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Networks and Mobilization Processes: The Case of the Japanese Anti-Nuclear Movement after Fukushima



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PRELIMINARY REMARKS

Japanese names are given in their original order, starting with the family name followed by the given name. Japanese names and expressions are transcribed following the Hepburn System.

LIST OF JAPANESE EXPRESSIONS

ORGANIZATIONS AND POLITICAL PARTIES

3.11 Japan Nuclear Disaster Aid Association	3.11 Ukeire Zenkoku Netto	3.11 受け入れ全国ネット
3a Kōriyama	3a Kōriyama	3a 郡山
69 Meeting	Rokku no Kai	ロックの会
Aizu Radioactivity Information Center	Aizu Hōshanō Jōhō Center	会津放射能情報センター
Alliance for Nuclear Zero	Genpatsu Zero no Kai	原発ゼロの会
Amateur's Revolt	Shirōto no Ran	素人の乱
Anti-Nuclear Tent Common Space	Datsu Genpatsu Tenta Hiroba	脱原発テント広場
Anti-Nuclear TEPCO Shareholders	Datsu Genpatsu Tōden Kabunushi Undō	脱原発東電株主運動
Assembly to Think about the Aging Fukushima Nuclear Plant	Fukushima Rōkyū Genpatsu o Kangaeru Kai (Fukurō no Kai)	福島老朽原発を考える会 (フクロウの会)
Association of Japanese Labor Unions	Nihon Rōdō Kumiai Sōrengō Kai	日本労働組合総連合会
Citizen's Commission on Nuclear Energy (CCNE)	Genshiryoku Shimin Iinkai	原子力市民委員会
Citizen's Nuclear Information Center (CNIC)	Genshiryoku Shiryō Jōhō Shitsu	原子力資料情報室
Citizens' Conference to Promote the Nuclear Victims Support Act (SHSK)	Genpatsu Jiko Kodomo Hisaisha Shienhō Shimin Kaigi	原発事故子ども・被災者支援法市民会議
Citizens' Radioactivity Measuring Station (CRMS)	Shimin Hōshanō Sokuteisho	市民放射能測定所
e-shift – Conference for the Realization of a Nuclear Phase-Out and a New Energy Policy	'e-shift' – Datsu Genpatsu Atarashi Enerugi Seisaku o Jitsugen suru Kai	「e シフト」脱原発・新しいエネルギー政策を実現する会
Daichi o Mamoru Kai	Daichi o Mamoru Kai	大地を守る会
Democratic Party of Japan ¹ (DPJ)	Minshutō	民主党

¹ Dissolved in March 2016 and merged with the Japan Innovation Party (*Ishin no Tō*) and the Vision of Reform Assembly (*Kaikaku Kesshū no Kai*) to form the Democratic Party (*Minshintō*), see The Democratic Party (2016).

Diet's Energy Investigation Conference	<i>Kokkai Enerugī Chōsa Kai Junbi Kai</i>	国会エネルギー調査会準備会
ene shifu Japan	<i>ene shifu Japan</i>	エネ・シフ・ジャパン
Forum for Constitutional Advocacy, Peace, and Human Rights	<i>Kempō Yōgo, Heiwa, Jinken Fōramu</i>	憲法擁護・平和・人権フォーラム
Forum Peace, Human Rights, Environment (Peace Forum)	<i>Fōramu Heiwa, Jinken, Kankyō</i>	フォーラム平和・人権・環境 (平和フォーラム)
Fukushima Nuclear Accident Urgency Assembly	<i>Fukushima Genpatsu Jiko Kinkyū Kaigi</i>	福島原発事故緊急会議 (緊急会議)
Fukushima Nuclear Disaster Information Center	<i>Fukushima Genpatsu Hisai Jōhō Renraku Sentā</i>	福島原発被災情報連絡センター
Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Legal Action Group	<i>Fukushima Genpatsu Kokusodan</i>	福島原発告訴団
Gōdō Shuppan	<i>Gōdō Shuppan</i>	合同出版
Goodbye Nuclear 10 Million People's Action	<i>Sayōnara Genpatsu Issenman-nin Akushon</i>	さようなら原発 1000 万人アクション
Green Action	<i>Gurīn Akushon</i>	グリーン・アクション
Green Tea Party (Alliance for Nuclear Phase-out)	<i>Ryokuchakai (Datsu Genpatsu Seiji Renmei)</i>	緑茶会 (脱原発政治連盟)
Greenpeace Japan	<i>Gurīnpīsu Japan</i>	グリーンピース・ジャパン
Institute for Sustainable Energy Policies (ISEP)	<i>Kankyō Enerugī Seisaku Kenkyūjo</i>	環境エネルギー政策研究所
Japan Business Federation	<i>Nihon Keizai Dantai Rengō Kai (Keidanren)</i>	日本経済団体連合会 (経団連)
Japan Civil Network for Disaster Relief in East Japan (JCN)	<i>Higashi Nihon Daishinsai Shien Zenkoku Nettowāku</i>	東日本大震災支援全国ネットワーク
Japan Congress Against A- and H-Bombs	<i>Gensuibaku Kinshi Nihon Kokumin Kaigi (Gensuikin)</i>	原水爆禁止日本国民会議 (原水禁)
Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs	<i>Gensuibaku Kinshi Nihon Kyōgikai (Gensuikyō)</i>	原水爆禁止日本協議会 (原水協)
Japan Federation of Bar Associations	<i>Nihon Bengoshi Rengō Kai (Nichibenren)</i>	日本弁護士連合会 (日弁連)
Japanese Communist Party (JCP)	<i>Kyōsantō</i>	共産党

Kikō Network	<i>Kikō Nettowāku (Kikō Netto)</i>	気候ネットワーク (気候ネット)
Lawyer's Association of Fukushima prefecture	<i>Fukushima-ken Bengoshi Kai</i>	福島県弁護士会
Let's Save Children from Radiation Kantō Regional Network	<i>Kodomo o Hōshanō kara Mamorō Kantō Netto (Kodomo Kantō Netto)</i>	子どもを放射能から守ろう関東ネット (子ども関東ネット)
Let's Stop Nuclear Power Tōkyō Movement	<i>Genpatsu Tomeyō Tōkyō Kōdō</i>	原発止めよう東京行動
Let's Stop Nuclear Power Tōkyō Network	<i>Genpatsu Tomeyō Tōkyō Nettowāku</i>	原発止めよう東京ネットワーク
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)	<i>Jiyū Minshutō (Jimintō)</i>	自由民主党 (自民党)
Mayors for a Nuclear Power-free Japan	<i>Datsu Genpatsu o Mezasu Kubichō Kaigi</i>	脱原発を目指す首長会議
Metropolitan Coalition Against Nukes	<i>Shutōen Hangenpatsu Rengō</i>	首藤園反原発連合
Nara Prefecture Disaster Victim Group	<i>Nara-ken Hisaisha no Kai</i>	奈良県被災者の会
National Anti-Nuclear Movement News Conference	<i>Hangenpatsu Undō Zenkoku Renraku Kai</i>	反原発運動全国連絡会
National Citizens' Radiation Measurement Station Network	<i>Zenkoku Shimin Hōshanō Sokuteisho Nettowāku</i>	全国市民放射能測定所ネットワーク
National Conference of Anti-Nuclear Lawyer's Groups	<i>Datsu Genpatsu Bengoshidan Zenkoku Renraku Kai</i>	脱原発弁護士団全国連絡会
National Evacuee Group for a Right to Evacuate	<i>'Hinan no Kenri' o Motomeru Zenkoku Hinasha no Kai</i>	「非難の権利」を求める全国避難者の会
National Movement for the Recognition of Support for Nuclear Victims	<i>Genpatsu Jiko Hisaisha no Kyūsai o Mitomeru Zenkoku Undō</i>	原発事故被害者の救済を求める全国運動
National Movement of Nuclear Victims	<i>Genpatsu Jiko Hinansha Zenkoku Undō</i>	原発事故避難者全国運動
National Network against the Rokkashō Reprocessing Plant and to Stop Radioactive Contamination	<i>Rokkashō Saishori Kōjo ni Hantai shi, Hōshasen Osen o Soshi suru Zenkoku Nettowāku (Soshi Netto)</i>	六ヶ所再処理工場に反対し、放射線汚染を阻止する全国ネットワーク (阻止ネット)

National Network for a Nuclear Phase-Out Law	<i>Datsu Genpatsuhō Zenkoku Nettowāku</i>	脱原発法全国ネットワーク
National Network of Pediatricians	<i>Zenkoku Shōnikai Netto</i>	全国小児会ネット
National Parents' Network to Protect Children from Radiation	<i>Kodomotachi o Hōshanō kara Mamoru Zenkoku Nettowāku (Kodomo Zenkoku Netto)</i>	子どもたちを放射能から守る全国ネットワーク (子ども全国ネット)
Nationwide Regional Energy Association	<i>Zenkoku Gotōchi Enerugī Kyōkai</i>	全国ご当地エネルギー協会
NO to Nukes at Kaminoseki YES to Seto Inland Sea Nature Conservation Citizen's Network	<i>Kaminoseki Dō suru Netto</i>	上関どうするネット
Nuclear Accident Victims' Organizations Information Assembly	<i>Genpatsu Jiko Higaisha Dantai Renraku Kai (Hidanren)</i>	原発事故被害者団体連絡会 (ひだんれん)
Nuclear Phase-Out Fukushima Network	<i>Datsu Genpatsu Fukushima Nettowāku</i>	脱原発福島ネットワーク
Nuclear Regulatory Agency	<i>Genshiryoku Kisei Iinkai</i>	原子力規制委員会
Nuclear Safety Commission	<i>Genshiryoku Anzen Iinkai</i>	原子力安全委員会
Ōsaka Assembly against the Mihama, Ōi, and Takama Nuclear Power Plants	<i>Mihama, Ōi, Takahama Genpatsu ni Hantai suru Ōsaka no Kai (Mihama no Kai)</i>	美浜、大飯、高浜原発に反対する大阪の会 (美浜の会)
Peace Boat	<i>Pīsu Bōto</i>	ピースボート
Peach Heart	<i>Pīchi Hāto</i>	ピーチハート
People's Plan Study Group	<i>People's Plan Kenkyūjo</i>	ピープルズ・プラン研究所
People's Power Network (PPN)	<i>Shimin Denryoku Renraku Kai</i>	市民電力連絡会
Politicians for the Support of Victims	<i>Kodomo Hisaisha Shien Giin Renmei</i>	子ども被災者支援議員連盟
Prefectural Politicians for the Promotion of the Support Act	<i>Shienhō Suishin Jichitai Giin Renmei</i>	支援法推進自治体議員連盟
Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation (RJIF)	<i>Nihon Saiken Inishichibu</i>	日本再建イニシアチブ

Sapporo Musubiba	<i>Sapporo Musubiba</i>	札幌むすびば
Save Fukushima Children Lawyers' Network (SAFLAN)	<i>Fukushima no Kodomotachi o Mamoru Hōritsuka Nettwāku</i>	福島の子どもたちを守る法律家ネットワーク
Sayōnara Genpatsu	<i>Goodbye Nuclear Power</i>	さようなら原発
Social Democratic Party (SDP)	<i>Shamintō</i>	社民党
Special Committee on Reconstruction after the Great East Japan Earthquake in the House of Councilors	<i>Sangiin Higashi Nihon Daishinsai Fukkō Tokubetsu Inka</i>	参議院東日本大震災復興特別委員会
Stop Nuclear Reprocessing! Tōkyō Citizens Assembly	<i>Saishori Tometai! Shutōen Shimin no Tsudo</i>	再処理とめたい！首都圏市民のつどい
Takagi Fund	<i>Takagi Jinzaburō Shimin Kagaku Kikin</i>	高木仁三郎市民科学基金
Tampoposha	<i>Tampoposha</i>	たんぽぽ舎
Tōkyō Peace Film Festival	<i>Tōkyō Heiwa Eigasai</i>	東京平和映画祭
Tōkyō Seikatsusha Network	<i>Tōkyō Seikatsusha Nettowāku</i>	東京生活者ネットワーク
Trade Union Council	<i>Sōhyō</i>	総評
Victims' Support Law Network	<i>Genpatsu Jiko Kodomo Hisaisha Shienhō Nettowāku</i>	原発事故子ども被災者支援法ネットワーク
Worker and Farmer Citizen's Assembly for the Preservation of Food Products, Environment and Water	<i>Shoku to Midori, Mizu wo Mamoru Chūō Rōnō Shimin Kaigi</i>	食とみどり・水を守る中央労農市民会議
Zeronomikuma	<i>Zeronomikuma</i>	ゼロノミクマ

EXPRESSIONS

alliance of parliamentarians	<i>giin renmei</i>	議員連盟
anti-nuclear group/group for nuclear phase-out	<i>datsu genpatsu dantai</i>	脱原発団体
anti-nuclear power	<i>han genpatsu</i>	反原発
areas of support	<i>shien taizō chiiki</i>	支援対象地域
basic policy	<i>kihon hōshin</i>	基本方針

caller for participation	<i>yobikake</i>	呼び掛け
citizen	<i>shimin</i>	市民
citizen action team	<i>shimin akushon chīmu</i>	市民アクションチーム
citizen movement	<i>shimin undō</i>	市民運動
claims-making type of paper directly addressed at central actors in the government	<i>yōsei</i>	要請
collaborator	<i>kyōsai</i>	共催
consultation activity	<i>sōdan katsudō</i>	相談活動
contact person for information	<i>otoiawase, renrakusaki</i>	お問い合わせ、連絡先
cooperation/cooperator	<i>kyōryoku</i>	協力
energy	<i>enerugi</i>	エネルギー
evacuee group	<i>hinansha no kai</i>	避難者の会
friendship-like	<i>nakama-teki</i>	仲間的
government advisory council	<i>shingi kai</i>	審議会
group	<i>dantai</i>	団体
group of responsible managers	<i>sewa-nin kai</i>	世話人会
group of responsible people or organizations for the organization of an event	<i>jikkō iinkai</i>	実行委員会
health recuperation stay	<i>hoyō</i>	保養
Hibakusha (person affected from radiation)	<i>Hibakusha</i>	被ばく者
host	<i>shusai</i>	主催
labor movement	<i>rōdō undō</i>	労働運動
management structure	<i>un'ei taisei</i>	運営体制
managing organizations	<i>un'ei dantai</i>	運営団体
movement organization	<i>katsudō dantai</i>	活動団体
inner-parliament assembly	<i>innai shūkai</i>	院内集会
non-profit organization (NPO)	<i>tokutei hieiri dantai (NPO hōjin)</i>	特定非営利団体 (NPO 法人)
nuclear power phase-out	<i>datsu genpatsu</i>	脱原発

nuclear power station	<i>genpatsu</i>	原発
operating statement	<i>un'ei yōryō</i>	運営要領
opinion paper directed towards governmental actors but also the general public and the media	<i>seimei</i>	声明
participating organizations	<i>sanka dantai</i>	参加団体
presenter, speaker	<i>supikā</i>	スピーカー
private organization	<i>nin'i dantai</i>	任意団体
public corporation	<i>kōeki hōjin</i>	公益法人
question-and-answer session	<i>seifu kōshō</i>	政府交渉
representative speaker	<i>daihyō sewa-nin</i>	代表世話人
resident movement	<i>jūmin undō</i>	住民運動
semi support areas	<i>jun shien taizō chiiki</i>	準支援対象地域
tax-exempted/authorized NPOs	<i>nintei NPO hōjin</i>	認定 NPO 法人

LAWS AND REGULATIONS

Act Concerning the Promotion of Measures to Provide Living Support to the Victims, Including the Children Affected by the TEPCO Nuclear Accident in order to Protect and Support their Everyday Lives (Nuclear Victims Support Act)	<i>Tōkyō Denryoku Genshiryoku Jiko ni yori Hisai shita Kodomo o Hajime to suru Jūmin nado no Seikatsu o Mamori-Sasaeru tame no Hisaisha no Seikatsu Shien nado ni Kan suru Shisaku no Suishin ni Kan suru Hōritsu (Kodomo Hisaisha Shienhō)</i>	東京電力原子事故により 被災した子どもをはじめ とする住民等の生活を守 り支えるための被災者の 生活支援等に関する施策 の推進に関する法律 (子 ども被災者支援法)
Act on the Promotion of Specified Non-Profit Activities	<i>Tokutei Hieiri Sokushinhō</i>	特定非営利促進法
Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets (State Secrecy Law)	<i>Tokutei Himitsu no Hogo no Kan suru Hōritsu (Himitsu Hogohō)</i>	特定秘密の保護に関する 法律 (秘密保護法)
Package of Measures for the Support of Victims from the Nuclear Disaster	<i>Genshiryoku Higai ni yoru Hisaisha Shien Shisaku Pakkēji</i>	原子力被害による被災者 支援施策パッケージ

MEDIA

Anti-Nuclear Newspaper	<i>Hangenpatsu Shimbun</i>	反原発新聞
Fukushima Minpō	<i>Fukushima Minpō</i>	福島民報
OurPlanetTV (OP-TV)	<i>Awā Puranetto Tibi</i>	アワープラネット・ ティービー

EVENTS

Global Conference for a Nuclear Power Free World	<i>Datsu Genpatsu Sekai Kaigi</i>	脱原発世界会議
Nuclear Phase-Out Forum	<i>Datsu Genpatsu Fōramu</i>	脱原発フォーラム

1 INTRODUCTION

Most of today's democratic nation-states have experienced multiple waves of social movement activity. Social movements are known to emerge when a political opportunity alters incentives for collective action, leading to periods of high confrontation between civil actors and the state. The emergence and decline of social movements follow a periodical cycle. While some movement organizations dissolve during latent movement phases, others maintain their activities to a certain level, ready to expand them anytime an opportunity arises. We can therefore assume that when movement actors perceive an opportunity, they draw on structures and relationships already in place in order to mobilize an encompassing social movement.

Most collective action does not develop spontaneously but requires organization. No public demonstration, petition, or movement-related talk event would be possible without a certain degree of organization. In most cases, protest events are organized by more than one group or organization. This implies that the different groups or organizations already know each other; they must previously share some sort of social tie. The structure of relationships among movement organizations, i. e. on the intergroup or meso level of a social movement, are formative for the shape of the movement as a whole, especially regarding forms of action but also for the framing of the issue at stake. Forms of action and framings are most often decided in inclusive discussions among movement organizers, and it depends on the characteristics of the organizers as well as on the composition of the group of participating organizations what kind of ideas are presented and executed.

Although we have seen a number of studies concerning the organizational structures of social movements from various perspectives (Curtis and Zurcher 1973; Della Porta and Diani 2006; Klandermans 2013; Kriesi 1996; McAdam 1988; McAdam et al. 1996; Staggenborg 1998), we still lack understanding of the way in which a political opportunity, in the form of a social or political development or a disruptive event such as an environmental catastrophe, influences movement structures and relationships at the meso level. This level of the social strata is the most decisive for movement mobilization, as it represents the bridge between political opportunity and individual participation in protest events, and because it is the basis for structural and cultural integration of different movement groups into a more encompassing social movement (Gerhards and Rucht 1992; Opp 2009; Staggenborg 2002). While many studies (Carroll and

Ratner 1996; Evans 1997; Hedstrom et al. 2000; Koopmans and Duyvendak 1995; Luft 2009; Smith 2002; Snow and Benford 2000) deal with the effect of issue framing on movement mobilization by frame diffusion through networks, most of these studies tend to disregard the interrelation of framings and chosen action repertoires with past and present relational dynamics at the meso level.

There is thus a need for comprehensive research on how disruptive events influence relational patterns at the movement meso level, and how these dynamically changing relationships influence issue framing and action repertoires (and vice versa). The present study seeks to close this research gap by developing a refined analytical model based on findings in political process theory (Tarrow 2011³; Tilly 2001), network theory (Borgatti and Halgin 2011b; Diani 2002; Hennig et al. 2012), and relational sociology (Mische 2011; Mische and Pattison 2000; Tilly 2002; White 1992). This model enables the researcher to link social movement action profiles, composed of common projects (issue framings) and chosen action repertoires, to relational dynamics in coalitional networks. These are further linked to network-building processes triggered by a mobilizing event as well as latent movement intergroup structures that were in place before the event.

The present study further applies the proposed model to the case of the Japanese anti-nuclear movement, which experienced a period of high mobilization after the nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, triggered by the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami in March 2011. The nuclear disaster in Fukushima has been followed by a change in Japanese public opinion from primarily pro-nuclear to largely the opposite. In the eyes of movement actors this shift in public opinion represents a political opportunity of enormous scale. The movement wave after 3.11² thereby represents an ideal case to study mobilization processes by looking at relational changes at the meso level of a social movement.

In sum, this study aspires first to carefully expand existing knowledge about mobilization processes in social movements by examining changes at the movement meso level following a disruptive event; second, it provides valuable insight into movement structures and working procedures of a Japanese social movement from a constructivist-relational point of view. The study thus provides a fruitful ground for further

² Abbreviation for 'March 2011', the month in which the nuclear disaster unfolded in Japan. 3.11 is often used in analogy to 9.11, which represents the date of the similarly disruptive terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York (USA) on September 11, 2011.

comparative transnational studies of movement emergence following disruptive events or large-scale social change.

This introductory section serves to expose the theoretical parameters for the proposed analytical model as well as to outline previous research findings on the Japanese anti-nuclear movement before and after the Fukushima nuclear accident, thereby providing the context for this study. The section starts with an outline of the analytical model and a definition of mobilization processes and network theory (section 1.1). This is followed by an introduction to the case of the Japanese anti-nuclear movement, particularly its history, its organizational infrastructures, and major forms of action, drawing from relevant previous research as well as important background knowledge gained during the author's field work in Tōkyō between September 2013 and May 2014 (section 1.2). In order to pave the way for the in-depth empirical analysis of network mobilization processes after a disruptive event, section 1.3 gives an overview of the sample: the two networks e-shift (*ī-shifuto*) and the Citizen Conference to Promote the Nuclear Victims Support Act (*Shienhō Shimin Kaigi*) – hereafter SHSK – which developed after the nuclear disaster in March 2011 and which are both primarily involved in less visible advocacy-oriented collective protest actions. While e-shift is informally organized, taking the form of a network-coalition, SHSK is a more formally organized coalition. Section 1.4 frames the research objectives in detail and illustrates the further course of this study.

1.1 MOBILIZATION PROCESSES THROUGH NETWORKS: TOWARDS A REFINED ANALYTICAL MODEL

In most readers' minds, thinking about social movements evokes an image of masses of people holding placards and marching in the streets, demonstrating more or less peacefully against or for a social or political issue they would like to change. But what is necessary for such collective action to take place? To describe this phenomenon, researchers resort to a term originally used to describe the process of gathering military troops: mobilization. The term mobilization as used in social movement research thus describes the process of uniting masses of people to raise their voices in demanding social and/or political change. While the term in a military sense involves a command from a person high in the hierarchy to assemble its personnel (top-down), in social movements, people mobilize because it is their will to do so (bottom-up). Now, why and how do people mobilize to reach social change from the bottom up? It is easy to picture the outcome of a mobilization process in the form of protest events (e. g. street

marches but also any other kind of imaginable contentious collective action) but the process leading to such action remains difficult to grasp.

In social movement research, we find a number of differing approaches to the study of mobilization. Research on the subject has traditionally involved scholars from a variety of disciplines such as sociology, political science, anthropology, social psychology, and history, to name just the most important (Klandermans and Roggeband 2010: 3). Their approaches to the study of collective action differ as much as they approach their respective study subjects. The sociological tradition in which the present study is broadly anchored however, has produced the largest body of literature in the field (Klandermans and Roggeband 2010: 4). Sociological studies of social movements can roughly be divided into structural and cultural approaches. While structural approaches emphasize key concepts such as mobilizing structures, the dissemination of resources, as well as political opportunities for movement mobilization, cultural approaches highlight the fact that action is triggered by the interpretation and perception of certain issues as well as an emotional need to act.

Some researchers originally from the structural tradition of movement research have incorporated cultural factors into their models in order to provide a more comprehensive picture of movement emergence. Examples include McAdam et al.'s *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings* (1996) as well as Tarrow's *Power in Movement. Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (2011³). These scholars come from a background in political process theory, but integrate different strands of movement research (collective behavior, resource mobilization, framing and collective identity, etc.) into their models. They generally identify a political opportunity as a movement-mobilizing event. Consequently, they argue that movement mobilization requires three ingredients: first, a development or an event increasing the saliency of the issue in the society as a whole, rendering it possible to reach critical masses of people; second, connections or networks between people or groups along which information and interpretations of the issue can travel and which serve as organizational basis providing the resources for collective protest action; and third, framings of the issue that motivate people to participate in a social movement, more specifically in protest events. But these "ingredients" are merely factors contributing to mobilization, initiating or supporting the process. But what can be said about the process itself? In their book on *Dynamics of Contention*, McAdam et al. (2001) look at mechanisms in order to picture a mobilization process. While they emphasize the impossibility of constructing a causal story of mobili-

zation because in most cases mechanisms work simultaneously, they nevertheless identify cognitive, relational, and environmental mechanisms that play an important role in the mobilization (and demobilization) of social movements (McAdam and Tarrow 2011).

These mechanisms can be located at different social strata: cognitive mechanisms on the individual or micro level, relational mechanisms on the individual but also on the intergroup or meso level, and finally environmental mechanisms in terms of events or developments at the macro level, concerning the society as a whole. Of course, these three mechanisms are strongly interrelated: the cognitive interpretation of an issue depends on the type of event or development on the macro level and is equally important for actors on the meso level; interpretation and framing also depend on the types of actors engaging in the discussion and their relational patterns. The framings and the relational patterns that emerge on the meso level (in interactions among movement organizations) also intersect with the types of protest events that are organized and consequently also with the individuals participating in such events.³ The study of mobilization processes thus deals with highly intersecting, almost blurred analytical categories (Diani 2003; McAdam and Tarrow 2011; Staggenborg 2002: 124).

A possible solution to this dilemma is to concentrate on mobilization processes at only one level of the social strata by applying a consistent method and to draw conclusions on the larger process from there. As movement researchers such as Gerhards and Rucht (1992) have pointed out, it is the meso level of a social movement where the most important mobilizing action takes place. Without an organizational basis, no coordinated collective action is possible. Moreover, a focus on the meso level allows the observation of important links between the micro and the

³ Another concept to grasp the dynamics of mobilization from a social-psychological point of view is provided by Klandermans (2004: 360–361), who distinguishes between a demand and a supply side of participation. The demand side refers to factors such as “socialization, grievance formation, causal attribution, and the formation of collective identity”. The supply side of participation refers to factors such as “action repertoires, the effectiveness of social movements, the frames and ideologies movements stand for, and the constituents of identification they offer”. Thus, the supply side of participation largely refers to a movement’s organizational infrastructures. Building on this conceptualization, Klandermans defines mobilization as “the process that links demand and supply”, i. e. the “marketing mechanism of the social movement domain” that concerns “the effectiveness of (persuasive) communication, the influence of social networks, and perceived costs and benefits of participation”.

meso as well as between the meso and the macro level of social movements (Staggenborg 2002: 125).⁴ This is why the present study centers on relational mechanisms at the meso level of a social movement – in other words relations among social movement organizations – while keeping in mind the intersections with the macro and the micro level.

The network metaphor is deeply linked to the study of social processes and able to depict relations at the meso level; the term ‘social network’ obviously suggests linkages or ties between social entities. A network perspective considers such ties or relations important variables for explaining an actor’s behavior (Borgatti and Halgin 2011b; Hennig et al. 2012). The idea of networks has also gained much popularity in social science research because it offers the possibility to grasp “phenomena of change” (Diani 2003: 4). Consequently, it enables researchers to look into social mechanisms, such as the relational mechanisms that contribute to movement mobilization. But what do we know so far about relations at the meso level of a social movement? And what happens with these relations during a mobilization process?

The literature includes some conceptualizations of the meso level of social movements. Curtis and Zurcher (1973) and Klandermans (2013) describe social movement organizations as embedded in multi-organizational fields, clustered in alliance or conflict systems. Staggenborg (2002) – building on Zald’s (2000) definition of movements as ‘ideologically structured action’ – frames the meso level in terms of movement communities, which include not only organizations but also engaged individuals and other kinds of groups, as long as they are ideologically close and somehow involved in movement organization. So, at a movement’s meso level we find many different kinds of actors with more or less close relations to each other.

Moreover, research has shown that when movement groups mobilize in response to a perceived political opportunity, they tend to build close-knit networks or coalitions with other ideologically similar groups or individuals in order to maximize their impact on the political sphere (Tarrow 2011³; Van Dyke 2013). Naturally, relations among coalition members carry potential for internal conflict, and cooperation takes on different organizational forms (Beamish and Luebbbers 2009; Diani and Bison 2004; Jones et al. 2001; Obach 1999; Van Dyke 2003). Concerning the

⁴ Staggenborg (2011: 28–29) categorizes research issues concerning social movements into micro, meso, and macro level questions. Macro level questions touch upon “large-scale structural changes”, meso level questions concern the “organizational dynamics” of social movements, and micro level questions look at “individual decisions and interactions”.

process of coalition-building, Van Dyke (2013) notes that the most important precondition for cooperation among movement organizations is shared social ties or, in other words, that they know each other. Here, the structure of the organizational field in which organizations are embedded enables some connections while it disables others. Furthermore, we can identify several factors facilitating coalition-building. Besides a political opportunity or threat, coalitions are facilitated by a shared common goal, consistent identities, ideologies, good leadership, shared mobilizing philosophies, and the experience of past cooperation. However, while knowledge about coalition-facilitating factors is a great achievement of movement research, it still does not comment upon the relational dynamics of coalition or network-building as part of a movement mobilization process.

Mische and Pattison (2000) develop a model to trace coalition-building processes by looking at sociocultural mechanisms. They look at networks in terms of 'networks of meaning', building on Harrison White's (1992) and Charles Tilly's (2002) constructivist approaches to the understanding of relational social processes, and assume that social relations are communicatively grounded. Based on this assumption, they develop a model involving three stages to coalition formation by analyzing the interpenetration among organizations, their ideological framings or primary issues, and events at three different points in time. At the first stage, we find a sectoral segmentation of movement organizations even though there might be some overlap between the organizations' issues. At stage two, the organizations intermingle and try to find a common project or framing and strategy for a joint campaign; in other words, they interanimate. Finally at stage three, the organizations have converged and given way to a common project. However, this model falls short on a number of points. First, it does not take into account latent movement relational structures, i.e. the relations that movement organizations entertain before a mobilization process is initiated, as well as their past experiences of cooperation. These relational patterns most likely influence the way in which organizations intermingle at stage two. Second, the model also neglects the influence of the movement-initiating event on the coalition-building process. Finally, it disregards the fact that most coalitions are active over a period of time, so relationship patterns may be submitted to constant renegotiation against the background of changing political circumstances and in relation to the way they act (Hennig et al. 2012; Tarrow 2011³). Clearly, the current theories and past research results presented here demand the careful development of a more encompassing model to analyze coalition-building and networking processes as part of a mobilization process.

To fill this gap, I draw on constructivist approaches to the study of social relations and develop an analytical model which a) takes into account the relational patterns of a given movement coalition or network itself, but b) interprets them against the background of its antecedents, namely the latent structures of the movement community and the coalition or network-building process, as well as c) in relation to its outcomes in terms of a certain action profile consisting of a common project and a joint action repertoire. This model thus promises to shed light on mobilization processes in social movements from a constructivist network perspective by expanding our knowledge of the changes in relational patterns among movement actors at the meso level before and after a mobilizing event. And it further allows to look at meso level network structures in relation to action profiles of movement networks or coalitions.

Since this theoretically developed analytical model will be applied to the case of the Japanese anti-nuclear movement after Fukushima, section 1.2 outlines the literature on the infrastructure of Japanese civil society; past anti-nuclear movement waves that provide the basis for latent movement relational patterns today; research results on the heterogeneity of organizations involved in the recent movement wave; and insights into the visible and less visible movement activities after Fukushima. This provides the context for this study's sample of two coalitional networks, which will be introduced in section 1.3.

1.2 THE CASE OF THE JAPANESE ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENT SINCE 3.11

The 9.0 magnitude earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011 triggered one of the worst nuclear disasters in human history and led to a national crisis in Japan. The disaster has altered public opinion on nuclear energy from primarily pro-nuclear to clearly in favor of a nuclear phase-out, thereby raising the saliency of the issue to a level unprecedented in Japan (Aldrich 2013; Kingston 2014a). The experience of the immediate consequences of a nuclear disaster has triggered a wave of social movement activity, including support activities for the direct victims of the earthquake and tsunami but also activities expressing uncertainty about the situation at the Fukushima nuclear power plant. Oguma (2013: 195–196) describes the general mood in Tōkyō after the disaster as filled with anger and tension; people did not know whom to trust. During the first weeks after the disaster restaurants were empty, concerts were cancelled, supermarkets were sold out, and in order to save energy the city's lights had been switched off. Many people began to distrust information from tradi-

tional mass media about the situation at the Fukushima nuclear power plant and radiation risk, and started to search for alternative information on the internet. This situation resulted in already existing social movement organizations reinforcing their activities, the formation of new groups in related policy fields, increased joint action among such civil organizations, and the expansion of the use of alternative media to reach a broader public. But before describing the most recent research on movement developments after 3.11, I will introduce the characteristics of Japanese social movements and civil society in general, and in particular of the anti-nuclear movement, to offer a sense of the main factors contributing to the latent movement structures.

1.2.1 INFRASTRUCTURE OF JAPANESE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CIVIL SOCIETY

To understand the impact of the Fukushima disaster on anti-nuclear social movement relational structures at the meso level, one must have insight into the general characteristics and infrastructures of social movements and civil society in Japan. The term 'social movement' traditionally describes collective action to push for social and/or political change and therefore emphasizes a conflictive or contentious relationship between society and the state (Della Porta and Diani 2006; Raschke 1988; Rucht 2005). The term 'civil society' in contrast has often been defined as a so-called 'third' or 'non-profit sector' besides the state, the market, and the family, thus suggesting a less contentious, more supportive relationship with the (democratic) state (Diani 2013; Foljanty-Jost and Aoki 2008; Pharr 2003; Shaw 1999). While social movements tend to rise and fall over certain periods in time, civil society connotes permanent or long-term organized activity. This leads to the conclusion that civil society structures correspond largely with social movement structures during latent times, providing the basis for social movements to emerge in times of issue saliency (see section 2 for more details on the relationship between civil society and social movements).

To illustrate the relationship between civil society and the state in Japan, I characterize the main features of Japanese social movements and civil society as well as their ways of influencing the policy-making process. I do so because the way in which alternative political actors are involved with the state has an influence on the structural features of the field as a whole. Following this, I present the most important findings on network structures in Japanese civil society.

One of the main structural features of Japanese social movements and civil society, frequently repeated in the literature, is the distinction between citizens' movements (*shimin undō*) and residents' movements

(*jūmin undō*). The term *shimin undō* developed gradually during the 1960s following the first big protest wave in Japan after the end of the Second World War, which centered around the renewal of the security treaty with the United States of America.⁵ Participants in the so-called Ampo-struggle⁶ started to define themselves as *shimin* (citizens), a term connoting an independence of existing political ideologies and solidarity among otherwise unconnected individuals (Hettling and Foljanty-Jost 2009: 28).⁷ In the 1970s, we can observe the rise of residents' movements or *jūmin undō*. With increasing environmental pollution and ecological devastation, many local or communal groups formed to deal with environmental problems in their immediate surroundings. While the two terms are often used synonymously in everyday life, in many people's minds today, citizens' movements refer to groups focused on political activities related to value-oriented issues such as peace or racism at a national or cross-regional level, while residents' movements describe local groups concentrating mostly on single issues directly concerning their livelihood. Political activities by ordinary citizens were viewed askance by the general public at least into the 1990s (and some argue even today), supposedly because of the violent student protests during the 1960s – so the term *shimin undō* may still have a somewhat negative image (Derichs 1995: 24–25; Hasegawa 2004: 39–42; Hettling and Foljanty-Jost 2009: 29; Steinhoff 2013; Vosse 1998: 255).⁸

⁵ In this treaty, the United States guaranteed to defend Japan in case of foreign aggression. In return, Japan agreed to keep US military bases on Japanese grounds and to support them financially. The first security treaty was signed in 1951 when Japan was still occupied by the United States; 1960 marked its renewal.

⁶ Avenell (2010: 62–63) describes these protests as “some of the largest mass protests in modern Japanese history” and points out that “the Ampo-struggle represents the first and last time that progressive forces would unite on such a large scale against the conservative establishment”.

⁷ Avenell (2010: 63) points out that the Ampo-struggle “witnessed the flowering of a new type of activism, brewing cultural and other forms of grassroots activity since the early postwar years and invigorated by activists who now defined themselves as *shimin*”. He further states that “these self-proclaimed *shimin* spilled into the streets during the protest, sometimes individually, but often in small, democratically organized protest groups”, thus indicating grassroots organizational structures. Some observers saw in the birth of such citizen movements “the nativity of a performative citizenship in postwar Japan”.

⁸ Avenell (2010: 3) on the other hand emphasizes that activists use the term *shimin* and related concepts to “legitimize, encourage, facilitate, or otherwise make action possible”. The connotation of the concept *shimin* thus depends on an actor's specific point of view.

This atmosphere however changed significantly after the Kōbe earthquake in 1995, when a wave of civil engagement could be observed (Avenell 2010: 245–246, 2016). These mainly volunteer activities led to the implementation of the so-called NPO law (Tokutei Hieiri Sokushinhō) in 1998,⁹ which was supposed to support civil engagement on a broader scale. Through the law, civil groups hoped to get better access to policy-making, financial support, and a better public reputation by achieving legal status as a non-profit organization. But according to Foljanty-Jost and Aoki (2008), the law did not have the impact hoped for by many. Before the implementation of the NPO law, the non-profit sector in Japan could be classified into two categories: public corporations (*kōeki hōjin*), including several types of foundations and associations¹⁰ which profit from tax exemptions, and private organizations without corporate status (*nin'i dantai*). The NPO law opened up a third big category, non-profit organizations (*tokutei hieiri dantai* or *NPO hōjin*), which granted corporate status allowing groups to, for example, open a bank account in the name of the organization. To qualify for the status of a non-profit organization, the groups have to fit into one of twenty fields of activity defined by the state.¹¹ They are not allowed to pursue religious or political activities, they have to have at least ten members and three directors, and they have to hand in a financial and action plan every year (Nihon NPO Center 2015). On the one hand, NPOs are prohibited from pursuing explicitly political activities; on the other hand, the status allows for limited participation in the policy-making process by taking part in government advisory committees (*shingi kai*). As of March 2015, there are 50,089 registered NPOs in Japan, of which most are active in the fields of medical care, social education, community development, and child support (Cabinet

⁹ The law was amended in 2003 and 2013.

¹⁰ Between 2008 and 2013, the law concerning public corporations differentiated six types. Since December 2013, however, the categories have been reduced to four.

¹¹ These are, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (2013), 1. health, medical treatment, welfare, 2. social education, 3. community development, 4. promotion of sightseeing, 5. promotion of rural and intermountain areas, 6. science, culture, arts, sports, 7. environment, 8. disaster rescue, 9. regional safety, 10. human rights and peace, 11. development assistance, 12. gender equality, 13. child rearing and education, 14. information technology, 15. promotion of science and technology, 16. promotion of economy, 17. vocational expertise, 18. consumer protection, 19. support of non-profit activities, 20. activities of the above established under the supervision of designated communes.

Office 2015c). Only a fraction of these NPOs (about 0.2 % or 108 organizations in total as of August 2015) also profit from tax exemptions and fall into the category of tax-exempted/authorized NPOs (*nintei NPO hōjin*) (Cabinet Office 2015b; Foljanty-Jost and Aoki 2008: 8–20). The law on public corporations (*kōeki hōjin*), in contrast, is based on the Japanese Civil Code of 1898. On this basis, organizations can apply for the status of a non-profit corporation. The main difference between public corporations and NPOs is that besides having to prove their public interest, the former must secure a high proprietary capital and a high membership number. The process of recognition for public corporations remains opaque, allowing for great influence of state actors on this part of civil society. Thus, most public corporations cooperate closely with government institutions and show a high degree of professionalization (Foljanty-Jost and Aoki 2008: 6–7). As of July 2015, there are 9.300 public corporations registered in Japan (Cabinet Office 2015a). However, the biggest area of organized civil society consists of informal private organizations whose overall number has been estimated at around 200.000 or more (Foljanty-Jost and Aoki 2008: 13; Tsujinaka 2003: 85).

To conclude, the laws on public services structure the third sector into three categories with varying distances from the state and the market. While the private organizations that form the biggest part of organized civil society work in relative distance from the state, among NPOs, the second largest category, we find some cooperating while others prefer to be as independent from the state as they can. Public corporations, comprising the smallest number of groups, tend to cooperate closely with government organizations and profit from tax exemptions; they can also boast of large memberships, high professionalization, and good financial backing.

