

October 2004

# A New Dawn

## *Japan's Recovery & Its Global Impact*

Merrill Lynch Japan Securities

Chief Economist

Jesper Koll

*jesper\_koll@ml.com*

# What's Different?

- Political Economy Stable & Focused
  - *Koizumi Rules Until September 2006*
  - *Clear Policy Goal - End Deflation With BoJ Action*
  - *New Generation Ruling Elite Ambitious & Patriotic*
- Forced to Act
  - *Fiscal Position Close To Bankruptcy*
  - *Asia / China Competition Relentless*
  - *U.S. Structural Problem = Weak Dollar “Productivity Stick”*
- Market Power
  - *M&A ; Hostile Takeover Bids ; MBOs ; TOBs*

# What's The Same?


## *Export Strength vs Domestic Worries*

	<u>2002</u>	<u>Q2/04</u>	<u>Growth</u>
<b>GDP<sub>(nominal)</sub></b>	<b>498.3 trn</b>	<b>504.4 trn</b>	<b>6.1 trn.</b>
<b>C</b>	<b>284.8</b>	<b>287.4</b>	<b>2.6</b>
<b>I</b>	<b>71.7</b>	<b>78.7</b>	<b><u>7.0</u></b>
<b>H</b>	<b>18.0</b>	<b>18.2</b>	<b>0.2</b>
<b>X</b>	<b>55.8</b>	<b>65.6</b>	<b><u>9.8</u></b>
<b>M</b>	<b>49.4</b>	<b>55.6</b>	<b>6.2</b>
<b>X-M</b>	<b>6.4</b>	<b>10.0</b>	<b>3.6</b>
<b>Public</b>	<b>118.7</b>	<b>110.2</b>	<b><u>-8.5</u></b>
<b>Inventory</b>	<b>-1.3</b>	<b>-0.1</b>	<b>n/a</b>


# Still A Powerful Export-Machine

**19% of All Industrial Output Is For Export -- Up From 13% In 1990 ; 18% In 2002**  
**Capital Goods Drive The Cycle Up -- Japan's Consumer Goods Export Machine Stalling**

## Production for Export as % of Total Production



Source: METI




Source: METI

# Japan Is Back : A Trade Surplus With China

## True China Trade Balance Back In Surplus

(True China Trade equals Exports/Imports With Both Peoples Republic and Hong Kong).




Source: MoF, Datastream

# Real Structural Change

## *Cross-Shareholdings Have Halved*


### *The End Of “Keiretsu” & Bank-Centered Corporate Governance*



# Restructuring Success

## *Record High Operating Profitability*

TSE 1<sup>st</sup> section, non-financials




Source: TSE and Merrill Lynch Calculations; sample is TSE 1st section, non-financials

# Broader Profits Recovery

*Domestic Companies Now Drive Profits Growth*

## % Contribution To TSE Non-Financial Profit Growth




Source: TSE and Merrill Lynch Calculations; sample is TSE 1st section, non-financials  
Exporters = Transportation + Electrical Machinery + Precision Machinery



# Balance Sheet Recession is OVER

*Corporate Japan Has Paid-Back Its “Bubble Economy” Debts*

Total Corporate Sector Interest Bearing Liabilities as % of Nominal GDP




Source: ESRI of Cabinet Office

Jesper Koll - Merrill Lynch Japan Securities

Refer to important disclosures starting on page 60

# Managing For Shareholders

## Corporate Net Equity Buying and Executed Share Buybacks




Note: Cash transaction by non-financial corporates within TSE, NSE and OSE

Source: TSE


# Structural Up-Cycle #1 : Capital Investment

## Bubble-Excess Capacity Now Cut



Source: METI

## Very Old Capital Stock




Source: ESRI of Cabinet Office


# Globalization Success

**Off-Shore Production Capacity Now More Than 40% Of Global Total.  
Japan's "De-Industrialization Is Complete?!"**

**Offshore Capacity as % of Total Capacity**




**Imports as % of Total Production**



Source: METI & Merrill Lynch

# Structural Up-Cycle #2 : Human Capital Investment


*New Job-Offers Now Running At 700,000/month -- More Companies Are Looking To Hire More Workers Than Ever Before In Japan's History.*



# Worker Competition Is Rising

*End Of The Middle Class: Companies Need - and Pay Up for - Specialists, Not Salarymen ---> "Winners" Lead The Recovery*


