty small.

**Question** (Hijiya-Kirschner):

A small correction: You talk about the enormous amount of translations into Japanese from Western languages which is, of course, very conspicuous for the past 100 years. As it is always restated that Japan has the highest amount of translations, I would just counter with the fact that according to UNESCO statistics which I only have seen since the 70s, Japan is not the language with the highest amount of translations, it's German, and Japan is not even second. Of course, Japan has this history since Meiji times of very intensively absorbing Western information, but at the present, that is since the 70s, it's different.

You talked about changing hierarchical attitudes and the enormous shortening of social distance as a pattern which makes the Japanese development look closer to the developments in higher industrialized Western societies. And you stated that now if there is hierarchical distance, it is based on status achievement only. But if I observe Japanese social lives, still, the differentiation according to the *senpai-kōhai* pattern or the *sensei-deshi* pattern still seems to prevail. And this is, of course, not based on status achievements. Do you see any change in this pattern, and would you see in the continuous existence of these patterns something that sets Japan off from Western societies?

**Question** (Leims):

And one more remark on the last part. You gave the example of Kabuki and cultural museumization, that is Kabuki is not really a living form of art, but is now only an attraction. But, on the other hand, you have Kabuki as a living form of theater as well, because they are developing new styles and transforming the Kabuki theater, so I would not think that this is a completely dead kind of art. But if it were, as you said, then it also would not be much different from the forms we have in Central Europe. If we have operated theaters, I don't think there is any literature for operated theaters, so maybe the average citizen once in a while they go there for amusement and then in less than no time forgets it.

It may not be as museumized as Kabuki in most of its stations but in this point of view it's [...]

**Answer:**

I didn't know about Germany, as I said earlier, and I thought that the figures I had seen say that there are more translations in the Soviet Union than in Japan. But on the other hand, those are misleading, because a lot of them are among the languages within the Soviet Union. In the case of

the Soviet Union they have translations from the languages of the constituent republics into Russian and some from Russian into the local languages. And if you add it up, it probably doesn't add up to the same thing; that's a complicated count. I did not know about Germany and I am very happy to know about it. It's hard not to find an important book published in the United States or in most European countries, which usually means England, France and Germany – I don't think there's much in the way of translation of Italian – that is not published in Japan, there's very little of importance that doesn't get translated. And then you have an enormous amount of translation of articles in addition to books. I am sure that your figures are correct and I accept them. But Japan still remains a country with an enormous amount of translation where much of the knowledge of the outside world came by way of translations.

On the question of hierarchy I would say that the proportion of birth-related status difference has declined enormously; it hasn't disappeared entirely. It hasn't disappeared in the United States; it hasn't disappeared in England, in Germany, or any place else. If I chose words that suggested that it has disappeared in Japan, I didn't really mean that. I meant that the proportion has gone down enormously and that in a lot of cases where there appears to be this kind of differential behavior, it's related to the particular status that a person has obtained. Your boss you show respect for; you may not show respect for him after he's demoted or retired, but you show respect to him while he's your superior.

Now the question of the *sempai*, *kōhai*, *dōhai* etc. We have something like that in the United States, although not as strong. You talk about your cohorts at university, you talk about your people – I forgot the term that we use, we don't say *sempai* or *kōhai*, we use terms of that kind as well. How much does that correspond to genuine deep respect and a feeling of obligation, a feeling of acceptance of authority as against a kind of formality? I don't think it's all that deep in that sense; in the case of the company it's different. If you talk about *sempai* in your company, it may not be because of achievement, you may be quite correct, it may be because they were of a preceding class. But in a sense it is, because they are higher up on a scale of pay and of advancement than you are by that amount and that will remain the case throughout your life. As long as they remain there, they will be a step up, even if it's by only one class. They came in 1983 and you came in 1984; throughout your entire career in that company, they're going to be one step ahead of you. Their pay is going to be higher, the annual increases of pay and the associated allowances, etc. So some element of that is still in there. In the case of universities, I don't know; people talk that way, I don't see that it is accompanied by a great feeling of traditional kinds of hierarchical respect.

**Question (Albach):**

I wonder about your approach which focuses mainly on institutional change and value change that is related to it. You mentioned the main institutional changes you take into account were changes in the modernization field, e.g., change in education, change in economy, changes in population. In all Western and more modern westernized countries these changes occur in a similar way, and so you illustrated a picture of these institutional changes which could be observed, too, in modern countries. My first question, then, is how far would you think that there are some specific changes of the modern Japanese society which are different from what we see in Western countries?