Authors such as Pekkanen (2006: 7) argue that through “legal, regulatory, and financial instruments, the state powerfully shapes the organization of civil society”, because state incentives influence “the processes of group formation and development and the institutionalization of social movements”. He contends that incentives such as the legal framework introduced above are the reason for a “weak” civil society in Japan, because they lead to the promotion of small, local groups while discouraging large professionalized organizations. This pattern of many small, resource-weak organizations and only a few large professional groups restrains Japanese civil society from having a decisive influence on the policy-making process, leading to a civil society characterized by “members without advocates” (Pekkanen 2003: 117). Foljanty-Jost (2005) supports this argument by asserting that

compared to the German case, Japanese movement or civil organizations have a weak position in the national policy-making network. A comparison of the state-civil society relationship in Japan with that in the United States or some European country makes these arguments seem justified. A consideration of the historical, political, and social background in Japan, however, shows that there are also less confrontational and more indirect ways to influence policy. Vinken et al. (2010: 8) hold that in an environment where the state actively targets civil society, “civil society groups and civic activism are likely to seek subtle ways to work not against but with the state [...] to manipulate state control instead of openly confronting it, to accept compromise organizations (that may include retirees from the state), [and] to use silent diplomacy at the right moments instead of making loud public displays”. Indeed, scholars such as Tsujinaka (2003) emphasize the ongoing maturation of Japanese civil society, pointing especially to the growing advocacy sector. Aldrich’s (2008b) study on nuclear facility siting in Japan also indicates a rather strong civil society in Japan, especially regarding protest against the siting of public bads.¹² Others, such as Steinhoff (2000, 2011, 2014a) have drawn attention to the fact that much of civil activism in Japan runs under the radar of the mainstream media, therefore remaining largely unseen by broader society. Steinhoff (2011: 1–2) characterizes these parts of Japanese civil society as “invisible civil society”, containing “thousands of small, informal, non-hierarchical voluntary groups that easily form and dissolve”. Even when such groups dissolve, the participants tend to build new groups with similar organizational patterns. She interprets this interactional and organizational pattern as “an alternative micro-politics of everyday life”. This invisible civil society comprises “single issue advocacy groups and small artistic and cultural groups that have a long history in Japanese society”, and also includes “a variety of special organizational forms invented or modified during the late 1960s protest cycle, such as community unions, trial support groups for people confronting the legal system, and cooperatives that provide special services”. Another reason for these parts of Japanese civil society to be largely invisible to the broader public is that they tend to

¹² Aldrich (2008b) argues that states prefer to use “hard” social control tools to site public bads, such as the blocking of access points or limiting information to local opposition, rather than “soft” control tools such as social control and financial incentives. He observes that in most siting cases in Japan, soft control tools have been utilized. To him, this indicates that the state considers civil opposition to nuclear facility siting as strong.

resort to less visible forms of protest action such as law suits,¹³ petitions, question-and-answer sessions with the bureaucracy, study groups, and so on. In summary, it can be said that although the civil sphere in Japan is regulated and influenced by the state, we still find a vibrant civil society that, while less visible to the public eye and not as well-integrated in policy-making networks as in European countries, still creatively tries to influence policy-making.

Indeed, in times of high mobilization, all kinds of groups or organizations, state-recognized or not, connect and develop common framings and strategies to make their voice heard in the political arena. Hasegawa (2010: 87) for instance observes the phenomenon of “collaborative environmentalism” in Japan, by which he means “an interorganizational/sectoral and interdisciplinary coalition in which people from different occupations, different places, and different groups work together in a nonroutine manner”, “[...] [overriding] longstanding social norms of clear institutional boundaries between businesses, NGOs and government bureaucracies”. He points to three cases, namely the local anti-nuclear movement in the village of Maki (Niigata prefecture) in 1996, which opposed the siting of a nuclear facility in town through local referendum and successful collaborative campaigning involving traditional anti-nuclear groups as well as more conservative citizens; communal wind power projects in Hokkaidō prefecture born out of collaborations between a local anti-nuclear movement and consumer cooperatives; and nation-wide networks against climate change which cooperate with government institutions while preserving their critical stance. In these three cases, collaborations between diverse actors contributed to a positive outcome. Naturally, movements are not always successful, even if they can build on broad collaborative networks. Broadbent (2003) suggests that the success or failure of a movement in influencing the policy-making process may be explained by the relationship patterns of individuals, but also of groups inside and outside of the polity – especially in terms of the roles and loyalties they need to fulfill.

¹³ Steinhoff (2014b) points out that litigation is a common means to bring about social change in many countries. In Japan, there are a number of groups from different issue fields employing litigation to pursue their goals. In cooperation with cause lawyers, many of these groups even engage in decade-long lawsuits. For an account of anti-nuclear lawsuits in Japan from the perspective of a lawyer, see Kaido (2011). Others such as Arrington (2016) provide an account of Hansen disease victims’ movements in Japan and South Korea, examining litigation as a means of activism by paying special attention to the relationship between these movements and third-party supporters in relation to movement outcomes.

Authors such as Vosse (1998: 270) also emphasize the networked nature of Japanese civil society and movements. An important feature of the Japanese environmental movement in the 1990s, he argues, is that it was shaped by a number of autonomous, highly networked 'partial movements'. Moreover, Vogt (2006) shows that Japanese environmental movement organizations network increasingly on a transnational level as well. Both authors agree, however, that although the environmental movement may win some local successes, its impact on national or international policies is rather weak. One reason, the authors agree, is that although the movement fostered an awareness of environmental problems in Japan, it manifested primarily in terms of individuals striving for a more environment-friendly lifestyle rather than political action to change policy (Vosse 1998: 269). This may be the reason why we find a vibrant alternative consumer sphere in Japan (Bouissou 2000: 337).

In summary, Japanese civil society is less well integrated into the policy-making process than in other (predominantly western) democracies, but it nevertheless represents an active sphere in which most groups and organizations operate without corporate status. Most groups also tend to – at least since the last big wave of protest action in the 1960s and 70s – employ invisible forms of action and cooperative network-building strategies to influence policy. A reason for adopting such strategies may be that ever since the violent 1960s protest cycle, alternative movements, especially citizens' movements centered on value-oriented issues, have had a difficult standing with large parts of broader society.¹⁴ Nevertheless, Japanese environmental movements have proven successful in concrete local cases and in fostering alternative eco-friendly lifestyles. The following section takes a look at the development of anti-nuclear activism in Japan, which was fostered by the emergence of a variety of networked movement groups.

¹⁴ Steinhoff (2013) shows that the collective memory of this time period consists mainly of negative images of violent student protests, and includes only limited knowledge about the social and political problems of the time. She furthermore shows that this negative collective memory led to the suppression of social conflict in the following decades. However, Steinhoff interprets the resurgence of peaceful street protest since 3.11, which has been largely well-received, as a chance to change the negative image attached to social protest. However, this remains to be seen.

1.2.2 THE JAPANESE ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENT WAVES BEFORE 3.11

The Japanese society experienced its first nuclear shock right after the end of World War II when information about the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki became publicly known. When a Japanese fishing boat, the Daigo Fukuryū Maru,¹⁵ was contaminated by an American nuclear weapons test close to the Bikini Islands in 1954, this triggered the first wave of anti-nuclear movement with a clear focus on banning nuclear weapons. The movement was initiated by a housewives' book club in the Suginami district of Tōkyō. The housewives launched a petition which gathered 20 million signatures by the end of 1954 and doubled this figure by the end of 1955. From this initiative came the idea to hold a World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs in Hiroshima to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing. This in turn was the incentive for forming the Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuibaku Kinshi Nihon Kyōgikai or Gensuikyō in short), a council of affiliated organizations striving for peace, which organized subsequent World Conferences (Totten and Kawakami 1964). In the 1960s, Gensuikyō split due to ideological differences concerning the question of which countries should be allowed to possess a nuclear bomb. The result of this split was the inauguration of the Japan Congress Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuibaku Kinshi Nihon Kokumin Kaigi or Gensuikin in short) in 1965, which took a far stricter stance toward nuclear technology as a whole, also rejecting its use for the purposes of energy production (Nishio 2013: 41). Gensuikin served as an umbrella for organizations all over Japan, mainly labor unions and youth organizations. In 1999, Gensuikin merged with the Forum for Constitutional Advocacy, Peace, and Human Rights (Kempō Yōgo, Heiwa, Jinken Fōramu) and the Worker and Farmer Citizen's Assembly for the Preservation of Food Products, Environment and Water (Shoku to Midori, Mizu wo Mamoru Chūō Rōnō Shimin Kaigi). The merged organization named itself Forum Peace, Human Rights, Environment; or Peace Forum for short (Fōramu Heiwa, Jinken, Kankyō or Heiwa Fōramu) (Gensuikin 2015). As a member of Peace Forum, Gensuikin, still the umbrella organization for various labor unions against nuclear technology from all over Japan, remains an important actor in the anti-nuclear movement after Fukushima – as subsequent sections will show.

This first peace or anti-nuclear weapons-oriented movement wave did not have much of an influence on the increasing construction of nuclear power reactors all over the Japanese archipelago, which started with the

¹⁵ 「第五福竜丸」

Tōkai plant in Ibaraki prefecture that began operation in 1966 (Nishio 2013: 36). In the following years, the Japanese nuclear program expanded despite local opposition or *jūmin undō*, which formed in almost every locality where a plant was built.¹⁶ In 1972, the first of many local referenda were held concerning nuclear power plant construction in the cities of Shiga (Ishikawa prefecture) and Kashiwazaki (Niigata prefecture). While the local ballot in Shiga was destroyed before counting because of strong pressure from the prefectural and town governments, the referendum in Kashiwazaki showed 76% of the residents against construction. Even so, with the exception of the local referendum in the village of Maki in 1996 (see previous section), no referendum really influenced either the construction itself or governmental policy.¹⁷ Besides pushing for referenda on nuclear construction, local opposition groups very often took power plant construction and other issues to court, and still do. According to Nishio (2013: 52), the first court case was a case to push for the withdrawal of the construction permissions for the Ikata nuclear plant in Ehime prefecture by Shikoku Electric Power Company¹⁸ in 1973. Since then, lawsuits have been an important part of the action repertoire of local movements, used primarily to delay construction because so far, courts have generally ruled in favor of the electric companies. With the increasing number of nuclear power plants, the number of local anti-construction movements has also increased. Over time, these NIMBY¹⁹-type local groups across Japan have formed connections with each other because they realized that nothing would change as long as there was no change in national policy. Nishio (2013: 56–60) reports that the first national anti-nuclear power assembly took place on August 24th and 25th, 1975 in Kyōto. In the same year, the Citizens' Nuclear Information Center (Genshiryoku Shiryō Jōhō Shitsu), or CNIC, was founded. The most prominent CNIC founding member, nuclear scientist Takagi Jinzaburō, framed the group simply as 'citizen scientists' thinking about technology from an ordinary citizen's point of view (and thereby qualifying as a *shimin undō*), but the organization actually plays an important networking role by ensuring the flow of information and expert knowledge among different local movement groups. Since 1978, this has been facilitated by a movement

¹⁶ For a map of nuclear power plants in Japan see Citizens' Nuclear Information Center (2015).

¹⁷ This is because outcomes of local referenda are binding neither for the prefectural nor for the national government, according to Er (2005: 75).

¹⁸ Main electricity supplier on Shikoku Island, comprising the prefectures of Ehime, Tokushima, Kōchi, and Kagawa, located in southern Japan.

¹⁹ Not In My BackYard.

newspaper called Hangenpatsu Shimbun (Anti-Nuclear Newspaper), born of an idea conceived at the national assembly of anti-nuclear groups in 1975. The Hangenpatsu Shimbun is issued by the Hangenpatsu Undō Zenkoku Renraku Kai (National Anti-Nuclear Movement News Conference), which is composed of regional anti-nuclear group leaders. Since 1987 the Renraku Kai has cooperated closely with the CNIC (Nishio 2013: 112). Gensuikin, whose regional chapters had cooperated with local groups since 1972, played a key role in connecting the diverse anti-nuclear *jūmin undō* with the citizen scientists at the CNIC. Besides rallies, sit-ins and anti-construction lawsuits, these groups have frequently, starting in the 1970s, held joint study groups and symposia, organized joined campaigns, held questionings of governmental agencies, closely monitored nuclear policy, and documented accidents.

With the beginning of nuclear plant construction during the 1970s, the national anti-nuclear movement thus coalesced from three main sources: local anti-construction movements (*jūmin undō*); labor movements (*rōdō undō*), typically supported by the Trade Union Council (Sōhyō) or the Social and Communist Parties of Japan; and engaged citizen scientists (*shimin undō*) (Hasegawa 2004: 134; Nishio 2013: 210).²⁰ Although their influence on regional and national decision-making was rather marginal, during this time these actors developed important movement network infrastructures that are still in place today.

A third wave of anti-nuclear activism emerged in the 1980s after the nuclear accidents at Three Mile Island (USA) in 1979 and in Chernobyl (today Ukraine) in 1986. Although women held key positions in many *jūmin undō* right from the start, after the Chernobyl accident there was even more anti-nuclear action involvement from women, particularly mothers' groups²¹ as well as consumer cooperatives. Hasegawa (2004: 136) describes the spread of the movement after 1986 as "spread[ing] like wildfire, becoming citizen's movements to protest nuclear energy on a scale never before seen". He points out that many new movement organizations developed during this time, especially in regional centers and metropolitan areas. A particular feature of these groups was that they tended to be based on "individual-based networks independent of

²⁰ Hasegawa (2004: 132–135) refers to this as a structure of "local anti-construction movements", "support movements in regional centers", and "anti-nuclear movements in metropolitan areas".

²¹ Hasegawa (2004: 140–141) points out that since the movement wave of the 1980s and 90s, when many housewives got involved, the framing for these groups' engagement relies strongly on the notion of criticizing current circumstances from the point of view of 'ordinary mothers' rather than just 'citizens'.

existing labor unions, political parties, and neighborhood organizations”, rejecting “norms of bureaucratic organization in favor of loose horizontal connections”. During the 1980s and 90s, new and old movement groups became increasingly connected and worked together on a number of campaigns, for example on opposing construction of the nuclear reprocessing plant in Rokkashō (Aomori prefecture), which had received construction permission in 1984, or exposing problems at the fast-breeder reactor in Monjū (Fukui prefecture), which started construction in 1986. One of the biggest protest events during these years was an anti-nuclear rally in Tōkyō in April 1988, attracting about 20,000 participants, which was more than four times as many as the organizers expected (Hasegawa 2004: 137). Over time, the movement became increasingly transnational. Inspired by a nuclear referendum in Italy in 1987,²² in a concerted effort and supported by a number of parliamentarians, the National Network for a Nuclear Phase-Out Law²³ (Datsu Genpatsuhō Zenkoku Nettowāku) submitted petitions for a Nuclear Phase-Out Law (Datsu Genpatsuhō) in 1990 and 1991, successfully gathering a total of 3,280,000 signatures (Nishio 2013: 125). Regardless of the high number of signatures, the idea was not even discussed in the Diet, contributing greatly to the demotivation of many movement activists.

Despite this major setback, movement actors continued local protests and followed up on Rokkashō and Monjū, as well as the issue of nuclear waste. In 1992, following the development of the nuclear fuel cycle involving the use of plutonium in Japanese reactors, actors under the leadership of the CNIC and Greenpeace International²⁴ organized an international campaign against nuclear fuel shipments, leading to a wave of anti-plutonium action (Hasegawa 2014: 288). The campaign focused particularly on the route of the nuclear transport ship Akatsuki-

²² According to Watts (2010: 40), Italy decided by referendum in 1987 to shut down all nuclear capacity.

²³ The use of the term ‘network’ in many organizations’ names (see previous sections) most often refers to the flat, non-hierarchical organizational structure of the group, which allows individual members to keep their personal integrity, to only act upon their free will, and to withdraw anytime they lack resources to participate. Other civil groups use the term in their names because they define networking as their primary field of action; see Hanibuchi (2005). This use of the term, however, is different from the connotation of ‘network’ in network analytical terms, where the term denotes only connections between social entities without attaching a value to them.

²⁴ According to Nishio (2013: 131), the campaign was facilitated mainly by these two organizations, the interviews held for this research however showed that there were a number of Japanese as well as overseas organizations involved.

maru.²⁵ The Akatsuki-maru was the first ship to transport mixed-oxide fuel (MOX)²⁶ from France to Japan²⁷ and its route was kept secret. In 1993, activists discovered the plans and organized a sit-in camp in the harbor of Tōkai village (Ibaraki prefecture) where the ship was to arrive, and mobilized citizens and governments along the ship's route to protest (Nishio 2013: 131–132).

In the second half of the 1990s, international contacts intensified and anti-nuclear activists from around the world participated in symposia and speeches all over Japan; Japanese activists contributed to conferences overseas as well. During the 2000s, these connections were consolidated and the establishment of contacts with leaders of other movements, such as the movement for renewable energy, the environmental movement, the women's movement or the movement against poverty could be observed (Nishio 2013: 169).

Clearly, the Japanese anti-nuclear movement before the Great East Japan Earthquake in March 2011 was a well-integrated network of labor, residents', and citizen's groups with contacts to other movement actors, especially peace, women's, environmental and pro-renewable energy actors.²⁸ In the background especially of the residents' movements, we also find lawyers' groups supporting them through various lawsuits (Kaido 2011). While the movement was visible during its four main movement waves in the 1950s and 60s; the 1970s; after 1986; and the first half of the 1990s, during the second half of the 1990s and the 2000s²⁹ their actions became routinized and thereby less visible to the public eye

²⁵ 「あかつき丸」

²⁶ Mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) contains uranium and reprocessed plutonium. Because of the high concentration of plutonium, which is more radioactive than the low-enriched uranium used in most nuclear facilities, MOX fuel poses an even greater risk to health and environment according to Lyman (2001).

²⁷ Other shipments of MOX fuel from France to Japan took place in 1999, 2001, 2009, 2010, and 2013, according to data provided by the World Nuclear Association (2015).

²⁸ The journalist Kamata Satoshi (2011), who has observed the anti-nuclear movement in Japan since the 1970s, argues that the movement needs to extend cooperation even further, especially to bridge the divide between different political ideologies. Avenell (2012) also points out that the anti-nuclear movement before 3.11 was unsuccessful particularly because the groups were too focused on being against nuclear power and neglected to frame the issue in terms of preventing radioactive pollution.

²⁹ Hasegawa (2014: 288) also distinguishes four movement phases: from 1954 to 1973 on the abolition of nuclear weapons; from 1973 to 1986, the phase of anti-construction protests; from 1986 to 1992 following the Chernobyl accident; and finally from 1992 to 2011, the phase of anti-plutonium protests.

(Honda 2005). During the different movement waves, new groups emerged, found a place in the overall movement network, ready to join smaller networks or coalitions to develop campaigns whenever a critical issue arose. The overall movement network also extended to transnational actors and overseas anti-nuclear groups.

The movement at the time of the nuclear disaster in Fukushima, then, consisted of a more or less tightly-knit network of multifaceted movement actors with some expert knowledge as well as cooperative experiences with other groups and individuals. Additionally, we find hierarchically organized groups side by side with loosely structured groups; labor unions; NPOs; and a large number of groups that qualify as members of the 'invisible civil society'.

The following section introduces the results of a survey on the diverse infrastructures of the anti-nuclear movement after Fukushima, displaying some features of the current anti-nuclear movement in Japan.

1.2.3 THE HETEROGENEITY OF THE ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENT SINCE 3.11: THE HITOTSUBASHI SURVEY

To date, the most significant survey on the infrastructure of the anti-nuclear movement after the Fukushima disaster has been conducted by the 'Infrastructure and Society' research group at Hitotsubashi University in Tōkyō under the supervision of Machimura Takashi and financed by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS).³⁰ The research group conducted a countrywide questionnaire survey of anti-nuclear groups (*datsu genpatsu dantai*)³¹ during February and March 2013.³² Their survey gives an initial overview of the organizational infrastructure behind collective action since 3.11 and thereby provides an interesting background to the networks of groups sampled by the present study.

I will summarize in more detail the focal points of analysis of the Hitotsubashi survey, starting with an introduction of the survey's parameters. Then I outline the composition of organizational forms in the survey's sample and the major action repertoires of the surveyed groups. Here we can observe an allocation of applied action repertoires according to

³⁰ The JSPS is a national organization under the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology to advance research in the humanities as well as social and natural sciences.

³¹ Groups actively involved with the issue of a nuclear phase-out.

³² The Japanese version of the survey is publicly available on the website of the research group (last accessed on October 20, 2015). The English version is to be published in No. 6 of the research group's online journal.

different issue clusters. The issue clusters also are differentiated according to two factors: a) the foundation of the group before or after the disaster and b) along the geographical foci of the groups' activities. Finally, I present the research group's findings on the differences and conflicts between the groups, which resulted from their interpretations of the issues at stake and consequently their cooperation and networking with other groups.

For their sample, Machimura's research group scanned the *Asahi* and *Mainichi* newspapers³³ for names of social movement organizations containing the keywords 'anti-nuclear' (*datsu genpatsu*) or 'energy' (*enerugi*), and 'civic' (*shimin*) or 'groups' (*dantai*). To include organizations that did not receive media attention, they also gathered names from the pamphlet from the Global Conference for a Nuclear Power-free World, an anti-nuclear movement event held in January 2012 in Yokohama (details see next section). This produced a sample of 326 organizations with varying legal statuses from all over Japan. The majority of organizations (20.8 %) who responded were located in the capital, the most densely populated area of Japan. About one third (34.4 %) of the responding organizations were formed after the disaster; two thirds were already in existence (Machimura et al. 2015: 2; Satoh et al. 2014: 180).

Legal status of the organizations surveyed for this study varied. Private organizations were by far the largest group at 57.7 %, followed by Non-Profit Organizations at 13.8 %. Trailing behind were public corporations (3.7 %), cooperatives (3.4 %), business corporations (3.1 %), and labor unions (2.8 %). Surprisingly, the number of organizations that did not find their organizational status on the questionnaire was relatively high at 8.6 %. These results show that the post-Fukushima movement is composed of a wide range of groups, including non-profits with various relationships to the state, more economically oriented bodies, and even labor unions. A comparison of the statuses of organizations before and after the disaster shows that most organizations (80.9 %) founded after the disaster are private organizations, in contrast to previously existing organizations which generally already have legal status.³⁴

³³ Two of the largest progressive newspapers in Japan besides the conservative papers *Yomiuri*, *Sankei*, and *Nikkei*.

³⁴ The fact that most newly founded organizations do not have a legal status is natural, since the process of institutionalization takes time and only makes sense for groups that aspire to exist long-term. It might be interesting to follow up on the institutionalization processes of organizations founded after the disaster, but this clearly goes beyond the scope of the present study.

Machimura et al. divided the action repertoire of the surveyed groups broadly, into activities related to general support³⁵; appeal and expression³⁶; expression of opinion and policy proposals³⁷; and business-related³⁸ activities. Among general support activities, the most common activities relate to material support and donations (50.5 %). Activities concerning appeal and expression were dominated by symposia, study groups, and workshops (74.5 %). Participation in demonstrations came in second (47.4 %). Among the proposal and opinion-related activities, most organizations engaged in signature campaigns and requests for local referenda (46.1 %), closely followed by petitions (43.6 %). Finally, in the section of business-related activities, most organizations engaged in training, seminars, and expert lectures, followed by the gathering of expert information and dissemination (45.5 %). Worthy of note, notwithstanding observations of significantly increased participation in rallies and demonstrations (e. g. Oguma 2013), is that most activities still fall into the category of less visible collective action such as symposia or the gathering of expert knowledge and the dissemination of information. It is therefore important to further the study of groups engaged in less visible collective action, as does the present study.

Although most organizations in the sample originated in Tōkyō, most of the collective activities take place in Fukushima and the broader Tōhoku region, or are described as taking place all over the country. Other loci of action include the two economically strongest regions, Kantō (especially Tōkyō) and Kansai (especially Kyōto), as well as overseas (Machimura et al. 2015: 10). This indicates that although most organizations are based in the most densely populated areas of Japan, these groups try intensively to support the people in the affected regions building connections that play an important role in justifying their actions. The networks of organizations

³⁵ Includes activities related to material support and donations, charity events, volunteer activities, set-up of a support organization or center, and cooperation with support businesses.

³⁶ Includes symposia, study groups, workshops, cultural events, organization of demonstrations, participation in demonstrations, information provision of demonstrations on the internet, organization of sound demos and parades, participation in sound demos and parades, expression through art, sit-ins.

³⁷ Includes petitions, signatures for local referenda, participation in government commission meetings and submission of policy proposals, direct government questioning, submission of counter-proposals, opinion papers, and lawsuits.

³⁸ Investigation and measuring activities, gathering of expert information and dissemination thereof to the public, expert technical skills and provision of human capital, training, seminars, expert knowledge, sale of goods and publications, and promotional activities.

sampled in this present study are engaged primarily in advocacy-related activities which is why the geographical focus of their activities centers on the capital, Tōkyō. However, some participating organizations have strong ties to the affected regions.

In an effort to break down the anti-nuclear and energy movement according to the issues with which organizations engage, the research group identified five issue areas: 'anti-nuclear',³⁹ 'energy shift',⁴⁰ 'health risk',⁴¹ 'support for victims and evacuees',⁴² and 'response to nuclear damage' (Satoh et al. 2014: 185–189).⁴³ Comparing these issue clusters before and after 3.11, the authors state that before the disaster, organizations were mainly involved with the first two, 'anti-nuclear' and 'energy shift', whereas the disaster expanded activities to the latter three issues. They also hold that the 'anti-nuclear' and 'energy shift' issue clusters were already connected to each other before the disaster, since some organizations dealt with both areas simultaneously.⁴⁴ Following the disaster, three new issue areas opened up, covering issues directly connected to the impact of the nuclear accident: health risks, and victim or evacuee support for example. While the organizations existing before the disaster continued their activities in their main issue fields, they integrated other issue areas into their actions. Newly founded organizations in contrast tended to work mainly on the newly emerged issues directly related to the consequences of the nuclear calamity. Satoh et al. find a certain divide between groups engaging primarily in victim support activities and those involved in anti-nuclear activities. Asked for their standpoint on nuclear energy issues, 71 % of the victim support groups did not offer a clear stance on the problem of nuclear energy (Satoh et al. 2014: 195). Machimura et al. (2015: 30) interpret this as a

³⁹ Includes 'providing information about nuclear accidents', 'anti-nuclear/peace' issues, and 'opposition to the construction of nuclear power plants/the reduction and abolition thereof'.

⁴⁰ Includes 'popularizing renewable energy', 'promoting and popularizing energy conservation', and 'energy policy change and decision process reforms'.

⁴¹ Includes 'children's health and safety of school meals', 'food and water safety', and 'measuring radiation doses'.

⁴² Includes 'support for victims and evacuees, mutual cooperation and solidarity', 'support for the reconstruction of devastated regions', and 'intermediate support and networking with related groups'.

⁴³ Includes 'decontamination activities', 'issues around disposing and accepting of waste', 'countermeasures for reputational damage', 'nuclear damage compensation disputes', providing information/support for nuclear power plant workers', and 'improving the safety of nuclear power plants'.

⁴⁴ This differs slightly from some of the qualitative data gathered for this study.

strategy to avoid conflict. Another divide around issues occurs in relation to the proximity of organizations to the nuclear plant in Fukushima. Organizations closer to the plant were more involved with activities concerning health effects, compensation, and decontamination issues. Issues such as nuclear phase-out and renewable energy are generally dealt with by organizations with a certain geographical distance from the plant. Notably, activities such as information dissemination, support activities, and networking do not seem correlated to organizations' proximity to the plant (Machimura et al. 2015: 10).

The Hitotsubashi research group also tried to capture the movement's development over time and asked the organizations to indicate the months between March 2011 and February 2013 during which they were especially active. Here, we can see a first peak in June 2011 followed by other peaks in August and July 2011, February and March 2012, and June and July 2012. While still much higher than at the time of the nuclear accident, since summer 2012 the activity seems to be decreasing. Most activities concerned health issues, followed by activities for nuclear abolition, victim's and evacuee's issues, and finally the promotion of renewable energy (Machimura et al. 2015: 13–14).

Besides these data, Machimura et al. tried to grasp the reasons for cooperation behind the movement's activities. The researchers first discovered that 84 % of all questioned organizations cooperated, and that there was no significant difference between organizations founded before 2011 (84.5 %) and after 2011 (86 %). In order to better grasp the structure of cooperation, the authors distinguished four groups of organizations: two types of organizations already existing before 2011 and two for those founded afterwards. Among the pre-2011 organizations, they distinguish between organizations that did not change their issue domain and those that did. As for those founded after 3.11, they distinguish between organizations whose membership is composed of people who were previously involved with other organizations and those whose members were not. Interestingly, there is no significant difference between these groups of organizations when it comes to why they decide to cooperate with others. 77.7 % of the groups answered that the main reason for cooperation was the other organization's action content. Other but minor reasons for cooperation for all organizational group types were action repertoire (6.4 %), geographical scope of activity (5.6 %), and moral concept of the organization's leader (5.2 %).

It follows that cooperation plays an important role in Japan's anti-nuclear movement and is mainly driven by shared issues. However, we find a great variety of organizations, in terms of organizational forms; in terms of their perspectives or interpretations of the issue at stake; and regarding

their preferred action repertoires. Despite this heterogeneity, organizations nevertheless recognize the importance of cooperation. The scale of the disaster leads them to value their connections to each other, no matter how tenuous, and in order to avoid conflict many organizations refrain from having clear positions on adverse issues (Machimura et al. 2015: 18).

To conclude, the Hitotsubashi survey shows that after the nuclear disaster many new groups formed which very quickly integrated into larger movement networks with already existing organizations of various types. At the same time, new framings emerged, allowing the groups to unite. There is strong evidence that groups are clustered according to two main issue framings: nuclear energy-related groups, and groups that concentrate mainly on issues related to victims or direct consequences of the disaster.

But besides stating that cooperation is very important to the groups and that because of the differing ideological standpoints of some organizations, many connections remain loose, the survey specifies neither the quality of relations nor the dynamics of how organizations cooperate; it also does not give any specific reasons for why organizations choose to act the way they do. The present study aims to flesh out their description of the movement's infrastructure by looking at two coalitional networks, one from each issue cluster. But before giving a detailed description of this study's sample, I offer an overview of anti-nuclear activism since 3.11 with a focus on activities in Tōkyō by their degree of visibility. Section 1.2.4 introduces the organizational dynamics behind the most visible protest actions, focusing on the development of public demonstrations; section 1.2.5 investigates the organizational networks behind less visible movement actions such as advocacy activities, indirect forms of resistance, or lawsuits.

1.2.4 INSIGHTS INTO THE DYNAMICS OF VISIBLE PROTEST ACTION SINCE 3.11

Right after March 11, 2011, there were only small-scale public demonstrations against nuclear power. However, street protests reached a first high in the summer of 2011 and a peaked in the summer of the following year, with about 200.000 participants gathering in front of the Prime Minister's residence. These mobilizations were facilitated by the involvement of an increasing number of organizations and by the extensive utilization of social media such as Twitter, Youtube, and Facebook.

The first anti-nuclear demonstration in Tōkyō, with about 20 participants, took place on March 12, 2011. It was organized by Tampoposha, a very small Tōkyō-based anti-nuclear protest organization active since 1989 that mobilized its small membership. Starting from March 15, 2011,

however, Tampoposha offered study groups about radiation risks. Sono Ryōta, a Freeter⁴⁵ movement activist, participated in one of these study groups which prompted him to mobilize two of his friends and launch the first public demonstration with a microphone in front of TEPCO's main office in Tōkyō on March 18, 2011. The alternative internet TV station Independent Web Journal (IWJ) heard of it and broadcasted the three-man demonstration on U-Stream. Sono and his friends continued demonstrating from March 20 to 25, 2011, making extensive use of social media and thereby gaining further attention from anti-nuclear organizations but also musicians, who contributed short live performances on the spot. These rallies were followed by the organization of a bigger demonstration on March 27, 2011 in Ginza⁴⁶ by Tampoposha, Gensuikin, CNIC, the food cooperative Daichi o Mamoru Kai, and other long-standing anti-nuclear groups that already belonged to a network called Stop Nuclear Reprocessing! Tōkyō Citizens Assembly (Saishori Tometai! Shutōen Shimin no Tsudoi). This network had organized a monthly demonstration for many years with 20 participants on average, but on this day, it drew about 1.200. One of the participants was Hirano Daiichi, who thereafter became the main activist of TwitNoNukes, a group mobilizing for demonstrations via Twitter (Hirabayashi 2013: 165–167).

Starting in April 2011, however, a group called Amateur's Revolt (Shirōto no Ran) came into the spotlight by organizing an anti-nuclear demonstration on April 10, 2011 that mobilized about 15.000 participants. This was the beginning of the so-called Kōenji⁴⁷ demonstrations (Tan 2011; Trunk 2011). After the unexpected success of the first rally, the group organized monthly demonstrations until September 2011 in cooperation with other groups such as No Nukes More Hearts, an anti-nuclear group founded in 2007. In September 2011, these groups, together with Sayōnara Genpatsu (Goodbye Nuclear Power), a labor union-led coalition managed by Gensuikin, organized a national anti-nuclear action week. The climax of the action week was a demonstration which drew about 60.000 participants. Because of a number of arrests at this demonstration, Amateur's Revolt decided to refrain from being a central protest organizer in future (Kingston 2014b; Obinger 2013: 587–588). The arrests at this demonstration resulted in a decline of participants in visible

⁴⁵ According to the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (2015), Freeters fall into a category of unmarried men and women between 15 and 34 working in or aspiring to work in part-time jobs, thereby often living in precarious circumstances.

⁴⁶ Central shopping district in Tōkyō.

⁴⁷ Neighborhood in Sugunami ward in Tōkyō.

collective action in Tōkyō over winter 2011. Despite this setback, a number of Tōkyō-based anti-nuclear groups founded MCAN, the Metropolitan Coalition Against Nukes (Shutōen Hangenpatsu Rengō), which organized its first demonstration in October 2011 (but with only 1,000 participants). Starting from March 29, 2012, however, this coalition has organized standing demonstrations in front of the Prime Minister's office in central Tōkyō every Friday evening between 6 and 8 pm, up until the time of writing of this study. The so-called Friday demonstrations peaked during summer 2012, when the administration of then-Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko⁴⁸ decided to restart the nuclear power stations in Ōi.⁴⁹ According to MCAN, the demonstrations drew up to 200,000 participants at the end of June 2012 (Noma 2012; Redwolf 2013: 20). The coalition Sayōnara Genpatsu (Goodbye Nuclear Power) also organized further public protests. This coalition continues to organize timely rallies and marches drawing on a network of labor unions all over Japan, and is supported by celebrities such as Ōe Kenzaburo (writer) or Sakamoto Ryūichi (musician) (Oguma 2013).

In addition to the MCAN and Sayōnara Genpatsu demonstrations, a group of experienced anti-nuclear activists started a sit-in tent village in front of the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) in Tōkyō in September 2011. The Datsu Genpatsu Tento Hiroba or Anti-Nuclear Tent Common Space has occupied the the space ever since; the organizers regard it as an important symbol of the anti-nuclear movement as a whole (Ei Emu Kikaku 2012). In March 2013, however, the Ministry filed suit against two of the group's representatives for disrupting their everyday business (Asahi Shimbun 2013).

Other remarkable anti-nuclear events were the two Global Conferences for a Nuclear-Power-free World (Datsu Genshiryoku Sekai Kaigi), initiated by the Tōkyō-based peace organization Peace Boat. Drawing on their broad national and international connections to peace and environmental groups as well as researchers and local politicians, this group organized a two-day conference in January 2012 in Yokohama with about 11,500 participants from Japan and abroad to discuss the issue of nuclear power. The climax of the conference was the anti-nuclear demonstration on the second day, organized with the help of MCAN. The 5,000 participants was a combination of conference participants and others who had been involved in protest action since the nuclear disaster (Brown 2012:

⁴⁸ Prime Minister of Japan from September 2011 to December 2012.

⁴⁹ According to The Guardian (2012), the Ōi nuclear plant was the first to be restarted after all nuclear plants had been stopped to be stress-tested by the previous government under Prime Minister Kan Naoto (2010–2011).

40–42). The second Global Conference, with a similar format, took place in Tōkyō and Kōriyama city (Fukushima prefecture) in December 2012.

Because of the peacefulness of the anti-nuclear demonstrations that peaked in summer 2012, many observers believe this wave of street rallies and marches helped change the prevailing negative public sentiment towards demonstrations that has persisted since the student protests in the 1960s (Kindstrand 2013; Steinhoff 2013). At a talk on October 14, 2015 in Tōkyō Japanese sociologist Oguma Eiji discussed his documentary ‘Tell the Prime Minister’, which traces the mobilization after 3.11 by presenting interviews with eight protest participants from various backgrounds. He voiced the opinion that the anti-nuclear protests in front of the Prime Minister’s residence were the starting point for the establishment of a Japanese demonstration culture, enabling new groups and issues to emerge.⁵⁰

In sum, the organizational background for visible protest action was provided by already established anti-nuclear groups with protest experience that gradually broadened their networks, integrated new groups, and expanded their usage of social media. Over time, many of them also incorporated new issues into their agendas. Nevertheless, at least for the actions taking place in Tōkyō, we can observe a certain divide between more progressive or new coalitional networks such as MCAN and older groups, whose structures remain far more hierarchical e.g. the labor union-led coalition Sayōnara Genpatsu (Noma 2012).

1.2.5 INSIGHTS INTO THE DYNAMICS OF LESS VISIBLE COLLECTIVE ACTION SINCE 3.11

Alongside visible protest actions, numerous less visible collective actions have taken the form of study groups; joint symposia; questioning of governmental agencies and other advocacy activities; citizen-initiated measuring of radiation levels; the spread of citizen renewable energy power stations; as well as lawsuits against TEPCO⁵¹ officials. This section gives an overview of some organizational features behind such less visible collective actions.

⁵⁰ For example, the Students’ Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy (SEALDs), formed in response to the discussions surrounding the new Secrecy Law (Himitsu Hogohō) which passed the Diet in the summer of 2015 and which was largely supported by the anti-nuclear movement. SEALDs, after having been able to mobilize large numbers of people in a sequence of demonstrations in 2015 and 2016, dissolved towards the end of 2016.

⁵¹ Tōkyō Electric Power Company.

The action repertoire of almost all groups, including those focused on visible collective action, also includes some kind of less visible collective action. In particular, newly founded groups dealing with problems directly related to the consequences of the nuclear accident tend to focus on less visible collective activities. These are primarily mothers', victim support, and evacuees' groups, who engage mainly in advocacy, as well as groups practicing indirect forms of resistance by actively measuring radiation levels in the environment and in foodstuffs. Additionally, we find groups that indirectly criticize and resist the government's pro-nuclear energy policy by installing renewable energy power stations in their neighborhoods. Besides these initiatives, there are also groups trying to make TEPCO take responsibility for the disaster through lawsuits; artist groups trying to draw attention to social problems related to the disaster; and policy recommendation initiatives by networks of intellectuals and movement leaders who bring together expertise on how to phase out nuclear power.

In the wake of the accident and because of a perceived lack of information from the government concerning the hazardous effects of radiation especially on children, many mothers started to look for alternative information on the internet and connected to other worried parents via social media. For most of the mothers who began to gather in local groups, this was the first time they had engaged in political activities (Holdgrün 2012). Nonetheless, only four months after the accident, the idea for a national parents' network was born. According to Shiraishi (2011: 187), mothers from all over Japan came together for the first time on July 12, 2011 for a National Parents' Network kick-off meeting, which attracted about 500 participants from all over Japan. The *Kodomotachi o Hōshanō kara Mamoru Zenkoku Nettowāku* or *Kodomo Zenkoku Netto* in short (National Parents' Network to Protect Children from Radiation) has a small administrative office in Tōkyō, but their organizational structure remains flat and flexible. The network aims to connect local groups and create possibilities for joint action. Indeed, it contributed to the building of regional networks such as, for example, the *Kodomo o Hōshanō kara Mamorō Kantō Netto* (Let's Save Children from Radiation Kantō Regional Network) (cf. section 5). The *Kodomo Zenkoku Netto*'s actions include signature campaigns, questioning of governmental agencies, information dissemination, and cooperation with other organizations and experts. According to their website, the network includes over 330 local groups from all over Japan. The *Kodomo Zenkoku Netto* successfully applied for NPO status in 2013 (*Kodomo Zenkoku Nettowāku* 2015b).

Many mothers' groups cooperate closely with citizen radiation-measuring groups that formed due to the lack of data provided by local

and national authorities after the nuclear disaster on radiation levels in air, soil, and food. Similar to the mothers' groups, the measuring groups also formed locally first, but soon connected and built a national network: the Zenkoku Shimin Hōshanō Sokuteisho Nettowāku (National Citizens' Radiation Measurement Station Network) (Zenkoku Shimin Hōshanō Sokuteisho Nettowāku 2015). In 2012, the idea was born to gather all data measured by the individual measuring stations and make them available on a website that was launched in September 2013. Since 2014, the network has been undertaking soil measurement projects in different parts of Japan in order to complete their data (Minna no Dēta Saito 2014a; 2014b). The network maintains a neutral stance regarding the data they gather; however, they aspire to provide objective data to all citizens, enabling them to make their own decisions (Cataloguehouse 2015).

The parents' and measuring groups also work closely together with victims' relocation support and groups organizing recuperation stays for children from the affected areas. During the ongoing involuntary and voluntary evacuations⁵² from contaminated areas⁵³, many municipalities accepted evacuees and soon, local residents built groups to support the evacuees in their relocation process. In September 2012, these relocation support groups united with groups organizing short-term health recuperation stays (*hoyō*) for children from strongly contaminated to less but still affected areas. Many recuperation groups already existed, having developed after the Chernobyl accident; at the time they offered stays in Japan to children from Ukraine and Belarus (Shiraishi 2011: 186). Together they formed the 3.11 Ukeire Zenkoku Netto (Japan Nuclear Disaster Aid Association 3.11) (Kodomo Zenkoku Nettowāku 2015a; Ukeire Zenkoku Kyōgikai 2015a). The 3.11 Ukeire Zenkoku Netto now disseminates relevant information available to the groups as well as to people who want to evacuate; maintains a data base about groups offering health recuperation stays; expands the network; and helps improve the quality of recuperation stays. Moreover, they organize counseling sessions (*sōdan katsudō*) in contaminated areas to support people who are considering

⁵² The Japanese government distinguishes between involuntary evacuations due to an official evacuation order and voluntary evacuations of people living in contaminated areas where no evacuation order was issued. Evacuation orders have been given for areas with an estimated annual radiation exposure exceeding 20msv. Residents of areas with an estimated exposure of less than 20msv have been accorded the right to evacuate, thus becoming voluntary evacuees. However, financial and housing support for voluntary evacuees is gradually being reduced.

⁵³ The scope of designated evacuation areas changes according to decreasing radiation levels (see e.g. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2011, 2012, 2013).

evacuation or recuperation stays for their children, and to spread the word about their activities (Ukeire Zenkoku Kyōgikai 2015b).