Earnings Gap: Wage Earnings of Male Employees, top 10% to bottom 10%



Source: OECD


# A Workers' Paradise No More

*Labor Compensation Policy Now Favors Shareholders:  
In Past Cycles, 7-quarters After Profits Hit Bottom, Workers'  
Compensation Was Up 4% -- This Cycle It Is Down 2%*



# A Powerful Echo

*Passive Benefit: Expensive “Baby-Boomers” Are Replaced By Inexpensive “Echo Boomers”*




Source: NIPSSR



# A Meaner, Leaner Japan Inc.

## *Employment Costs Down To Historic Lows*

Worker Compensation In Natl.Income




Source: ISE and Merrill Lynch Calculations;  
sample is TSE 1st section, non-financials

# Households Now A Debtor

*Japan Has A Negative Household Savings Rate :  
Generation Transfer of Jobs and Income plus Desire To Maintain High  
Standard of Living Drives Down Savings Flow.  
Households Now A Net Borrower - A New Credit Cycle*

Household Savings - Yen Trillion per Quarter. Flow Of Funds Based




Note: Flow-based, four-quarter accumulated.

Source: BoJ

# Sweet-Spot For Profits

## *Structural Decline In Unit Labor Costs*

### Unit Labor Cost % YoY - All Economy




Source: METI, MoL & Merrill Lynch

# Productivity: Nothing Special Yet

*Productivity Boost Still Mostly Cyclical*

Productivity % YoY - All Economy



Source: METI , MoL & Merrill Lynch

# Japan Lags

*Japan Leads In IT-Productivity, But Lags Everywhere Else*

(% YoY)

*Contribution*

**GDP**

**IT Capital**

**Non-IT Capital**

**Labor**

## Japan

1990-95	1.2%	0.4%	1.0%	-0.2%
1995-00	1.0%	0.9%	0.3%	-0.2%

## US

1990-95	2.2%	0.5%	0.6%	1.1%
1995-00	3.5%	1.0%	1.1%	1.4%

Source: Motohashi, METI & Merrill Lynch

Jesper Koll - Merrill Lynch Japan Securities

Refer to important disclosures starting on page 60

# Boost Only For IT-Manufacturers

*Outside of IT Manufacturers, Only Little Productivity Improvement.  
Services Dismal*

(% YoY)	<u>Total Productivity</u>	<u>IT Factors</u>	<u>Capital Factors</u>	<u>Utilization Factors</u>	<u>Other Factors</u>
<b>All Industries</b>	<b>1.5%</b>	<b>0.4%</b>	<b>0.6%</b>	<b>0.2%</b>	<b>0.3%</b>
<b>IT Manufacturers</b>	<b>6.2%</b>	<b>0.9%</b>	<b>1.2%</b>	<b>0.4%</b>	<b>3.7%</b>
<b>IT Users - Industry</b>	<b>1.3%</b>	<b>0.3%</b>	<b>0.6%</b>	<b>0.1%</b>	<b>0.3%</b>
<b>IT Users - Services</b>	<b>-0.2%</b>	<b>0.3%</b>	<b>0.4%</b>	<b>n/a</b>	<b>-0.9%</b>

Source: Historic Averages 1995 until 2002 ; Motohashi, METI & Merrill Lynch

# Focus On Logistics

*66% of All Japanese Wholesalers Do Not Have A Customer Who Is A Retailer Or Producer*


## Wholesales by 1,000

Number of Employees	1994		1999	
	Companies	%	Companies	%
1 to 2	90	21.1	96	22.4
3 to 4	103	24.0	98	23.1
5 to 9	120	28.0	118	27.7
10 to 19	68	15.8	67	15.8
20 to 29	21	5.0	21	4.9
30 to 49	15	3.4	15	3.4
50 to 99	8	2.0	8	1.9
over 100	4	0.8	3	0.8
Total	429	100.0	426	100.0

Source: METI

# A “War Economy”

*Surge In Public Deficit Forces Public Debt Monetization  
Inflation Is Always A Fiscal Phenomena ?!*



Source: BoJ and Mikuni & Company




# The China Challenge


*Compared to Past Economic Empire Transitions, The China Challenge Is Huge....BUT: it's Not just about who is the cheapest producer, it is Who Owns The Customer*