The second question relates to the topic of our symposium, that is to value change. To what degree do you observe value changes related to these changes of institutions which are typical for Japan and which are not observed in other countries? And I would like to take up a point you mentioned in the beginning of your lecture when you said it is important to have a reference point when you talk about change. Of course, I agree with you. And the reference point you took was the Second World War and the period after 1945. But always implicitly, you also had as a reference point a comparative point of view, by comparing the situation of Japan with the United States. I think the last comment or the last part of our discussion makes it clear to me that it is important, however, to take into account both the intra-cultural comparison over time and the situation in other countries. And if you do this systematically, I imagine that the way of talking of value change may gain a different character; it is depicting more clearly what is Japanese in this kind of value change as compared to value changes in other Western societies which also went through these procedures of modernization and post-modernization.

**Answer:**

What is distinctly Japanese is what I intended by speaking of the compromise between new sets of conditions and some of the traditional forms. Changes in all societies are related to their own past, anyway. There may be some changes that are totally detached from the past of a particular culture or the culture of a particular society or country, but most changes are related; there is a continuity. It is wrong to think that there is a sudden discontinuity where everything changes. There is always a kind of relation. And I think that's what I intended by using that particular phrase. I think that the forms of change in many respects are very different in Japan, the outcome of the process in many respects are very different in Japan from other countries. I think it's, generally speaking, the case that the outcome in any particular country would tend to be different from another

country because it always involves the interaction between past traditional elements and the newer elements and how they're perceived. So while I didn't go into details, this is what I had in mind by offering that formulation of the issue. I think the question of wedding is a good example. It's totally different from the way weddings would appear in our own countries. And even though they're responding to similar kinds of influences, it's in relation with something else. And the things it is in relation to in Japan are very different from what it's in relation to in other countries, so the outcome tends to be very different. And I think that's true of many other kinds of changes of values, and in the changes of institutions. The outcome tends to be different because the change occurs in relation to a completely different starting point. I would suggest, however, that increasingly Japan is moving closer to many other Western countries, because its dominant experiences tends to be very similar to the dominant historic experiences occurring in the other countries. So that more and more tends to be explicable in terms of what is happening in other countries.

**Question (Kreiner):**

The particularities of Japan are disappearing?

**Answer:**

A lot of them are, some of them remain and we heard a lot about them from Prof. Manabe, but yes, I think a lot of them are disappearing.

**Question (Sofue):**

I think this is a very difficult question. To compare the Japanese situation with the Korean situation and other countries in Asia, I think this will also be very important. For instance, in Korea there are many clear changes in education, marriage, etc. And also you mentioned the marriage ceremony in Japan. The same thing is happening in Korea, a combination of traditional customs and Western custom. But still you find things quite different from Japan. Still, they look at their father or elder brother and they're never supposed to smoke in the presence of their father and elder brother, also ancestor worship is still extremely strong inspite of many changes after the war. So why has this difference happened between Japan and Korea? Probably some countries in Southeast Asia will be also in the same situation as Korea?

Speaking of the *sempai-kōhai* relationship, we Japanese are very frequently discussing if there have been any differences in it. Sometimes I myself think that the *sempai-kōhai* relationship is greatly changing. But at the same time, I happen to again feel that it is still very strong. So I would say the issue is to what extent does continuity remain and to what extent is change occurring.

You also talked about women attending universities. I am now teaching at the University of the Air where most of the students are married housewives, nurses, etc., and their ages are between 30 or 40 or 50. And many of them study by radio and television and then they write up their theses and graduate. After that many of them go on to graduate school. I think this kind of situation never occurred before 1970 or 1960. Would you say this is a change?

Coming back to the question of the land reform by the occupational forces. At that time I was a student and was frequently told by many that there were some struggles within the American forces (over democratization, or an anti-Soviet stance). That was at the beginning. Democratization was strong, so they were enthusiastic about democratization. My understanding is that at the beginning they were expecting to do land reform of farms – at the beginning –, and later, if successful, they were expecting to do land reform of mountain areas. Then some struggles became stronger and stronger. So the Occupation shifted from a democratization to an anti-Soviet orientation. So the secondary land reform was given up. After that there was never a land reform of the mountain area, so owners of mountain land remained wealthy, probably until recently or maybe to today. That is my opinion. It is not a question, but maybe a suggestion to think about it later in a future study.

**Answer:**

On the question of the land reform. There was no conflict within the Occupation about the land reform itself. The conflict you talk about has to do with other issues, not about the land reform itself. So far as I know there was never a proposal to include mountain land within the land reform. Perhaps they should have done it, but they never did. There was no serious discussion, no plan ever to include mountain land in the land reform program. The number of mountain landlords in the country is really relatively small and, yes, a few of them retained considerable assets. One of my first areas of field research was in one village that had the largest owner of mountain land in all of Japan, Yoshida-mura in Shimane Prefecture. This family owned the largest amount of mountain land in Japan, next to that of the Imperial family. I myself had always been in favor of including the mountain land, but nobody seriously discussed that. That really was not the issue with regard to the “anti-Soviet” question. This related more to industry. The democratizers were not in favor of measures that improved Japanese industry. And those that were in favor of strengthening Japan against the Soviet Union were in favor of strengthening Japanese industry. That’s where the issue arose, not in the land reform.