Besides these victim support groups, evacuees themselves united and formed evacuee groups (*hinansha no kai*) in the areas to which they evacuated. Many evacuee groups such as the Nara-ken Hisaisha no Kai (Nara Prefecture Disaster Victim Group) aspire to help and support each other, but also to build better ties with their new communities and inform the public about their situation. To this end, they sometimes cooperate with relocation support groups (Nara-ken Hisaisha no Kai 2015). In October 2015, the Hinan no Kenri o Motomeru Zenkoku Hinansha no Kai (National Evacuee Group for a Right to Evacuate) came into being. This group is composed of individual evacuees from all over Japan, and as the name indicates, they focus on advocacy-related activities for the right to evacuate. This group is supported by some Diet members as well as lawyers' groups (Hinan no Kenri o Motomeru Zenkoku Hinansha no Kai 2015).

Because of the current public opinion against nuclear power and for renewable energy, we can observe an increase in citizen power station projects. All over Japan, citizen groups have installed renewable energy power stations in their communities. These groups also build regional and national networks such as the Zenkoku Gotōchi Enerugī Kyōkai (Nationwide Regional Energy Association), founded in 2014 to replace the Community Power Initiative led by the NPO ISEP (Institute for Sustainable Energy Policies or Kankyō Enerugī Seisaku Kenkyūjo), which had been born in 2013 in order to connect local community power initiatives and other key persons (Institute for Sustainable Energy Policies 2015; Zenkoku Gotōchi Enerugī Kyōkai 2015). The Zenkoku Gotōchi Enerugī Kyōkai is a network of regional power projects that ensures the exchange of expert knowledge and undertakes advocacy activities. In the broader Kantō region, we also find the Shimin Denryoku Renraku Kai (People's Power Network), which connects regional community power groups and has a similar action profile, focusing on information exchange and advocacy (Shimin Denryoku Renraku Kai 2015).

Along with these primarily advocacy-oriented actions to push for better treatment of victims and changes in energy policy, two lawsuits against TEPCO personnel and government officials have been filed: one by the Fukushima Genpatsu Kokusodan (Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Legal Action Group), a group of 1,324 Fukushima resident plaintiffs and 13,262 joint plaintiffs from all over Japan, and the other by a group calling themselves Anti-Nuclear TEPCO Shareholders (Datsu Genpatsu Tōden Kabunushi Undō). The Fukushima Genpatsu Kokusodan came into being in March 2012 and is pressing criminal charges against 33 TEPCO and government officials (Fukushima Genpatsu Kokusodan 2013; 2015). The

Anti-Nuclear TEPCO Shareholders' group has existed since 1989 and has been opting for TEPCO's nuclear phase-out ever since, mainly by submitting nuclear phase-out proposals at the yearly shareholder meetings. In March 2012, this group pressed criminal charges against 27 high-ranked TEPCO managers, based on two claims: neglecting to implement sufficient risk assessment and failing to prepare for the reduction or avoidance of the environmental and human damage that occurred after the disaster (Datsu Genpatsu Kabunushi Undō 2015a; 2015b; Kawai 2012). Both groups are represented by the lawyers Kaido Yūichi and Kawai Hiroyuki, who both have long experience with anti-nuclear law suits. Since July 2011, these two lawyers have led the Datsu Genpatsu Bengoshidan Zenkoku Renraku Kai (National Conference of Anti-Nuclear Lawyer's Groups), a national network of regional lawyers and lawyers' groups supporting anti-nuclear facility construction movement groups (Datsu Genpatsu Bengoshidan Zenkoku Renraku Kai 2015).

After the disaster, many artists also got involved by drawing attention to social problems related to the disaster. The artists' initiative Rokku no Kai (69 Meeting) for example is a group of media-related artists such as the actress Matsuda Miyuki; journalist, writer and director of the Independent Web Journal Iwakami Yasumi; creative director and environmental activist Maekita Miyako; film director Iwai Shunji; and musician Kobayashi Takeshi, who came together on June 9, 2011 to reflect on their social responsibility as artists. They decided to hold "salons," inviting experts and artists to talk and discuss social problems with an invited public (Rokku no Kai 2015). Each salon is organized by a different member who invites speakers, drawing on their individual networks. The group has many connections to other artists but also to politicians from the Social Democratic Party, to mothers' groups, and the lawyers' groups who support disaster victims (EFN14; CM2).

On yet another level, we find a network of intellectuals and social movement leaders who have produced a book-thick policy recommendation on how to phase-out nuclear power in Japan, dealing with all related problems in detail. The Citizen's Commission on Nuclear Energy (CCNE, Genshiryoku Shimin Iinkai), a civil alternative to the government's Nuclear Safety Commission (Genshiryoku Anzen Iinkai), was founded through an initiative of the Takagi Fund (Takagi Jinzaburō Shimin Kagaku Kikin), a fund established by the citizen scientist Takagi Jinzaburō. After the disaster, the fund received an anonymous donation on the condition that it be used to finance a project with long-term impact. The fund, which is one of the major financial donors to anti-nuclear organizations in Japan, then called for intellectuals and movement leaders to produce a Policy Guideline on Nuclear Power Phase-

out (Datsu Genpatsu Seisaku Taikō) (SR8⁵⁴). In a series of meetings, this expert network wrote a preliminary version and subsequently introduced it to the public in different locations all over Japan, gathering comments from the public and incorporating them in the Guideline (Genshiryoku Shimin Linkai 2014). The Policy Guideline was published in April 2014 and presented for the first time at a large Nuclear Phase-Out symposium (Datsu Genpatsu Fōramu) in Tōkyō which attracted about 900 participants. The symposium was organized by a large number of organizations and the topics ranged from the contents of the Policy Guideline to the situation of mental stress experienced by people living in contaminated areas; from worried parents' issues to the presentation of citizen renewable energy stations (EFN31).⁵⁵

These examples of less visible action show that after the Fukushima disaster many people felt the need to connect with others and create spaces for discussion and action. In most cases this happened first on a local level and then on a national level. The national network-building usually occurred first among groups with the same issue or action focus (thus within the same movement family) and then with groups or networks of groups focused on related issues from the broader movement community. Network overlaps are especially noteworthy among mothers', evacuees', radiation measuring, and victim support groups. In another area we find that lawyers' groups supporting anti-construction lawsuits tightened their national networks to increase the exchange of expert knowledge, also connecting this networking to criminal lawsuits suing TEPCO officials. Similar networking is taking place among citizen power stations, in order to share experiences and build a basis for advocacy activities. Artists, for their part, engage in public dialogue, providing a space for discussion and gaining knowledge. Through their broad individual networks, artists are connected to various citizen groups and provide a stage for their activities. Groups from all of these networks have even collaborated to organize joint events such as the Datsu Genpatsu Fōramu in April 2014. All these different groups do not come together only for certain events: we can also observe network-building of a more durable nature, in the form of advocacy-oriented coalitional networks such as those represented in the sample of this study.

⁵⁴ For more on the annotation of interviews conducted for this study, see section 3.2.2.

⁵⁵ For more on the annotation of attended movement meetings, see section 3.2.1.

1.3 THE SAMPLE: TWO COALITIONAL NETWORKS, E-SHIFT AND SHSK

As the previous sections have shown, the events of March 11, 2011 gave rise to a new anti-nuclear movement wave. New local groups formed, built national networks and cooperated with other old and new groups as well as with other regional and national networks, working on related issues and employing a broad range of action repertoires. Among the many networks which formed after 3.11, we also find networks of civil actors uniting civil groups and individuals from different movement communities and forming coalitional networks to organize events or work on advocacy issues.

The present study analyzes the network mobilization processes of two Tōkyō-based advocacy-oriented networks: e-shift or the Conference for the Realization of a Nuclear Phase-Out and a New Energy Policy (*ī-shifuto – Datsu Genpatsu Atarashī Enerugī Seisaku o Jitsugen suru Kai*) and SHSK, the Citizens' Conference to Promote the Nuclear Victims Support Act (*Genpatsu Jiko Kodomo Hisaisha Shienhō Shimin Kaigi*).

e-shift is a broad network-coalition that emerged immediately after the nuclear disaster in March 2011 and is dedicated to pushing energy policy towards renewable energies and a nuclear phase out. e-shift united for the first time many of the above-mentioned groups and networks and other organizations associated with environmental, anti-nuclear, renewable energy, and consumer-related causes. It is thus one of the broadest and most diverse active networks in Japanese civil society sphere working for a nuclear phase-out. e-shift is best designated a 'network-coalition' for two reasons: for their technical cooperation and shared goals, which are typical for a coalition, and on the other hand for their loose network-like organizational structure, which allows for involved organizations to invest according to their available resources and to keep their different ideological stances while working on shared goals.

SHSK on the other hand is a coalition that seeks to influence the implementation process of the Nuclear Victims Support Act, enacted in June 2012. The Nuclear Victims Support Act was made possible by a large collaboration of parliamentarians, lawyers, and civil groups. But while the Support Act guaranteed a 'right to evacuate' to all people in areas affected by nuclear contamination, it did not provide for concrete measures and or even include a budget guideline. SHSK thus aimed to make victims' voices heard in the implementation of this Act. Because of its single-issue nature, the coalition became less active after the implementation process came to an end in October 2013. However, former member organizations formed a new network, the National Movement for the Recognition of Support for Nuclear Victims (*Genpatsu Jiko Hisaisha no Kyūsai o Mitomeru Zenkoku*

Undō) and continue to cooperate in other ad hoc forms as well. SHSK united a wide range of victims' groups, including the above mentioned mothers', evacuees', radiation measuring, and health recuperation stay groups as well as a number of professional organizations with environmental and human rights profiles. At 68 members, it is one of the broadest organizational associations for victims' rights after 3.11. The organizational form of SHSK can be described as a coalition (cf. section 2) with a strict membership adherence procedure, clear allocation of tasks, and a clear single issue.

The relational patterns of the social movement organizations (SMOs), which come together in such networks at the movement's meso level, contribute to overall movement building and framing, the organization of joint campaigns, and the broadening and professionalization of advocacy activities. Both networks also include a wide range of organizations, some of which already existed before the Fukushima accident, others of which were newly founded. The networks also both include NPOs, labor unions, social businesses (e. g. food cooperatives and alternative shops) as well as all kinds of private organizations.

The sample analyzed in this study thus contains two Tōkyō-based advocacy-oriented networks that emerged after the nuclear disaster in 2011, assuming different organizational forms and covering the two main nuclear-related issue fields after the disaster: energy policy and victim support. Although in terms of action and mobilization strategies these action fields seem discrete, the organizational foundation underlying them is shared. Sections 4 and 5 analyze the two sample networks in detail.

1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND COURSE OF THE STUDY

The intention of this study is to shed light on social movement mobilization processes by analyzing changes of relational network patterns of movement organizations at a movement's meso level, particularly after a disruptive event that presents a political opportunity for the movement to achieve its policy goals. Based on the assumption that a social actor's behavior is guided mainly by its perception of the relations in which it is embedded, I approach the problem by adopting a constructivist point of view, using qualitative research methods in tandem with a quantitative structural network analysis that provides network images in order to give insight into general relational structures (see section 3).

From a network analytical point of view, it is especially intriguing to know more about the interrelation between a particular network structure and a network's outcome in terms of a joint action profile (which consists of

a common project and a joint action repertoire) and relationship patterns in latent movement times as well as coalition-building processes (which can be understood as the network's antecedents). Using a network analytical approach, the present study aims to analyze the chosen networks as a representative sample of advocacy-oriented movement networks with particular attention to three levels: the network outcome (action profile), the network (relational patterns of the network), and the network's antecedents (latent movement structures and coalition-building process).

The following figure 1 depicts the analytical model underlying this study, which is derived from political process theory, network theory, and relational sociology. Section 2 of this study discusses these theoretical foundations in detail.




Figure 1. Network Mobilization Model.

The analysis is guided by the following two research questions, situating the study in the broader field of research on mobilization processes from a network theoretical point of view:

1. Why do the networks choose their particular action profiles? How do the relational patterns of the network samples influence their action profiles?
2. Are there changes in relationship patterns and working procedures at a movement's meso level following the initiation of a new movement wave? Or are movement meso level structures rather resistant to change?

To answer these questions I draw on data gathered between September 2013 and May 2014 in the form of qualitative semi-structured interviews with movement organization representatives, participant observation of movement events and network meetings, as well as secondary sources such as websites and movement publications. To analyze the data, I triangulate qualitative content and quantitative structural network analytical methods with the help of the digital tools MAXQDA (content analysis), UCINET (network analysis), and NETDRAW (network visualization). Data collection and analysis procedures are explained in section 3.

Sections 4 and 5 of this study turn to the analysis of the two sampled coalitional networks: e-shift and SHSK. In order to answer the research questions cited above, the analysis proceeds from the action profiles to the relational patterns behind the action of the networks; and then uncovers the process of emergence of the networks and movement relational patterns before the nuclear accident. By this, I excavate layer by layer first the visible action on the surface of the networks, second their less visible relational structures, and finally the even less visible history of the emergence of these structures. This excavation procedure, which proceeds from the visible to the less visible, allows me to examine the mobilization process from the actors' point of view, focusing on how the actors' cognition of movement structures affects relational dynamics at a movement's meso level.

This means that there are a couple of issues this study does not address. First, it does not question success or failure of the social movement in terms of policy realizations, but focuses mainly on inner-movement dynamics at the intergroup level. Thereby it touches only indirectly upon mobilization processes in terms of motivations for individual participants, for example by the introduction of movement framings. Second, it does not look into the inner structures of individual social movement organizations but focuses on the relations between such organizations. Third, because of the sampled case studies – e-shift and SHSK are mainly involved in advocacy-related actions – the study also touches only indirectly upon the meso level dynamics behind visible protest actions such as demonstrations or rallies.

Nonetheless, this study contributes to refining our theoretical assumptions on movement mobilization processes on the social meso level, which represent the infrastructure or organizational backbone of any social movement. Additionally, the study provides insight into the relational processes of Japanese civil society. Section 6 summarizes the findings on the Japanese example and section 7 reflects on the usefulness of the Network Mobilization Model and embeds the study's results in the broader field of social movement research.

2 SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, MOBILIZATION, AND NETWORKS: A RELATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

This study analyzes mobilization processes at the meso level of a social movement since previous research has shown that this social stratum plays a key role in the development of movement campaigns and the organization of movement events. In order to be able to organize movement events and to mobilize large numbers of participants, movement organizations build cooperative structures. Thus, existing relations among movement groups are a precondition for mobilization. At the same time, the patterns of such relations are closely connected to the overall form and course of a social movement.

To understand mobilization processes at a movement's meso level after a disruptive event, I draw on relational approaches to the phenomenon of collective action. Specifically, I combine Sidney Tarrow's idea of movement cycles and contentious dynamics, rooted in political process theory, with the cultural-constructivist network perspective introduced by the New York School of Relational Sociology.

Sidney Tarrow's idea of movement cycles looks at social movements in their broader historical contexts and emphasizes that social movements "must be seen in relation to those they challenge and to influential allies, third parties, and the forces of order, in the context of the specific type of regime in which they operate" (Tarrow 2011³, 2011³: 33–34). A movement cycle – which can be imagined in terms of a wave of movement activity – touches off when movement actors perceive a political opportunity and increase the frequency of collective actions. A movement cycle declines when collective actions become less frequent.

During a mobilization phase, Tarrow identifies a number of mechanisms contributing to mobilization. These are: campaigning, coalition formation, diffusion, and scale shift. The demobilization phase on the other hand is characterized by mechanisms such as repression, facilitation, exhaustion, radicalization and institutionalization. Tarrow takes a "mechanism-and-process approach" to collective action, stating that social movement processes such as mobilization and demobilization can be regarded as mechanisms among actors, i. e. a "delimited class of changes that alter relations among specific sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations" (Tarrow 2011³: 185). Thus, Tarrow's approach to the study of collective action is deeply

rooted in a relational perspective and therefore works well with elements from network theory.

For his comprehensive theory of cycles of contention, among others Tarrow draws on McAdam and Tilly (2001). In their book *Dynamics of Contention*, they distinguish between environmental, cognitive, and relational mechanisms leading to either mobilization or demobilization. By environmental mechanisms, they mean “externally generated influences on conditions affecting social life”. Cognitive mechanisms “operate through alterations of individual and collective perception” and relational mechanisms “alter connections among people, groups, and interpersonal networks” (McAdam et al. 2001: 25–26). Although McAdam et al. emphasize that these mechanisms coalesce, their book has been profoundly criticized for, among other things, because it did not show “how [these mechanisms] worked” and because they did not suggest what methods could be used to explore these mechanisms (Tarrow 2011³: 188). I approach this dilemma by applying network theory and network analytical methods to the study of mechanisms leading to mobilization.

A network perspective on social movements looks at movements in terms of network forms of interaction and tries to grasp movement structures, both in terms of measurable ties between actors and in terms of “processes of meaning attribution” (Diani 2003: 5). In this study, as already indicated, I adopt the latter point of view which corresponds to a cultural-constructivist perspective on networks. This means that I see structures as culturally created but also as real, since people act according to their cognitive relational maps, which they use to “make sense of and categorize their social environment and locate themselves in broader webs of ties and interactions” (Diani 2003: 5). This view is based on the general assumption that network relations are communicatively grounded and that these relations have implications for “understanding dynamic social processes” (Mische 2011: 81). The network constructivist approach thus explains the behavior of actors through their perceptions of the relational structures in which they are embedded and with which they identify. Moreover, it answers the question of how political opportunities intersect with relational structures: a political opportunity exists only if it is interpreted as such by actors who are embedded in networks whose structure is formed by identities – and vice versa. Finally, because of this, it incorporates the three mechanisms of contention (environmental, cognitive, and relational) as introduced by McAdam et al. (2001).

Before giving an overview of the following sections, I would like to clarify the concept of social movements on which this study is based. I

define social movements as networks of interaction⁵⁶ among all sorts of actors, be they individual or collective; I do not consider a single organization a social movement. It is important to clarify this point, since the term 'social movement' has been used to describe both networks of interaction as well as specific organizations. This study considers movement organizations as important actors in social movement processes, but not as social movements in themselves (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 25).

The following sections serve to outline the theoretical background of this study. In section 2.1, I summarize Tarrow's theory of movement cycles, which embeds the phenomenon of movement emergence and decline in its broader historical context and integrates different strands of social movement research into one comprehensive model. In section 2.2 I then take a look at the role of the meso level for social movement mobilization and introduce the concept of mobilizing structures which tries to capture all structural preconditions necessary for movement mobilization. I also introduce the idea of social movement communities, which interprets movement structures in terms of the ideological proximity of the different participating groups (section 2.2.1). Next, I define the role of movement organizations as key mobilizing agents (section 2.2.2). Further, the ways in which organizations relate to each other – cooperatively or competitively – have an influence on overall movement structures (section 2.2.3). The building of cooperative structures between movement organizations often leads to the establishment of movement coalitions to maximize the movement's effectiveness. Coalition formation is thus one of the most significant mobilization processes facilitated through existing connections or networks between groups. Such existing ties are the basis for the building of new network types in the form of more or less formal coalitions (section 2.2.4).

In section 2.3, I differentiate possible forms of collective action: social movements are most commonly associated with rallies and street demonstrations, which is a narrow image of movement activity and does not do justice to the various less visible collective efforts of social movements.

⁵⁶ This is in accordance with Diani (2003), who defines social movements as "strings of more or less connected events, scattered across time and space; [...] [which] cannot be identified with any specific organization either, rather, they consist of groups and organizations, with various levels of formalization, linked in patterns of interaction which run from the fairly centralized to the totally decentralized, from the cooperative to the explicitly hostile. Persons promoting their actions do so not as atomized individuals, possibly with similar values or social traits, but as actors linked to each other through complex webs of exchanges, either direct or mediated. Social movements are in other words, complex and highly heterogeneous network structures".

In section 2.4, I argue that social movements today are embedded in broad civil networks that serve as a basis from which movement activities are mounted and to which they 'return' during latent phases. In section 2.5 I summarize social findings on the structural implications of the broader political and social environment in which movements are embedded.

Section 2.6 then touches upon network analysis in its realist orientation and explains the origin of the network metaphor as well as the shift in perspective from attributes to relations as basic units of analysis. This section also introduces the most important contributions of the network perspective to the study of interpersonal relations, many of which can also be applied to the intergroup level. Sections 2.6.2 and 2.6.3 summarize the most important findings on movement mobilization at the individual (recruitment of participants) and interorganizational levels while pointing out the interplay between both.

Section 2.7 introduces the constructivist approach to movement networks, pointing out that network structures or relations are communicatively grounded and are underpinned by constant processes of negotiation and renegotiation. Building on White's and Tilly's work, Mische and Pattison (2000) have developed a model to trace the discursive building of civic coalitions, which is introduced in section 2.7.1, and greatly influenced the analytical model at the heart of this study (presented in section 2.8).

2.1 MOVEMENTS IN CONTEXT: TARROW'S MODEL OF MOVEMENT CYCLES AND MECHANISMS OF CONTENTION

In his book *Power in Movement. Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, Tarrow (2011³) provides a synthesis of four of the main theoretical approaches to social movements, namely: collective behavior theory, resource mobilization theory, framing and collective identity theory, and political process theory. Aiming to give a comprehensive picture of the phenomenon of social movements, he creates a model he calls cycles of contention. This model looks at the specific dynamics and mechanisms of social movements in their development over time, especially with regards to the mobilization and demobilization phases of social movements within their broader political and social environment.

Contentious politics in his eyes occur "when ordinary people – often in alliance with more influential citizens and with changes in the public mood – join forces in confrontation with elites, authorities and opponents" (Tarrow 2011³: 6). However, such contentious collective action is but one feature of social movements. Tarrow reserves the term 'social movement'

to describe “sequences of contentious politics based on underlying social networks, on resonant collective action frames, and on the capacity to maintain sustained challenges against powerful opponents” (Tarrow 2011³: 9). By distinguishing social movements from other contentious action by emphasizing their sequentiality and sustained interaction with opponents on the basis of social solidarity, Tarrow shows that movement leaders need to perceive political opportunities in order to use organizational structures and existing networks. They must also be aware of collective identities that have been constructed by careful framings of movement issues in order to assemble a number of people to express their political and/or social claims. The perception of political opportunities by movement actors is therefore a precondition for any collective action. Tarrow agrees with Goldstone and Tilly (2001: 182) that political opportunities are “the [perceived] probability that social protest actions will lead to success in achieving a desired outcome”.

A cycle of contention touches off when a political opportunity characterized by “broad change processes [...] affect both challengers and authorities” (Tarrow 2011³: 188). Such change processes manifest themselves in framing, i. e. how challengers and authorities interpret what is happening; the perception of opportunities and threats on both sides; the appropriation of resources, organizations, and institutions to take advantage of opportunities and ward off threats by challengers and authorities; and in challengers’ engagement in collective action to threaten authorities, while authorities organize to oppose or appease them (Tarrow 2011³: 188–189).

The most basic processes in social movements are, as already mentioned, mobilization and demobilization (Tarrow 2011³: 185–186). Tarrow connects specific sets of mechanisms to both. The major mechanisms that we find in almost all processes of mobilization are: campaigning (public efforts in order to make collective claims); coalition formation (means-oriented collaboration and resource-sharing by collective entities to have a broader impact); diffusion (people taking advantage of opportunities created through other groups’ actions); and scale shift (when contention diffuses to different levels of the polity). The major mechanisms of demobilization processes are: repression (authorities control or oppress contention); facilitation (some of the contenders’ claims are being satisfied); exhaustion (people become tired of being active or irritation/strain becomes apparent among constituents of the collective action); radicalization (shift of parts of the movement towards more assertiveness); and institutionalization (incorporation of organizations into organized politics) (Tarrow 2011³: 190). Table 1 shows these mechanisms.

Mechanisms of Mobilization	Mechanisms of Demobilization
Campaigns	Repression
Coalition formation	Facilitation
Diffusion (direct, indirect, mediated)	Exhaustion
Scale Shift (upwards or downwards)	Radicalization
	Institutionalization

Table 1. Tarrow 2011³. Mechanisms of Mobilization and Demobilization.

The premise for mobilization as defined by Tarrow is that people or groups are connected with each other; that they share some kind of relationship. People or groups of people are necessary in order to perceive an opportunity to press for social and/or political change and develop framings for the issues at stake, which eventually merge into campaigns. Campaigns are initiated either by a single group or by a number of groups. Also at the root of diffusion are relations between people, including more abstract relations such as indirect diffusion through media. Scale shift also requires relations: connections among the different groups constituting the polity that allow the flow of information and cause a specific reaction. Such relations can be described in terms of networks.

Before looking at the assumptions of network theory in more detail (section 2.6), I outline the major findings on the role of the meso level for movement mobilization which is at the heart of the presented analytical model (section 2.2), take a look at predominant forms of collective action (section 2.3), characterize movement structures in times of movement latency (section 2.4), and attend to the influences of the political environment on social movements (section 2.5).

2.2 THE ROLE OF THE MESO LEVEL IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT MOBILIZATION

The meso level perspective on social movements became popular in the 1980s and attracted reasonable attention especially in the study of mobilization processes (Staggenborg 2002: 124). Among the most prominent researchers calling for further analysis of meso level mobilization processes in social movements was McAdam, who developed the concept of micromobilization contexts in 1988 to bridge the micro-macro gap in social movement research. He defines a micromobilization context as a “small group setting in which processes of collective attribution are combined with rudimentary forms of organization to produce mobilization by collective actors” (McAdam 1988: 134–135).

With the intention of deepening the understanding of the role of the meso level in mobilization processes, Gerhards and Rucht (1992)

expanded the idea of micromobilization contexts by integrating the concept into a meso level analysis. In their article “Mesomobilization: Organizing and Framing in Two Protest Campaigns in West Germany”, the authors propose that McAdam’s micromobilization contexts should describe only the environment in which the micromobilization actors are embedded and within which they mobilize individuals to participate in protests. Furthermore they suggest that micromobilization potential – a term they coined based on Klandermans and Oegema’s (1987) mobilization potential⁵⁷ – be limited to describing those individuals who are the targets of micromobilization actors. In a second step, they argue that micromobilization actors usually have only a very loosely connected structure. In order to pursue a common campaign, these collective actors need to be linked together. Here, mesomobilization actors come into play. Mesomobilization actors coordinate and integrate micromobilization groups. Mesomobilization potential consists not of individuals (as on the micro level) but of micromobilization groups (Gerhards and Rucht 1992: 558). Mesomobilization actors have two functions: first, they provide structural integration by connecting the different groups, collecting resources, organizing protest activities, and doing public relations. Second, they are responsible for culturally integrating the various groups by developing a common frame of meaning for the issue at stake (Gerhards and Rucht 1992: 559). The authors conclude that both types of actors are in a complementary relationship: both are needed for successful mobilization. The following table summarizes Gerhards and Rucht’s findings.

	micromobilization	mesomobilization
context	all individuals in the environment of micromobilization actors	all micromobilization groups in the environment of mesomobilization actors
potential	those individuals who are targets of micromobilization actors	those micromobilization groups who are targets of mesomobilization actors
actors	mobilize individuals to participate in protests	coordinate and integrate micromobilization groups for protest events

Table 2. Gerhards and Rucht 1992. Micromobilization and Mesomobilization.

⁵⁷ Mobilization potential refers to macrostructural factors such as demographic and ideological variables that “predispose individuals and social groups toward the means and goals of mobilization” according to Gerhards and Rucht (1992: 555–556).

Gerhards and Rucht's study contributes to a differentiated picture of mobilization processes especially because it includes the macro-structural factors that show the mobilization potential among meso- and micromobilization actors and lead mesomobilization actors to organizationally integrate micromobilization groups, in the process of forming coalitions and providing framings for the issues at stake. The framings are then used by micromobilization groups to recruit individual participants for collective action events.

2.2.1 FROM MOBILIZING STRUCTURES TO MOVEMENT COMMUNITIES

Studies such as the above mentioned, helped with the emergence of the concept of mobilizing structures presented by McAdam et al. (1996) in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*. Based on their background in resource mobilization and political process theory, these social movement researchers define the concept of mobilizing structures as "those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action". Research in this field therefore includes analysis of formal organizational processes of meso level groups, organizations, and informal networks that "comprise the collective building blocks of social movements and revolutions" (McAdam et al. 1996: 3). Without such intermediate structures, social movements could not exist.

Much of the literature on mobilizing structures, however, focuses on social movement organizations (SMOs). Staggenborg (2002: 126) argues that although it is important to deepen the study of social movement organizations, there is a need to recognize that the "meso level of a social movement is much more complex than a collection of SMOs and [we] must consider the internal dynamics and functions of all mobilizing structures". She points out that the notion of 'social movement communities' helps to capture such diverse meso structures. She (1998: 182) expands the concept of social movement communities to "encompass all actors who share and advance the goals of a social movement: movement organizations; individual movement adherents who do not necessarily belong to SMOs; institutionalized movement supporters; alternative institutions; and cultural groups".

Movement communities, as Taylor and Whittier (1992) point out, share and develop a collective identity and link individuals and groups that are embedded in social networks and participate collectively in movement events. Staggenborg (2002: 126) also links the concept of movement communities to Zald's definition of social movements as "ideologically structured behavior", a "behavior which is guided and

shaped by ideological concerns-belief systems defending and attacking current social relations and the social system" (Zald 2000: 3–4). This definition integrates movement adherents embedded in all kinds of organizational structures into the overall picture of a movement.

In another article, Staggenborg (1998) develops the idea of movement communities further by examining their patterns of change over the course of a movement cycle. She shows that movement communities vary according to their political environment and that their shape may change over the course of a social movement. In protest cycles, movement communities often become visible and overlap with other movement communities of the same movement family.⁵⁸ In mobilizing phases, movement communities within the same movement family are interconnected; they share participants and provide mutual support. At the height of a movement cycle, a general social movement community emerges, often comprised of different movements (e. g. the environmental and the women's movement). When a movement declines, the general movement community disentangles, single movement communities lose their connections to the broader field, and individuals and organizations may drop out of their specific movement community (Staggenborg 1998: 183).

Analyzing mobilizing structures at the meso level with the help of the movement community concept thus provides an ideal basis for bridging the micro-macro gap (Staggenborg 2002: 138):

"[...] starting with the meso, we can examine the ways how characteristics of movement communities influence individual commitment and how meso structures are altered by leaders and activists (the meso-micro link). We can also examine the ability of different mobilizing structures to exploit, and sometimes create, political opportunities and large scale changes, as well as the ways in which large-scale changes alter mobilizing structures (the meso-macro link)".

Elaborating the importance of the meso level in the emergence of social movements, Staggenborg (2002: 130) points out that most of the research in this field thus far has focused on the meso-micro link (framings, micro-mobilization contexts, mesomobilization actors, multiorganizational fields, movement cultures), while the meso-macro link has been – with few exceptions – widely neglected.

Although social movement organizations are but one type of actor in movement communities, they nevertheless hold key positions because of

⁵⁸ Della Porta and Rucht (1995: 230) define a social movement family as a specific set of movements, analogous to "'party family', 'famille de politique', and 'famille spirituelle' in the literature on political parties".

their organizing and mobilizing capacities. The following sections provide insight into the inner structures of social movement organizations and the organizational dynamics that exist among them – such as coalition and alliance building – which represent a major mechanism in mobilization processes.

2.2.2 KEY MOBILIZING AGENTS: SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS

An important structural indicator of a movement community is the degree to which social movement organizations are central to it. Movement communities with strong SMOs have advantages: they provide the movement with professionalism around the recruitment of participants; mobilizing resources; strategy and tactics; coalition-building and maintenance; and fostering dialogue with other organizations or individuals in the community. Movement communities that do not rely on organizations often involve themselves only in short-term or crisis-oriented collective action (Staggenborg 1998: 186).

Organizations thus play an important role in social movements, as they provide them “with strategic and tactical leadership and with a focal point for the interaction of activists – a mechanism for framing how events and relationships are interpreted and a source for recruiting new members and identifying future leaders”. They fulfill three roles: organize “collective action at the point of contact with opponents”; perform advocacy (making public interest claims); and provide the “connective structures or interpersonal networks that link leaders and followers, centers and peripheries, and different parts of a movement sector” (Tarrow 2011³: 123–124).

The label ‘social movement organization’, however, is ambiguous; definitions range from emphasizing their strict formality and structure (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1218) to very broad conceptualizations such as Lofland’s: “associations of persons making idealistic and moralistic claims about how human personal or group life ought to be organized” (1996: 2–3). Della Porta and Diani (2006: 145) and McCarthy and Zald (1987: 375) generally distinguish between professional movement organizations and participatory movement organizations. They define professional movement organizations as being characterized by “(1) a leadership that devotes full time to the movement, with a large proportion of resources originating outside the aggrieved group that the movement claims to represent; (2) a very small or non-existent membership base or a paper membership [...], (3) attempts to impart the image of ‘speaking for a constituency’ and (4) attempts to influence policy toward the same constituency”’. Della Porta and Diani locate participatory movement or-

ganizations at the other end of the organizational range, subcategorizing them into mass protest organizations and grassroots organizations. In mass protest organizations, participatory democracy plays an important role but is often combined with some formal organizational structure. In organizations with a large membership, consensual decision-making initially tends to produce confusion and incertitude, eventually leading to the establishment of more stable organizational structures. In grassroots organizations however, the participatory element is more prominent and only low levels of formal structures are found. Such organizations tend to be small, local groups relying on ideological incentives for participation (2006: 147–148).

The following section looks into the effects of the broader movement field on the structure and behavior of movement organizations. In the section on mobilizing structures, I have already pointed out that it is possible to identify social movement communities and movement families (cf. Staggenborg 2002). While Staggenborg's concept of movement communities includes formalized movement organizations, but also engaged individuals etc. as constituents of such communities, other researchers have concentrated solely on the description of relations among organizations.

2.2.3 THE QUESTION OF HOW TO GET ALONG: COOPERATION OR COMPETITION?

Curtis and Zurcher (1973: 53) developed the idea of multiorganizational fields to capture “the total possible number of organizations with which one organization can establish specific linkages”, thus referring to the embeddedness of organizations in broader movement fields. Klandermans (2013: 796–797) extends this idea from the perspective of movement organizations, further describing an organization's alliance or conflict systems by categorizing other groups in the broader field into supportive, antagonistic, and indifferent. Alliance systems provide resources and create political opportunities; conflict systems do the opposite. The boundaries between the two systems however remain fluid and change over time. The disjunctures in the organizational field reflect already existent disjunctures in a society to a high degree. Different SMOs have different but overlapping conflict and alliance systems. Organizations in the same movement industry⁵⁹ have the biggest overlap; still, organizations from different industries may also have overlapping systems. Multi-

⁵⁹ McCarthy and Zald (1977: 1219) define a social movement industry as being constituted by “[a]ll SMOs that have as their goal the attainment of the broadest preferences of a social movement”.

organizational fields are, just like SMOs themselves, organic entities expanding and contracting according to cycles of protest.

Della Porta and Diani (2006: 157–159) also look at interorganizational relations from a network perspective. They argue that interorganizational relationships vary in content and intensity and try to capture these differences by asking whether organizations are in competition for the support of the same social base. They then analyze the presence or absence of cooperation and competition to identify four types of interorganizational relationships: neutrality, factionalism, non-competitive cooperation, and competitive cooperation. They thus assume that movement organizations are by default in a neutral relationship; in their model the absence of competition corresponds to an absence of cooperation. A high level of competition for the same constituency combined with a low level of cooperation creates factional relationships, while intense exchanges between organizations with different natural constituencies create non-competitive cooperation. Finally, when organizations competing for the same support base engage in cooperation, competitive cooperation occurs.

Such alliance and conflict structures in multiorganizational fields, affected by competition for supporters and other factors, pre-structure the possible coalition-building processes that are characteristic for a mobilization phase.

2.2.4 COALITION-BUILDING: A KEY MOBILIZING MECHANISM

As the preceding sections suggest, in cycles of contention, movement organizations build coalitions or alliances⁶⁰ with other organizations

⁶⁰ In most cases, these two terms are used interchangeably. Another important distinction should be made between the term ‘coalition’ and the term ‘advocacy network.’ While the term ‘coalition’ refers to movement organizations that work closely together on a common goal with all forms of collective action at their disposal, ‘advocacy networks’ represent loosely-knit networks of individuals and organizations sharing common values and exchanging relevant information (mainly through new media) to organize around joint campaigns. Although the concept is relevant to the analysis of local, national, and international movement contexts, it has mostly been employed in international research. Advocacy networks may also deploy the whole range of forms of action, but the majority of them rely solely on less visible forms such as advocacy, lobbying, and the dissemination of information. The conceptual differentiation between these terms becomes even more complicated when we include the term ‘advocacy coalition.’ This concept broadly overlaps with ‘advocacy network’ but it is mainly used in the literature on policy processes. Advocacy networks and coalitions include actors such as policy-makers, experts, activists, and journalists who share common beliefs; see Bonzoni (2013).

in their (multiorganizational) fields in order to broaden their support bases and increase their resources (money, personnel, mobilizing skills, etc.). The goal is to increase their legitimacy and make a bigger impact.

We can speak of a coalition when movement organizations “work together on a common task” (Van Dyke 2013: 205). Such coalitions are essential for collective action and can take many forms. Some are formal and last for years; others are informal alliances and dissolve after only a short period of time. While the benefits of participating in a coalition are clear, participation in a coalition also comes at substantial cost to movement organizations. Collaboration may have a negative impact on an organization’s resources and collective identity and the organization may have to adjust its agenda, tactics, and frames to find common ground with other coalition participants.

As participation in coalitions may also have negative effects for a movement organization, it is important, when studying the link between coalition-building and mobilization, to identify factors facilitating participation in a coalition. Van Dyke (2013) identifies some of these factors: the first precondition for the formation of a movement coalition is contact between organizations. Here, social ties between individual members of organizations play an important role in fostering cooperation. The second factor is that organizations must have consistent identities and need to share at least some common goals to cooperate. This is a necessary but insufficient indicator for predicting cooperation, as organizations may vary in their mobilizing philosophy. Besides such internal factors, there are external factors causing coalition formation: as part of cycles of contention, coalitional processes are triggered by political opportunities and threats (Staggenborg 1986; Tarrow 2011³).

In summary, the dynamic relational processes at the meso level of a social movement are central to movement mobilization because the meso level functions as the ‘supply’ side of protest, providing opportunities to turn the ‘demand’ for protest in a society into concrete protest action (Klandermans 2004: 360–361). The structures of movements at the meso level have been described as movement communities connected to broader movement families structured by ideational differences. In other research focusing especially on relations between social movement organizations, the same meso structures have been described as multiorganizational fields clustered around conflict and alliance systems. We have also established that social movement organizations are central actors in mobilization processes, especially when it comes to coalition-building that can increase a movement’s influence on policy-making. SMOs show various internal organizational forms, ranging from strictly

hierarchic to broadly participatory. Such internal organizational structures can influence the cooperative behavior of SMOs and thereby impact meso level structures, e.g. coalitional forms, which can range between purely technical cooperation to loosely-knit networks. In this study I regard the analyzed populations as movement communities and families which, along with hierarchically and participatory organized SMOs, integrate engaged individuals and other loose groups into the analytical picture and are structured by alliance and conflict systems. As already indicated, I consider coalitions formally organized networks of movement organizations. At the other end of the spectrum are loosely networked informal forms of cooperation.

The following section now turns to the outcomes of social movement coalitions and enumerates the predominant forms of collective action organized by meso level actors during salient movement phases.

2.3 AT THE HEIGHT OF MOBILIZATION: FORMS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Collective action can take “a myriad of forms” (Taylor and Van Dyke 2004: 264). Taylor and Van Dyke (2004: 263) distinguish four possible tactical categories: the first is based on political persuasion and includes activities such as “lobbying, voting, and petitioning”; the second is confrontational and uses “marches, strikes, and demonstrations that disrupt the day-to-day life of a community”; the third is based on violence “that inflict[s] material and economic damage and loss of life”; and the last category uses cultural ways to express political opinions through “rituals, spectacles, music, art, poetry, film, literature, and cultural practices of everyday life”.

Political persuasion	Lobbying, voting, petitioning
Confrontation	Marches, strikes, demonstrations
Violence	Inflicting material and economic damage
Culture	Art and practices of everyday life

Table 3. Taylor and Van Dyke 2004: 263. Forms of Collective Action.

Although there are no creative limits on new forms of protest, organizers of collective action usually rely on forms of action that they already know and which have been used during past protest cycles of the same or other movements (Della Porta and Diani 2006; McAdam 1995; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004; Tilly 1977). Tilly (1977) and Tarrow (2011³) use the term ‘reper-

toires of action' to describe the set of forms of action cognitively available to collective actors.

Accordingly, collective actors choose forms of collective action that are part of the movement's strategy or tactic repertoire. Since a number of groups, organizations and even a number of different coalitions are involved in the course of a movement cycle, most often we find more than one form of collective action. In fact, it may even be part of the strategy of a movement to have different groups concentrate on different forms of collective action, creating a 'cocktail' of forms of action addressing the issue(s) at stake through different pathways.

Della Porta and Diani (2006: 181) point out that movement actors face "strategic dilemmas" in deciding which kind of action to take: "[a]ny form of action needs to cover a plurality of sometimes contradictory objectives". The authors continue that "strategic options are limited by a series of factors internal as well as external to the protest itself. Material resources constrain strategic choices, but repertoires are not just instruments: they belong to, and represent, a movement culture, and are therefore linked to the activists' values. The aims, in this sense, do not fully justify the means". Thus, the choice of certain forms of action is in part based on a movement's identity.

The fact that certain forms of protest refer to older social movements serves as both a constraint and a benefit. Referring to older movements can enhance the legitimacy of claims, but at the same time some forms of protest are appropriate only for certain social groups, e. g. 'alternative' courses organized by students (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 182–183). The history of a form of action or its symbolic meaning, which may still resonate in the broader society, can also influence the possible recruitment of new participants to movement events.⁶¹

New forms of protest are often developed in order to catch media attention, but only the most successful of new protest forms are also adopted by other movements or in other countries. Another important factor in choosing an action repertoire is that different generations sometimes prefer different forms of action. Furthermore, action repertoires may change over the course of a movement cycle, in many cases towards radicalization, especially if there are violent interactions with the police. In some cases, too, activists successfully react with tactical innovations in order to keep protests non-violent (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 183–185).

⁶¹ This is particularly so in the case of protest rallies in Japan, which are still strongly associated with the violent student protests of the 1960s (see in particular sections 1, 4 and 5).