	Wage Gap	Population Gap
<b>England versus America</b>  <b>1881</b>	<b>1.21</b> <i>(England was 1.21 times more expensive)</i>	<b>1.61</b> <i>(America was 1.61 times larger)</i>
<b>America versus Japan</b>  <b>1979</b>	<b>1.37</b> <i>(America was 1.37 times more expensive)</i>	<b>0.51</b> <i>Japan was 0.51 times as large)</i>
<b>Japan versus China</b>  <b>2002</b>	<b>32.5</b> <i>(Japan is 32.5 times more expensive)</i>	<b>10.1</b> <i>(China is 10.1 times larger)</i>
Source: IMF		

# China Challenge: End Of Cost Competition




# China Challenge : Start Of Brand Competition



# Cool Nippon

## Do You Think This Country's Products Are "Cool"? Response By Consumers In Different Cities




Source: Nikkei

Note: China=Beijin, Shanghai, Guangzhou

# The Pacific Century Gets Going

	<u>GDP</u>	<u>Growth</u>	<u>\$ Growth</u>
<b>US</b>	<b>11 trn</b>	<b>3%</b>	<b>330 bn</b>
<b>Japan</b>	<b>4.8 trn</b>	<b>1.5%</b>	<b>72 bn</b> ↘
<b>ASIA</b>	<b>4.3 trn</b>	<b>6%</b>	<b>258 bn</b> → <b>330 bn</b>
China	1.4 trn	9%	125 bn
A-Tigers	1.8 trn	6%	110 bn
India	600 bn	5%	30 bn
Australia	500 bn	3%	15 bn
<b>W.Europe</b>	<b>10.2 trn</b>	<b>1.5%</b>	<b>153 bn</b> → <b>200 bn</b>
<b>Accession E.</b>	<b>535 bn</b>	<b>5%</b>	<b>27 bn</b> ↗
<b>Russia</b>	<b>400 bn</b>	<b>5%</b>	<b>20 bn</b> ↗

# China FDI Boom - The End Of Profits?




# Appendix

# FX Policy : De-Facto Dollar Peg

**New Budget Authorizes \$580 billion of Possible Intervention :  
2003 was about \$15bn/month - 2004 could be \$48bn/month**

### FX Intervention Funding Bills - Budget & Actual



Note: bar chart is the actual amount of FX intervention bills outstanding ; the line is the budget limit.  
Source: BoJ, MoF




# Fiscal Realities

- 82 trn. Expenditures
- 42 trn. Revenues
- 40 trn. Borrowing

# Towards A Fiscal Debt Trap

*To Stop Debt-To-GDP From Rising, Japan Needs A Primary Budget Surplus of 2% of GDP --- Today's Deficit is 6% --- A Swing of 8% is a Herculean Task : 8% of GDP = ¥40 trillion ; Total Tax Revenues are ¥42 trillion.*



# Going For Growth

*For Every 1% Growth Japan's Primary Deficit Improves about 0.26%. So Japan Must Grow about 32% Just To Stop Debt-To-GDP Ratio From Rising*

## Impact of Growth on Budget Deficit

	<u>Japan</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>OECD</u>
<u>Cyclical Elasticities YoY%</u>				
Tax				
Corporate	2.1	1.8	0.8	1.26
Personal	0.4	0.6	1.3	1.03
Indirect	0.5	0.9	1.0	0.89
Social Security	0.3	0.6	1.0	0.81
Expenditure	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.29
<u>Total Impact on Budget % of GDP</u>	0.26	0.25	0.51	0.49

If Growth 1% Above Potential Primary Deficit Drops by 0.26 % of GDP

Source: OECD, ML Estimates

# Consumer Challenge

		(Yen billion)	
<b>2004</b>	Oct	320	hike in employee pension contribution
	Dec	480	end special spouse tax deduction
<b>2005</b>	Jan	240	end special old people & retirees pension deduction
	Apr	40	hike national pension contribution
		150	hike unemployment insurance contribution
	Jun	180	end special spouse tax deduction (local tax)
	Sep	320	hike in employee pension contribution
<b>Total</b>		<b>1,730</b>	<b>= 0.5% of disposable income</b>