The Japanese anti-nuclear movement at the heart of this study also draws on a 'cocktail' of different collective action forms, ranging from very visible mass rallies and street occupations to less visible forms such as lobbying and advocacy-oriented activities. However, the sample of this study consists of actors pursuing a less visible collective action strategy. These actors are nevertheless well integrated into the broader movement family and are more or less well connected to actors or groups of actors who focus on more visible action strategies.

2.4 BEFORE AND AFTER MOBILIZATION: LATENT MOVEMENTS OR CIVIC NETWORKS?

Mechanisms of mesomobilization – such as the above mentioned coalition-building and the cooperative or competitive actions of meso-movement actors that go along with it – are a very important part of social movement emergence. Considering the cyclical course of social movements over time, it is necessary to examine the structural basis from which movements emerge in order to fully understand the form a particular movement takes during mobilization. Most of today's democratic societies have already experienced multiple movement waves. We can therefore assume that before a new movement cycle develops, there are already some meso level organizational structures in place. Taylor (1989: 761) describes these as 'social movement abeyance structures'. Abeyance structures "provide organizational and ideological bridges between different upsurges of activism by the same challenging group". This means that some kind of movement activity survives after a movement cycle's decline, which "can serve as starting points of a new cycle of the same or a new movement at a later point in time" (Taylor and Dahl Crossley 2013: 1). Taylor and Dahl Crossley (2013: 1) add that a movement in abeyance "may provide linkages to new rounds of mobilization through *activist networks*, an established *repertoire of goals and tactics*, and by constructing a *collective identity* that can serve as symbolic resource for subsequent mobilization". Staggenborg (2002, 1998) also confirms the existence of such abeyance structures, which serve as a basis for new mobilizations of movement communities.

Neidhardt and Rucht (1993) describe the frequent recurrence of social movements in modern democratic societies by characterizing today's societies as 'movement societies'. This concept is based on the idea that certain social conflicts are structurally inherent in today's democratic societies; as a result, these issues become periodically salient and often find expression in social movements.

Nonetheless, when thinking about the structure of movements during 'latent' periods, the concept of 'civil society' comes into mind. In fact, the concepts 'civil society' and 'social movements' overlap: research in these fields shares many common interests such as the study of participation, organizational forms and dynamics, and resource allocation. Diani (2013) points out the major point of divergence: social movement studies tend to put a stronger emphasis on conflict, i.e. more contentious forms of collective action, whereas civil society studies focus more on the study of less contentious action. Much of the research in both fields actually includes the study of non-governmental or social movement organizations, including interorganizational structures.

For the purpose of this study, I consider social movement organizations as part of a broader civil society.⁶² However, social movement organizations must be distinguished from non-contentious, service-providing collective actors because their goals and tactics are in conflict with public institutions; they are also in some way embedded and active in a networked movement community. The concept of 'civil society' on the other hand evokes a more static, less fluid image than a 'social movement'. That said it is useful to think of the civil society sphere as a basis from which social movements emerge and to which they 'return' during latent periods.⁶³ For the study of the networks⁶⁴ and dynamics underpinning movement mobilization processes, it is clearly indispensable to consider pre-existing but changing movement infrastructures, in other words, the history of cooperation among the involved collective actors.

⁶² Rucht (2004: 144) argues that the idea of civil society itself was born and made possible by social movements. Consequently, political and social protests – with the exception of anti-democratic protests – have an important strengthening function for civil society.

⁶³ Saunders (2007: 109) defines latent movement periods as periods in which "movement activity is invisible to the general public". She distinguishes latent periods from visible periods in which "movement activity is highly noticeable as a result of engagement in protest".

⁶⁴ Crossley (2002: 98) points out that an understanding of networks helps make sense of movements during latent periods when movement actors hold together by "keeping those networks going". However, both Crossley and Saunders indicate that in visible or salient periods, movement actors are more likely to build connections to actors with differing ideological standpoints.

2.5 STRUCTURAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE BROADER MOVEMENT ENVIRONMENT

The shape of a civil society – the basis for social movement activity – is influenced by the national state in which it is embedded. Consequently, strategies and tactics applied by movement actors also vary according to national context. Although it is not the purpose of this study to analyze state–movement interactions, it is useful to touch upon the question of the broader movement environment because of its important external and internal structural implications.

Rucht (1996: 186) provides a model of how context structures influence movement structures, which in turn influence mobilization. According to him, the context structure of a social movement can be divided into cultural, social, and political contexts. These contexts can either promote or suppress specific movement structures, the allocation of resources, and certain forms of protest. This happens because context influences how movements choose their forms of action and avoid patterns that disadvantage the movement (Rucht 1996: 189).

The cultural context of social movements refers to the general values and issue perceptions in society that influence individuals' behavior towards the movement. The social context is influenced by social milieus and networks that contribute to the building of a collective identity and other movement structures as well as by the social stratification of the society. The political context, finally, refers basically to political opportunity structures. Rucht identifies four variables that shape the political context: 1. access to the party-system and the relative possibility of influencing policy decisions either through direct or indirect participation, 2. policy implementation capacity, or the relative power of the government to implement policies regardless of opposition, 3. alliance structure, or the pattern of possible allies, and 4. conflict structure or the configuration of possible opponents (Rucht 1996: 190–191).

Based on these reflections, Rucht develops a model to show the influence of context structures on social movements and vice-versa. Besides the cultural, social, and political context, a movement is also influenced by a situational context, including movement-specific opportunities and diffusion between and within movements and countries. The structural implications of a movement's theme are also influential; for example, it is unlikely that a peace movement will try to influence the polity through violent means (Rucht 1996: 202–203). Figure 2 shows Rucht's model, depicting the influence of context structures on social movements.




Figure 2. Rucht 1996: 203. Elaborated Model for Context Structures and Social Movements.

Although Rucht's model includes contextual influences on social movement structures, it does not explain mobilization processes and dynamics. The network perspective introduced in the following section, however, provides the means to do so.

2.6 NETWORK ANALYSIS AND MOVEMENT MOBILIZATION

The use of network models to grasp social movement structures has a long tradition (cf. Gerlach and Hine 1970; Curtis and Zurcher 1973). Mario Diani is currently one of the most prominent researchers in the field of social movements and networks, applying network analysis as a research method to social movements (Baldassarri and Diani 2007; Della Porta and Diani 2006; Diani 1990; 2002, 2003, 2004, 2011; Diani and Bison 2004; Diani and McAdam 2003). In his introduction to *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action*, a miscellany he edited with McAdam in 2003, he identifies three intellectual fields in which network concepts and social movement analysis play an important role: (1) the meso level of social analysis, or the relation between structure and agency; (2) social mechanisms, especially with regard to the dynamic spread of social movement activity; and (3) the consolidation of social network analysis in the social sciences (Diani 2003: 4–5). He points out

that network analysis has been applied to these three fields in two ways: The first sees network analysis “with reference to a ‘realist’ view of social networks which link together concrete actors through specific ties, identifiable and measurable through reliable empirical instruments”. The second tradition interprets network ties as “processes of meaning attribution”: they reflect the “cognitive maps through which actors make sense of and categorize their social environment and locate themselves in broader webs of ties and interactions” (Diani 2003: 5). The last represents the constructivist approach that lies at the heart of the analytical model proposed and tested by this study.

Scholars from both realist and constructivist approaches have addressed the question of how networks contribute to movement mobilization. It is one of the most established findings in the research on social movements that existing social ties function as the basis for movement mobilization (cf. Snow et al. 1980; McAdam 2003; Passy 2003; Diani 2003; Fisher 2010; Gould 1993, 2003). The following subsections review the basic notions and concepts of social network analysis and present the most relevant research findings in the field, notably those concerning networks and movement mobilization.

2.6.1 THE NETWORK METAPHOR

Marin and Wellman (2011: 11) define as the starting point of social network analysis “the premise that social life is created primarily and most importantly by relations and the patterns formed by these relations”. Network researchers try to explain factors leading to the establishment of relations between social actors, the characteristics of those emerging relations (network antecedents), and the effect that network structures have on other variables such as the actor’s behavior (network consequences or outcomes) (Borgatti et al. 2009: 894; Hennig et al. 2012: 30). Applying a network perspective thus means not looking at attributes of individuals, organizations etc. as the main cause for their actions, but rather considering how their relational embeddedness motivates their actions. Network analysts assume that the position of a social actor in a network determines its opportunities and constraints for action. This also means that groups do not have strict boundaries, but that group members usually participate in multiple groups, which may in turn lead to mutual influence. Consequently, network analysts “take context so seriously that relations are often analysed in the context of other relations” (Marin and Wellman 2011: 13).

To grasp the structure of such social relations, researchers imagine them graphically in terms of nodes and ties. Nodes can be individuals,

groups, organizations, neighborhoods, states, or even elements of speech. Ties represent the relations among these nodes. These relations can be direct or indirect. Nodes are directly linked to each other when they are clearly interacting. Ties are indirect when the relationship is assumed, for example because the nodes share some activity or resource.

Borgatti et al. (2009: 894) propose a typology of social ties among individuals including similarities, social relations, interactions, and flows. Similarities involve factors such as location, membership, and attributes. Social relations can consist of kinship/non-kinship, affective and cognitive ties; interactions involve all kinds of direct social contact, such as talking to, helping and so on; and flows signify the movement of information, beliefs or resources via networks as the following table shows.

Similarities			Social Relations				Inter- actions	Flows
<i>Location</i> e. g., Same spatial and tem- poral space	<i>Member- ship</i> e. g., Same clubs Same events etc.	<i>Attribute</i> e. g., Same gender Same at- titude etc.	<i>Kinship</i> e. g., Mother of Sibling of	<i>Other role</i> e. g., Friend of Boss of Student of Competi- tor of	<i>Affective</i> e. g., Likes Hates etc.	<i>Cognitive</i> e. g., Knows Knows about Sees as happy etc.	e. g., Sex with Talked to Advice to Helped Harmed etc.	e. g., Informa- tion Beliefs Personnel Resources etc.

Table 4. Borgatti et al. 2009: 894. A Typology of Ties Studied in Social Network Analysis.

Hennig et al. (2012: 28) point out that ties between actors can be single or multiple depending on the number of types of relations they share. Ties may also vary in terms of content, intensity, and strength. Although Borgatti et al.'s typology above primarily gives examples of ties between individuals, their general categorization can also be applied to ties between organizations and other types of nodes. It is, however, only natural that individual actors be embedded in multiply layered networks, which means that they may belong to more than one group or organization at the same time. This intersection or multiplexity of networks within one actor defines the actor's individual behavior, which in turn feeds back into the broader group's relational embeddedness (Breiger 1974: 181). Network researchers therefore must choose their unit of analysis carefully and according to their particular research questions.

Scholars debate whether network analysis is a methodology, a perspective, a paradigm, or a theory (Borgatti and Halgin 2011b; Marin and Wellman 2011; Scott and Carrington 2011). Even so, a good deal of network theorizing exists. Borgatti and Halgin (2011b: 1168) distinguish

two strains of theorizing on social networks: 1) work on the antecedents of network properties, namely the “processes that determine why networks have the structures they do” which they name “theory of networks”; and 2) analyzing the consequences of network structures or the “mechanisms and processes that interact with network structures to yield certain outcomes for individuals and groups”, to which the authors refer to as “network theory”. Hennig et al. (2012: 29) summarize the two strains by stating that “[e]xplicitly or implicitly, social networks often play the role of intermediate meso level variables, which moderate the effect of antecedents, such as individual behavior, on consequences such as collective action, possibly with feedback”. It is therefore important to note not only that network structures influence actors, but also that actors influence network structures which indicates that over time social networks are defined by change and cannot be understood as a static concept. Figure 3 shows the network causality chain.




Figure 3. Hennig et al. 2012: 30. Networks as Explanatory, Dependent, or Intermediate Variables.

Reasons for the formation especially of interorganizational networks which are at the center of the proposed analytical model, in the form of long-term cooperative relationships are motivated by factors such as resource acquisition, reduction of uncertainty, enhancement of legitimacy, and the attainment of collective goals. Also, organizations with prior experience of working together with others tend to build more diverse network ties. Another important aspect for building interorganizational networks is trust: especially under conditions of uncertainty, prior ties play an important role. Organizational actors are – just like individuals – more likely to cooperate the more similar they are. Besides such factors, changes in the broader cultural, historical, and institutional context may function as facilitators for network-building. Important factors influencing interorganizational network structures are “reciprocity norms” or “rules of behavior”, which come into effect in the case of disputes. Interorganizational networks transfer information, facilitate the imitation of certain practices, and can lead to innovation and high performance which in turn may contribute to the survival of the organization (Brass et al. 2004: 802–807).

Most of the consequences or outcomes of networks are related to the acquisition of social capital through networks. Granovetter’s (1973)

“strength of weak ties” theory and Burt’s (1992, 2004) theory of structural holes are both well known and in many regards similar network theories related to the notion of social capital. Granovetter looks at processes in interpersonal networks, but his results are useful for the interorganizational level as well. He defines tie strength as a “combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie”. The strength of weak ties theory is based on two premises. The first one is that the stronger a tie between two individuals, the more likely it is that they also share ties with the same third party; in other words, their social worlds overlap. The reason for this can be found in the underlying causes for tie formation in the first place which is that people tend to have stronger ties with others who are similar to them. The second premise is that bridging ties, or ties between two actors who are not otherwise related to their respective clusters of friends, increase their probability of acquiring new information. Such bridging ties are unlikely to be strong. Therefore, the more weak ‘bridging’ ties a person possesses, the more social capital the person can rely on (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell 2011: 41–42).

Similarly, Burt’s structural holes theory also points out that the more ‘bridges’ an actor has, the more social capital it has but the terminology Burt uses differs from Granovetter. Instead of characterizing bridging ties as weak, Burt (1992: 17) prefers to speak of ‘nonredundant’ ties (in the sense of not leading to the same people), because these are the ties that provide new information. Such nonredundant ties do not necessarily have to be weak, as weak ties tend to degenerate. What is decisive about them is primarily their bridging function. Burt (1992: 18) refers to the “separation between nonredundant contacts” as structural holes; in other words, a structural hole is a “relationship of nonredundancy between two contacts”. These structural holes function as buffers and provide the two contacts with “network benefits that are in some degree additive rather than overlapping”. Burt (2004: 349) considers brokerage across such structural holes as a mechanism for providing social capital; consequently, people who “stand near the holes in a social structure are at higher risk of having good ideas” because of the alternative information ‘flowing’ along such nonredundant ties.

This research concerning the motivations for and impacts of social relationships as represented by the network metaphor also found their way into social movement research. The next sections introduce research regarding the influence of networks on the mobilization processes of individuals as well as between organizations (sections 2.6.2 and 2.6.3). This study’s focus is on intergroup networks, but as indicated above, micro- and meso-mobilization go hand in hand (Boekkooi and Klander-

mans 2013). Including this background knowledge in a comprehensive theoretical account is necessary because the movement organization representatives interviewed for this study have likely gone through similar processes (cf. section 3.2.2).

2.6.2 NETWORKS OF INDIVIDUALS AND MOVEMENT MOBILIZATION

On the individual level, social movement activists are already connected to each other through multiple forms of ties before action occurs. Social ties stimulate mechanisms which affect the chances and forms of participation (Diani 2003: 7). Individual social networks transmit information on opportunities for action, are a source for social pressure to participate or not, and convey certain sets of values (as they provide the context for socialization) which may or may not lead to participation in movement organizations or single movement events (Diani 2003: 8). Participation in a movement is thus facilitated by social networks, which also contribute to the establishment of new ties, embedding activists often in multiple group memberships and thereby forming activists' particular identities.

Klandermans and Oegema (1987: 519) also point out the importance of the formation of recruitment networks by movement actors so that a movement may fully tap its mobilization potential. Networks provide the means to reach out and motivate people who might be interested in the movement's issue to join and take action. The authors conclude that social networks provide the very basis for movement emergence and mobilization because they help individuals in "becoming part of the mobilization potential, becoming target of mobilization attempts, becoming motivated to participate, and overcoming barriers to participate".⁶⁵

Passy (2003: 24–25) takes this line of thought a step further and distinguishes three functions of social networks in the mobilization process: socialization, structural-connection, and decision-shaping. These three functions play different roles in the process of encouraging individual participation in movement organizations. The socialization function describes the role of social networks in the identity-building process, which eventually creates ideological proximity of an individual to a movement's issue (or not). Social interactions convey meanings and shape

⁶⁵ Klandermans (2002) and (2004) confirms this from a social psychological point of view, emphasizing that identification with unjustly treated groups increases the potential for protest participation. The dynamics of movement participation may also be generated by demand for (for example specific grievances) and supply of protest (possibilities for participation provided by movement actors).

an individual's cognitive frame and are thus the very basis of an individual's identity. The structural-connection function of networks points to the fact that without opportunities, individual dispositions will not be turned into action. Networks provide the opportunity to get actively involved in collective action by linking activists to one another; very often they link participants to movement organizations. The decision-shaping function of social networks means that getting involved in collective action requires a series of decisions, especially when it comes to collective activities involving risks. Whether or not an individual decides to act despite such barriers also depends on the social networks in which they are embedded. Passy (2003: 27–28) points out that these three functions vary and influence participation processes according to the characteristics of movement organizations, especially their preferred action repertoire (legal vs. illegal) and their public visibility (high vs. low).

In a nutshell, individual participation patterns in either movement organizations or in isolated collective action events such as street demonstrations depend heavily on the types of ties between people. Notably, the probability of participation rises with the strength of the tie. The strength of the tie is at least in part defined by ideological proximity, or the identification of the individual with the values related to the issue at stake.

2.6.3 INTERORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS AND MOVEMENT MOBILIZATION

Individual networks as described above represent the “backbone of broader social movement communities where interpersonal ties are often multiple and may involve joint participation in mobilization campaigns as well as the sharing of distinctive lifestyles or of broader cultural models” (Diani 2003: 9). The most important spaces for individuals to encounter and interact within such broader movement communities are movement organizations. They “form [...] major node[s] in social movement networks” (Diani 2003: 9) facilitating “dense interaction in a [...] fluid network of activists who may shift from group to group and cause to cause” (Clemens and Minkoff 2004: 157). Activists in movement organizations are embedded in individual networks which include linkages to people outside of the organization or even the movement as a whole. Thus, individual networks provide the basis for interorganizational networks (Diani 2004: 348–349). Breiger (1974) as already indicated describes this as the duality of persons and groups: individual multiple group memberships have an impact on overall intergroup relations.

While acknowledging that interorganizational networks are usually rooted in individual networks and that participating in organizations also contributes to the formation of new ties, we have to keep in mind that

representatives or leaders of movement organizations usually act on behalf of their collective entities. This means that organizational leaders follow not only their personal interests in their actions but must act according to the interests of their respective memberships, also with regard to the establishment and forms of ties to other movement organizations or prominent movement individuals. On the interorganizational level, this results in alliances and oppositional structures within organizational movement networks, shaping the possibilities for cooperation.

Looking at alliance structures at the interorganizational level, Diani (2003: 10) states that even among cooperating organizations, relations can have different qualities. He distinguishes between alliance structures and coalition networks by the degree of the shared collective identity between the participating organizations. In his view, interorganizational alliance structures have a common identity while coalition networks often include organizations from different movement families, and therefore in most cases do not share the same identity and thus remain instrumental. In their study on civic networks, Baldassarri and Diani (2007) follow up on this idea and differentiate two types of ties between organizations: transactions and social bonds. They define transactions as “alliance ties, involving exclusively the exchange of information and resources necessary to the pursuit of shared collective goals”, while social bonds include a shared identity in addition (Baldassarri and Diani 2007: 743). The authors furthermore suggest that “organizations are involved in multiplex relational patterns in which identity relations – social bonds – embed associates into dense clusters of interactions, while instrumental relations – transactions – operate across clusters, integrating them into the broader civic network” (Baldassarri and Diani 2007: 737). This perspective generally corresponds with Burt’s theory of structural holes and Granovetter’s strength of weak ties theory, hinting at the fact that transactional or weak bridging ties may be decisive for the success of movements in terms of the number of mobilized people. Tarrow (2011³: 68–69) refers to this in terms of “weak ties and strong movements”. He points out that although strong solidarity ties are the basis of any movement activity, weak bridging ties are the precondition for forming broader movements. The macro-structure of a given movement network is therefore influenced by the quality or the content of the interorganizational ties – so to say – from below.

From a macrostructural point of view, we can distinguish between hierarchical and polycentric interorganizational network forms. In a typical hierarchical structure, one or few organizations are in the center and connect more peripheral organizations that are unrelated to each other. This organizational form can mobilize people on a large scale but it tends to be less robust. If for example one of the central organizations disinte-

grates, the network as a whole can easily collapse. This is why we can speak of an asymmetric interdependence within such networks. In a polycentric form, organizations are embedded in multiple clusters. Within the clusters, relations are very dense. These clusters are then related to each other by few and rather functional relations. In polycentric networks, mobilization tends to be diffuse and may not constitute a large number of people, but this form is less vulnerable to external threats and therefore more robust. In terms of power relations we can speak of a balanced interdependence in this case. Strong social bond-type ties are important for micro level integration within cohesive groups, whereas weak transaction-type ties are necessary for the macro level integration that is necessary to the formation and mobilization of a movement. Organizations therefore usually engage in both types of relations (Baldassarri and Diani 2007: 743–744).




Figure 4. Baldassarri and Diani 2007: 741. Hierarchical and Polycentric Network Structures.

Diani (2003: 10–11) points out that civil networks may not necessarily intersect with movement boundaries, since in his view movements are strongly defined by shared identities.⁶⁶ Movement boundaries, defined in terms of a common identity, are nevertheless unstable because their internal structure is influenced by processes of segmentation (division of labor, differentiation of issues, ideological conflicts, fragmentation) and processes of centralization (SMO positions and their influence in a given

⁶⁶ In a study with Bison (2004: 283), Diani defines social movements as processes involving “instances of collective action with clear conflictual orientations to specific social and political opponents, conducted in the context of dense informal inter-organizational networking, by actors linked by solidarities and shared identities that precede and survive any specific coalitions and campaigns” (see also section 2.2.4).

network). In this sense, the concept of movement boundaries defined by shared identities corresponds to the notion of movement communities as introduced by Staggenborg, except that Staggenborg's definition involves not only networks of movement organizations but also includes engaged individuals and informal groups. As movement communities share important ideological points of view, they assume a common identity which results in strong social bond-type ties. Therefore, from a macrostructural point of view, movement communities can be described as clusters of movement activity. As indicated above, in times of high mobilization, movement communities often overlap and build larger networks in the form of alliances or coalitions in order to represent more people and thereby enhance the legitimacy of their social and/or political goals. In this case, we can speak of transaction-type ties bridging different movement community clusters, eventually forming a broader movement.

Diani (2011: 226) points out that social movement network dynamics usually remain purely informal (except when involved in functional coalition-building). On the transnational level, however, movement organizations tend to develop a hybrid model of "network organization", "combining elements of formality with [...] elements from a loose network structure". In many cases, network organizational models are formed to coordinate action concerning specific campaigns or policy issues. They do not depend on the organizations that originally initiated them, and cannot take leadership functions beyond the specific issue they tackle. Such network organizational forms have the advantage of easing alliance building and increasing a transnational movement's resources by, in particular, resource sharing and facilitating the spread of ideas. They also help cushion negative effects in the case of failure. But the network organization models are also often subject to ideological factions or internal conflict between organizational units. This is why they are often only short-lived compared to more formal organizational forms (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 159–160). Here, Della Porta and Diani speak mainly of a networked type of transnational coalition. However, as indicated in section 2.2.4, generally, coalitions can show different relational patterns. The two coalitional networks at the center of this study integrate organizations and activists from a range of movement fields. e-shift in particular conceives of itself as a 'movement forming body' and draws on its broader networks to actors not in its core membership to set up movement events, so it represents a network form of coalition, a 'network-coalition' (cf. section 4.1.1). SHSK on the other hand also integrates actors from outside their membership in movement events, but is more of a formal coalition in that it has a strict membership adherence procedure and a formal internal working structure (cf. section 5.1.1).

2.7 CULTURAL-CONSTRUCTIVIST NETWORK PERSPECTIVES ON MOBILIZATION: THE NEW YORK SCHOOL OF RELATIONAL SOCIOLOGY

Network theorizing is rooted in structural analysis as it was developed within the tradition of sociological structuralism, which is associated mainly with algebraic methods to model relational structures. In the 1990s however, a new theoretical perspective on networks emerged as scholars recognized the shortcomings of the structural model of relations, especially in terms of not taking into account its cultural dimension (Fuhse and Mützel 2010: 1–2; Mische 2011: 82).

Harrison White's book *Identity and Control* (1992), in which the author develops a constructivist view of social networks, motivated a group of researchers to take a look at networks from a similar point of view. Eventually, their view on social networks was labelled 'relational sociology', following Mustafa Emirbayer's article "Manifesto for a Relational Sociology" (1997). In order to clearly distinguish the constructivist view of relations from its structuralist counterpart, Mische (2011: 2) speaks of the "New York School of Relational Sociology", which is based on a "shared focus on the communicative grounding of network relations and the implications of these relations for understanding dynamic social processes". According to this thinking, social networks are facilitated through "a set of common stories" (White 1992: 65). Consequently, social networks can be described as "network[s] of meaning" (White 1992: 67).

Another key figure in the New York school of Relational Sociology was Charles Tilly, who, based on a constructivist point of view presents his idea of a "relational realism" that he describes as the "hoped-for synthesis" between structural realism and social construction (Tilly 2002: 5). According to him, a political identity is based on "shared political stories as outcomes of contentious conversation", which play a central role in "political mobilization, conflict, and change" (Tilly 2002: xi). Identities are thus constructed in conversations involving symbols derived from history and culture. Identities influence the ways people behave, including their participation or non-participation in social movements. Tilly (2002: 122) therefore concludes that in order to explain political contention, analysts have to "take mere speech acts and their nonverbal equivalents seriously".

In what ways are meaning structures significant for the mobilization of social movements? The next section gives an example of the discursive construction of a civic arena, where different social groups unite and form a broad civic coalition.

2.7.1 MOBILIZATION REFLECTED IN DISCOURSE: BUILDING A 'CIVIC ARENA'

In their article "Composing a Civic Arena: Publics, Projects, and Social Settings", Mische and Pattison (2000: 163) analyze the "sociocultural mechanisms by which diverse and contending actors construct a 'civic' arena in a fractured, contentious, and multi-sectoral political field". They define a civic arena as "a cluster of 'public' settings in which sectorally diversified actors provisionally suppress their particularistic projects in order to formulate and pursue an emerging common purpose" (2000: 168). They delineate public settings as social settings in which sets of actors that usually act independently from each other meet and interact in order to build civic alliances – for example in the form of coalitions. Social settings are the local contexts in which sub-sets of actors come together around sub-sets of their projects. This could for example be a party congress or a professional conference. Projects are "future-oriented narratives of proposed interventions by groups or collectivities". Such collective projects function in discursive space and structure relationships "in a changing political arena". A civic arena can therefore be seen as a process as well as the result of negotiation and organization efforts of divergent movement actors to build a common campaign on a pressing issue. It involves a broad range of actors from ideologically differing movement groups or – on an intermediate level – movement communities, willing to at least temporarily pause their own particular projects in order to work together on a common issue. The authors point out that civic arenas are often "characterized by sectoral desegmentation as well as a fair degree of discursive ambiguity" (Mische and Pattison 2000: 167–168).

The authors distinguish two mechanisms that interact when actors build a civic arena. The first is interanimation, a "process by which actors interweave projects and narratives that are usually expressed in segmented social settings" (Mische and Pattison 2000: 169). In this case different narratives are decoupled from their original settings and mix with other narratives, forming a new frame for the issue at stake. The second mechanism is suppression. In this case, actors refrain from involving certain narratives that they confirm in more private settings. Instead, actors concentrate on overlaps in projects. While interanimation and suppression are interrelated, they are of differing importance during the process of civic arena-building. The authors distinguish three stages of civic coalition formation: in the first stage (T1), sectoral segmentation prevails and actors exchange mainly with actors from the same sector. In the second stage (T2), actors intermingle at public events. Here, interanimation between the different narratives takes place. In the last stage (T3), a "process of convergence"

occurs, leading to the suppression of some of the projects or narratives first expressed during phase two as actors come together in a “series of civic mobilizations” (Mische and Pattison 2000: 169).




Figure 5. Mische and Pattison 2000: 170. Three Stages of Civic Coalition Formation.

To date, Mische and Pattison’s model is the most comprehensive model for analyzing a mobilization process from a constructivist point of view. However, methodologically it is heavily based on conversation analysis and in terms of field access it requires the observation of conversations between movement groups for a long period in time, from the mobilizing event to civic coalition formation.⁶⁷ Therefore in order to facilitate the study of mesomobilization processes by focusing on network dynamics in coalition-building even if limited by short-term field access, I develop an analytical model that can easily be combined with a variety of data acquisition and analysis techniques.

2.8 TOWARDS A SYNTHESIS: THE NETWORK MOBILIZATION MODEL

Movement mobilization is all about networks. All mobilizing mechanisms are made possible by connections among different actors in a movement field. Networks are the premise for information flow and diffusion as well as the negotiation of ideas and projects; they are the basis for the organization of movement events and for the recruitment of participants to such

⁶⁷ In the case of the anti-nuclear movement after Fukushima this would have required anticipating the initiating event; namely the 9.0 earthquake and tsunami in March 2011, an impossible task.

events. Of particular importance in the process of mounting collective action is the meso level. Here, movement groups and outstanding engaged individuals function as key nodes to connect larger numbers of people (micromobilization). At the meso level, groups develop interpretations of issues at stake, develop joint projects, and test possibilities for cooperation, leading eventually to the building of coalitions (mesomobilization). In today's democratic societies, most movement events are organized by more or less formal coalitions of different groups in multiorganizational fields. Such movement fields are structured by the ideological proximity of movement groups and engaged individuals. In other words, they consist of a particular structure of overlapping movement communities that become the basis for the emergence of coalitions or other cooperative networks, a central mechanism in mobilization.

Focusing the analysis on networks entails shifting attention from attributes to relations as the key variable in explaining the behavior of actors. In the constructivist approach to networks, networks are structured by meaning and vice-versa. Meaning in a social movement context shapes identities as well as different visions for the future (or 'projects' in Mische's terms), which are interconnected and which emerge equally in network processes. Different ideas and visions for the future play an important role in the field of social movements, where those ideas that are directly connected to the future of the people are negotiated in a public arena, eventually leading to coordinated collective action. Since in most cases social movements produce future visions that differ from those proposed by national governments, it seems essential for movements to assemble behind a common project that both mobilizes the largest possible number of participants in movement events and is well received by the broader public. This is obviously the best way to gain a better negotiating position vis-à-vis the national government.

Therefore, to best understand the outcome of a movement mobilization process in the form of an action profile of a coalitional network which consists of a joint action repertoire and a common project, it is key to examine the ways in which movement networks are structured. These network structures are influenced by the network-building process as well as network antecedents such as movement structures in latent times. Thus, in order to capture a mobilization process, it is necessary to integrate the antecedents, the network, as well as the outcome into the analysis.

Figure 6 shows the analytical model which underlies this study, which is based on the theoretical conclusions introduced in the previous sections. Understanding mesomobilization processes requires regarding latent movement structures in times of no or low mobilization, as well as




Figure 6. Network Mobilization Model.

the network-building process initiated by disruptive events or large scale social change, as antecedents or structure-giving factors for a coalitional network.

During movement latent times, movement organizations maintain ties based on shared values and/or experiences of past cooperation. When a disruptive event happens that in the eyes of the actors promises to be an opportunity for social and/or political change, actors (movement groups) activate their more or less latent ties and test chances for cooperation or coalition-building with other groups. The establishment of a certain cooperation structure goes hand in hand with the development of a common project. Once such a network, whether it takes the form of a formal coalition or a less formal network-form of coalition, is established, member organizations – at least while cooperating – suppress their individual projects. During a period of cooperation within a more or less formalized network, relationship patterns tend to be stable but are constantly re-negotiated. The composition and relational patterns of such coalitional networks are decisive for the network outcome, i.e. the common action profile. The following section applies empirical methods to the network mobilization model.

3 APPLYING EMPIRICAL METHODS TO THE NETWORK MOBILIZATION MODEL

Taking the network concept for relations as a starting point for grasping mobilization processes in social movements, this study is rooted in the tradition of social network analysis. While social network analysis has often been associated with quantitative research techniques (cf. section 2.7.1), in recent years, a qualitative approach to the study of social networks has gained momentum (Hollstein and Straus 2006). Hollstein (2006: 11) points out that a qualitative approach enriches network research by exploring new perspectives on human relations, linking structure and agency, and understanding the nature and dynamics of networks. Qualitative network analysis can be described as a both actor-oriented (through the eyes of the actor) and structure-oriented research strategy, focusing particularly on the interpretation of the impact of relationship patterns on the behavior of the corresponding units of analysis.⁶⁸ Generally, qualitative and quantitative social research complement each other (Flick 2011: 23–26). While quantitative social research is based on the example of the natural sciences, requiring experimental designs that allow for objective generalizations and quantifications for the studied phenomena, qualitative social research takes into account the subjectivity of social experiences. Methodological principles in this research tradition therefore require open procedures for data collection (Hollstein 2011: 405). While approaching mobilization processes basically from a qualitative point of view, this study also employs quantitative techniques to balance the analysis, including objective structural patterns along with the actors' views and perceptions of them.

My initial approach toward studying mobilization processes in the Japanese anti-nuclear movement after the Fukushima nuclear accident was an open one in the tradition of qualitative social research, based on the Network Mobilization Model (cf. section 2). However, after digging deeper into the data material, it became evident that a realist-structural analysis of the networks under study was necessary to provide a concrete visualization of the abstract notion of 'movement network', and in particular to draw conclusions on the centrality and therefore relative power positions of certain actors in the networks. As a result I decided to

⁶⁸ Units of analysis can include individuals, groups, nations, or even elements of speech. Cf. section 2.6 for details.

apply quantitative network analysis tools, thereby expanding to a mixed-methods approach. A mixed-method approach to studying networks has the advantage of strengthening both the explanatory power and generalizability of the network study. While acknowledging that mixed-method approaches to network studies can take on different forms, Hollstein (2010: 464–466) identifies three mixed-method design types: sequential-explanatory, sequential-exploratory, and parallel. A sequential-explanatory mixed-method design begins with the collection of quantitative data, which is then followed by a qualitative sub study. In the case of a sequential-exploratory design, a qualitative approach is complemented by quantitative data collection. In a parallel design, both approaches are applied on an equal footing and more integrated than in the other two design types. This study thus falls into the category of sequential-exploratory mixed-method design, where the qualitative data serves to explore the actors' perceptions of their relations; this is complemented by quantitative data that provides network centrality measures and visualizations.

To analyze the different stages of the mobilization process derived from the theoretically developed Network Mobilization Model (cf. section 2) with regard to the research questions outlined in the introduction (cf. section 1), my procedure is as follows.

The network outcomes in terms of the action profiles of my two case studies, are derived from qualitative evaluation of the coalitional networks' online and offline publications as well as from qualitative interview data and participant observation. Facts on the nature and quality of relations within the coalitions, as well as to their main targets, are drawn from a quantitative structural-realist analysis of affiliation networks and create a visualization of network structures in action. The results of this quantitative analysis, based on the co-participation of organizations in movement events, are complemented by qualitative content analysis of semi-structured interviews with SMO representatives and the evaluation of data provided by participant observation, which provides insights into the actors' perceptions of their relations and behavior towards each other. Research results on the network antecedents of the two case studies – i. e. latent movement structures and the coalition-building process – are derived from qualitative content analysis of the interviews with SMO representatives. Thus, while the majority of data analyzed is qualitative, the study triangulates qualitative and quantitative analytical techniques as well as a broad range of data material.

The sampling procedure was done in two steps and followed a purposeful sampling strategy (Patton 1990). As already indicated in the introduction to this study (section 1), I chose the case of the Japanese anti-nuclear movement because the disruptive event of the Fukushima nuclear




Figure 7. Analytical Model and Data Analytical Procedure.

accident represents a critical case that triggered a large-scale mobilization process. Because it is impossible to gather data on the mobilization processes of an entire social movement, further sampling of cases for network mobilization within the Japanese anti-nuclear movement was necessary. In order to find appropriate case studies which account for interesting examples for such a network mobilization process while remaining sensitive to the specific conditions of the anti-nuclear movement in Japan and having the theoretical premises in mind, I approached the field openly, searching for typical cases of meso level network patterns in the Japanese anti-nuclear movement. This sampling procedure resulted in the choice of two intersecting movement coalitional networks. Choosing networks with a more or less formalized structure as is the case with coalitional networks, has the advantage of providing relatively plainly defined network boundaries.

I started field work between September 2013 and May 2014 by participating in a broad range of movement events which were posted on various websites⁶⁹ to get a feeling for the movement environment. While

⁶⁹ I discovered these events online by googling terms such as 'datsu genpatsu' (nuclear phase-out), 'han genpatsu' (anti-nuclear), 'ibento' (event), 'demo' (demonstration) along with the names of movement organizations I came across during my literature review.

doing so, I narrowed the focus of the study to networks of groups that could serve as examples of network dynamics in the Japanese civil society sphere. In a following step, I conducted interviews with network members in order to get a deeper insight into members' interpretations of the networks in which they are embedded; after gaining their consent, I participated in regular meetings of operating networks. This approach, the process of which is described in more detail in section 3.1, led to my choice of the two cases, namely the coalitional networks e-shift and SHSK. After choosing the two case studies, I increased the number of interviews with members of these networks and started gathering their online and offline publications.

Following the description of the research design settings in section 3.1, section 3.2 provides a detailed description of the data material collected through the outlined sampling procedure. Section 3.3 then discusses the applied analytical techniques, especially the structural network analysis performed with the help of the UCINET and NETDRAW software (section 3.3.1), and the qualitative content analysis assisted by the MAXQDA software (section 3.3.2).

3.1 RESEARCH DESIGN SETTINGS

The difficulty of empirically grasping the meso level network mobilization process of a social movement after a disruptive event requires the sampling of networks that are relevant to the theoretically established categories at hand. The following sections introduce the sampling strategy, the definition of network boundaries, and the choice of the field site. To conclude, an overview of the sampling process during field work and insights into the researcher's relations to the field are given.

3.1.1 SAMPLING STRATEGY

The literature on sampling strategies in qualitative social research suggests a distinction between theoretical and selective or purposeful sampling.⁷⁰ Theoretical sampling refers to a strategy in which cases are selected during the categorization of data material and guided by an emerging theory. It requires an open research design – if possible without time limits – and is especially suitable in ethnographic and explorative

⁷⁰ Flick (2011: 155–162) distinguishes between theoretical and statistical sampling in qualitative research. His use of the term 'statistical sampling' however corresponds broadly to 'selective' or 'purposeful' sampling as introduced above.

research. Selective or purposeful sampling in contrast refers to a strategy in which cases are selected according to characteristics defined before getting in contact with the field. These characteristics are determined by theoretical assumptions and previous knowledge of the field (Kelle and Kluge 2010: 50). The sampling strategy followed by this study falls into the category of selective or purposeful sampling as characteristics for case selection are given by the underlying theoretical assumptions.

Patton (1990: 169) defines qualitative research as a tradition relying “on relatively small samples, even single cases ($n=1$), selected *purposefully*”. He emphasizes that “[t]he logic and power of [such] purposeful sampling lies in selecting *information-rich cases* for study in depth”, defining such cases as “those from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the research”. He distinguishes 16 types of purposeful sampling, listed in the following table.

Type	Purpose
1. Extreme or deviant case sampling	Learning from highly unusual manifestations of the phenomenon of interest, such as outstanding successes/notable failures, top of class/dropouts, exotic events, crises.
2. Intensity sampling	Information-rich cases that manifest the phenomenon intensely, but not extremely, such as good students/poor students, above average/below average.
3. Maximum variation sampling – purposefully picking a wide range of variation on dimensions of interest	Documents unique or diverse variations that have emerged in adapting to different conditions. Identifies important common patterns that cut across variations.
4. Homogenous sampling	Focuses, reduces variation, simplifies analysis; facilitates group interviewing.
5. Typical case sampling	Illustrates or highlights what is typical, normal, average.
6. Stratified purposeful sampling	Illustrates characteristics of particular subgroups of interest; facilitates comparisons.
7. Critical case sampling	Permits logical generalization and maximum application of information to other cases because if it is true of this one case it is likely to be true of all other cases.
8. Snowball or chain sampling	Identifies cases of interest from people who know people who know people who know what cases are information rich, that is, good examples for study, good interview subjects.

Type	Purpose
9. Criterion sampling	Picking all cases that meet some criterion, such as all children abused in a treatment facility. Quality assurance.
10. Theory-based or operation construct sampling	Finding manifestations of a theoretical construct of interest so as to elaborate and examine the construct.
11. Confirming and disconfirming cases	Elaborating and deepening initial analysis, seeking exceptions, testing variation.
12. Opportunistic sampling	Following new leads during fieldwork, taking advantage of the unexpected, flexibility.
13. Random purposeful sampling (still small sample size)	Adds credibility to sample when potential purposeful sample is larger than one can handle. Reduces judgement within a purposeful category. (Not for generalizations or representativeness).
14. Sampling politically important cases	Attracts attention to the study (or avoids attracting undesired attention by purposefully eliminating from the sample politically sensitive cases).
15. Convenience sampling	Saves time, money, and effort. Poorest rational; lowest credibility. Yields information-poor cases.
16. Combination or mixed purposeful sampling	Triangulation, flexibility, meets multiple interests and needs.

Table 5. Patton 1990: 182–183. Sampling Strategies.

In order to maximize the potential for conclusions on general mobilization processes, this study adopts a combination of “critical case” and “typical case” sampling (numbers 7 and 5 in the list above). First, the case of the Japanese anti-nuclear movement was chosen because the disruptive event of the March 2011 nuclear accident in Fukushima was the trigger for a large-scale movement mobilization process comparable only to mobilizations after other nuclear accidents, large-scale environmental disasters, or radical social change (cf. sections 1.2.4 and 1.2.5). The mobilization of the Japanese anti-nuclear movement thus represents a critical sample for a mobilization process triggered by a disruptive event.

Further sampling of networks within the anti-nuclear movement was based on “typical case” sampling: to enhance explanatory power, two typical cases of anti-nuclear movement networks in the form of more or less formal coalitions were selected, allowing for a comparative analysis. The selection process was guided by the theoretically established premise

of explaining mobilization processes by looking at the meso level of a social movement, analyzing the changes of network patterns of the social movement organizations that are the units of analysis. The critical comparison of two cases of network mobilization allows for the generation of coherent categories, thereby further enhancing the potential explanatory power of the study (Kelle and Kluge 2010: 110–111).

3.1.2 NETWORK BOUNDARIES

Another important question for the sampling of networks as case studies is how to define the boundaries of the networks under examination. In general, social network researchers distinguish between nominalist and realist strategies for boundary definition. In the nominalist tradition, boundaries are imposed by the researcher, who “identifies a set of criteria defining membership in a given network, selects the nodes on this basis, and then proceeds to look at the interaction between those nodes” (Diani 2002: 176). The realist approach on the other hand defines boundaries based on the perceptions and identity of the actors themselves, and other actors are “included or excluded to the extent that the others judge them to be relevant” (Knoke and Yang 2008: 15).

The network boundaries of the two cases under study have been defined in accordance with the nominalist approach of boundary definition. The meso level actors of both networks are members of the more or less formal coalitional networks under examination, and the names of their organizations are either listed on membership lists and/or they have participated in the same events organized together with member organizations (cf. sections 3.1.2, 4.2.2 and 5.2.2).

Delineating movement network boundaries along the lines defined by coalition memberships and event co-participation has the advantage of offering clear network boundaries in the face of the otherwise difficult palpability of social movement phenomena. Moreover, the emergence of coalitional networks is a central process in movement mobilization (cf. section 2.2.4). Thus, taking coalitional networks as sample cases can help us find a clearer trail through the complex jungle of movement networks and their dynamics in mobilization processes.

3.1.3 FIELD SITE

Choosing an appropriate site for field work is another important task when setting up a research design. For my field work between September 2013 and May 2014, I chose Tōkyō as the primary field site because it is the political and economic center of Japan; the concentration of social

movement organizations is highest in this huge metropolitan area. For any actor in the political arena who aims to influence the policy-making process, geographical closeness to the center of political power is an important factor (Hanibuchi 2005: 482–483).

However, the nuclear accident happened in Fukushima prefecture⁷¹ and the impact on the population there is highest, so I paid special attention to connections between groups based in Tōkyō and groups in Fukushima, as well as the tactics of groups in Fukushima to influence policy-making in Tōkyō. Consequently, I also conducted an interview with a representative of a group based in Kōriyama city, Fukushima prefecture. Moreover, during field work, I recognized that the Kansai region⁷², especially the cities of Ōsaka and Kyōto, are also a center of anti-nuclear movement activity and that some of these groups share ties with groups in Tōkyō and frequently participate in advocacy activities there. I thus conducted interviews with two groups from the Kansai area as well. I also participated in a demonstration in Ehime prefecture⁷³, which was jointly organized by local and Tōkyō-based groups. This approach allowed me to get an impression of the anti-nuclear movement networks that extend all over the country.

3.1.4 SAMPLING PROCESS

In order to get a feeling for the movement environment in Tōkyō and to get in contact with movement groups, I began my field work by participating in a broad range of events which were publicly posted on various websites. Such websites included those of organizations I had previously known through literature review but also websites I discovered by googling terms such as “*datsu genpatsu*” (nuclear phase-out), “*han genpatsu*” (anti-nuclear), “*ibento*” (event), or “*demo*” (demonstration). Screening event postings, I recognized that besides demonstrations, a huge number of symposia and study groups were also being held (cf. section 1.2.3).

While most demonstrations in Tōkyō were organized either by MCAN (Tōkyō Metropolitan Coalition Against Nukes) or Sayōnara Genpatsu (cf. section 1.2.4), symposia and other less confrontational actions often named a number of organizations as organizers (cf. section 1.2.5). MCAN and Sayōnara Genpatsu are both associations of a number of organizations. MCAN was founded after the Fukushima accident and since then

⁷¹ Fukushima prefecture is located at about 240 km north of Tōkyō.

⁷² Name for the region surrounding the cities of Kyōto and Ōsaka in western Japan, the second largest economic center after Tōkyō.

⁷³ Prefecture located on Shikoku Island, southern Japan.

has organized the widely-known Friday demonstrations in front of the Prime Minister's office. Sayōnara Genpatsu is led by Gensuikin, one of the oldest anti-nuclear movement organizations in Japan, which is in essence an association of labor unions. This network however also integrates other groups, particularly from leftist backgrounds, and boasts a number of famous movement activists or participants such as the writer and Nobel Prize winner Ōe Kenzaburō.

During the first months of field work, I recognized that MCAN as well as Gensuikin were also members of another, larger but action-wise less visible network by the name of e-shift. This coalition-like network organization has the goal of pushing change in energy policy by promoting alternative energy, mainly by means of advocacy-oriented activities. Around the same time, I also became aware of the fact that many organizations – some of which could account for meso level networks or coalitions themselves – and which conducted advocacy-oriented events mainly on the issue of radiation and evacuation were equally organized within a larger coalitional network: the Shienhō Shimin Kaigi (SHSK). Further research showed that some individual organizations were members in both networks.⁷⁴ e-shift and SHSK are thus two intersecting meso level movement networks in the form of more or less formal coalitions having differing action profiles according to their main issues of concern⁷⁵ (common projects), even though both of them belong to the broader anti-nuclear movement.

Besides e-shift and SHSK, MCAN and Sayōnara Genpatsu, many other meso level organizational networking initiatives were launched or intensified their cooperation after the nuclear disaster in Fukushima. These include national networks of groups to stop the recommissioning of nuclear reactors, networks of groups engaging in lawsuits against nuclear reactors, networks of women's groups against nuclear power, consumer organization networks, networks of concerned mothers' groups, networks of groups to organize vacations for children from affected areas in less affected areas, networks of groups engaging in citizen power stations, and many more. Among those I encountered more intensively during field work are the Citizen's Commission on Nuclear Energy (CCNE), the People's Power Network (Shimin Denryoku Renraku

⁷⁴ This confirms the theoretical assumption that social movements can be described as 'networks of networks of networks' but also that movements' organizational networks (or communities) are often patterned according to the issues they address (cf. section 2).

⁷⁵ As indicated in section 1.2.3, the two issue clusters the sampled coalitional networks are engaged in have developed after 3.11.

Kai), the National Parents Network to Protect our Children from Radiation (Kodomotachi o Hōshanō kara Mamoru Zenkoku Nettowāku; Kodomo Zenkoku for short), and the 311 Ukeire Zenkoku Kyōgikai (National Conference for 311 Hosting) (cf. sections 1.2.4 and 1.2.5).

The Citizen's Commission on Nuclear Energy was launched by the Takagi Fund for Citizen Science in 2013 after receiving an anonymous donation of a significant amount that stipulated its use for a long-term anti-nuclear project. The Takagi Fund invited a large number of specialists with either an academic or an activist background to write a detailed report on how to phase out nuclear power in Japan. This group of activists aims to provide a citizen alternative to the government-led Nuclear Regulatory Agency (Genshiryoku Kisei Linkai), which has been roundly criticized for its mishandling of the Fukushima crisis. The report, titled "Road to a Zero-Nuclear Society: A Citizens' Roadmap for a Nuclear Phase-out" was published in April 2014 (Genshiryoku Shimin Linkai 2014). Although this network of experts involves a number of representatives from organizations also engaged in e-shift and SHSK, they contributed to the CCNE project as individuals rather than as representatives of their organizations. It is thus a network of individuals rather than a network of organizations. Wiemann (2016) provides a detailed analysis of how this network and its report contributed to the mobilization process by involving specialists as well as various people on the ground from all over the country.

The People's Power Network was founded in February 2014 as a network of citizens' groups who either already run a citizen renewable energy power station or intend to do so. The goal of this network is two-fold: the first reason for them to come together is to share technical know-how about how to run such power stations, as well as knowledge about the relevant laws and regulations. The second purpose is to engage in a policy dialogue with parliamentarians in order to improve regulations (Shimin Denryoku Renraku Kai 2016). The Kodomo Zenkoku Network on the other hand is a network of mothers' or parents' organizations which were founded all over the country after 3.11, and who engage in questions concerning the safety of children from radiation. The 311 Ukeire Zenkoku Network is a network of organizations that offer recuperation stays for children from areas with high radiation levels. Although representing meso level networks themselves, the People's Power Network, Kodomo Zenkoku, and Ukeire Zenkoku are closely connected with either e-shift or SHSK. Considering the content of e-shift's publications, it seems reasonable to conclude that the ideas promoted by e-shift are very much reflected in the power station initiative or may have helped mobilizing citizen's

groups to found renewable energy power stations and connect with others. Kodomo Zenkoku and 311 Ukeire Zenkoku are both members of SHSK, where they work closely with lawyer's groups and groups representing evacuees, thereby influencing each others' activities.

Thus, e-shift and SHSK unite organizations and even other coalitional networks from various backgrounds. This fact leads to the assumption that by representing such a diverse and numerous organizational populations, the two coalitional networks are influential actors in the policy-making process. Furthermore, since e-shift and SHSK are well-versed in connecting networks to networks, i. e. meso level organization, they represent typical cases for meso level mobilization, especially in terms of networks performing advocacy-oriented action.

Once I decided to concentrate the analysis on the coalitional networks e-shift and SHSK, I participated mainly in events in which their member organizations were involved and began to ask representatives of member organizations present at such events for interviews. I conducted interviews, then, primarily with representatives of groups central to the activities of the two networks in order to get at their perceptions of the relational structures in which they are embedded. During the interviews I became aware that both networks hold regular internal meetings in which they discuss and study issues and decide on actions to be taken. I thus asked for permission to participate in these meetings and in both cases, I was welcome. Section 3.3 gives a detailed description of the data material gathered by this procedure.

3.1.5 RELATIONS OF THE RESEARCHER TO THE FIELD

Access to the field and getting in contact with representatives of movement organizations was easy. In most cases, I contacted them after the events in which I participated, introduced myself and my research project briefly and asked them if they were available for interviews.

The majority of movement organization representatives in the field seemed used to presenting themselves and their goals in public; they were comfortable giving interviews, also to foreigners. While many of them first wanted to refer me to the two or three organizations in the field with English-speaking staff, upon understanding that the interview would be conducted in Japanese they consented to talking with me. A factor which often attracted their curiosity was my German nationality. For many of them, the German anti-nuclear movement represents an interesting role model and I was frequently whether I knew this or that German organization or activist.

However, there was a slight difference between e-shift and SHSK in the contact to network members. The contact to e-shift members was always very friendly and through my participation in their internal meetings I attracted a great deal of interest in my research. At the beginning of my participant observation, I placed myself at a distance from their round table but once they realized this, I was asked to sit with them and was repeatedly asked to introduce myself and my project, especially when new member organizations joined the meeting for the first time. After getting used to my presence at their meetings, they also invited me to the informal meals they usually shared after the sessions. Sharing a meal provided an opportunity for informal conversation and I felt like a trusted, valued partner for discussion (especially for outside views on their activity as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the anti-nuclear movement as a whole); they showed much interest in my research. For me, being welcomed this way was an opportunity to gain deeper insights into the way members got along with each other, especially when different or conflicting issues were discussed.

While the contact to SHSK members was generally friendly, too, I had the impression that they were not too happy about my participant observation of their meetings. Once I was declined participation in a meeting which was, according to them, "not open to the public". This difference could be due to the fact that SHSK often deals with the personal fate of people directly affected by radiation and/or evacuation; representatives are sensitive to protecting the interests of these people. e-shift on the other hand is more focused on energy policy, which is less related to personal issues but has a more ideational component.

Conscious of the fact that some organizations deal with sensitive issues, I promised my interview partners to keep their names anonymous. However, publicly available data on network members is cited the way it is presented on websites and in publications because these contain information which the organizations considered safe and worth sharing with the public.

3.2 DATA MATERIAL

The research design as introduced in the previous section 3.2 has led to the acquisition of various types of data: field notes, interview transcripts, and documentary data. In the following sections I present the techniques I used for the acquisition of such data (participant observation, qualitative semi-structured interviews, and the gathering of movement publications) in conjunction with my concrete experiences while in the field.

3.2.1 PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION

The goal of participant observation is “to better understand the research setting, its participants, and their behavior” (Glesne 2011: 66). For the purpose of this study, data gathered by participant observation of movement events and network meetings served to get an overview and a feeling for the movement environment, to choose appropriate network case studies; it also served as basis for the acquisition of interview partners. Participant observation allowed me to grasp predominant movement discourses and ideological points of disagreement among movement organizations or prominent activists and the ways these influence their relations.

Glesne (2011: 64) points out that the term ‘participant observation’ is problematic because it urges “engagement and distance, involvement and detachment” at the same time. This can create tensions between the researcher and the field. She states that “[a]s a researcher, your observer stance can make you and others feel as though you are a spy of sorts, while your participant stance can indicate a closeness or an involvement that may be suspect because of your role as a researcher (and observer)”. Thus, participant observation ranges “across a continuum from mostly observation to mostly participation”, according to the degree of interaction with the field. Glesne (2011: 64–65) fixes four roles or positions along this continuum: observer – observer as participant – participant as observer – full participant. If a researcher remains an ‘observer’, he or she has no to little interaction with people in the field; in the case of an ‘observer as participant’ the researcher “remains primarily an observer but has some interaction with study participants”. A ‘participant as observer’ on the other hand interacts intensely with the study subjects and may take over intermediary or even advocating roles. A fully participating researcher then is “simultaneously a functioning member of the community undergoing investigation and an investigator”. Considering my sampling strategy and relations to the field as described in sections 3.2.4 and 3.2.5, most of the time, my role in the field was one of an ‘observer as participant’. This meant I was less in danger of losing “the eye of the uninvolved outsider” while at the same time having opportunities to learn directly from exchanges with the people studied.

During the process of participant observation, I constantly kept a field book for taking notes. In many situations, this was absolutely natural, as most other participants in advocacy and study-related events were also taking personal notes. This way I jotted down phrases and key words on what was happening, my impressions, and – as my experience grew – analytical thoughts that came to mind while in the field. In the case of

more action-oriented events such as demonstrations, I often took some notes in the train on my way back home. From these phrases and key words, I subsequently wrote more detailed field notes the next day and entered them into the MAXQDA text retrieving software, preparing them for qualitative content analysis. The following two sub-sections give an overview of the collective events and coalitional network meetings I attended.

3.2.1.1 Public Movement Events

During field work I participated in a total of 37 public movement events. Most of the events I observed (30 in total) fall into the category of publicly less visible movement actions such as symposia, film screenings, talks, conferences, study groups, inner-parliament assemblies, question-and-answer sessions, law suits, seminars, forums, and a foundation meeting. The remaining seven events, which can be categorized as more visible, were demonstrations, most anti-nuclear, except for some against the new Secrecy Law which passed the Diet in December 2013 (cf. section 4.1.2). The mobilizations against the Secrecy Law happened with tremendous support from anti-nuclear groups, but also groups from a peace or environmental movement background, labor unions, as well as various lawyer associations and alternative media. The protests were also supported by a number of parliamentarians mainly from the oppositional parties such as the DPJ, SDP, and JCP.⁷⁶ Participating in these demonstrations provided an impression of the embeddedness of the anti-nuclear movement in networks outside their own movement community.

My choice of events to participate in was generally guided by the question of which topics or issues were most widely discussed among movement actors at that point in time and which upcoming events were of most interest to them. Often towards the end of an event, an upcoming one was introduced along with a call for participation. Many of the public events I attended were also discussed or even planned during the network-coalition meetings I was allowed to observe. Additionally, I participated in two events that could be counted as government-guided or under the umbrella of government discourse. These were the symposium by the Mansfield Foundation on lessons learned from the Fukushima accident, where many representatives from the US-American and the Japanese nuclear industry as well as government bureaucrats were

⁷⁶ Democratic Party of Japan (Minshutō) which in 2016 after merging with the Japan Innovation Party (Ishin no Tō) and the Vision of Reform Assembly (Kai-kaku Kesshū no Kai) changed its name to Democratic Party (Minshintō), Social Democratic Party (Shamintō), and Japanese Communist Party (Kyōsantō).

present. The other was a symposium by the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation (RJIF) on an assessment of the Fukushima crisis that was critical of the DPJ; the political party in power at the time of the accident.⁷⁷ RJIF is chaired by Funabashi Yōichi, who was also involved in one of four investigations into the Fukushima nuclear crisis.⁷⁸ By participating in such oppositional movement events and more confrontational yet less visible forms of action such as inner-parliament assemblies, question-and-answer sessions, and lawsuits, I got an impression of the discourse and the argumentative structures movement actors deploy during their events.

Some of the most frequently discussed issues among the observed movement actors during my fieldwork were:

- the 'real' costs of nuclear power,
- the clarification of how radiation impacts flora and fauna and the human body,
- the critical evaluation of how the Fukushima accident is interpreted and evaluated at different international agencies (IAEA⁷⁹, UNSCEAR⁸⁰, United Nations Human Rights Council, ICRP⁸¹, etc.),
- how to realize an economy-friendly nuclear phase-out,
- the right to evacuation and housing problems of victims,
- the Secrecy Law and its impact on nuclear reporting,
- comparisons between victims' laws in the countries surrounding Chernobyl and the 'boneless' Nuclear Victims Support Law in Japan,
- nuclear phase-out policies in countries around the world (frequent examples were Sweden and Germany, and Finland for the treatment of nuclear waste),
- how to engage in an energy shift from below through citizen initiatives,
- how to get new and younger people involved in movement issues,

⁷⁷ Kan Naoto, Prime Minister at the time of the Fukushima nuclear accident in March 2011 is a DPJ party member.

⁷⁸ Lukner and Sakaki (2013) provide an analysis of four investigations into the Fukushima nuclear accident. The first investigative commission was initiated in May 2011 by the Cabinet of then-Prime minister Kan Naoto; the second was appointed by the Japanese Diet in December 2011. The third was launched as a private commission initiated by the above-mentioned Funabashi Yōichi (chairman of RJIF) in September 2011, and the fourth investigation was undertaken by TEPCO itself starting in June 2011. The authors point out that "while biases can be detected to some extent, the four reports overall agree in their identification of fundamental issues and crucial problems".

⁷⁹ International Atomic Energy Agency.

⁸⁰ United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation.

⁸¹ International Commission on Radiological Protection.

- the issues of nuclear phase-out and climate change,
- the developing taboo in the Fukushima region of talking about fear of radiation,
- the unreasonable and insufficient evacuation plans for the areas around nuclear plants in the case of a major accident,
- the incorrect calculations by the responsible agencies of earthquake risks in nuclear plant areas,
- the problem of what to do with the contaminated water at the Fukushima plant and the leaking water containers,
- the insufficient information policy of the responsible agencies, and many more.

3.2.1.2 Coalitional Network Meetings

During my fieldwork between September 2013 and May 2014, e-shift's regular meetings took place once a month. Through the interviews, however, I learned that when e-shift started, and during most of 2012, meetings were held twice a month. I was able to observe six internal e-shift meetings in total between December 2013 and May 2014. As participants became used to my presence, I was invited along to their usual meal after the meetings in April and May 2014.

SHSK's regular meetings during the same period (September 2013 to May 2014) took place every two months. I was permitted to participate in their November 2013 meeting; however the meeting was held in Sapporo city, Hokkaidō prefecture⁸² and I was unable to travel from Tōkyō to Hokkaidō on that date. Their next meeting was held in January 2014, but when I asked for permission to participate, it was declined for the reason that this meeting was "not open to the public" and for "steering committee members only". They had regular meetings in February and April 2014 in which I participated; I thus observed a total of two SHSK meetings, and only those open to the public.

After getting in contact with Gensuikin, I learned that Sayōnara Genpatsu also held regular meetings and showing interest in it, my interview partner invited me to observe their March 2014 meeting. This experience served as an interesting opportunity for comparing the styles of such meetings. Because Gensuikin and most other members of the network are movement organizations with a long history, their meeting contributed to my impression that cooperation in networks in the form of regular meetings as an organizational platform is something movement actors are familiar with and which serve as a template for new network mobilizations.

⁸² The most northern prefecture of Japan, the prefecture's capital Sapporo city is located over 800 km from Tōkyō.

The agenda of these meetings was usually predetermined and distributed to all members before the meeting by one of the key or leading actors in the network. In the case of e-shift, members received the meeting agenda by email through the mailing list; in the case of SHSK the schedule was also posted on their website. The agenda often included presentations by member organizations on new developments regarding other topics of interest. During the meetings, there was usually time to share experiences, knowledge, and know-how as well as for discussions of new developments and exchange of opinions on what to do next. Very often, all present members gave a short account of their latest actions and invited other members to events they were organizing individually or in cooperation with others. Once the need for action was confirmed, the members brainstormed on what kind of event to organize, when, where, whom to invite as speakers, and discussed the division of tasks to realize the event.

My participant observation of the coalitional network meetings was guided by observations concerning the number of members present; the atmosphere; the workflow; the main issues discussed; points of conflict and agreement among the members; their intercourse and ways of dealing with conflict – in other words everything that indicates the nature of the relations among them – and finally, self-positioning in the broader movement field and relations to organizations or governmental entities outside the coalitional networks.

Appendix I lists the movement events in which I participated, indicating the type of event, date and location, as well as the theme of the event and the main organizing SMOs. In the text, references to field notes taken at public movement events are coded with the abbreviation EFN for Event Field Note and a number. Field notes taken at network meetings are coded as MFN for Meeting Field Note, plus a number according to the list in Appendix II, which also indicates the name of the network, the date, location, and the type of network meeting attended.

3.2.2 QUALITATIVE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS

For the interviews with representatives of key organizations in the networks, I chose to employ a semi-structured interview technique. Compared to structured interviewing, which relies on a pre-established questionnaire with limited possibilities for response, semi-structured interviewing means to rely on “an *interview guide* that includes a consistent set of questions or topics, but the interviewer is allowed more flexibility to digress and to probe based on interactions during the interview” (Blee and Taylor 2002: 92). Blee and Taylor (2002: 93) also note that in the field of movement studies “semi-structured interviewing is a

common methodological tool, especially useful in studies where the goals are exploration, discovery, and interpretation of complex social events and processes when combined with participant observation and/or documentary methods". Besides this, semi-structured interviewing can also be used as "a streamlined means of obtaining the rich, detailed data typically generated through field research without committing the investigator to prolonged involvement in the lives and activities of social movements" as well as "a way of investigating research questions or propositions derived from social movement theory". As the goal of this study is to explore social movement network mobilization processes based on a theoretically developed analytical model, and as the time for fieldwork was limited to a period of nine months, semi-structured interviewing was the best method to get rich data on meso level movement actors' perceptions of the relations in which they are embedded.

As already indicated above, the sampling strategy for interview partners was to approach representatives of key organizations in the respective networks and other key informants of the broader movement environment who showed a degree of involvement in the studied networks (Blee and Taylor 2002: 105). To acquire interview partners, I mostly approached key SMO representatives at movement events and introduced myself and my research project. This was usually followed by an exchange of name cards; I then contacted the representatives a day or two after the event and arranged for interview dates. In most cases, the informants were happy to arrange for interviews, except for two cases in which I did not receive a response to my emails. The interviews were usually conducted either in the offices of the organizations or at a café easy for them to reach. In a few cases, such as for the two interviews with expert-activists, I was introduced by a supervising and an advising professor. In the case of three interviews with SMO representatives, I was introduced by other SMO representatives. The interview with one central movement organization was arranged after a cold call by email contact. This way, I acquired 25 interviews in total. These include 20 interviews with SMO representatives, two interviews with expert-activists, two with citizen media activists, and one interview with a politician. Appendix III is based on the model provided by Bleich and Pekkanen (2013) and provides an overview of the interview partners, indicating their main fields of action; the location of the interview; the date and way in which the interview was conducted; how contact was made; the language used; interview length; and data format for analysis. In the text, SMO representatives are cited with the abbreviation SR, expert-activists with EA, citizen media activists as CM, and the politician as P. These abbreviations are complemented by a number that refers to each particular interview.

The interviewed SMO representatives, which represent the largest group of interview partners, were either the leaders of their respective organizations or the ones responsible for the network project (in the case of larger multiple-issue SMOs). The expert-activists are both academics but are also engaged in anti-nuclear movement contexts. The media activists are both active in the alternative media scene but are also both engaged in teaching at universities. They have dealt extensively with the nuclear issue, and are involved in the studied coalitional networks.

All except for one interview was recorded with permission of the interview partners and later transcribed in accordance with the rules for simple transcription suggested by Kuckartz (2012: 136–137), i. e. focusing more on the content of the utterances than on catching linguistic particularities of the interview partners. After many interviews I wrote additional notes summarizing my impressions of the interviews and the content of conversations that took place after the recorder was turned off. The transcripts and notes were then prepared for qualitative content analysis and fed into the MAXQDA software, introduced in detail in section 3.4.2.1. The majority of interviews (21) were conducted in Japanese; the remaining four interviews were conducted in English.⁸³ The interviews took between 27 and 118 minutes; the total length of voice material amounts to 1515 minutes or 25 and a half hours. The average interview thus lasted about an hour.

The interview guide included three big question blocks: about the organization itself, their cooperation with other organizations, and the organization's reaction to the Fukushima accident (see Appendix IV). The questions of course varied according to whether the foundation date of the organization was before or after the Fukushima accident, and in response to the course of the interview itself. When questioning individuals such as expert-activists, media-activists, and politicians, I asked them mainly about their connections to the movement and certain organizations in particular, their evaluation of movement networks and projects, as well as changes in the movement landscape after 3.11.

Of course, concentrating meso level research on conversations with individual representatives of movement organizations involves the risk of shedding light only on their individual perceptions of their organization's role in the movement field and overlooking the fact that an organization is composed of a number of people acting together. This is a problem encountered by any research on the meso level of the social strata, and must be taken into account when analyzing the content of the

⁸³ Citations from interviews conducted in English language reflect the original wording and may thus contain language inaccuracies.

interviews with SMO representatives. Every individual is simultaneously involved in many personal networks; these networks then cluster in groups, and such clusters then cluster again in bigger groups (network multiplexity, cf. section 2.6). The clusters of these groups of course differ from each individual's point of view. Even so, representatives must have in mind to a certain degree the impression their actions make on the name of the group they are acting for. As such, their perceptions as individuals can also be considered as images of meso level networks.

3.2.3 DOCUMENTARY DATA

The documentary data that is central to my analysis of the case studies' action profiles and the realist-structural network analysis, and which at many points complements data provided by other sources, stems from official websites of movement organizations; the actors' publications of books, booklets, and magazines; and pamphlets and other information material distributed at movement events.

Of particular importance for the structural network analysis was the information on movement events and the organizing and supporting organizations of these events on the two case studies' websites. The SHSK and e-shift websites also provided information on the common projects and action repertoires of the case studies. The websites of the single member organizations provided an important source for understanding their ideological backgrounds, and from there, conclusions could be drawn about the composition of the networks under study.

A major source for grasping the ideas and future projects, as well as the knowledge and know-how circulating in the networks (particularly in e-shift but also in SHSK), is the e-shift series *Enerugī Shirīzu* (Energy Series) published in cooperation with the publisher Gōdō Shuppan. By summer 2016, e-shift had published six booklets in this series concerning issues ranging from how to phase out nuclear power without hurting the country's economy, to victim-related issues. Appendix V contains a detailed description of the booklets' arguments and ideological contents. Documentary data is cited directly in the text.

3.3 DATA ANALYSIS

The data acquired through the procedure introduced in the previous section was evaluated using a mixed-method approach (applying both quantitative and qualitative methods). The structural network analysis of the two chosen networks is based on affiliation networks and network

centrality; qualitative content analysis is used to understand the communically constructed quality and dynamics of network relations.

Kuckartz (2012: 14–16) points to the fluidity between qualitative and quantitative data analysis by referring to four types of data analysis that actually represent points on a continuum between qualitative and quantitative analysis. The first point on the continuum is qualitative-qualitative analysis which includes interpretative text analysis, hermeneutics, and grounded theory. The second category is quantitative-qualitative and describes the search for meanings of quantitative data, while the third is qualitative-quantitative, favoring the transformation of words into numbers, classical content analysis, word frequency and more. The fourth and final category is quantitative-quantitative and represents the statistical and mathematical analysis of numerical data. According to this categorization, the structural network analysis applied in this study is qualitative-quantitative because the numbers are provided by textual data from websites. These numbers are then further analyzed by applying mathematical formulae, thus moving the analysis to the quantitative-quantitative category of the continuum. The interpretation of this now visualized data falls into the quantitative-qualitative category because I deduce the meaning of the data. Finally, the qualitative content analysis of my interview data represents a qualitative-qualitative procedure.

3.3.1 STRUCTURAL NETWORK ANALYSIS AND VISUALIZATION

The following section 3.3.1.1 introduces background knowledge on affiliation networks which correlate actors and events and based on event co-participation reconstruct network relations. From these relational data, it is possible to apply network centrality measures such as eigenvector centrality, which calculates central positions and thereby provides information on the most influential actors in a given network. Section 3.3.1.2 presents the network analytical tools UCINET and NETDRAW developed by Borgatti et al. (2002), which contribute to producing affiliation matrices and images of the networks under study.

3.3.1.1 *Affiliation Networks and Network Centrality*

Affiliation networks are “two-mode networks, consisting of a set of actors and a set of events”. They “describe collections of actors rather than simply ties between pairs of actors” and they are characterized by the fact that “[c]onnections among members of one of the modes are based on linkages established through the second mode” (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 291). Thus, they represent “two-mode, non-dyadic network[s]” (Faust 1997: 157). The correlation of actors and events is based on the

assumption that participation of certain actors in the same event represents on the one hand an opportunity for social ties to develop, facilitating the flow of information and ideas between the actors. On the other hand co-affiliation to the same event can be understood as the result of having a tie. By defining co-affiliation or participation in the same event as a tie, it becomes possible to draw conclusions on the relational structure of the actors. This is done by counting the number of shared events of all actors in the network (Borgatti and Halgin 2011a: 417–420). Based on the number of shared events, it is possible to deduce the centrality of actors in the network.⁸⁴

Measuring the centrality of actors in a network can give information about the “‘importance’ or ‘visibility’ of actors within a network” (Faust 1997: 160). In interorganizational networks, the centrality of organizations can provide clues on whether network patterns show an asymmetric or a balanced interdependence hinting at the overall robustness of a network as a whole (Baldassarri and Diani 2007) (cf. section 2.7.3).

The two indices that have been widely used to measure centrality in affiliation networks are degree and eigenvector centrality. The index for degree centrality measures centrality according to the level of activity, expressed in the number of contacts possessed by the units of analysis. This measurement, however, does not take into account “the centrality of the actors [...] to which an actor [...] is adjacent”. The problem is that “two actors may be adjacent to the same number of others, but an actor is more central if it has ties to actors that themselves are central” (Faust 1997: 168–169). Eigenvector centrality integrates the centrality of adjacent actors into its index. Therefore eigenvector centrality has been considered as expressing the ability of actors to influence others in the network, by defining their status or relative power position within the network (Faust 1997: 166–172). I apply eigenvector centrality to my two case studies in order to be able to estimate the interdependence and relative power positions of organizations in their networks.

The data on events and their participating organizations have been retrieved from the websites of the two case studies. In the case of e-shift, event data from between April 26, 2011 and April 28, 2015 (5 years) has been analyzed. Event data of SHSK covers the period between June 21, 2012 and June 21, 2015 (4 years). This is due to the fact that e-shift was

⁸⁴ Faust (1997) points out that centrality in affiliation networks should be measured for actors as well as for events simultaneously. However, as the focus of this study is to capture movement actors’ networks, the centrality of events is not a priority. The centrality measure applied here is therefore based on the one-mode matrix of event co-participation.

founded in April 2011 while SHSK came into being in June 2012. These data have been fed into an Excel sheet providing for an actor-event matrix. This matrix was then transferred into the network analytical tool UCINET, and from there to the network visualizing tool NETDRAW (details in the next section). UCINET calculates eigenvector centrality using Philip Bonacich's approach (Analytic Technologies 2016). Accounts of this mathematical approach can be found in Bonacich (1972a, 1972b, 1991, 2007) and Faust (1997).

The event postings on the networks' websites often distinguish various forms of participation or ways of contributing to the event. Interestingly, the way in which events are presented does not differ significantly between e-shift and SHSK. On both websites, some organizations are classified as 'hosts' (*shusai*), others as 'cooperators' (*kyōryoku*), 'contact persons for information on the event' (*otoiawase, renrakusaki*), 'collaborators' (*kyōsai*), 'caller for participation' (*yobikake*), and 'presenters' or 'speakers' (*supikā*). To provide the most comprehensive picture of the network relations enacted by co-participation in events, I regard all named and listed organizations as 'actively involved actors' and integrate them into the matrix. The result is an image that shows not only cooperative actors such as parliamentarians, evacuees, or experts in various issue fields, but also non-cooperative actors such as governmental agencies or local administrations. Individual evacuees or experts (predominantly university professors, physicians, or lawyers) are in most cases presenters on the issue at the focus of the event while the event itself is either directed towards governmental agencies in a confrontational manner, or towards the citizen public, providing information and points for discussion. Parliamentarians often either support the event (especially if it takes place in Diet buildings) and/or contribute to it as speakers.

The network images provided by such event-actor matrices do not include all organizations named as members on the websites of the networks. This is because many of them do not appear as 'actively involved actors' in the events. While staff and/or members may have participated in the event passively, this is impossible to prove and therefore I exclude such 'passively involved actors'. On the other hand, the matrices do include groups or individuals not belonging to the case studies' formal memberships. This indicates that the movement communities in which the individual organizations are embedded reach beyond the membership of the coalitional networks. Another important point concerning the event data provided by the websites is that the coalitional networks are often listed side by side with their member organizations. In the case of e-shift for example, e-shift may be listed as 'host' or 'cooperator' while member organizations such as FoE or ISEP function as

‘collaborators’ or ‘caller for participation’, or vice versa. The result is that e-shift or SHSK form a central node in the network images. To interpret centrality within the two networks, however, I will focus on results concerning the centrality of the network members.

Consequently, the network images provided by the event-actor matrices show slightly constricted images of network structures for the two coalitional networks. Nevertheless they give a powerful impression of the most visible organizations, their position, and their influence in the networks, and careful conclusions concerning the robustness of the networks can be drawn.

3.3.1.2 UCINET and NETDRAW

To study the affiliation networks of my two case studies, I gathered data on movement events and the participating organizations from their websites and entered them into a Windows Excel Matrix. This matrix was then transferred to UCINET 6 for Windows, which converted the data into a DL format (UCINET reads only this format but allows for conversion from and into Excel or text files). UCINET 6 for Windows is the 2002 version of a network analytical software written and produced by Borgatti et al. The program incorporates a large variety of network techniques developed by “different individuals from different mathematical, methodological, and substantive point[s] of view”, including techniques such as consensus analysis, cluster analysis, scaling, frequencies, core/periphery and centrality measures, and many more. All data in UCINET is described and stored as matrices (Borgatti et al. 2002).

UCINET 6 comes in a package with the network visualizing tool NETDRAW. Network visualizations serve the simple purpose of demonstrating visually what the data analysis reveals, usually in the form of nodes and lines representing the units of analysis and the relations between them. They have been used both in qualitative and quantitative research (Straus 2010). Network visualization tools for computers based on quantitative numerical data have gradually evolved; today they usually include different analytical tools, such as the ability to give nodes different attributes or to apply different centrality measures to a given data set and transform such data into visual symbols (Krempel 2010). NETDRAW is integrated in UCINET and provides analytical techniques for the visualization of such attributes, centrality measures, subgroups, structural holes, and many more (Borgatti 2002). By feeding UCINET DL files into NETDRAW, it is possible to draw network visualizations of affiliations and eigenvector centrality for the two case studies (see section 4.1.2.2 for e-shift and section 4.2.2.2 for SHSK).

3.3.2 QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS

Qualitative content analysis finds itself at the qualitative-qualitative end of the data analysis continuum introduced above, representing a “method for systematically describing the meaning of qualitative data”, which is done by “assigning successive parts of the material to the categories of a coding frame”. The coding frame is “at the heart of the method” because it “contains all those aspects that feature in the description and interpretation [...] of the material”. Qualitative content analysis thus “reduces data, it is systematic, and it is flexible” (Schreier 2014: 170).

Qualitative content analysis reduces the amount of data by allowing the researcher to focus on selected aspects of meaning related to the research question. Also, defining categories in a coding frame means to take text meanings to a higher level of abstraction by relating different text passages to each other which form one category applying to all of them. Above that, the approach is highly systematic because it involves the thorough examination of all the data material relevant to the research question, thereby reducing the danger of looking at the material guided only by the researcher’s expectations. Qualitative content analysis follows a step by step process in which codings are modified. As a result, double coding is necessary which means to go through the data at least twice to test the quality of the established categories. Another important feature of qualitative content analysis is its flexibility, combining “varying portions of concept-driven and data-driven categories within any coding frame”, even while “part of the categories should always be data-driven” to ensure that “the categories in fact match the data”, thereby achieving a high level of validity (Schreier 2014: 170–171).

The idea for qualitative content analysis was developed in the first half of the twentieth century by dissociating from quantitative content analysis, which is based on a purely quantitative description of communicative contents. While quantitative content analysis takes into account the explicitly manifest content of communication (for example in frequency counts of certain expressions), qualitative content analysis embraces the context and therefore the meaning of the communicative content. Over the years, the technique of qualitative content analysis has been further developed by a number of researchers. One of the most prominent representatives of this research tradition in the German-speaking world is Philipp Mayring, who developed a highly systematic procedure for content analysis (Mayring 2000, 2010; Schreier 2014).

Mayring (2010: 605) introduces a ‘model for the procedure of inductive category formation and deductive category application’, which initially involves the precise framing and theoretical justification of the

research question, the selection and characterization of the data material, the determination of the direction of the analysis, and the determination of the units of analysis. The following determination of categories or coding frames can be performed inductively or deductively, combining both approaches if desired. In defining analytical units by induction, categories must be defined first. The next step is the determination of the level of abstraction, which is followed by forming inductive categories. When defining analytical units by deduction, the researcher needs to define categories theoretically and formulate a coding guideline before starting deductive categorization. In both the inductive as well as the deductive case, the next step is a revision of the system of categories. At this point it is possible to run another round of category definition, be it inductive or deductive. This revision or precision of categories is followed by the analysis of the whole data set which needs to be performed twice (double checked) before interpreting the results. Figure 8 shows a simplified version of Mayring's model.

For the qualitative content analysis of this study's field notes and interview transcripts, I followed a deductive-inductive procedure. In a first step, I coded the data for each of my coalitional networks according




Figure 8. Mayring 2010: 605. Simplified Qualitative Content Analysis Model.

to the theoretically established categories of 'network antecedents' and 'networks', in this case text passages referring to relations pre-Fukushima and post-Fukushima. The category of network antecedents contains all text passages dealing with past networks; their relational characteristics; working procedures; issues of contention before Fukushima; all passages referring to the emergence of the two case studies; the reaction of the organizations to the Fukushima event; and the motivations of members to join the networks. The category of 'networks' gathers all text passages concerning argumentative structures; ideas and reasons behind recent activities; working procedures; the atmosphere at meetings; cooperation and conflict; and the actual relational patterns (among each other and to movement actors outside of the networks).

In a second step, these theoretically established categories were sub-categorized inductively according to the themes inherent in the text, while keeping in mind the research goal outlined in the introduction: tracing the mobilization process of the two coalitional networks after the disruptive event of the Fukushima nuclear accident.

3.3.2.1 MAXQDA

Computer software to assist with qualitative data analysis (QDA) such as that used for this study is different from computational tools for quantitative analysis. While tools for quantitative analysis often apply mathematical formulae directly to the data (as can be seen in the network analysis by UCINET and NETDRAW, but also with programs for statistical evaluation such as SPSS etc.), computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) merely facilitates coding of texts, images, or video material through file retrieval. It is still the researcher who codes and categorizes by hand (Flick 2014: 14–15; Gibbs 2014: 277).⁸⁵ Using CAQDAS is "a way of managing the data and the analytic thoughts that are created in the analysis" (Gibbs 2014: 278). Some of the core functions of CAQDAS, according to Kuckartz (2012: 132–164) and Gibbs (2014: 279–280) are:

- import of data files (text, sound, image, video); some QDA software also integrates a tool for direct transcription of interviews (sound files),
- organization of data; possibility for a team to work simultaneously,

⁸⁵ Gibbs (2014: 277–278) points out that even so, CAQDAS has changed "the way in which analysis is done and there is considerable debate about the extent to which the software has affected practice".

- construction, modification, and maintenance of code lists which can be developed either deductively or inductively,
- coding of text passages and their retrieval,
- tools for annotations, memos, or the marking of text passages in order to link analytical ideas to text passages and other analytical ideas.

Besides these basic functions, CAQDAS often also integrates a number of sophisticated quantitative text searches (such as concordance lists or word frequencies), a range of diagrams and charts, as well as visualizing tools.

The MAXQDA software used in this study is professional QDA software provided by VERBI GmbH. The first version was produced in 1989; since then development has continued (VERBI GmbH 2016). The version used for this study is MAXQDA 11, released in 2012 (VERBI GmbH 2012). I chose MAXQDA because it has an easily accessible and manageable interface and is (at least in the German-speaking area) one of the most popular QDA programs.

The following section 4 presents my findings based on the introduced research techniques starting with the action profiles of the two coalitional networks, their current internal and external relational patterns, the process of emergence of the networks, and the latent relational patterns that served as a basis for their emergence (sections 4.1 and 4.2). Section 4.3 relates both networks to each other and interprets the findings against the background of the general movement wave after 3.11.

4 E-SHIFT: NETWORKING FOR NUCLEAR PHASE-OUT AND RENEWABLE ENERGY

e-shift was founded in April 2011 under the leadership of the environmental NPO Friends of the Earth Japan (FoE), which serves as the main administrator. The network-coalition (for definition see section 1.3 and in the following) defines itself as a loose network of civil organizations and engaged individuals working together for the promotion of renewable energy and towards the phase-out of nuclear power in Japan. On the basis of the analytical model introduced in section 2, the following sections present my findings on the action profile of e-shift, both in terms of its joint project and its joint action repertoire; the composition of the network; the relational structures of the network in action; and the quality of its internal and external relations. These findings provide insight into the network-coalition's building process. Finally, I draw some conclusions on latent structures of the energy-related anti-nuclear movement in Japan.