# Koizumi Tax Reform Mistake?


- Fixed Tax Rate Deductions
  - ¥2.6 trillion national income tax  
*(0.8% of disposable income)*
  - ¥0.9 trillion local income tax  
*(0.3% of disposable income)*
- Implemented by PM Hashimoto, but technically still only temporary
- Likely to be extended into FY3/05, but need to see

# Banks: Japan *Versus* U.S.

	Japan	United States
<b>Largest Bank</b>	MTFG or SMFG Total Assets: \$1.7 trillion	Citigroup Total Assets: \$1.3 trillion
<b>Largest Deposit Market Share</b>	MTFG or SMFG: 33%	Bank of America: 9.6%
<b>ROA*</b>	0.1 to 0.4%	1.5 to 2%
<b>NPA Ratios*</b>	5 to 8.5%	0.5 to 1.5%
<b>Capital Ratios*</b>	Total: 10 to 11% Tier I: 5 to 6%	Total: 11 to 12% Tier I: 7.5 to 9%
<b>Net Int Margins</b>	About 1%	3.5 to 5.5%
<b>Credit Spread</b>	Mizuho (Baa1/BBB-) 5.79% '14: T+123	JPM (A2/A) 4.875% '14: T+87
<p>* Range for the Big 4 largest banks in Japan and top 30 banks in the US. Source: company reports</p>		


# When Will “Cold Money” Turn “Hot”?

*Monetary Policy Now Working : Cash Velocity Picking-Up.  
Mobilization of Record-High Cash Balances Bring Positive Demand &  
Asset Price Effect*



# U.S. Consumer Headwinds

*\$190 billion of U.S. Household Cash-flow Needs To Be Replenished By End-2004.  
Another \$79 billion If U.S. Home Prices Stop Rising.*



Source: Hayer Analytics & Merrill Lynch



# Key Forecasts

- Sayonara Deflation

**Positive Nominal GDP Growth --- Up 1.9% By End 05**

**Consistently Positive core-CPI By Early-2005**

**2005 Focus: A New Credit Growth Cycle**

- Domestic Demand Driven

**Consumption Drives Growth --- 3.9% unemployment by mid-2005**

**Positive Wealth Effects --- A Pick-up In Money Velocity**

- Pragmatic Policy

**Pro-Growth BoJ --- Zero Rate Stays Until Early-2006**

**No Fiscal Tightening**

**De-facto “Dollar Down Peg”**

## Important Disclosures

- Copyright 2004 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated (MLPF&S). This report has been issued and approved for publication in the United Kingdom by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Limited, which is regulated by SFA, and has been considered and issued in Australia by Merrill Lynch Equities (Australia) Limited (ACN 006 276 795), a licensed securities dealer under the Australian Corporations Law. The information herein was obtained from various sources; we do not guarantee its accuracy or completeness. Additional information available.
- Neither the information nor any opinion expressed constitutes an offer, or an invitation to make an offer, to buy or sell any securities or any options, futures or other derivatives related to such securities ("related investments"). MLPF&S and its affiliates may trade for their own accounts as odd-lot dealer, market maker, block positioner, specialist and/or arbitrageur in any securities of this issuer(s) or in related investments, and may be on the opposite side of public orders. MLPF&S, its affiliates, directors, officers, employees and employee benefit programs may have a long or short position in any securities of this issuer(s) or in related investments. MLPF&S or its affiliates may from time to time perform investment banking or other services for, or solicit investment banking or other business from, any entity mentioned in this report.
- This research report is prepared for general circulation and is circulated for general information only. It does not have regard to the specific investment objectives, financial situation and the particular needs of any specific person who may receive this report. Investors should seek financial advice regarding the appropriateness of investing in any securities or investment strategies discussed or recommended in this report and should understand that statements regarding future prospects may not be realized. Investors should note that income from such securities, if any, may fluctuate and that each security's price or value may rise or fall. Accordingly, investors may receive back less than originally invested. Past performance is not necessarily a guide to future performance.
- The bonds of the company are traded over-the-counter. Retail sales and/or distribution of this report may be made only in states where these securities are exempt from registration or have been qualified for sale. MLPF&S usually makes a market in the bonds of this company.
- Foreign currency rates of exchange may adversely affect the value, price or income of any security or related investment mentioned in this report. In addition, investors in securities such as ADRs, whose values are influenced by the currency of the underlying security, effectively assume currency risk.