4.1 ACTION PROFILE

This section presents the action profile of the e-shift network-coalition, which is composed of a common project and a joint action repertoire. The common project points to the ideas and goals that justify and structure their activities, while the joint action repertoire describes the conducted event types. In order to analyze the common project and the ideas behind their action, I draw on the six booklets e-shift had published by the time of writing, and in which the network presents the issues they consider key elements for the realization of a nuclear phase-out in Japan. The data for the analysis of the joint action repertoire stems from event postings on e-shift's website, which are complemented by findings gathered from participant observation of e-shift related events (cf. section 3).

4.1.1 COMMON PROJECT

e-shift's goal is to contribute to a nuclear phase-out and a shift towards renewable energy in Japan. Most conclusive on the framings of the issue are the six booklets they published between 2011 and 2016. The booklets contain about 80 to 100 pages each, in which network members outline their thoughts on the key issues that will lead to a nuclear-free Japan.

On the second page of each booklet, e-shift introduces itself and identifies its main project to effect a change in Japan's energy policy towards renewable energy. They point to the Fukushima accident as the trigger for forming a 'network of citizens' who seek to prevent another accident of the same scale by realizing a general policy change (e-shift 2012a: 2, 2012b: 2, 2013a: 2, 2013b: 2, 2014: 2, 2015a: 2):

"We (e-shift = Association for Nuclear Energy Phase-Out and the Realization of a New Energy Policy), got together after 3.11 in order to prevent a situation like the Fukushima nuclear accident ever repeating itself again. We are a network of citizens with the goal to change Japan's energy policy, which has been relying on nuclear power, towards a policy based on safe and sustainable, renewable energy. In addition to individuals, groups such as Kikō Network, the Citizen's Nuclear Information Center (CNIC), WWF Japan, the Institute for Sustainable Energy Policies (ISEP), and FoE Japan are members [of our network]."⁸⁶

Besides giving the reason for their existence, they name explicitly a handful of established organizations with a high degree of professionalization: Kikō Network, CNIC, WWF Japan, ISEP, and FoE – who seem to represent the network-coalition in public. In the following, they describe what they consider the biggest grievance of the Japanese people since the nuclear disaster, and what motivates their action:

"Energy policy does not only concern the government. It concerns all citizens. Although after the Fukushima accident in March 2011, 80 % of the [Japanese] citizens expressed their wish for a 'nuclear power phase-out' (Japan Association for Public Opinion Research 19.06.2011), the government's policy of promoting nuclear power did not change."⁸⁷

⁸⁶ 「私たち「e シフト＝脱原発・新しいエネルギー政策を実現する会」は、3・11の後に、福島第一原発事故のような事態を二度とくり返さないために誕生しました。原子力に依存してきた日本のエネルギー政策を自然エネルギーなどの安全で持続可能なものに転換させることを目指す市民のネットワークです。個人の参加に加えて、気候ネットワーク、原子力資料情報室、WWF ジャパン、環境エネルギー政策研究所、FoE ジャパンなど、さまざまな団体が参加しています。」

⁸⁷ 「エネルギー政策は政府だけのものではありません。すべての市民に関係しています。しかし、2011年3月の福島第一原子力発電所事故の後、8割以上の市民が「脱原発」の意思表示をしているにもかかわらず（日本世論調査会2011年6月19日発表）、政府の原子力推進の方針は変わっていません。」

Here, e-shift points out the huge gap between the will of the people for a nuclear power phase-out (according to an opinion poll of June 2011), and the government's policy of nuclear power promotion. Their citation indicates that the shift in public opinion from pro- to anti- nuclear power (cf. section 1.2) is the main motivation for them to work together and presents a window of opportunity to press for the changes they seek. Advocating for the opinion of the majority of the people legitimates their work. It also becomes clear that they identify the government as their main opponent in the struggle to change energy policy. They continue, defining their identity as the realization of the people's will:

“We, e-shift, propose a new energy policy based on renewable energies. We gather the voices and power of many people; we take action against the government and in doing so we set our sights on the goal of realizing [a new policy]. We want to collect true information and communicate it in an easily understandable way to the people. Together, we want to think about what we can do now to actively pursue that goal.”⁸⁸

e-shift seeks to develop pathways for the realization of a new energy policy in a grassroots, participatory manner by engaging the people in dialogue, assembling their voices and then using the people's arguments to counter the government. To empower citizens to argue competently, they seek to provide citizens with the necessary knowledge. One means to disseminate such easily understandable knowledge is the publication of the booklets, in which they provide important information on the issues of nuclear power and renewable energy in Japan:

“To this aim, in this Gōdō booklet e-shift energy series, we pick up key words concerning nuclear phase-out and the realization of a new energy policy. We hope in this way to help everyone in their research and actions.”⁸⁹

Here, by directly addressing the reader and by offering their know-how to everyone, e-shift appeals to readers, seeking to motivate them to take

⁸⁸ 「私たち e シフトは、自然エネルギーを活用した新しいエネルギー政策をみずから提案し、多くの人の声と力を集め、政治に働きかけ、これを実現させていくという目標を掲げています。正しい情報を集め、わかりやすく人びとに伝え、いま何をしたら良いのか、みなさんと一緒に考え、行動していきたいと思っています。」

⁸⁹ 「そのために、この合同ブックレット・e シフトエネルギーシリーズでは、脱原発と新しいエネルギー政策を実現するためのキーワードを取り上げていきます。みなさまの学習や活動にお役立てください。」

action based on their study of the booklet's contents. Clearly, e-shift sees its role as two-fold: while advocating for an energy shift, they seek to educate and empower citizens and other movement actors in particular.

The six booklets published by e-shift cover the following topics: "Four Reasons to not Recommission Nuclear Power Plants", "The Separation of the Grid from Power Generation for a Nuclear-free Society based on Renewable Energy", "The Liquidation of TEPCO for the Revitalization of the Japanese Economy", "Nuclear Zeronomics: Grand Design of a Nuclear-free Society", "The Nuclear Victims Support Act and the Right to Evacuation", and "The Nuclear Regulatory Agency and the New Regulatory Standards do not Guarantee Nuclear Safety".⁹⁰ The impressively wide range of issues covered by the e-shift booklets, ranging from 'Stop Nuclear Power' over visions on how to realize an energy sustainable society to issues such as the future of TEPCO and questions on how to revitalize the Japanese economy as well as the issue of the rights of nuclear evacuees and problems of the new nuclear regulatory standards shows that the network-coalition draws on broad expertise from many different fields.

In general, the first chapter of the booklets serves to introduce its theme. Appendix V provides a detailed summary of the booklets, based mainly on the arguments given in the first chapters; however, the summaries also include important arguments from the other chapters of the booklets. Their arguments are often supported by examples, background information, and comprehensive and comparative data and graphics (including those from other countries). Finally, they also often include very detailed descriptions of ideas on how to solve the outlined problems.

Generally speaking, e-shift's joint project consists on the one hand of advocacy for a shift in energy-related policies; on the other hand, they support the empowerment of citizens to take the future into their own hands. The main target actors they identify are the government, as well as other parliamentarians; but also bureaucrats in the public agencies (especially the National Regulatory Agency and the Financial Service Agency); the ministries (especially METI⁹¹ and the Ministry of Finances); and other stakeholders in the so-called nuclear village.⁹² Their main addressees,

⁹⁰ 『原発を再稼働させてはいけない4つの理由』、『脱原発と自然エネルギー社会のための発送電分離』、『日本経済再生のための東電解体』、『原発ゼロノミクス・脱原発社会のグランドデザイン』、『「原発事故子ども・被災者支援法」と「非難の権利」』、『原発の安全性を保証しない原子力規制委員会と新規制基準』

⁹¹ Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry.

⁹² According to Kingston (2012: 1), the term nuclear village "refers to the institutional and individual pro-nuclear advocates who comprise the utilities, nuclear vendors, bureaucracy, Diet (Japan's parliament), financial sector, media, and academia".

however, are citizens, especially young people in their 20s and 30s, civil organizations, small and middle-sized enterprises, and local communities.




Figure 9. e-shift: Joint Project.

In the booklets, e-shift refutes many arguments disseminated into public discourse by the government and other actors of the nuclear village, for example:⁹³

- “Nuclear power is safe.”
- “Without nuclear power, there will not be enough electricity to cover our needs.”
- “Phasing out nuclear power means harming the Japanese economy.”
- “A liquidation of TEPCO would harm the Japanese economy.”
- “It is not possible to cover electricity demand with renewables only.”
- “A yearly dosage of 100msv does not increase cancer risk.”
- “Speeding up return is what evacuees desire.”
- “The new Nuclear Regulatory Agency guarantees the safety of all nuclear reactors in Japan.”
- “The Japanese nuclear regulatory standards are the strictest in the world.”

⁹³ The arguments listed here are derived from the analysis of the contents of the e-shift booklets of which a summary can be found in Appendix V.

They encounter these arguments by saying:

- “The Fukushima nuclear accident has shown that nuclear power is not safe and has never been.”
- “Even during the temporary halt of all nuclear power plants in Japan there was enough electricity and it did not hurt the economy.”
- “The liquidation of TEPCO would open the electricity market to fair competition and would increase the chances for a shift towards renewable energy. Moreover, it allows Japan to regain its leading position as an innovator in a growing market. It would therefore have a positive effect on the Japanese economy.”
- “The energy demand can be met by the smart management of renewable energy.”
- “It is difficult to estimate the consequences of low dosage radiation exposure. Therefore it should be as low as possible; best less than 1msv per year, which was government policy before the Fukushima accident and which is in accordance with international standards.”
- “The laws and regulations concerning the support of voluntary and involuntary evacuees do not allow the aggrieved parties to make their own decisions regarding return or non-return.”
- “The new Regulatory Agency cannot ensure the safety of nuclear reactors in Japan because some of its staff has a background in the nuclear village and they systematically neglect earthquake and tsunami risks in their assessments.”
- “The new regulatory standards are even softer than those in the USA or in the EU.”

To empower its civil audience, e-shift uses the different expertise of their network members to construct a counter-discourse to the rhetoric of the government/actors in the nuclear village. Although the shift in energy policy is their main objective, as the network coalition’s name indicates, e-shift also integrates questions concerning the evacuee issue into their profile, going beyond their focus on energy-related issues. One reason for this may be that the e-shift network has overlaps with a coalition engaged mainly in evacuee and victims’ issues, and which serves as the second case study in this research paper, the Shienhō Shimin Kaigi (SHSK) (see section 5).

4.1.2 JOINT ACTION REPERTOIRE

e-shift thus seeks to change Japanese energy policy by advocating for and empowering citizens. They do so by employing a range of less visible collective actions. The following representation of their joint action reper-

toire is based on data provided by event postings on e-shift's website and participant observation of e-shift events.

Between April 2011 and April 2015, e-shift posted 149 event dates on its website, including 170 different, albeit related events. One fifth (35 of 170) of their joint action repertoire includes study and exchange of expertise-related activities, such as symposia, seminars, and lectures or workshops. These often involve the presence of specialists sharing and discussing their knowledge with the public. Workshops and forums also often serve as knowledge transmission to the public: how to write public comments,⁹⁴ for example or how to lobby parliamentarians. Such activities provide members and other interested people an equal level of knowledge necessary to participate in discussions, and also serve to reach a broader public and the press.

Accounting for another fifth (32 of 170) of the action repertoire is making policy proposals. This includes the writing of a claims-making type of papers directly addressed to central actors in the government (*yōsei*) as well as an opinion paper type (*seimei*) directed at both governmental actors as well as the general public and the media. Other important forms of action are lobbying (24 of 170), inner-parliament assemblies (16 of 170), petitions (14 of 170), as well as press-related activities (14 of 170) and demonstrations (12 of 170). Lobbying activities often include campaigns to send postcards, faxes, or emails to parliamentarians, while also trying to meet with them directly at their offices.

Inner-parliament assemblies (*innai shūkai*) usually take place in one of the conference rooms of the parliamentary buildings, involving different speakers on a certain topic. To hold inner-parliament assemblies, the organizers need the support of at least one Diet member. Depending on the issue, more or less press is attracted. Because it is important for e-shift

⁹⁴ Since 1999 it has been possible for citizens to make public comments on draft policies by the ministries. This is possible through a feature on the home pages of all national ministries except for the Ministry of Defense. However, not all ministerial policy initiatives are opened to public comments, according to Takao (2007: 120). According to Kadomatsu (2011: 9–10), the public comment procedure was first introduced by a Cabinet decision in 1999 and was “limited to orders, etc., that ‘formulate, amend, or repeal a regulation’”. However, the procedure was amended and enacted as a Diet law in 2005 and was expanded to “all administrative orders classified as delegated legislation and some important types of administrative internal guidelines”. The law requires the submission of draft policy to public comments and obliges the ministries to respond to such comments; however, it does not require the ministries or the government to change the draft legislation according to the comments received.

to make its activities known to the general public, press conferences and press releases are also part of the action repertoire.

Calling for participation in demonstrations, which are usually in some form co-organized by individual e-shift members, is also an important activity. e-shift as such refrains from organizing demonstrations, but helps in amplifying such events by calling for participation.

Another important activity that contributes to sharing knowledge and expertise is the publication of booklets and posters on issues of concern (cf. section 4.1.1). In these booklets, different authors, all members of the network, outline their thoughts, criticisms, but also solutions to the various issues tackled by e-shift (as discussed above).

During my field work, question-and-answer sessions (*seifu kōshō*) with governmental agencies seemed to be an important part of their action repertoire, even if the numbers do not seem to indicate it: only 6 of 170 events fall into this category. However, the preparation of such question-and-answer sessions requires immense resources in terms of time, contacts to parliamentarians, and research of contents. They, too, have to be supported by at least one parliamentarian. In principle, these sessions are for parliamentarians to get clarification on the bureaucratic procedures to implement certain laws. However, some parliamentarians accept requests from civil society, allowing these groups to question governmental agencies through them. This is why these sessions must be

e-shift Joint Action Repertoire 2011–2015	
Symposia, Study meetings, Seminars, Lectures, Forums, Workshops	35
Policy Proposals (including claims making (<i>yōsei</i>) and opinion papers (<i>seimei</i>))	32
Lobbying (e. g. postcard/fax actions, direct contact to parliamentarians)	24
Inner-Parliament Assemblies (<i>innai shūkai</i>)	16
Petitions (including signature campaigns and submission)	14
Press conferences, Press releases	14
Demonstrations (including appeals, human chains, assemblies)	12
Publication (booklets, posters)	7
Question-and-Answer Sessions (with governmental agencies) (<i>kōshō</i>)	6
Campaign launches	4
Opinion polls among Parliamentarians and their Publication	3
Public Comment Campaigns	3
	170

Table 6. e-shift: Joint Action Repertoire (April 2011–April 2015, data from website).

carefully prepared and coordinated with the office staff of the relevant parliamentarians (SR14II: 5). Because these sessions offer the opportunity to directly pressure those governmental or administrative actors who are at the core of policy implementation, the atmosphere can be quite confrontational. Very often, petitions are also handed in on the occasion of these question-and-answer sessions (EFN24, EFN29).

Besides these activities, e-shift also participates in national and international promotional campaigns. Nationally, they have so far supported a Go Vote campaign,⁹⁵ a Vote-for-Anti-Nuclear-Candidates campaign,⁹⁶ as well as a campaign on Nuclear Zeronomics, to counter arguments that the Japanese economy cannot survive without nuclear power. On an international level they engaged in a We-All-Share-Oceans campaign to draw attention to the ongoing contamination of the sea by the release of contaminated water at the Fukushima plant. In connection to these promotional campaigns, e-shift also undertakes opinion polls among parliamentarians (3 of 170) in order to make their positions on e-shift's topics of interest public. Moreover, the network-coalition is also involved in promotional activities to encourage individuals and organizations to submit public comments on relevant draft laws whenever this was possible (3 of 170).

In summary, e-shift's joint action repertoire clearly focuses on advocacy-related activities, while also including action directly targeting governmental actors. The network-coalition puts a lot of effort into disseminating knowledge and expertise in order to unify civil actors from various backgrounds. In this way they support the activities of the individual member organizations as well as present themselves as a loosely structured but unified actor to their governmental counterparts. The following sections provide insight into why the network-coalition chose this particular action profile.

4.2 RELATIONAL PATTERNS

The following sections focus on the network-coalition's composition; its relational patterns in action; the quality of its internal relations; its structural embeddedness in the broader movement; and its relations to outside actors like the political sphere and the larger society. This discussion will show how the relational patterns within e-shift, as well as between e-shift and its environment, affect and influence the network's outcome in terms of its action profile as outlined above.

⁹⁵ On the occasion of the Upper House elections on July 21, 2013.

⁹⁶ On the occasion of the Tōkyō gubernatorial elections on February 9, 2014.

Section 4.2.1 presents the composition of the network-coalition in order to understand the background of the single member organizations, the movement fields they come from, and the kind of expertise they bring into the network. This section is based on data provided by the group's website as well as the websites of member organizations. The e-shift website lists 55 member organizations and the names of 20 individuals, of which some indicate their affiliation with movement organizations in brackets after their names. However, during fieldwork it became clear that there were far more organizations and individuals involved, as the network expands continuously. According to an interviewee, the network-coalition's mailing list consists of over 250 addresses (SR20: 22). Unfortunately it was impossible to acquire a complete membership list, mainly because there is no formal membership, and anybody interested in the activities of the network and/or acquainted with another member can get connected to the mailing list and participate according to how much the group or the individual is willing to invest. This open concept is due to the network-coalition's self-conception as a "loose, movement forming body" using informal ties to connect; it is also one of the reasons why I consider e-shift a network-coalition rather than a formal coalition (e-shift 2015b). Nevertheless, the 55 member organizations listed on the website can be considered founding members because they must have been present when the network-coalition was initiated, or at least shortly before the website was conceptualized. Whenever necessary, data provided by websites is complemented with information gathered during interviews with network members or during participant observation.

Section 4.2.2 presents findings on the structural patterns of e-shift, using a quantitative analysis of their affiliation network based on the co-participation of 'actively involved actors' in e-shift events as posted on their website (for details see section 3.3.1). Here, the data covers the period from April 2011 to April 2015 and amounts to a total number of 149 events in which 206 actors co-participated. The analysis includes all organizations named as active participants in the event, including governmental agencies or experts on the issues of concern, and thus goes beyond the listed 55 members. The bipartite graph presented in this section gives a first impression of the connections between actors as shown by their joint participation in events. In a second step, the two-mode affiliation data is transformed into a one-mode matrix providing for the number of times single actors have co-participated in an event. This is the basis for centrality measures, which hint at the core actors of the network and allow for drawing conclusions on the interdependence of network actors. This section thus provides a visual impression of relational structures among e-shift actors and their opponents in their field of action.

Section 4.2.3 describes the contents of ties or, in other words, the quality of relations within e-shift as drawn from qualitative interviews and participant observation. This qualitative point of view from the actors complements the findings of the quantitatively reconstructed network structures in the previous section. This section focuses particularly on the actors' perceptions of the quality of relations to others in the network, the most central actors and their relative influence, as well as forms of cooperation and conflict among network members.

Also on the basis of interview and participant observation, sections 4.2.4 and 4.2.5 characterize e-shift's relations to the broader movement, its relations to the political arena, and to society. Section 4.2.4 in particular focuses on e-shift's position in the broader movement, the multiplex relations of its members to other movement fields, as well as cooperation and conflict with other movement actors in the anti-nuclear movement community. Section 4.2.5 illustrates in detail the relational patterns to politics and society.

4.2.1 NETWORK COMPOSITION

47 of the 55 listed e-shift member organizations existed before 2011. Only five member organizations were founded after the nuclear accident. For the remaining three organizations it was not possible to find out their foundation date. The fact that the overwhelming majority of the member organizations can be traced back to before the nuclear accident in March 2011 suggests strongly that they formed part of the latent or abeyance structures of civil society in Japan before this most recent movement wave, and that they may have shared ties and experiences through previous cooperation in prior mobilizations.

Foundation Date of the Participating SMOs	
before 2011	47
2011/2012	5
unknown	3
	55

Table 7. e-shift: Foundation Date of the Participating SMOs
(data from SMO websites).

As for the degree of corporatization of the individual member organizations, most e-shift members (29 organizations in total) have some sort of legal status, be it as a non-profit organization (16 NPOs plus 5 tax-exempted NPOs), a labor union (4), a public corporation (2), or a business

corporation (2). The second largest group of 21 organizations, however, falls into the category of private organizations⁹⁷; rounding out the list are a food and a worker's cooperative, as well as a think tank and an alternative book shop. Finally, an international NGO (INGO) is also part of the network-coalition. This organization explicitly presents itself as an international NGO,⁹⁸ as it disposes of consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

While the organizational membership thus shows varying degrees of distance to the state, the majority nonetheless possess a legal status. This, and the fact that most organizations have existed since before 2011, suggests that they bring a high level of expertise in dealing with state actors to the work of the network-coalition as a whole.

Types of Organization	
Private Organization	21
NPO	16
Tax-exempted NPO	5
Labor Union (Federation)	4
Public Corporation	2
Business Corporation	2
Food Cooperative	1
Worker's Cooperative	1
Think Tank	1
Shop	1
International NGO	1
	55

Table 8. e-shift: Types of Organization (data from SMO websites).

⁹⁷ Many of the organizations categorized as private organizations describe themselves as networks of individuals. This suggests that a flat or non-hierarchical network form of organization, leaving individual members room for self-expression and self-responsibility, is a widely preferred form of association. This could be because the groups want to distinguish themselves from the very hierarchically organized groups of the 1960s and 70s movement cycle (cf. section 1), which demanded the subordination of individual members.

⁹⁸ There are several other network-coalition members defining themselves as international NGOs, but in most cases, they either have a legal status as NPOs or fall into the category of private organizations. In Japan, the term NGO is very much connected to organizations that cooperate internationally and are often engaged in projects concerning official development assistance.

Concerning the individual projects or primary issues of concern of the member organizations it can be said that the biggest group comes from an environmental background (19), the second largest group defines itself as anti-nuclear (12), and the third biggest group advocates for pro-renewable energy (5). Besides this group of member organizations, e-shift also includes organizations involved primarily in activities related to official development assistance, peace, urban development, alternative life, organic products, evacuees, citizen science, as well as organizations engaged in women and freeter⁹⁹ issues. The broad background of issues tackled by the individual organizations suggests that while working together in the network-coalition, individual organizations are also embedded in networks with other organizations in their respective issue fields or movement communities. The network-coalition e-shift can therefore be described as a forum where different movement commu-

Primary Issues of Concern of the Participating SMOs	
Environment	19
Anti-Nuclear	12
Promotion of Alternative Energy	5
Development (ODA)	4
Peace	3
Urban Development	3
Alternative Life	3
Organic Food/Clothes	2
Evacuees	1
Citizen Science	1
Women	1
Precarity/Freeter	1
	55

Table 9. e-shift: Primary Issues of Concern of the Participating SMOs (data from SMO websites).

⁹⁹ According to Inui (2005), freeters are young people between 15 and 34 years of age who are in “temporary or part-time work and not in school”. The number of freeters in Japan rose during the 1990s with the increasing instability of the labor market. Although the phenomenon increased with the neoliberal labor policies established during these years, the term has been connected to young people deliberately choosing not to join the regular working population. There is an overlap between the freeter movement and the anti-nuclear movement; freeter groups were the first to organize anti-nuclear demonstrations in Tōkyō (cf. section 1).

nities overlap and work on the joint project of a nuclear phase-out in the form of a network-coalition, drawing on the expertise and information provided by the broader movement fields in which they are embedded.

The primary action repertoires of the participating individual SMOs reveal that most of them are in some form involved with advocacy-related activities (60.0 %).¹⁰⁰ Symposia, study groups, and lectures (43.6 %), policy and other research-related activities (36.4 %), as well as lobbying (34.5 %) and networking (32.7 %) are other important forms of action for individual member organizations. Additionally, lifestyle activism (25.5 %) and direct protest actions (21.8 %) are significant parts of their action repertoires.

Action Repertoires of the Participating SMOs¹⁰¹	
Advocacy (e. g. policy proposals, petitions, campaigning, publishing)	60.0%
Symposia, study groups, lectures	43.6%
Research (e. g. policy research, measurements, monitoring, study tours)	36.4%
Lobbying (involving direct contact with politicians/bureaucrats)	34.5%
Networking with other SMOs (nationally and internationally)	32.7%
Lifestyle (including renewable power stations, film festival, alternative stores, farming, eco consulting)	25.5%
Direct protest action (e. g. demonstrations, parades, art)	21.8%
Education	12.7%
ODA (e. g. funding of projects overseas)	7.3%
Lawsuits	3.6%
Funding of movement activities	3.6%

Table 10. e-shift: Action Repertoires of the Participating SMOs
(data from SMO websites).

¹⁰⁰ Pekkanen (2006) indicates that the political opportunity structure in Japan is more favorable to small grassroots organizations focused on concrete local issues and providing service, but less favorable to bigger, professional organizations engaged in advocacy-related activities. The study of Vogt and Lersch (2007) on migrant support organizations in Japan seems to confirm this discrepancy. The present study shows that depending on the issue field – in this case the anti-nuclear field – there are also small grassroots-type civil society organizations engaged in advocacy. These groups do so often in cooperation with a number of other big and small organizations e. g. by making joint policy proposals or coordinating signature campaigns. The e-shift network includes a high number of such small organizations that, besides other activities, also engage in advocacy.

¹⁰¹ As most organizations engage in more than one form of action, results are presented as percentages.

Moreover, some member organizations also engage in educational activities (12.7 %), ODA-related actions (7.3 %), anti-nuclear lawsuits (3.6 %), as well as the financial funding of movement activities (3.6 %). The overall action profiles of the member organizations listed on the website therefore clearly show an orientation towards less visible forms of action, while being connected to groups also engaging in more visible forms of action such as demonstrations. As a result, the joint action repertoire of e-shift also consists mainly of less visible advocacy-oriented action.

Based on the list of member organizations on the website, e-shift consists primarily of experienced social movement organizations with a high degree of corporatization. These organizations come from the environmental, anti-nuclear, and pro-renewable energy movement communities, bringing their respective expertise. Above that, the action profiles of the individual member organizations clearly show a focus on less visible forms of collective action such as advocacy, the organization and realization of study groups, policy-related research, or the lobbying of politicians and/or bureaucrats. This explains the advocacy-oriented joint action repertoire of e-shift overall.

4.2.2 RELATIONS IN ACTION

An affiliation network analysis correlates actors to events based on the assumption that joint event participation was either possible through previous ties or contributed to the creation of new ties between actors. This analysis thus provides an impression of the network structures in which e-shift is embedded beyond the mere membership list, and includes the actors that are the main targets of the events. Moreover, a visualization of the structure is possible (cf. section 3.3.1). Correlating actors and events in a two-mode affiliation network provides a bipartite graph (graph theoretic layout) showing the affiliation of actors to movement events.

In the network image, the nodes in the form of red dots correspond to movement actors; blue squares correspond to movement events. The lines represent the ties of affiliation between the events and the actors.

Looking at this graphic it becomes clear that e-shift is very much at the center of event organization. Almost all events are related to e-shift, except for a few events at the lower left of the graphic. These are events which e-shift posted on its website without being directly involved in the organization. Nevertheless, e-shift actors must have attached importance to these events; otherwise they would probably not have posted them.

Organizations such as ISEP, FoE, Green Action, Fukurō no Kai, Mihama no Kai, CNIC, Gensuikin, Peace Boat, and WWF Japan are the most active members and connected to a large number of events; they are

thus located at the center of the actor-event network graphic. Most organizations, however, participated only in a limited number of events, as can be seen by the large number of red dots at the periphery. Accordingly it can be said that e-shift has a large periphery and few organizations at the center of action when it comes to event participation. This indicates that the central organizations organize most events and then call for participation of others.

The bipartite graph provided by the actor-event matrix also includes actors towards which most of e-shift's actions are directed and which are thus in an oppositional relationship to e-shift. Figure 11 shows these actors, towards which most of e-shift's actions are directed marked in green: TEPCO, the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare (MHLW), the Nuclear Safety Agency (NSA), the government/Prime Minister, city council members (of cities with high radiation doses), prefectural governments, the Ministry of Energy, Trade, and Industry (METI), the National Policy Unit, as well as the Ministries of Finance, Foreign Affairs, and the Environment. The reason for this composition of direct opponents is e-shift's goal to change energy policy and reduce the impact of radiation on the population. e-shift directly addresses the relevant actors in the policy-making process, leading to their position at the inner periphery of the network.

Besides their direct opponents, figure 11 also shows actors such as the press and parliamentarians marked in yellow. Relations to parliamentarians are as discussed in section 4.1., two-fold: e-shift works together with a number of parliamentarians with whom they cooperate closely. Without these supporters, many of the events e-shift holds, especially in the Diet buildings, would not be possible. These activities are then directed towards other parliamentarians, those who do not cooperate.

Relations to the press are equally difficult. This state of affairs can be explained by the complicated relationship between social movements and media in general.¹⁰² This is true in the Japanese case in particular, because of strong government and industry influence on news content

¹⁰² Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993: 115–116) describe social movements and media as “two complicated systems of actors with complex internal relationships”. The authors point out that in this relationship “[m]ovements are generally much more dependent on media than the reverse” because media are the main means for social movements to reach and eventually mobilize a broad public. There is thus a “fundamental asymmetry”. However, media also need movements because movements often “make good copy for the media”, providing “drama, conflict, and action”.




Figure 11. e-shift: Actor-by-Event Matrix. Conflictive and Hybrid Relations.

(for a detailed analysis of movement actors' handling of mass and social media, see Wiemann 2017).

The bipartite graph above provides some ideas on the centrality of some e-shift actors, and especially the relationship between the core and the periphery. Nevertheless, in order to get a more precise picture of the centrality of the network actors, an eigenvector analysis can provide an even deeper understanding of the most central movement organizations in terms of engagement in jointly organized events. The results of the analysis of eigenvector centrality are based on the numbers of events in which the actors co-participated and the actors' adjacency to other central actors (cf. section 3.3.1).

The eigenvector analysis shows that FoE is the most central and therefore also probably the most influential organization within the network-coalition, which is congruent with the fact that FoE functions as the main administrator of the network-coalition. Besides FoE, the Citizens' Nuclear Information Center (CNIC), the Institute for Sustainable Energy Policy (ISEP), Kikō Netto, Greenpeace, Peace Boat, Green Action, Fukurō no Kai, Daichi o Mamoru Kai, and Gensuikin are among the most central organizations in terms of event participation and probably organization. These organizations come from backgrounds in the environmental movement (FoE, Kikō Netto, Greenpeace), anti-nuclear movement (CNIC, Green Action, Fukurō no Kai, Gensuikin), promotion of alternative energy (ISEP), peace movement (Peace Boat), and the organic food industry (Daichi o Mamoru Kai). Thus, the majority of the core actors come from an anti-nuclear background. While the network coalition's discourse promotes alternative energy as a solution to the nuclear power dilemma, this asymmetry might result from the relative power positions of the actors with environmental and renewable energy backgrounds.

The groups of actors comprising parliamentarians and the press sharing hybrid relations to the network-coalition members are also quite central to event participation. While they are difficult partners, we can assume cooperation with these actors plays a major role in e-shift's action profile. Providing information and maintaining contact to parliamentarians and citizens especially through media is clearly one of the most important activities of the actors. Besides parliamentarians and the press, the Ministry for Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) also holds a central position, according to eigenvector centrality. This indicates that METI represents the most important target actor, towards which most of e-shift's actions are directed.

4.2.3 INTERNAL RELATIONS

This section illustrates the relational patterns within e-shift, including its working procedures, as well as members' perception and evaluation of the network's structures generally. It also characterizes the roles and positions of the core members and discusses the cooperative and conflictual facets of the network-coalition's internal relations.

In general, e-shift actors do not distinguish clearly between the quality of relations within the network and other movement actors outside of the network. This hints at the openness of the network. For the purpose of this study, however, this distinction will be made. Most of the individual members operate while embedded in a number of often overlapping networks and seldom draw clear boundaries between e-shift and other movement networks when they talk. Movement networks of meso level actors in the Japanese anti-nuclear movement are thus highly multiplex, a point further explored in section 4.2.4.2.

4.2.3.1 *Network-Coalitional Structures*

e-shift has a loose internal network structure, despite holding regular meetings. During the first months after 3.11 when the saliency of the issue was highest, meetings were held twice a month. However, by the time of my fieldwork between September 2013 and May 2014, meetings were held only once a month in different community centers all over the Tōkyō metropolitan area. Most of the meetings during my fieldwork took place in one of the conference rooms at Rengō Kaikan, the building of the Association of Japanese Labor Unions (Nihon Rōdō Kumiai Sōrengō Kai) in central Tōkyō where Gensuikin's office is located. The date for the meetings was usually decided at the preceding meeting and communicated to the members who were not present via an e-shift mailing list, usually together with a short agenda for the next meeting as well as the minutes from the previous meeting. These organizational aspects are managed by the central administrating organization, FoE Japan.

On the website, e-shift provides a graphic to outline its inner structures and working procedures.

According to this graphic and the attached description, there are supposed to be seven working teams on the following five issues: 1. the protection of children from radiation, 2. nuclear power phase-out, 3. the TEPCO problem, 4. the promotion of renewable energy, and 5. the dissemination of information to the public and the formation of a social movement. Three working teams tackle the issue of nuclear power phase-out; namely the issues of nuclear power plant restarts, the new




Figure 13. e-shift: Schematic from their Website (my own translation).

regulatory standards for nuclear power plants in Japan¹⁰³, as well as nuclear exports to countries overseas (e-shift 2016). However, when I asked e-shift members about the working teams described on the website, many referred me to the FoE representative, whose thoughts would have been strongest on the conceptualization of e-shift (SR18: 268). The FoE representative however indicated that although this was the original concept of e-shift, these structures were never really strictly followed. Another member indicated that during the first meetings after the accident when meeting participation was still high, they realized that participants had different expertise, such as energy policy or health effects. They had discussed working in three teams: one on the problems in Fukushima, one on policy issues, and one on action. However, most of these subgroups never became active.

The only functioning working team that emerged within e-shift was a media action team (SR20: 5). Within the media action team was another

¹⁰³ After the Fukushima nuclear accident in March 2011, the Japanese government decided to temporarily shut down nuclear power plants and subject them to new safety regulations. There was a complete halt of all nuclear power stations by May 2012; see Lah (2012).

sub-team whose role was to approach and mobilize citizens. When many people in the media action team became inactive in 2013, the remaining people decided to rename their team the ‘citizen action team’ (*shimin akushon chīmu*) (SR17: 93). Among the actions organized by the citizen action team are: an event for families to experience the possibilities of renewable energy, e. g. by using a solar cooker for cooking their meal, as well as the programming of an online map of all communities and prefectures that came out with anti-nuclear statements (MFN3; SR17: 97–99). Thus, the citizen action team is the only subgroup directly under the umbrella of e-shift that works together effectively. The team members hold meetings among themselves once every third week to once a month and report about their actions at the general e-shift meetings (SR17: 103).

Although the citizen action team is the only officially existing working team within e-shift, there is also the informal editing team working on the booklets mentioned in section 4.1.1. Some of the core members brainstorm about what topic should be written about, discuss their ideas at regular meetings and subsequently contact appropriate authors. This team also includes a professional editor from Gōdō Shuppan. Gōdō Shuppan is known for its movement-related publications, and some employees who participated in e-shift in 2011 and 2012 were the ones who proposed publishing booklets providing alternative information on Fukushima-related issues (SR20: 44):

“Gōdō Shuppan has a high interest in social issues and has worked on social movements for a long time. They started to participate in e-shift in 2011 or 2012 and proposed making something like it [the booklets].”¹⁰⁴

Although only one official and one informal working team exist under the umbrella of e-shift, the meetings were also an incentive to launch other networks that now work on different albeit related issues (for example a network working on nuclear exports). Although many of these groups are now engaged in different networks and do not join the meetings anymore, these networks of groups remain linked to e-shift and still exchange information (SR20: 14):

“At the beginning, yeah. We worked in teams. At the beginning there were many people, more than 50 people came together at the meetings in March and April. And among these people there were

¹⁰⁴ 「合同出版はもともとそういう社会問題の関心が高いところで、市民運動もずっとやってきた方なんです。e シフトに 2011 年か 2012 年ぐらいから参加されて、こういうのを作っただいじゃないかと提案をいただきました。」

some who knew a lot about energy policy and others about radiation exposure [...]. At the beginning, we divided into three groups, one about the Fukushima problem, one to work the policy, and one about actions, but although we did this, the groups immediately dissolved. In the meantime, we started to have our regular meetings once a month, and also during that time, many different networks were built and as a consequence, some people didn't show up anymore. But we keep connected via the mailing list and exchange information so we share cooperative relationships.”¹⁰⁵

Besides working on the different issues, looking at the above graphic, it also becomes clear that the idea of e-shift is to engage more citizens into the movement and to form a broad movement network under the master frame of contributing to a shift in energy policy by reaching out to the media and organizing events. The graphic also depicts an e-shift citizen steering committee, although the members of this steering committee are not indicated. This suggests that even the membership of the core or steering committee is to a certain degree flexible.

The membership list on the website, comprising 55 groups and a number of individuals, was put together in April and May 2011, when the number of participants in the network meetings was highest. Around this time, there were 40 to 50 participants in the regular meetings (see above). During my fieldwork the number of participants in the meeting varied between fifteen and twenty people, but the e-shift mailing list included about 250 email addresses (SR20: 21).

Because of its openness, e-shift members describe the network as an informally organized entity but with a high potential to develop strategies for phasing-out nuclear power and influencing the policy-making process, as it brings together many organizations from various backgrounds such as the environmental, anti-nuclear, and consumer fields (SR5: 53):

¹⁰⁵ 「最初はそうですね。チームでやっていたんですけども。最初は、ものすごくたくさん、50人以上の人が集まって、3月4月のミーティングはですね。人によっては、エネルギー政策のところが得意だったり、被爆の問題が得意だったり [...]。最初は福島の問題と、政策にはたらき掛けるところとアクションというふうに三つに分かれたんですけど、そんなに別れても、それはすぐに解消してしまっただって感じで。そのうちもう、月に1回のミーティングが定例になってきて、やっぱりそのうち、それぞれのネットワークを立ち上げてこなくなった人とかも居るんですけど、それでもメーリングリストでつながって情報共有をすることで、いざというときは協力する関係ができたというのがあると思います。」

“e-shift is a network which came together after 3.11; after 3.11 many different kinds of groups came together. These were environmental groups, anti-nuclear groups, and consumer groups, that is characteristic for it [e-shift], and FoE does the administration.”¹⁰⁶

Organizations from various fields came together for the first time on such a large scale, providing an opportunity to really promote an alternative discourse (SR12: 61). The members are aware that the network is composed mainly of Tōkyō-based organizations, most of which are old, although some newly founded organizations are also in the mix (SR14: 43).

Some members point out that what is special about e-shift is its loose and open structure, which allows each group or individual member to give in the way they can (SR17: 109):

“[...] e-shift is taking more a form like, people who are needed get together. People who can invest strength, invest strength; people who can provide ideas, provide ideas.”¹⁰⁷

The big difference in the numbers of participants in the regular meetings and the number of organizations or individuals connected to the mailing list indicates that for many members, e-shift is primarily a mailing list, although a very comprehensive one (SR6: 86):

“Yeah, e-shift is, I think, ah, the broadest network of NGOs working on nuclear power. And at the same time it's basically a big mailing list. And it's exchange information forum. And all those action proposals or key information about what's happening in the Diet and so on is delivered to the groups. And for example when something happened like for example the government is trying to export nuclear power to Turkey and then one organization put up to this e-shift group for the petition idea. And then, ah, just immediately we can collect one hundred or more supporting organizations; and that kind of information sharing role. And also from time to time, e-shift hosts strategy meetings. I think, a few times a year. And to look at the general strategy direction. And FoE is functioning well as a, as a type of head of this process.”

¹⁰⁶ 「eシフトは3.11の後に立ち上がったネットワークで、3.11の後にさまざまな種類の団体が集まったんですね。環境団体であったり、反原発団体、そして消費者団体だとか、それが一つの特徴で、FoE Japan は事務局をしています。」

¹⁰⁷ 「[...]eシフトのほうは集まるべき人が集まって、力が出せる人が力を出して、アイデア出せる人はアイデア出してみたいな形だった。」

One member, a representative of an organization based in the Kansai¹⁰⁸ area, describes the relationship of groups to the network as very natural, even when they are not officially listed members (SR14: 43):

“[e-shift is] like very informal, like, many groups think: ‘Did I sign up for it? Am I part of it? Or no, I am not?’ Or: ‘I thought I was but you mean I am not listed’. You know, kind of, that type of organization.”

Thus the mailing list, which provides for an important means of exchanging information between the actors from various fields, is one of the major achievements of e-shift: it connects a broad range of different movement communities and facilitates information exchange, creating a feeling of ‘natural’ albeit loose connectedness. As already indicated above, by the time of fieldwork, the number of participants in the regular meetings had decreased and movement activity was in decline. With the decline in active participants joining the physical meetings, the importance of the mailing list increased, since it functions to raise new action as soon as the slightest window of opportunity appears and allows maillist members to stay updated on the activities of organizations in their respective movement fields (SR20: 13).

However, observing e-shift’s regular meetings, relations especially among the core members seem trustful, friendly and routinized; when new members join the meeting for the first time they are warmly welcomed. FoE Japan, as the administrator and manager of the network, usually mediates the discussions according to the agenda, which has been set up in advance. Issues on the agenda often cover issues that arose during informal discussions among groups of members. They often touch upon political developments, what is going on in other parts of related movement communities, energy issues raised by the network’s opponents, the ways these are represented in the media, and how to advance a counter-discourse and/or action. If members suggest that an event should be organized surrounding a particular issue, they discuss the format (most often they organize symposia or workshops) and which experts to invite for a talk. Once this is done, they often put together a group of responsible people to organize (*jikkō iinkai*) the event.

Many e-shift members are proud of the new ideas or ways the group comes up with to counter the dominant discourse of their opponents. Some members especially felt the need to take a more political stance on issues, or at least to support anti-nuclear or pro-renewable candidates in election

¹⁰⁸ Region comprising the area around the cities of Ōsaka and Kyōto in Western Japan.

campaigns. Because many of the members have an NPO status, they are not allowed to be involved in any kind of political activity (cf. section 1.2.1). This is actually how the idea for Ryokuchakai was born, which is a group of people who openly support such candidates and operates independently from e-shift. The discussion surrounding this issue also gave birth to a mascot: the Zeronomikuma, a green bear with a black zero on its belly. The mascot can be booked for events or electoral campaigns promoting the idea of nuclear zeronomics, or an economy without nuclear power. Zeronomics is in direct opposition to Abenomics¹⁰⁹, Prime Minister Abe's



Figure 14. Zeronomikuma at e-shift's Zeronomics Symposium (November 16, 2013; own photo).

¹⁰⁹ According to Yoshino and Taghizadeh-Hesary (2014), Prime Minister Abe has tried to use this economic program to revive the stagnating Japanese economy since he came into power in December 2012. Abenomics is based on three pillars: fiscal consolidation, monetary easing by the Bank of Japan, and structural reform to boost Japan's competitiveness. Hilpert (2015) points out that Abenomics has so far been largely unsuccessful in reinvigorating the Japanese economy.

economic revival program, which is based upon the use of nuclear power as a “‘cheap’ alternative to imported fossil fuels and crucial to reviving the economy”, including potential nuclear exports overseas (Kingston 2013).

Many of the ideas discussed within e-shift also led to the initiation of the Shimin Denryoku Renraku Kai (People’s Power Network) and the Citizen Energy Information Assembly in February 2014, a forum for citizen power station owners (usually citizen groups) to exchange know-how and spread their idea of “taking back” energy production and supply through community management of renewable power stations in their regions. The idea to produce a detailed report on how to phase out nuclear power in Japan was also first discussed within e-shift, and was picked up by the Takagi Foundation which then initiated the Citizen’s Commission on Nuclear Energy (CCNE) to produce such a report.

In summary, e-shift tries to keep in balance the relationship patterns necessary for a functioning working structure with representing civil unity by maintaining the most possible openness and accessibility to any civil groups and individual citizens interested in joining a network pushing for a shift in Japan’s energy policy.

4.2.3.2 Core Members

FoE Japan functions as the initiator, conceptualizer, and manager of the network-coalition and is thus the most central organization within e-shift (cf. section 4.2). The centrality and importance of FoE in the network was also clearly confirmed during the qualitative interviews with other network members and was apparent during all e-shift regular meetings and e-shift-related events. The members are aware that FoE functions as the head of the network, brings in many ideas, has a central role in the agenda-setting for the meetings, and has the leadership in setting up and organizing events. FoE is also responsible for the allocation of funding. Each year, e-shift, represented by FoE, applies for funding to the Takagi Fund, the most important donor for anti-nuclear related activities in Japan (cf. section 1.2.5). The funding amounts to 500.000 and 600.000 Yen¹¹⁰ per year. Some of the money is used for the administration of the network; some is used for the organization of urgent actions (SR20: 30–32):

“Well, we receive funding from the Takagi Fund for doing the administration. It’s about 500.000 to 600.000 Yen. [...] Besides getting it for our running costs, we receive the money for urgent actions or

¹¹⁰ Equates to about 4.000 and 4.800 Euro as of December 2016.

to print flyers for example. The booklets finance themselves through their sales; we try to have them cover their expenses. For the events we also take an entrance fee, so we try not to get into the red.”¹¹¹

Besides managing the finances, a person from FoE often functions as the moderator during events such as symposia and study groups, introducing the theme of the event as well as the speakers, and guides through the program. Within e-shift, FoE cooperates most closely with the NPO ISEP¹¹² (Institute for Sustainable Energy Policies; cf. section 1.2.5), Kikō Network¹¹³, an environmental NPO focused on the issue of climate change, Gensuikin, one of the oldest anti-nuclear organizations in Japan (cf. section 1.2.2), and Daichi o Mamoru Kai¹¹⁴, a social organic food business (EA2: 54; SR18: 268; SR11: 186; SR6: 86; SR5: 48,60,81; MFN1–6; EFN1,9,20,23,34,37).

The NPO ISEP is an influential organization in the network in terms of providing knowledge and know-how about alternatives to nuclear power, in other words the “way out”. Its leader, Iida Tetsunari, a former nuclear engineer, is often described as one of the most influential figures in the recent anti-nuclear movement. With a background in nuclear

¹¹¹ 「最低限、FoE Japan が事務局をやっていることについて、高木仁三郎市民科学基金（高木基金）の助成を得ています。50－60 万ぐらいですね。[...] 本当に FoE Japan の運営費のためにもらっていて、あとは、例えば緊急のアクション、チラシを作ったりだとか、そういうことのためにお金ももらっています。ブックレットとかはだいたい売り上げと販売と同じぐらいに、とんとんになるようにしています。イベントもだいたい参加費を集めているので、あまり赤字にならないようにしています。」

¹¹² ISEP was founded in 2000 and is dedicated to the promotion and research of renewable energy production. They engage especially in making policy proposals and supporting local renewable energy projects. The organization has large national and international networks in this field and is engaged in government advisory councils.

¹¹³ The NPO Kikō Network was founded in 1998 as a successor to Kikō Forum, a coalitional network of environmental organizations that cooperated on the occasion of the UN conference on climate protection in Kyōto (COP3) in 1997. Kikō Network today engages in a number of transnational projects and networks to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, monitors the activities of the Japanese government in this field, and makes policy proposals. For more information on the emergence of Kikō Forum see Reimann (2001).

¹¹⁴ Daichi o Mamoru Kai, founded in 1977, is a social business that brings organic food products to the market. They aim to protect organic farming, thereby also protecting the lives and health of consumers, and they engage in social issues directed towards forming a sustainable society. Since the Chernobyl nuclear accident they are also engaged in the nuclear issue, as contamination of soil and food poses a threat to the health of consumers.

sciences as well as alternative energy, he can both critique nuclear technology and policies as well as provide arguments for the development and promotion of renewable energies (SR12: 5):

“[...] Iida Tetsunari originally used to be a nuclear engineer, but he left [that world] and went to study in Europe. I think it was a university in Sweden, but he went to study there and learned about what's called energy democracy¹¹⁵ and he wanted to disseminate this idea in Japan and when he came back to Japan, he founded ISEP as an organization to spread the word about it; that's how it was.”¹¹⁶

He is thus a very sought-after speaker in all parts of the anti-nuclear movement. ISEP has good connections to key figures in the policy-making process and its personnel often participates in government advisory councils (*shingikai*) concerning energy-related questions (SR12: 3,25,51,77; EA2: 48; MFN3: 22).

Kikō Network is an NPO working mainly on questions concerning climate change. Nevertheless, when e-shift was initiated, Kikō Network played a central role in sketching out ideas to phase out nuclear power in Japan and was involved in discussing the issue of climate change and nuclear power (SR19: 217; SR12: 70).

Gensuikin does not appear to have a central position in the intellectual leadership within e-shift, but it contributes by providing infrastructure: for example organizing a conference room for a number of meetings. It also provides a bridge to the 'old style' anti-nuclear movement, being the initiator of Sayōnara Genpatsu, which organized a number of demonstrations and seeks to collect 10 million signatures for nuclear phase out (cf. section 1.2.4) (SR11: 186; MFN 3: 6; MFN11).

Daichi o Mamoru Kai represents a consumer perspective on the direct impact of radiation on the human body and environment. This social business has been involved in the anti-nuclear movement since the Chernobyl nuclear accident, when radioactive substances were also detected in Japan-grown vegetables (SR17: 30).

¹¹⁵ This notion refers to the idea of citizen consumers choosing their energy source and taking action to produce such renewable energy themselves, in contrast to leaving energy supply and policy to governmental actors. It thus represents a democratization of the field of energy production and consumption.

¹¹⁶ 「[...] 飯田哲也が、もともとは原子力の技術者だったんですけども、そこを飛び出して、ヨーロッパのほうに留学をしたんですね。スウェーデンのほうの大学だったと思いますけども、留学して、向こうのいわゆるエネルギーデモクラシーについて学び、そういったものを日本でもぜひ普及したいと、日本に戻ってきてからそういう普及のための一つの団体として、この環境エネルギー政策研究所を設立したという経緯ですね。」

Besides these central organizations, there are two individual members who appear as central discussants during the regular meetings in terms of intellectual leadership as well as tacit knowledge, i. e. how to turn ideas into action and influence the policy-making process. They have both been involved in the anti-nuclear, environmental, and renewable energy movement for a long time and are both active in a number of networks simultaneously. One started off as an activist in the 1960s and became involved in the anti-nuclear movement in particular after Chernobyl. Now this individual is embedded and active in a number of less visible 'old style' movement networks, where boundaries are particularly fluid. This activist takes up nuclear-related issues nobody else within the network works on. In particular, this activist provides e-shift with background information on TEPCO as well as knowledge about the electricity market and prices (SR18: 6):

"I am somebody who says, when somebody says 'let's do this', when somebody says 'let's do something', I say 'let's do it like this'. For example, in the case of thinking about doing something about TEPCO, I say 'I got it, we really need to do something to dissolve TEPCO'; I think in that case people like that should come together. People who want to do this together. But these can also be people, as I said before, who have different perspectives and ways of thinking."¹¹⁷

The other individual draws on experiences working as a parliamentarian's secretary and in working for a number of NPOs in the environmental and renewable energy fields. This personality is now mainly engaged in questions concerning green energy, is an authority on the policy-making process and access to it, and provides many connections to politicians and experts in the field (MFN1-6). Often, this person is asked by movement organizations for training on lobbying activities (SR19: 61):

"I get involved when people call me, saying 'We're going to do lobbying activities, so teach us how to do it'."¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷ 「[...] 私なんかみたいなのは、これをやろうといったときに、何かをやろうといったときに、A ということだね。例えば、東電を何とかしようよとかいうふうに考えた場合に、じゃあ分かりました、東電をやっぱり解体しなきゃいけないねっていったときに、そういう人たちが集まるのはいいと思ってるんですよ。何かを一緒にやる人たちっていうことでね。それはある意味で、さっき言った、ものの見方と考え方が違う人でもいいんですよ。」

¹¹⁸ 「[...] 「ロビー活動するからやり方教えろ」って言って呼ばれて、そのままそこに絡んでいますけど。」

Some interviewees also mentioned that Greenpeace and Peace Boat, both listed as e-shift members, were important actors in the movement. However, they were not very prominent in e-shift's activities – at least during the time of field work – even though both organizations value the network and in particular the information it provides. Greenpeace is an international environmental organization famous worldwide for its distinctive protest actions. Their projects in Japan include anti-nuclear activities (in particular monitoring and measuring of contamination levels), the promotion of renewable energy, the protection of the ocean and forests, as well as peace and the building of a strong civil society. Peace Boat is a Tōkyō-based peace organization; its main activity is the organization and execution of “peace voyages” featuring global educational programs on a chartered passenger ship. Both organizations possess large transnational networks and thus provide connections to international civil society and media (EA2: 56, 60; SR6: 92,114; SR15: 138).

Besides these organizations, which were mentioned as central in the qualitative interviews, the eigenvector centrality in section 4.2.2 also shows that CNIC, Green Action, Fukurō no Kai, and Mihama no Kai are central to many events. The CNIC has existed since the 1970s and is thus one of the oldest anti-nuclear organizations in Japan. CNIC works together with a network of nuclear scientists, monitors nuclear related issues in Japan, and plays a central role in connecting local anti-nuclear groups nationwide (cf. section 1.2.2). As for their action repertoire, the SMO takes its role as information provider most seriously; although its representatives remain in the background, CNIC sometimes joins other organizations for question-and-answer sessions with the ministries. Because of its scientific orientation, staffers are also sometimes asked to participate in government advisory councils (EA2: 15–30; SR4: 6–33; EFN25; EFN29).

Green Action and Mihama no Kai are both Kansai-based, local groups. Mihama no Kai (its full name is Mihama, Ōi, Takahama Genpatsu ni Hantai suru Ōsaka no Kai) engages particularly in lawsuits (cf. section 1.2.1 footnote 13 on this form of action) and action against the Mihama, Ōi, and Takahama nuclear power plants in Fukui prefecture, operated by Kansai Electric Power Company (KEPCO) whose main office is located in the city of Ōsaka. Green Action is based in Kyōto, engages in law suits and protests in the region but also supports many local anti-nuclear groups and plays an important role in the regional and national networking of local groups. Through the English language background of a central member, the group also provides important linkages to the international anti-nuclear movement (SR14: 3–19; EFN25).

Fukurō no Kai, with the full name Fukushima Rōkyū Genpatsu o Kangaeru Kai (Assembly to Think about the Aging Fukushima Nuclear Plant), is a Tōkyō-based organization but with a particular focus on the Fukushima nuclear plants. Naturally, after 3.11, this organization was at the center of attention. The group has specialized knowledge of the situation at the Fukushima plants and monitors the developments at the site closely. Besides providing technological expertise and information, which they deploy during question-and-answer sessions, they tend to be more engaged in victims' issues than energy-related matters. The centrality in the eigenvector analysis of these three regionally/locally-oriented organizations is explained by their specialized knowledge of the situation in the regions. Because of this knowledge, they are valuable and frequently invited participants and speakers in e-shift-related events (EFN2,22,24,37).

e-shift's most central and apparently most influential members in terms of the network's agenda-setting thus come from the environmental and renewable energy fields and have good connections to anti-nuclear and consumer groups. The network-coalition clearly functions as a platform where ideas and experiences from these fields intermingle and have the potential to formulate new discourses. The master frame of these new discourses is generally set by the environmental field and is consequently guided by the underlying ideal of contributing to a better living environment for all beings.

4.2.3.3 *Cooperation and Conflict*

As the previous sections have shown, relational patterns within e-shift are characterized by close or social bond-type relations among core actors and loose or transaction-type relations between the core and the periphery. e-shift is also led by environmental and renewable energy organizations that hold relative power positions within the network's core.

During my fieldwork, the atmosphere at the meetings was generally friendly and cooperative. Before the meeting started people chit-chatted with each other about past events or recent political developments. Often they also distributed pamphlets and flyers about upcoming events in which their individual organizations were involved. The discussions, however, were most often led by core members; less central members contributed a question or a comment every once in a while. Besides this, the fact that core activists actively search to complement the expertise of others by building up their knowledge in related fields as mentioned in the previous section shows that cooperation is a matter of course and that they appreciate having a wide range of different people in the network (MFN1-6).

However, some internal conflicts were also apparent. By the time I began my fieldwork, working procedures had reached a routine. In most cases, FoE and some of its closest partners mainly decided on the meeting agendas. In an informal discussion after one of the regular meetings, as we were in transit to the restaurant where e-shift members often went after the meetings, some of the less closely related members voiced that they sometimes felt left behind. Moreover, they missed the vivid, open, and substantial discussions that had been the norm when e-shift had started out. Others felt that e-shift had developed into a platform for information exchange only. This conflict is understandable given that the general movement wave triggered by 3.11 had decreased by the time of fieldwork in 2013 and 2014: regular e-shift meetings were not as well attended; events became less frequent; and events were attracting fewer participants (MFN6: 56). On the one hand the open occurrence of such a conflict could contribute to the further development of e-shift by offering an opportunity to establish more resilient, stronger connections and ways for peripheral groups to actively shape the network and its activities. On the other hand, restructuring has become more complicated by the closing political opportunity under Prime Minister Abe and his pro-nuclear agenda, which demotivates many activists. The dampening effect of Abe's policies forces activists to re-focus on the core issues of their individual organizations; and there is the additional problem of the network's inability to assure financial resources for any more than a year in advance (cf. section 4.2.3.2).

A related problem is that although the members agree that the lack of younger people in the movement (especially those in their 20s and 30s) is a main weakness, they have had difficulties working intergenerationally. According to an interviewee, when e-shift was initiated, many young people became engaged but somehow the older people had difficulty integrating the younger ones and letting them add their input (SR18: 210):

“When it comes to the presence at the full meetings, at the beginning, there used to be more different people, stating many different opinions, and I thought that was really great. Especially younger people. Really, there are not many young people coming now. Well, it could be that the older people did not let them take the stage. Elderly people like me who have been working on the issue since before 3.11, possibly did not let them take the stage. In any case, they [the elderly] probably act in a way making it impossible for them [the younger people] to [really] join in. In the same way as we need more women in politics, we need younger people in the movement in so many ways. It's not good if it's only elderly people and men.

This is the absolute truth. Really. If we want to continue being dynamic, we need women and we need young people. If we could just fulfill these two conditions, that'd be really good. There have really only been old men until now.”¹¹⁹

Moreover, there seems to be a disparity between the membership in ‘traditional’ anti-nuclear organizations and some of the NPOs from the environmental and renewable energy fields in terms of identity and working style (SR18: 330):

“There are [A], [B], and [C] [all from environmental organizations]. They’re all really great people. [...] In the end, they are completely different from the anti-nuclear and nuclear phase-out people. [...] I thought that they’re incredibly great people doing great things, I was surprised. They’re really different from the anti-nuclear people. So things have really changed. The people doing things ‘old style’ are still in organizations such as [D]. That’s my sense.”¹²⁰

While the traditional anti-nuclear people often rather identify as individual activists and move back and forth easily among different movement groups or networks dedicated to different yet related issues, NPO staff often identify as representatives of their organizations and work according to their organizational mandate (SR18, SR16, SR12). Consequently, there are also difficulties between Tōkyō-based groups, many of which have NPO status, and regional groups that are composed mainly of anti-nuclear movement veterans. From the perspective of

¹¹⁹ 「[...] 全体会議という会議の場に来て、前はもつといろんな人が、いろんな意見を言ってたのでね、すごくいいなと思ってたんですけど。特に若い人が。もう本当に若い人が来ないんだよね。っていうか、入れさせないようにしてるのかもしれないね、年寄りが。3.11 の前から、私みたいに、ずっとやってる人たちが、入れさせないようにしてるのかもしれない。つまり、入れさせないようなことをやってるんだろうね。政治にしてみれば女の人やらなきや駄目だっていうことと、運動とか、何かいろんなことにしても若い人がやらなきや駄目。年寄りが出てきたり、男が出てきたら駄目だっていうね。これはもう、絶対的な真理としてあるわけですよ。本当に。活発っていうか、これから行くのには、やっぱり女の人がある、それから若い人が居る。この二つの条件さえあれば、それはいいんじゃないかな。もう、おじいさんばかり居たんじゃね。」

¹²⁰ 「[A]さんと[B]さん、それと[C]さん[環境団体]っていう人とかね。みんな、優秀です。[...] 反原発っていうか、脱原発運動をやってる人たちと、あの人たちは全然違うんですよね、結局ね。[...] ものすごい優秀な人たちがやってるなと思って、びっくり。反原発と全然違うなと思ってさ。それから、ものすごい変わってきてはいるんだけどね。旧態依然としてる人たちっていうのは、まあ、[D団体]に残ってるのかな。そういう感じとしてはね。」

regional groups, the Tōkyō groups often think in overly abstract terms and not enough about what kind of immediate action could achieve a concrete goal contributing to the minimization of a nuclear-related incident. For the Tōkyō groups, the traditional regional groups do not think enough of developing an overarching strategy to solve the problem of nuclear power at its root (MFN5). While relations between Tōkyō and the regions are generally not bad according to this interviewee, they don't seem to be able to 'play catch' very well (SR14: 64):

"My impression is that the relationship is not bad but it's only natural that you see it from your vantage point. For example, [A], I mean, the most active person of FoE Japan is like really hard hitting. Meeting after meeting on Fukushima with the government in Tōkyō and that's their job because they're in Tōkyō, you know. And you really have to, it's like each area has their own job and that is their job. There needs to be more awareness that we will do this so that this can be used by the regions. So the regions could actually use it and then feed back to us so that then we could push the government or the Diet members more. So in other words: there is not this awareness of the catch ball where we make some headway because this can be used here in Fukushima or there in Fukui."¹²¹

In conclusion, e-shift is a comprehensive network connecting many groups from a wide range of movement communities so it seems only natural that there be some conflicts particularly among different organizational types, older and younger activists, and urban and regional groups. Despite these substantial cleavages, e-shift had survived for over five years by the time of writing of this study. This could be due to the strong professional organization at the center, the social bonds among core members, and their strategy to have any organization or individual contribute via loose transactional ties whenever they want and can.

¹²¹ Both prefectures where a high number of nuclear power plants are situated. Fukui prefecture hosts the Suruga (2 reactors) owned by the Japan Atomic Power Company, and the Mihama (3 reactors), Ōi (4 reactors), and Takahama (4 reactors) nuclear power plants owned by KEPCO, as well as the fast breeder research reactor Monju. Fukushima is host to the nuclear facilities Fukushima Daiichi (formerly 6 reactors) and Daini (4 reactors) owned by TEPCO. However, the six reactors at Fukushima Daiichi have been out of operation since 3.11.

4.2.4 RELATIONS TO THE BROADER MOVEMENT

Besides internal relational structures, relational patterns of the larger movement society are also important for explaining e-shift's action profile. The organizational structures of movement coalitional structures are influenced by the context in which they are embedded. The following sections shed light on e-shift's position and role in the broader movement field, the different experiences and expertise core members bring into the network through the multiplex networks in which they participate, and describe the main lines of cooperation and conflict within the movement society and e-shift's relations to them.

4.2.4.1 *e-shift's Role in the Movement*

The most important role e-shift plays within the broader anti-nuclear movement in Japan is that it takes over the management of policy and lobbying-related activities; a field of action rather neglected by the traditional anti-nuclear movement before the Fukushima accident. Such policy-related action is also more easily performed by Tōkyō-based organizations, and regional groups especially appreciate the network's leadership on this form of action. For the core members it is essential to approach policy as a network – the best way to represent more people and maximize impact – so establishing good relations with the broader movement is a central pillar of their work (SR17: 118; SR18: 150; SR20: 11,47; EFN9: 12). e-shift's policy work is widely respected within the broader movement and especially among actors involved in public protest actions, because it complements their protest actions and helps build pressure on the government (SR11: 106):

“e-shift. That is another contributor who can help create the big stream that is necessary to change energy [policy], that's what I think. I think to create a big stream it is necessary to build an even broader structural framework.”¹²²

Hence, the relationship between networks mainly focused on protest action, and networks like e-shift that engage mainly in policy-oriented action, is one of mutual appreciation. They also support each other by letting information about each others' actions resonate in their respective networks. e-shift provides a fundamental discourse and reasoning on

¹²² 「エネルギーシフトね。エネルギーを変えるというのは、別に大きな流れを作ってくる上での一つだろう、というふうに思っていますけどね。大きな流れは、やっぱりもっと大きな枠組みで作らなきゃだめだな、と思う部分はあるけど。」

how to phase out nuclear power, instead of just saying 'No' to it. Networks of protest organizations on the other hand give the movement visible public expression (SR17: 125):

"This [public protest] is really important, I think. Because it is necessary to make it visible that there are divergent opinions within society. We also show up when we can."¹²³

e-shift shares generally good relations with networks organizing public protest, especially because organizations like Gensuikin are members of both types of networks (SR20: 98):

"There is Sayōnara Genpatsu of which Gensuikin functions as the administrator and twice a year they organize big rallies, right? It's mostly old people, but they've got their own great networks; networks made up of those kinds of people."¹²⁴

Within the broader movement, e-shift provides a different organizational style from older structures. Some members joined e-shift explicitly because of its loose and participatory structure, its openness also in terms of discussing controversial issues, and the possibility of engaging as much as they are able without submitting to a hierarchical structure that would pressure them to engage more. The network-coalition is quite distinct from the Fukushima Genpatsu Jiko Kinkyū Kaigi (Fukushima Nuclear Accident Urgency Assembly), a network of mainly older anti-nuclear organizations, which also emerged after 311 and is managed by People's Plan Study Group (People's Plan Kenkyūjo), an organization seeking to develop an alternative, non-capitalist social system. This network is organized 'old style', with a membership rules and a fee, and is composed mainly of older, traditional style anti-nuclear organizations (SR17: 109):

"The [A organization's] people call Kinkyū Kaigi the veterans, but they have been active for a long time and they have a rather precise structure, operating in a strict way and taking a membership fee to run it [...] and at the beginning, I don't know exactly what they do now, but they had a protest approach to the government, they often used that approach, it was their main form of action. e-shift on the other hand was concentrated on policy change because in the long

¹²³ 「あれはあれで大事だと思いますよ。社会の中に異論があるということ、目で見える形にすることは必要なので。僕らも行ける時は行ってるけど。」

¹²⁴ 「原水禁が事務局になって、さようなら原発って年に2回大きな集会やってるじゃないですか。大江健三郎さんとか。あのあたりは古い人たちなんですけど、それなりにものすごいネットワークを持っている。そういう人たちのネットワークとか。」

run, there are things that cannot be achieved by protest, many things cannot be changed just by protesting, so we thought we'd support those working on policy change."¹²⁵

Still, there are also organizations that are members of e-shift and Kinkyū Kaigi simultaneously, so they overlap to a certain degree. Both networks are valued for their different qualities. While e-shift and Kinkyū Kaigi shared a similar orientation at the beginning, by the time I was doing my fieldwork, Kinkyū Kaigi was focused more heavily on the issues of nuclear workers and preventing the recommissioning of nuclear plants (SR20: 102):

"Through relations to people who participate in it [Kinkyū Kaigi], I would say that they put more emphasis on issues such as nuclear workers or stopping recommissioning."¹²⁶

e-shift's position in the broader movement is shaped by the fact that it has brought together for the first time organizations from different movement communities. Such exchange between the environmental and anti-nuclear fields had not occurred to this extent before, and now creates the possibility for the cross-fertilization of ideas thus to create new interdisciplinary discourses and actions (SR20: 52):

"Until now, environmental organizations such as FoE or Kikō Network [...] have worked separately from anti-nuclear organizations. It's significant that all of these got together, I think."¹²⁷

The broadness of the network and its many weak or transactional connections to diverse organizations, even the women's movement or the ODA and peace fields, makes it function like a pool in which different information flows together in a very general way (SR6: 86):

¹²⁵ 「緊急会議は [A] の人たちがベテランて呼んでただけで、わりと古くからやってる、どっちかっていうとかつきりとした組み立てをして、会費もと取って運営して行くという固い感じ、[...] どちらかという和政府への抗議的な、最初はね、今どうしてるか知らないけど、取り組みが多かったですよ、取り組みの柱として。e シフトのほうは逆に政策の転換というところが柱になっていたので感覚的にはやっぱり抗議だけでは生み出せないものもあるし、変えられないこともいっぱいあるので、政策転換というところに関わっていったほうがいいなというふうに思ったんです。」

¹²⁶ 「そっちは参加してる人の関係で、被爆労働の問題だとか再稼働阻止とか、そういうところもうちょっと重点を置いてるかなと思います。」

¹²⁷ 「環境団体と、FoE Japan だとか気候ネットワークだとか [...], そういうところと反原発の団体だとかが、今までは別に活動してたんですよ。それが一緒になったというのは意義があったと思っています。」

“Yeah, e-shift is, I think, the broadest network of NGOs working on nuclear power. And at the same time it’s basically a big mailing list. And it’s an exchange information forum. And all those action proposals or key information about what’s happening in the Diet and so on is delivered to the groups. And for example when something happened like for example the government is trying to export nuclear power to Turkey, and then one organization put up to this e-shift group for the petition idea. And then, just immediately we can collect one hundred or more supporting organizations and that kind of information sharing role.”

In this sense e-shift is also different from another network based on a mailing list, ‘epp’. The list evolved in the 2000s and was intended for developing an anti-nuclear energy policy, but was never connected to a forum for physical meetings. Aside from some movement organizations, it is composed mainly of academics and experts. The epp-mailing list is strategy-oriented while e-shift is oriented towards the question of how to turn policy ideas into action (SR18: 71; SR19: 69; SR20: 95).

Yet another important trait of e-shift is that it spreads expertise about possibilities how to influence the policy-making process among organizations and individuals that have never dabbled in this type of action before (SR14II: 23, MFN2). For example, e-shift provides training on how to write public comments on draft laws (MFN2: 25) and serves as a forum for gathering knowledge about action fields unknown to some member organizations, for example international connections in the nuclear industry (MFN6: 1).

4.2.4.2 Multiplexity

Through the connections of the single member organizations, e-shift is embedded in multiple layers of the broader movement community networks of its members and indirectly draws on the information and expertise flowing in these communities. As already indicated in the previous section, single members provide connections to the traditional as well as the progressive anti-nuclear protest movement, including anti-nuclear electricity company shareholder groups; local anti-nuclear lawsuit groups; their lawyer support networks; and other regional and urban anti-nuclear groups and networks. Through these networks e-shift actors have access to information concerning the regional situation, especially in those regions where nuclear power plants are located.

Another important connection is the environmental movement community. This community is composed of diverse organizational

types, including small local and urban environmental groups often focused on single or concrete local issues, approved NPOs, and internationally oriented NGOs who provide connections to the international civil society sphere. Many of the professionally organized environmental NPOs have good financial resources, a number of paid staff, and often work on multiple issues simultaneously. They often have experience with working on issues related to policy, disseminating information internationally about the situation in Japan, providing bridges to international media, and bringing in international expertise.

Drawing on their respective networks, organic food businesses and consumer organizations add their business expertise and consumer perspective to e-shift. In particular, they represent consumers' concerns about internal exposure to radiation through contaminated food. This group of organizations is interested in the prevention of another nuclear accident from a consumer and business perspective. They represent a very powerful discourse that connects to the daily lives of the people and draws attention to the economic effects of nuclear accidents. The connection to the field of consumer organizations is highly valued by e-shift members.

Through the alternative energy organizations, e-shift is also connected to networks of small citizen power stations, bigger alternative energy companies, as well as international business and civil networks promoting renewable energy worldwide. Peace groups and women's movement groups also provide linkages to their movement communities and bring in international expertise from the perspectives of their respective fields (EA1; SR1; SR4; SR5; SR10; SR11; SR12; SR13; SR14; SR15; SR17; SR18; SR19; P1; EFN3,6,11,20,21,22,24,29,33).

4.2.4.3 Cooperation and Conflict

e-shift has cooperative relations with the Citizen's Commission on Nuclear Energy (CCNE), the Shienhō Shimin Kaigi (SHSK), and the Mayors for a Nuclear Power-free Japan in particular. The CCNE is a network organization composed of academics and representatives of social movement organizations, and published the comprehensive report "Roadmap to a Nuclear Phase-Out Policy" in April 2014. The CCNE was initiated by the Takagi Fund, which had received an anonymous donation of a significant amount with the obligation to use it for a long-term anti-nuclear project and developed the idea for a Citizen's Commission on Nuclear Energy (Genshiryoku Shimin Iinkai) as an alternative to the governmental Nuclear Regulation Authority (Genshiryoku Kisei Iinkai) (cf. section 1.2.5) (SR8: 2):

“That is because after the Fukushima accident, the Japanese organizations for the promotion of nuclear power completely failed. For example the Nuclear Energy Commission didn’t do much and the Nuclear Safety Commission collapsed. So, the government needs to do some restructuring, but doesn’t do it. So if we were to continue with nuclear power, we wouldn’t be able to do it without restructuring, but because we are in a situation where this isn’t happening, we went ahead and organized an alternative nuclear energy commission, because it is necessary to have discussions and to make proposals. That is how we started.”¹²⁸

Many members of CCNE are also e-shift members; as already indicated, ideas on how to phase out nuclear power in Japan had been discussed within e-shift before the inauguration of the CCNE. However, the ideas produced within e-shift at that point have never been put into writing (SR19: 235), so it is difficult to establish a direct link leading from e-shift to CCNE. It can be assumed however that these ideas somehow resonated in the networks and contributed to the birth of the idea for the CCNE. While e-shift actors now insist that the “direction [of the CCNE] is different [from e-shift]”¹²⁹ in the sense that it is not a movement organization (*katsudō dantai*) (MFN4: 16), the two networks nevertheless cooperate closely. e-shift supported CCNE actively with the organization of the event where they first presented their “Roadmap” in April 2014; they held a joint inner-parliament assembly (EFN31; EFN34); and during four of the six observed e-shift meetings, there were updates on the progress of the CCNE’s activities (MFN1,2,4,5).

e-shift also shares a number of members with the Shienhō Shimin Kaigi (SHSK). Most importantly, FoE, the most central e-shift actor, is a leading figure in both networks and thus provides important bridges to SHSK. Most notably, e-shift and SHSK cooperated on e-shift booklet No. 5 on the right to evacuation, and held a joint seminar about the same issue (e-shift 2014). However, SHSK actors prefer to keep separate from e-shift’s

¹²⁸ 「やっぱり福島事故があった後、日本の原子力推進の組織っていうのが機能不全に陥っているの。例えば、原子力委員会がちゃんといろんなことできなくなってるし、原子力安全委員会もほとんど崩壊してしまったし。なので、本来であれば政府が立て直しのためのいろんなことをすべきなんだけど、できていないと。もし本当に原発を続けるんだったら、ちゃんと立て直さないで続けられるはずがないんだけど、それすらやっていないという状況だったので、やっぱりそれだったらオールタナティブな原子力委員会をこちらが先につくっていいこう、提案をしったり議論を持ちかけたりすべきだろうと。そういうことになって始まったんです。」

¹²⁹ 「方向性が違う」

main projects, because e-shift also cooperates with the 'old style' anti-nuclear movement groups that still have a violent image in large parts of Japanese society. Being associated with these people is, according to some SHSK members, counterproductive to their goal to protect children from radiation. e-shift actors respect this and so both sides keep cooperation to a minimum although information exchange is fluid (SR20: 116):

"The issues they work on are different and each [of the networks] has many pressuring tasks, so we have to hold meetings separately. Some of those working on victim support, there are mothers' organizations, and among these organizations there are people who do not want to get involved in the anti-nuclear field in a radical, visible way."¹³⁰

Besides these two networks, e-shift is very supportive of the Mayors for a Nuclear Power-free Japan (Datsu Genpatsu o Mezasu Kubichō Kaigi). This is a network of current and former mayors and elected leaders of local communities (101 members from 37 prefectures in August 2016) who have committed to working together towards the goal of nuclear phase-out.¹³¹ It is a political initiative at the lower level of the polity and is largely backed by civil society. A number of e-shift members are part of the strategic council of this network (Datsu Genpatsu o Mesazu Kubichō Kaigi 2016a, 2016b). One e-shift member supports the Mayors network by temporarily sharing office space with them (SR6: 42). e-shift members tend to speak in a hopeful tone about the mayor's initiative (SR6: 115):

"[...] we continue what we are doing and so, if you just look at newspapers about Japan, then everybody is writing that Abe is just overriding everything and that Japan will return to the pre-Fukushima situation, which is not true. So we continue on this local level and NGO level with our efforts and Fukushima people are also changing and Mayors are getting power from that, so I think we can expect gradual change."

¹³⁰ 「やっていることが違うというのと、それぞれにすごくやることもあるから、会議とは別に持たざるを得ないというのと、こっちの被災者支援をやっている人たちのなかは、例えばお母さんの団体だとかそういうところは、あまり過激に見えるかたちで反原発をやりたいくないという人もいたりして。」

¹³¹ Vogt (2013) indicates that network-building among local communities, but also between local communities and local civil society have increasingly gained influence on political agenda setting in Japan, especially when it comes to the socio-political participation of immigrants. But while cooperation between civil society and local authorities is increasing, only a few such instances can be found among civil actors and actors at higher levels of the polity.

At e-shift's meetings, regular updates are given on the Mayor network's activities as well as on their increasing number of members (MFN: 1–6). Moreover, e-shift and the Mayors cooperated intensively on the Nuclear Zeronomics campaign in 2013, for example, by organizing a joint symposium (EFN9). e-shift members also supported a group of mayors with the logistics of a study tour to Germany to learn about the situation of renewable energy there (EFN15). Thus, e-shift values the connection to the Mayors as a way to influence politics, and the Mayors draw on e-shift's expertise concerning nuclear phase-out and the shift towards renewable energy.

The ideas for the inauguration of the organizations Ryokuchakai and Shimin Denryoku Renraku Kai (People's Power Network) (cf. section 1.2.5) were both born out of e-shift discussions. And even though e-shift does not support these groups openly, information exchange is good (MFN1–6; EFN21).

Conflicts and rifts between e-shift and the broader movement show most clearly along ideational lines. Although e-shift does not actively organize protest events, it has good connections to labor union-led networks that organize 'old style' demonstrations as well as to networks organizing more 'progressive' demonstrations that seek to make participation attractive especially to the middle class and families with children. However, there are some 'old style' movement groups that adhere to radical leftist ideas, some of which demand more violent forms of action (EA1: 6; SR17: 77). Taking violent forms of action, however, is a taboo for e-shift as well as for the protest groups they cooperate with. One e-shift member stated that they cooperated with most other groups except for those with which they did "not share the same feeling" (SR13: 146).¹³²

According to a discussion among e-shift members at a regular meeting, there are some traditional anti-nuclear groups that deny the causality between CO₂ emissions and climate change. These groups believe that the rhetoric about the danger of climate change through CO₂ emissions has been invented by the government in order to continue using nuclear power as a 'clean' source of energy. For these groups, fossil fuels represent a viable alternative to nuclear power (MFN6: 1). This contradicts strongly with e-shift's quest for a shift to renewable energy as the only sustainable way to phase-out nuclear power. In fact, they launched an initiative to start a campaign on the issue of nuclear power and climate change (SR20: 86):

¹³² 「気持ちが通じない団体」

“In April, the third part of the IPPC¹³³ report was sent through the mailing list and in that report nuclear power was mentioned and an exchange about this was started by people who have been involved in the anti-nuclear field for a long time. And so there was an exchange with [A] and [B], two people working on climate change, saying that this is no reason to promote nuclear power. So we proposed doing something about the issue also because around the same time, industrial actors and Keidanren¹³⁴ were starting to say that because of climate change it was necessary to recommission.”¹³⁵

As one would assume, there is also a major rift and no cooperation between groups favoring a participatory political process and groups from the right/far right that favor a top-down political process (EFN3; EFN11) – even if there are also rightist groups in favor of abandoning nuclear power.¹³⁶

4.2.5 RELATIONS TO THE OUTSIDE

The relational patterns to outside actors such as the political arena and broader society, and the way in which participation in the political process is possible for movement actors (directly in exchange with political actors or indirectly through positive resonances in society) are formative for movement internal relations and have a decisive influence on a movement's action profile. The next two subsections delineate e-shift's relations to political actors as well as to broader society.

¹³³ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. This panel assesses climate change under the supervision of the United Nations Environmental Program and the World Meteorological Organization.

¹³⁴ The Japan Business Federation is the biggest economic organization in Japan and is an important actor when it comes to economic policies.

¹³⁵ 「メーリングリストの中で、IPPCの報告書の第3部回のレポートが4月に出た、それでその中に原子力と書いてあったんだけど、これはどんなのかという投げ掛けが、ずっと反原発をやってきた人からあったんですね。それに対して、[A]さんとか[B]さんとか、温暖化をやってきた人たちから、全然原発を推進してるわけじゃないですよというやり取りがあって。ちょうど産業界、経団連とかも、温暖化のためにも再稼働が必要というような言い方をされてきているので、やっとなんかいいんじゃないかなというふうに提案して。」

¹³⁶ Hariya (2012), a right-wing ideologue, argues in his book *Nuclear Phase-Out from the Right* (Migi kara no Datsu Genpatsu), that the right and left should stage joint demonstrations for nuclear phase-out because for him this single issue requires no overarching ideology. However, he also describes conflicts between people from the right and left backgrounds concerning the use of the Japanese national flag at demonstrations. I confirmed this conflict in conversations during participant observation of demonstrations during my fieldwork.

4.2.5.1 Relations to the Political Arena

As already indicated in the previous sections, e-shift's main target is the policy-making process, especially energy-related policy (cf. section 4.1.1). To reach this goal, they apply an action repertoire including petitions, policy proposals, public comments on draft laws, lobbying of parliamentarians and other politicians, inner-parliament assemblies, as well as question-and-answer-sessions with the ministries. Thus, in general, their relationship to the political arena is confrontational. Yet, network members could not organize inner-parliament assemblies or question-and-answer sessions¹³⁷ without supportive parliamentarians, nor would they be able to participate in government advisory councils if they did not have some cooperative ties as well.

e-shift has particularly cooperative relations to two diet members: one from the Social Democratic Party, the other one without party affiliation. One of them has a long history with the anti-nuclear movement and the other has long been involved with establishing green policies. One of them describes their relations to civil society this way (P1: 10):

“I myself am involved with the anti-nuclear movement, I have been a parliamentarian for 15 years now and I have done a lot of questioning and question-and-answer sessions with the anti-nuclear movement. So I have connections to regional movements all over the country [...].”¹³⁸

Often at least one of them is involved with setting up events taking place in the Diet buildings. Especially in the case of question-and-answer sessions, the responsibility of the Diet members to ensure correct procedure is high. To organize a session, the Diet member needs to hand in a list with questions to the concerned ministry; they must also arrange a date and place. The ministry then arranges for staff to be present who are able to answer the questions submitted. The question list, as well as the necessary background information, is usually prepared by movement members and handed to the parliamentarians and/or their secretaries in advance. During the sessions, the parliamentarian is often present at the

¹³⁷ According to an interviewee, e-shift never does question-and-answer sessions as e-shift. However, member organizations are frequently involved in this kind of action and this is how these events are posted on the website. However, the interviewee does not give further explanation for this (SR20: 61).

¹³⁸ 「私自身も反原発であって運動には関わってきていて、国会議員になったのが15年前なんです、反原発でいろんな質問をしたり行政交渉をしたりっていうのはやってきているんですね。ですから、全国各地のいろんな運動とつながっていた [...]」

beginning and/or the end and addresses some words to the ministry personnel, usually explaining the reason for the session or insisting on the urgency to do something about the discussed issue. In cases where less pressing issues are discussed or if the parliamentarian is busy otherwise, he or she may leave the supervision of the event to a secretary (SR14II: 8):

“[...] those meetings are actually a briefing for the Diet member. That’s what it is. It’s not like, it’s not government meeting NGOs. The list of questions is actually officially from [a Diet member’s] office. They take that form. I mean, for the government, as far as the government is concerned, it’s from the Diet office. Because then, they have to answer. It’s not like Diet members saying, oh, a bunch of NGOs have these questions, can you please answer. They would not spend government staff time on that. So, officially it’s that. So, [the Diet member] shows up, but it is understood that the Diet member might not necessarily show up. [Yesterday for example], [the Diet member] was busy, so [the Diet member] came at the very beginning. Sometimes [the Diet member] is there for a while. But the staffer is there. But it’s gotten so routine that maybe even the staffer will leave and it’s just, you know, and it’s just us but officially it’s for the Diet office.”

Understandably, movement actors have almost collegial relations to some of the secretaries. Question-and-answer sessions however can develop into strained discussions or even verbal fights between movement actors and ministry staff, and are thus highly confrontational in character (EFN24; EFN29).

For inner-parliament assemblies in the Diet buildings, movement actors also need the support of parliamentarians to organize the room and security permissions for participants from outside. At such assemblies movement actors invite speakers (experts, directly affected people, sometimes also Diet members or ministry staff) on a certain issue and other Diet members and press are invited. The atmosphere among the presenters at such events is usually positive although the discussions can become emotional depending on the issue and the degree of personal affectedness of the speakers (EFN20; EFN32; EFN34).

e-shift also has a cooperative relationship with an alliance of parliamentarians (*giin renmei*) named the Alliance for Nuclear Zero (Genpatsu Zero no Kai), a multipartisan group of parliamentarians working together towards nuclear phase-out. This group got together for the first time one year after the nuclear accident, in March 2012. By March 2016 the group had 76 members from eight parties. The Alliance for Nuclear Zero cooperates with experts in the energy policy field and regularly holds

preparatory meetings for the Diet's Energy Investigation Conference (Kokkai Enerugī Chōsa Kai Junbi Kai). The other regular member at these preparatory meetings is the NPO ISEP (see previous sections), from a civil society background, which functions as a bridge to e-shift (Genpatsu Zero no Kai 2015). One of the members of the Alliance is Kan Naoto, former Prime Minister at the time of the nuclear accident, who is now an active supporter of the anti-nuclear movement and who sometimes joins events organized by e-shift (Kan 2015). The Alliance for Nuclear Zero also includes politicians from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Prime Minister Abe, which generally promotes nuclear energy. According to an internal party opinion poll the number of LDP members for nuclear phase-out comes to 50 lawmakers. Their names are kept secret except for a few who have openly voiced their opinion (EFN15: 23; EFN20: 72)¹³⁹ – but even these members are reluctant to join forces with civil society actors (SR20: 63; MFN2: 22,23). One of the most prominent LDP members who promotes nuclear phase-out is Kōno Tarō, but he is described as being 'labeled' within his party (SR14II: 17–19):

"Yeah, I think, e-shift, [is] more connected with the, well one is, there is around Kōno Tarō [...]. But then, there's a broader, you know when they did a poll on LDP Diet members there were a fair number that said that they should phase out. [...] And Kōno Tarō has been very active, LDP. But he's sort of labeled.¹⁴⁰ Of course you know, in the LDP. [...] In the LDP, of course he is. It's like he speaks, yeah of course, because it's him. But in the LDP when there's several other LDP members start to talk then it's a completely different issue, you know. I mean we already had the former LDP leader Koizumi¹⁴¹ now going like that. And then if you have current LDP members starting to voice various concerns it's very powerful."

In general, e-shift members find it difficult to influence the policy-making process at the national level (EFN1: 6; EFN20). There are not many chances for them to make their voices heard, and as for the chances they get – for example making public comments on draft laws – are easily disregarded by the administration (SR5: 71–77):

¹³⁹ e. g. Koizumi Junichirō and Kōno Tarō.

¹⁴⁰ Here the interview partner means labeled in the sense of being the one 'anti-nuclear person' in the party. After being promoted to Minister of State for Science and Technology in October 2015, however, Kōno closed down his anti-nuclear web blog.

¹⁴¹ Prime Minister of Japan from 2001 to 2006.

“A big one was in summer last year, the ‘citizens’ discussion on energy environment’. Citizens could choose among three possibilities that had been introduced by the government: zero by 2013, 15 %, or 15–20 %, and a citizens’ discussion was held on that. Because the government was nice enough to ask us, we decided to assemble as many opinions or public comments as possible, we held discussion forums all over the country, had government people speak directly to people and so on. [...] The biggest one was the action to call for public comments. In the end, we gathered more than 89,000 public comments. [...] We gathered voices for a nuclear power phase-out by 2030, but in September last year, it was decided to have even more policy options for discussion. And then [the Diet session] was closed and we had elections, and in December we got the Abe administration. And they said they would revise the nuclear zero plan from scratch.”¹⁴²

While under DPJ-rule, e-shift held study sessions with bureaucracy personnel and even talked to the State Minister for National Strategy once in 2012. The situation has completely changed under the Abe administration. The lack of accessibility to national policy-making is the reason for working hard to establish ties with mayors and prefectural politicians, who in turn will hopefully establish ties to national politicians (SR15: 87; SR4: 63; SR12: 77; SR6: 36,111,114; SR4: 37,44; EFN15: 12,24,25; EFN20: 64).

Another factor that influences the relationship between movement actors and the political sphere is the so-called State Secrecy Law (Himitsu Hogohō), which went into effect in December 2014 and which significantly increases the legal punishment for leakage of information designated as ‘state secrets’ (Repeta 2013, 2014). The law also does not include a parliamentary control mechanism so, as many activists fear: “What’s a secret? That’s a secret!”¹⁴³ (EFN12). Although it has always been difficult

¹⁴² 「[...] 大きかったのは去年の夏「エネルギー環境の国民的議論」というのがあったんですね。2030 年に向けて原発をゼロにするのか、15 パーセント維持するのか、20 ~ 25 パーセント維持するのかという三つの選択肢を政府が提示して、それに対して国民的議論というのをを行う。せっかくそんなわざわざ政府から聞いてくれるということがあるので、できる限り意見を出そう、パブリックコメントを出そうとか、各地で意見交換会を開いて、政府の人を呼んで直接話を聞いてもらうとか。[...] 特に大きかったのは、そのパブリックコメントを出そうというアクションだったと思います。結果的には 8 万 9000 件以上のパブコメが集まったということが言えます。[...] こういう声が集まって、何とか 2030 年代までに原発をゼロにしていくために、あらゆる政策支援を投入するということが、去年 9 月決まったんですね。だけれども、その後解散して選挙があって、安倍政権になって 12 月ですね。この原発ゼロの方針をゼロから見直すというふうに言ったんですね。」

¹⁴³ 「何が秘密？それは秘密！」

to access sensitive information about nuclear related issues from the authorities, this has become even more difficult because movement members as well as government staff will be twice as careful about the questions they ask and the information they release; they thus have a sense of crisis (SR4: 97):

“Of course, if the Secrecy Law is established, many things in the field of nuclear power will be designated secret, so we have a feeling of crisis in that sense.”¹⁴⁴

Another interviewee describes the problems related to the law in this way (SR2: 107):

“It [the law] is problematic, I think. The danger is high, that the freedom of speech and especially the right to know will be damaged. And also that we don’t know what kind of information will be declared secret. And that when somebody tries to access [this information] there is very strict punishment attached to it; what the government is doing is, it is very much taking 3.11 as a pretense and there are many problems, which makes it extremely important that civil society has the possibility to check that things are going the right way.”¹⁴⁵

However, there are also optimistic civil voices. Although the law represents a risk to civil activities, it also triggered broad public protest including anti-nuclear activists. There will be ways around it, such people say (SR6: 119):

“Of course, that [Secrecy Law] is very dangerous in terms of the potential risk of, how do you say, containing or preventing any type of civil activity and so on. But in the near term, to my surprise, this Secrecy Law reactivated anti-government movement. [...] to me it was really a surprise that the same people who have been fighting against nuclear power are talking about the Secrecy Law. [...] I don’t think it’s a start of a dark age like that, you know. And we have so

¹⁴⁴ 「当然秘密保護法ができれば、原子力分野も秘密になることが多くなるでしょうから、そういう意味でちょっと危機感というか。」

¹⁴⁵ 「問題だと思います。やっぱり表現の、特に知る権利と、侵害する危険性も高いです。それからいろんな情報を非常にどういうものが秘密になるか全く分からないまま、この秘密にしてしまうと。それにアクセスしようとしても、それに対して非常に厳しい罰則を付けるということで、政府のやっていることが非常に 3.11 を契機として、非常に問題が多くて、市民社会によるチェック、監視それを正していくということは、非常に重要なことなんですけれども。」

much international technology like Wikileaks and so on to break the barrier. So if they start like imposing this law, then we need to create some kind of hacking technology and so on.”

On top of the difficulty in accessing policy-making, civil society actors like e-shift and its partners in the political sphere feel that politicians do not have the influence they should have in a functioning democracy (EFN20: 74), and that the influence of bureaucrats and industrial actors on policy is traditionally very strong (SR10: 20):

“Ah, well, the old energy strategy, giving priority to nuclear expansion has a significant inertia in the bureaucracy and amongst the politicians. The bureaucracy and the politicians have formulated the strategy; the strategy has been implemented in collaboration with electric power companies and parts of the vendor industry, the nuclear reactor suppliers in Japan. They have been very tightly connected [...]”

Some find the reason for the weakness of the Japanese democracy in the lack of the Japanese public's ability to think critically (MFN5: 1). This ability is in their view not appropriately taught in the educational system, which is also guided by government policy (CM1: 133):

“We really need more people do things properly, I think. And that is not only in the field of nuclear power. That we're the ones who make democracy happen, that we're the players in a democracy, that kind of consciousness has no place in our education and we're not taught about it. In primary school, middle school, and in high school there is a negative image attached to being such a player, so, expecting from them once they are full members of the society to take up the responsibility of being the keeper of democracy, that's impossible, right?”¹⁴⁶

Thus, for e-shift, the political arena is a most contentious space, one that negatively reflects the state of democracy in Japan as a whole. Nevertheless, the actors rely on their political partners for access to this sphere and nurse these relationships in order to take the most advantage possible of the limited spaces given to them.

¹⁴⁶ 「もっと本気でやる人が増えていかなきゃいけないと思うんですよ。で、それは、別に原発のことじゃなかったって、そうなんです。自分たちが、民主主義を支えているとか、民主主義のプレーヤーであるとか、そういう認識が、やっぱり教育の中にないので、そういうことを全く教えられない。プレーヤーになることを、ネガティブにイメージつけられて、小学校、中学校、高校、大学と、ボンと社会に出てきた人たちに、民主主義を支えるのは、あなた方だって言っちゃって、無理でしょう？」

4.2.5.2 Relations to Society

For most social movements in democratically organized societies, a large supporter basis within the broader society is essential to legitimize and reinforce their claims, and to maximize their impact on the political sphere. e-shift, too, aims at establishing good relations to society, to make their arguments known, spread their ideas, and to gain new supporters (cf. section 4.1.1).

According to a number of interviewees, the most significant change since March 2011 has been the change in public opinion towards favoring a nuclear power phase-out. The Fukushima accident raised public awareness about the problems with nuclear power to a level not experienced before and thus significantly empowers the movement as a whole (SR11: 86; SR4: 93). An older movement activist remarks (SR11: 122):

“The fact that an accident like this could happen is very deplorable especially for us long-term activists. It means that if we had been stronger we might have prevented it. This is what we often think.”¹⁴⁷

Since March 2011, however, besides long-term activists, there are also people participating in demonstrations who never did before. Participant numbers went up, and it seems as though participation in social movements in general has gained a certain degree of approval in broader society compared to before the Fukushima accident (SR5: 107):

“There have been demonstrations before, too, but since 3.11 there are more people interested, including regular mothers and younger people, I think. Especially last year [2012] between 100.000 and 200.000 people came to the rallies and at that time there were many normal people. Recently, you could say that the number of such people has decreased, but it is astonishing that it has continued for more than two years, and there are still people who are just starting to be active, so I think, that probably citizen’s movements reached some sort of acceptance [in the society].”¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁷ 「ただやっぱりああいう事故が起きてしまったことは、僕ら昔からやっている人間は非常に残念でしょうがない。残念というのは、もっとわれわれに力があれば止められたんじゃないかと、というふうな思いがいっぱいある。」

¹⁴⁸ 「以前からデモとかもあったと思うんですけど、3.11の後本当に普通のお母さんとか、若い人も含めて関心を持つ人が増えたと思います。特に去年は20万人とか10万人とかそういう人が、デモや集会に集まりましたし、そのときに普通の人も多かったし。最近はそのような人が少なくなってきているとも言われるんですけど、それでも2年以上続いているということはすごいですし、最近になって新たに始めるという人も多いですし、市民運動が少しは身近になってきているんじゃないかなと思います。」

Nevertheless, a certain threshold to participation remains. Sometimes people react rather fearfully to encounters with demonstrators. At one instance during participant observation, a woman with little children who appeared to be surprised by a demonstration while on a shopping trip gave the impression of wanting to get away as quickly as possible (EFN11).

Even so, the Fukushima accident has significantly raised awareness about the dangers of nuclear power in society as a whole (SR11: 118; P1: 42). And so, besides using mass as well as internet-based media (for a detailed analysis of the movement actor's handling of the press see Wiemann 2017), some e-shift members also hold speeches and workshops at universities in order to reach a younger public (SR20: 85).

The increasing awareness about the danger of nuclear power has also changed the perception of anti-nuclear activists in some parts of the society. One e-shift member stated that before 3.11 neighbors often showed a skeptical attitude towards the member's activities, but that ever since, they had started showing recognition for the member's work (SR14: FN). Still, e-shift members struggle with how best to give a voice and a forum to people who have not as yet been involved in movement activities (SR14: 23):

"[...] there are some things that we know are needed but we don't know, yeah, we don't have the expertise, so we don't know how to go about doing them. Like this, how to keep up alive, how to give voice or forums to people that are concerned. Like there's 70 % that want to phase out nuclear power, 10 % of those could be people that might become active. And they are not because only 1 % of them is; because there is no forum."

There is a major difficulty for e-shift actors to keep up the activity and to engage people permanently, especially because people feel that their voices are continuously disregarded by political actors (SR14; EFN1: 8).

According to e-shift actors, another difficulty is establishing a counter-discourse to the government-supported argument that Japan's economy would suffer without nuclear power (SR12: 105; EFN9). When all of Japan's nuclear power stations were temporarily taken off the grid for safety checks in May 2012 and the economy did not regress as much as predicted, there was a new realization that a nuclear-free economic system might be possible (SR6: 30):

"And also it was really good that in May, we once came to zero nuclear power operation. And also, for the past three years already, the summers have been very, very hot. I was born in Tōkyō and grew

up in Tōkyō. But I think, these past few years, the summer was really crazily hot. But basically, we survived. And we, so, the people are getting aware that we may not need nuclear power, like that.”

Still, in the 2012 general lower house elections, citizens voted in favor of a – as many felt – promising economic agenda promised by the LDP and Prime Minister Abe. This was a major setback for the movement. Many activists find it contradictory that despite an increasing awareness of the danger of nuclear power, many voted for an agenda that clearly includes the continuation and promotion of nuclear energy. This outcome is why e-shift launched its Nuclear Zeronomics campaign which, with the help of the mascot Zeronomikuma, a green bear with a black zero on its belly (cf. 4.1.2.3.1), clearly addresses younger people (SR5: 75; EFN1: 6). The inability to transfer the awareness about the danger of nuclear power into voting behavior of the majority, as well as a spreading nationalistic feeling in the country, is demotivating for many e-shift actors (SR6: 36).

Many e-shift members, especially recognized NPOs, also stated that although they experienced a temporary increase in donations, there was no significant increase in membership numbers (SR5: 103; SR15: 161; SR13: 330). In spite of an increasing awareness of and appreciation for the movement, as well as temporarily high numbers of demonstrators, large parts of society did not change their behavioral patterns.

Yet another issue is the disparity between the populations in the large urban centers and in rural areas. Most nuclear power plants in Japan are sited in a certain distance from the industrial centers¹⁴⁹ and these regions and communities rely greatly on the income from nuclear power stations and the jobs they provide (SR8: 87):

“What became clear when we did meetings for opinion exchange in the regions was that there are many people who are worried about

¹⁴⁹ According to Onitsuka (2011), most Japanese nuclear reactors are geographically concentrated in economically weak rural areas (e.g. at the coastline of Fukushima prefecture, the Wakasa Gulf Coast of Fukui prefecture and in Niigata prefecture). He sees this as a result of the Japanese central government's influence on local governments through the subsidies it allocates to those rural communities. Onitsuka states that about 70 % of the budget of the local authorities comes from the central government and that this income often “come[s] with strings attached”, i.e. the community must accept the nuclear facilities. In many of the nuclear regions, nuclear facilities have become the only driving economic force – often suppressing any other kind of economic development – so that these regions find themselves in a situation of nuclear dependency.

[their regions] being ok without nuclear power stations. This is mainly out of economic concerns.”¹⁵⁰

Among the population of these regions, the dependence on the income from nuclear facilities results in reluctance to adopt an anti-nuclear attitude (EFN31). In most of the nuclear regions – Fukui prefecture is a typical example – no or only a very small and unstable local anti-nuclear movement¹⁵¹ exists (SR4: 67–69):

“There are weak places, too. Fukui for example is not strong at all. [...] When there are so many [nuclear power plants], there is a lot of nuclear money, and this leads to a situation where one cannot really say something clearly, and the movement is also not [strong].”¹⁵²

In Fukushima prefecture, which suffers most from the consequences of the recent nuclear disaster, the local anti-nuclear movement had previously been rather weak. Now, an ongoing taboo of nuclear related topics still makes it difficult for local activists to act openly (SR8: 29):

“Well, in Fukushima, there is a strong atmosphere in which residents, even among each other in every-day life, cannot talk about their concerns. On the surface, this atmosphere is like: everything’s ok, let’s happily do our best. Of course, nobody really thinks like that, but it is difficult to talk about it. I mean, in Fukushima prefecture, everybody is anti-nuclear, residents included. So the issue itself is not being discussed. What they worry about most are health issues and what will become of the people who cannot return.”¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ 「各地の意見交換会をやってだいぶはっきりしてきたのは、原発がなくて大丈夫だろうかっていうふうに心配する人がすごく多い。それは経済的な心配が一番多いですね。」

¹⁵¹ In his works, Aldrich (2005a, 2005b, 2008a, 2008b) interprets this as a result of successful strategies by the Japanese central government to further weaken civil society, already judged as weak in places where nuclear facilities are sited.

¹⁵² 「弱い所もある、やっぱり。福井なんかはあんまり強くないですね。[...] あんなにたくさんあると原発マネーが非常に多くて、大体あんまりはっきりと物を言えない状況になっていて、運動もあんまり。」

¹⁵³ 「やっぱり福島では、今なかなか住民同士で普通の生活の中で、心配に思っていることを口に出せないっていう雰囲気がすごく。もう大丈夫だから、みんなて明るく頑張ろうというのが表の雰囲気。みんな、必ずしもそう思ってるわけではないんですけども、やっぱりそのことを言い出しにくい。それから、福島県に関して言うともんな反原発なので、住民の人たちも含めて。だから、あんまりそのこと自体は議論にならない。一番、みんな心配してるのは健康問題や、それから帰れない人たちがこれからどうなるのかっていうのを。」

Yet other victims complain that the Tōkyō-based anti-nuclear movement does not care enough about their issues and only concentrates on energy policy-related questions (SR6: 31):

“[...] there is always a tension between Fukushima and Tōkyō. And the Fukushima people are basically needing support for their lives. And Tōkyō people are more focused on politics. And sometimes Fukushima people see those Tōkyō anti-nuclear people as, how do you say, irresponsible, or not fully taking care of the victims and so on. And there is a very unhealthy tension.”

In general then, the anti-nuclear movement has gained standing amongst the population, although some reservations remain. For e-shift, establishing good ties that ensure the flow of ideas to the public is one of their major objectives; public support for their actions in turn legitimizes their existence. Yet, e-shift members encounter difficulties with reaching out to society and the permanent mobilization of new participants remains a difficult task. While e-shift members feel empowered by the prevailing anti-nuclear public opinion, they are demotivated that this does not show in election results.

4.3 NETWORK EMERGENCE

Both coalitional networks that serve as cases for the present study emerged from within a comprehensive wave of civil action that arose after Fukushima. The next sections describe the civil networking that occurred in the energy-related field after the disaster, and then trace the emergence of e-shift.

4.3.1 CIVIL NETWORKING

Immediately after the news of the nuclear disaster became known, movement organizations became active. Already-existing organizations with expertise on the health impact of radiation, as well as alternative evaluations of the situation at the Fukushima nuclear power plant, were in the focus of public attention. They were intensively contacted by the media and invited by groups all over the country to speak (SR3: 132; SR4: 14).

Besides e-shift, in the energy-related field a couple of other cooperative networks came into being such as the above-mentioned Kinkyū Kaigi, Sayōnara Genpatsu, or the Metropolitan Coalition Against Nukes (MCAN). Relatively soon after the nuclear disaster, in Tōkyō two policy-oriented networks (e-shift and Kinkyū Kaigi) as well as two public

protest-oriented coalitional networks (Sayōnara Genpatsu and MCAN) were in place. Kinkyū Kaigi and Sayōnara Genpatsu can be counted as part of the 'old style', traditional anti-nuclear movement while e-shift and MCAN can be seen as more progressive members of the movement – despite all these networks being interrelated in one way or the other (SR17: 108; EA1: 6; SR20: 98).

An important event that brought many organizations and other important anti-nuclear actors actively together, and also provided connections to international civil society, was the Global Conference for a Nuclear Power Free World (Datsu Genpatsu Sekai Kaigi). This event was organized in Yokohama by Peace Boat, drawing on its broad national and international network, in January 2012.¹⁵⁴ Peace Boat was motivated to organize this event because the first anti-nuclear demonstrations organized by Sayōnara Genpatsu in summer 2011 drew about 60.000 participants, which for them represented a huge number of participants for a country like Japan (SR6: 27–29):

“[Our organization] has always been in a wide coalition of NGOs and the organizer organized more than 60.000 people in September which was really big as a Japanese standard. [...] And [...] it was really enormous. And, at that time, we thought, something needs to follow. At that time the organizers worked so hard and successfully organized that big event. But they don't have and we don't have any longer term strategy. And organizing people is the first thing. [...] And then the idea came up of holding an international event because the strength of [our organization] is having an international network of citizens.”

Besides Peace Boat, members of the organizing team included ISEP, Green Action, CNIC, FoE Japan, and Greenpeace: some of what became the core members of e-shift. The organizers also invited a number of mayors to this conference. When these mayors met for the first time in the back room before a planned panel discussion, they decided to launch an anti-nuclear mayors' initiative. These mayors then became the founding members of the Mayors for a Nuclear Power-free Japan (SR6: 54; Datsu Genpatsu o Mesazu Kubichō Kaigi 2015). The two-day conference was concluded by a demonstration organized and supported by MCAN.

¹⁵⁴ Peace Boat organized a second Global Conference in December 2012, held simultaneously in Hibiya (Tōkyō) and Kōriyama city (Fukushima prefecture). This conference was planned to be a counter-action to an event organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but it was much smaller in scale than the first Conference.

Besides these purely civil initiatives, a network of civil and political actors emerged at about the same time as e-shift, a network named ene shifu¹⁵⁵ Japan. ene shifu Japan was a multipartisan network of parliamentarians and citizens who held joint study groups in the Diet buildings. In some instances, ene shifu and e-shift held joint press conferences. At one of the study groups, ene shifu invited Kan Naoto, Prime Minister at the time, and Son Masayoshi, the CEO of Softbank, one of the biggest telecommunication companies in Japan. They both made anti-nuclear statements, attracting a lot of attention from the mass media. However, this network dissolved as elections loomed in December 2012 because members realized that as long as voting behavior does not change, the Diet will not change either (CM2: 130–138):

“ene shifu Japan was a study group held by Diet members of all parties together with citizens and it held study sessions in the Diet buildings. e-shift is a union of NGOs. But ene shifu held press conferences or made opinion papers together with e-shift; in a quite aggressive way. [The reason why ene shifu dissolved] was the goal, well, because we realized that what we thought was the problem wasn't really the problem. The problem wasn't in the Diet, the problem was the voting behavior. No matter how much we do study meetings [in the Diet], if we do not work on the voting behavior, there is no meaning to it.”¹⁵⁶

Thus, in the wake of the Fukushima disaster, movement organizations built large cooperative networks among themselves as well as with actors in the political sphere. While some of these collaborations only served the purpose of organizing one-time events, other networks were founded on the occasion of such events. Other groups started off with a certain vision but later realized that they needed to change their focus and dissolved. In this general atmosphere of civil and political forces joining for change, e-shift came into being.

¹⁵⁵ Abbreviation for the Japanese pronunciation of the English term ‘energy shift’, ‘*enerujī shifuto*’, thus, ene shifu.

¹⁵⁶ 「エネシフジャパンというのは超党派の国会議員と一般市民が一緒に作る勉強会で、いつも議員会館の中で勉強会をやるというので。イーシフトっていうのは NGO の連合なの。だけどいつもエネシフジャパン [...] がイーシフトと一緒に記者会見開いたり、意見書出したり、かなりアグレッシブにやって。[...] [エネシフが止まった理由は]、問題がここにあるというのが、ここに問題があるんじゃないくて、こっちに問題があるっていうことに気づいてしまったので。だから議会の中に問題があるというよりは、投票行動のほうに問題があるから。いくら勉強会をやっても、ちゃんと投票行動をやらないんだったら、意味がない。」

4.3.2 THE EMERGENCE OF E-SHIFT

Immediately after the nuclear disaster became obvious, FoE, the most central e-shift organization became active. After some internal discussions, they started exchanging with some of their closest partner organizations, ones they knew from previous collaborations (e.g. on nuclear exports and climate change). Most of these also became central actors in the network-coalition. These first discussions with other organizations spawned the idea for an open civil forum to debate about the issues ahead (SR20: 4):

“At the beginning we talked with FoE, CNIC, and ISEP, and we said let’s first have a meeting and so we had a meeting on March 31. At that time, we called upon many different people using different existing networks; we talked to different environmental organizations and citizens’ organizations and had this meeting. This became the kickoff and we said: On what day do we want to have the next meeting in April? Since then, we meet once a month.”¹⁵⁷

A group of organizations used existing mailing lists including environmental as well as other anti-nuclear citizen networks to organize their first meeting on March 31, 2011. One of the mailing lists used to call for participation was ‘epp’, a mailing list organized around the year 2000 to exchange strategies for nuclear phase-out (SR14: 43). Some other members were contacted by telephone (SR11: 189). One of the core members describes the way in which the network-coalition came together as a natural process (SR12: 61):

“[...] in the case of e-shift, we kind of came together naturally”.¹⁵⁸

The first meeting took place in a small room in Rengo Kaikan, which was stuffed with people (SR17: 82; SR19: 215). There, they organized the next meeting (in April 2011) and decided to meet regularly. The negotiations about action content were pre-structured by the main action fields of the core members: nuclear phase-out and energy shift (SR19: 217):

¹⁵⁷ 「最初、FoEと資料室と ISEP が話して、じゃあとにかく一度ミーティングをもちましようと言って、3月31日にミーティングをもったんですね。そのときに、いろんな人に声を掛けようということで、既にいろんなネットワークがあるので、いろんな環境団体とか市民団体に声を掛けて、ミーティングをもったと。それがきっかけで、じゃあ次のミーティングは4月の何日にしようと言って。以来、月に1回集まっているといった感じです。」

¹⁵⁸ 「自然発生的に集まってる感じがするんですけどね、eシフトの場合は。」

“Turning things over and over in our discussions, we wanted to do something, and people said that it’s important to make a solid nuclear phase-out policy and so the making of a citizens’ energy policy became our first topic. And that is also why our name is Citizens’ Assembly for the Realization of a Nuclear Phase-Out and a New Energy Policy.”¹⁵⁹

These were two issues that all participants felt needed addressing, as no movement unifying these issue areas had existed before then. However, there were also many other study or research projects discussed, such as electricity costs or climate change, which had also received minimal attention from organizations thus far. That the main form of action became making policy proposals was predetermined by the leadership of FoE which took this activity into their professional hands (SR12: 68):

“So many different NGOs and citizens’ groups came together, and I don’t think that a movement for nuclear phase-out and energy shift existed before 3.11. After 3.11, many citizens and all the NGOs felt that they had to do something, that something needed to be done, in that sense we came together naturally, and with the help of FoE which is a very strong administrator, we could make many policy proposals. It is this kind of space where many issues are studied to make policy proposals [...]. There were many different study projects such as electricity costs which we had only thought about so far on a small scale but there are many hidden costs, and also the risk of accidents, the risk of climate change, and we aim at studying these issues thoroughly [...]”¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁹ 「ああだこうだ議論して、で、何かをやっていくかっていうのでやっぱりその脱原発の政策をしっかりとつくっていくっていうことが大事じゃないかって話になって、それでその市民のエネルギー政策をつくるっていうのを最初のテーマにした。だから脱原発、新しいエネルギー政策を実現する会って、そういう名前になったんですよ。」

¹⁶⁰ 「ああいう複数のNGOあるいは市民団体が集まって、こういう脱原発あるいはエネルギーシフト目指そうっていう動きは、3.11 前はなかったと思うんですよ。やっぱり 3.11 が起きて、それをもうやらざるを得ないというか、やるべきだということを市民も感じたし、各 NGO も感じて、そういう意味では自然発生的に集まったと、で、まあ FoE Japan の強力な事務局体制のもとにいろいろなそういう政府提言をすることができたと、そういう場ですよ、そういう、政策提言をするためのいろいろな検討する[...]いくつか検討プロジェクトがあって、例えば発電コストというのは今までは非常に狭い範囲で考えてたけども、実は内部化されていないいろいろなコストがあって、その事故のいろんなリスクとか、気候変動のリスクとか、そういうのもちゃんと検討しましょうみたいなこともやりました [...]。」

Around June 2011, e-shift held its first big event. The idea for this event was born on April 11 at Earth Day, an annual event in Tōkyō's Yoyogi Park where environmental groups and alternative businesses represent themselves with booths and small discussion forums. On this occasion, it became clear that the annual Tōkyō Peace Film Festival (Tōkyō Heiwa Eigasai) scheduled for June had been cancelled. So e-shift took over the hall where the Festival was supposed to take place and organized an event with speakers from renewable energy and other scientific backgrounds. Despite the short lead time for the event, it became a success with about 700 participants (SR19: 221–229):

“The first [event] we organized was, well on March 11 we had the disaster and accident, and e-shift came together and discussions started, and I think we started to talk about it [an event] in April already and on June 11, we organized a big event. In a hall for 800 people. The story how we got there was that in April there was the Earth Day. And we wanted to do something big for the Earth Day. And around that time it became known that [A] had rented a hall in Yoyogi. That is the person who organizes the film festival. That is the Tōkyō International Film Festival and it always takes place in the National Olympic Youth Memorial Center; that is the name of the hall. So this person had rented it for June 11, but it was called off, so the hall was free. And the person said ‘I wanted to cancel it, but if you can use it, why don’t you use it?’ And I just said ‘Yes’. And so it was a hall for 800 people and when reservations exceeded 800 people, we stopped reservations. But on the day many people did not come. So we had about one hundred free places and I remember that we said ‘We shouldn’t have stopped [reservations]’.”¹⁶¹

¹⁶¹ 「一番最初に開いたのが3月11日にその震災で事故があって、で、eシフトの集まりで話し始め、多分4月にはもうその話を始めたと思うんですが、6月11日に大きな集会を開いたんです。それで800人の会場で。で、そこでやろうってことになったのは、アースデイが4月 [...]。で、そのアースデイのときに何をやるかみんなで決めようと。そうするとそのちょうどちょっと前っていうか、その辺に[A]が6月11日に代々木の会場を借りていると。で、あの人は映画会をやっているんですよ。東京国際映画祭っていう、それいつもあそこ、代々木の代々木青少年オリンピック記念 [...] 記念何とかっていう、そういう会場なんですけど [...]。ただ6月11日は借りているけどやらなくなったので空いている。で、「もうキャンセルしようと思っていたけど、使うんだったら使わない？」って言うてきたので。僕は気楽に「使う」とかって言うて。[...]それで800人の会場で、予約で800人を超えそうだったので、予約を止めたんですよ。そしたら意外と当日、来ないのね。それでなんか100人ぐらい空席が出て「止めなくて良かったんだね」みたいな、そういう話をした覚えがありますけど。」

Thus, e-shift's internal relational structure – an active core and a large, less active periphery – can be traced back to a process of emergence where a few organizations familiar with each other connected naturally, formed a nucleus, and called for action from a broad range of organizational actors from different movement communities by mailing lists of various networks. Connections first established through mailing lists have tended to remain rather loose whereas, assembling and meeting face-to-face in some cases has also contributed to establishing more personal and intensive ties among some of the groups.

4.4 LATENT RELATIONAL PATTERNS

e-shift's emergence was influenced by the structural movement patterns already in place at the time of the Fukushima accident. The following sections analyze the relational structures resulting from previous movement waves that can still be felt today (section 4.4.1); the operational patterns of national networking (section 4.4.2); and relational patterns to political actors (section 4.4.3).

4.4.1 RELATIONAL PATTERNS FROM PREVIOUS MOVEMENT WAVES

The Japanese anti-nuclear movement was born after the Second World War when the stories of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombings became known. The movement gained speed when in 1954 the fishermen crew of the Daigo Fukuryū Maru experienced the effect of nuclear weapons testing and the oldest anti-nuclear weapons organization, Gensuikyō, was founded. About ten years after its foundation, in the mid-1960s and with the expansion of the Japanese nuclear power program, however, Gensuikyō split and Gensuikin came into being (cf. section 1.2.2). Ever since this split, there is a boundary between organizations engaged in the fight against nuclear weapons (today mainly integrated into the larger peace movement), and those engaged in the anti-nuclear power stations movement (so representing a part of the larger environmental movement). However, slight cross-overs can be observed as when after Fukushima some peace organizations integrated the nuclear power issue into their action profile (SR6: 83,110).

The late 1960s and early 1970s were also the years of the Ampo-related student protests. From this time, public protest has had a violent image in large parts of Japanese society, raising the general threshold for participation in demonstrations even today (cf. section 1.2.1). After the student movement, many local initiatives against environmental destruction

were born nevertheless – among them many NIMBY¹⁶²-oriented anti-nuclear groups objecting to the increasing numbers of nuclear power station constructions. Besides these, a number of nuclear scientists also became aware of the effects their actions have on society (SR11: 115):

“[...] [at that time] in Japan, scientists were starting to discover the effects of their science. What their activities meant for society. The young people, the young scientists at that time thought about their social meaning and among the driving figures in the anti-nuclear movement today are many who became active during that time.”¹⁶³

Among these young critical scientists was Takagi Jinzaburō, who became a central actor in the anti-nuclear movement in the 1970s with the foundation of the CNIC in 1975; the Takagi School in 1998; and, in accordance with his last will, with the Takagi Fund in 2001. Takagi, his organization, and Gensuikin played a central role in networking and information exchange among local anti-nuclear power station groups, whose number increased significantly during these years, by providing the infrastructure for the Hangenpatsu Shimbun (Anti-Nuclear Newspaper) (Nishio 2013: 71–76) (SR4: 6–8):

“At that time, in 1975, there were only six or seven nuclear power stations operating in Japan but there were construction plans for nuclear power stations all over the country. There were many construction plans. In about 40 locations all over the country. And then all the construction plans became known. When it got into the newspapers or electric companies started to become active and these plans came to the surface, local people had a strong uncomfortable feeling about it because [Japan] was a victim of nuclear bombing and there was a strong anxiety about radiation. So there was a demand for alternative information different from the government, able to provide answers to the anxiety and doubts. Because the electric companies and the government only said: it’s safe. So there was an atmosphere around the country wishing for a different perspective, like a second opinion, and an organization was necessary to address that and so there was a call for an organization of experts [...]. The most active actor in calling

¹⁶² ‘Not In My Backyard’, emphasizing the exclusive focus of these groups on influencing projects in their immediate neighborhoods.

¹⁶³ 「[...] 日本の場合だと、自分たちの科学とかあり方そのものについて研究者が足元を見だしたというかな。やっていることがやっぱり社会に対してどうなのかという。社会的な意味付けなんかも、あの当時の若い人たち、若い研究者たちとかが随分見ている中で、今の反原発を引っ張っている人たちなんかは、やっぱりその頃の運動やっていた人たちがすごく多くて。」

for that organization was Gensuikin [...]. So from 1975 until the first half of the 1980s, until before the Chernobyl accident, it was mainly university professors who ran the CNIC. It was only a small number, two people, a really small number. And there were about 10 other staffers, and the university professors went to the regions to give lectures and they wrote articles for the CNIC newspaper which was sent out once a month, monthly; and so, by sending out critical information, the organization contributed to the stimulation of local anti-nuclear movements, by taking up that role they helped start activity.”¹⁶⁴

The organizations and networks bound through Takagi's initiatives still function as pillars of the anti-nuclear movement today, especially through the nuclear-related scientific knowledge they provide as well as their connections to local groups.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the student movement also intermingled with the anti-nuclear movement and when the period of student protests came to an end, some former student protesters became engaged in the anti-nuclear field (SR18). Many of these activists, however, were reluctant to submit to hierarchical organizations and thus preferred to engage in loose movement networks instead (SR18: 1).

“I have never joined [...] an organization myself. [The group I am active with now] is more an assembly of plaintiffs or an assembly of

¹⁶⁴ 「その当時、75年ですから、日本ではまだ原発が6基とか7基とか、運転していたのはすごく少ないんですが、各地で原発の立地計画というのがあったわけですよ。非常にたくさんありました。全国で40カ所ぐらいあったんじゃないかな。それで、それぞれの立地計画が浮上してきた。新聞に載ったりとか、電力会社が動き出したりとか、そういう計画が表に出てきたときに、地元の人たちが強い違和感というか、被爆国でもあるということだから、放射能に対する不安なり、そういったことが強くて。いわば政府とは違う情報、あるいは自分たちのそういう不安や疑問にちゃんと答えてくれる人を求めている。電力会社と政府はとにかく「安全」としか言わないから。そうではない、今ふうにいうと、別の視点というか、セカンドオピニオンといいますか、そういうのを求めている雰囲気为全国であって、それらに答えるべき組織が必要だろうということで、専門家の組織をつくらうということで呼び掛けがあった[...]その呼び掛けのフィクサーは原水爆日本国民会議[...]ですから最初の75年からしばらく80年代前半、チェルノブイリの事故が起こる前ぐらいまでは、大学の先生を中心に原子力資料情報室が運営されていたんですね。ただど人数的には2人ぐらいで、すごく少ない人数でやっていたんです。その他に運営委員というのが10人ぐらいいて、それに大学の先生たちが入っていて、各地に講演に行ったりとか、原子力資料情報室の通信が毎月、月間で通信を出していますので、そういう通信で記事を書いたりして、そういう意味では批判的な情報を届けることで、各地の反原発の運動を活性化させるというか、そういう役割で活動が始まったんですね。」

lawyers than an organization; in any case it is neither a sect nor a political organization; it is not an organization and I am doing it this way. I don't think I'll ever join any political organization, social movement organization or citizen movement organization. I don't even think, they'd let me in, somebody with a character like mine."¹⁶⁵

Groups in this sphere easily form and dissolve according to the issues they work on but participants often remain largely the same. Steinhoff characterizes this form of political participation as 'invisible' civil society, but within this study, I prefer to use the term 'less visible' civil society (cf. section 1.2.1). These activists prefer to engage in loose friendship-like (*nakama-teki*) networks which they choose to engage in because they are interested in the particular issue, so some of them find it easy to connect with a network organizational form such as e-shift (SR18: 6):

"But now there are different points of view and ways of thinking and there is no consensus. To a certain degree there is a hierarchy but the question is how every individual thinks and what they do. And there are groups with congruent perspectives and ways of thinking but besides that there are people like me who say let's do something on this issue, who if they want to do something, they just do it. For example, if somebody says: We need to do something about TEPCO and there are more people who think that TEPCO needs to be destroyed, I think such people should come together. But it in a sense it is also good if there are people who see things from a different perspective, as long as they have the same goal, as I said before."¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁵ 「私は昔から[...]一人で組織に入ってっていうことはなくて。[今一緒にやっているグループ]も組織というよりも、裁判のための原告の集まり、弁護士の集まりっていうことだから、いわゆるセクトだとか政治団体だとかっていう、そういう組織ではないので、私はそれでやってるって感じるんですね。多分、この後も、そういう政治組織なり、それから社会運動組織、市民運動組織というものには入らないんじゃないかな。っていうか、入れないんじゃないかっていう、性格的に。」

¹⁶⁶ 「今はもう、その見方とか考え方っていうのは通用しないだろうから。ある程度の階層はあるかもしれないけども、そうじゃなくて、やっぱり一人一人がものをどう考えて、どうするのか。その中で、ものの見方、考え方が一致するグループと、それからもう一つ、私なんかみたいなのは、これをやろうといったときに、何かをやろうといったときに、Aということをね。例えば、東電を何とかしようよとかいうふう考えた場合に、じゃあ分かりました、東電をやっぱり解体しなきゃいけないねっていったときに、そういう人たちが集まるのはいいと思ってるんですよ。何かと一緒にやる人たちっていうことだね。それはある意味で、さっき言った、ものの見方と考え方が違う人でもいいんですよ。」

Other groups of activists rooted in the 1960s however prefer a more clearly structured type of coalitional network with a formal hierarchy, clearly defined membership, and a participation fee, as is the case with Kinkyū Kaigi (cf. section 4.2.4.1).

Another significant movement wave kicked off after the nuclear disaster in Chernobyl in 1986. Although it took about two years for Japan to mount a demonstration that could draw 20,000 participants (in 1989) – a big number for protest action in Japan at that time – some interviewees maintained that the movement gained a different quality in the late 1980s and early 1990s (SR17: 30, SR16: 202; P1: 35; SR4: 37). In particular, the movement's thematic focus changed from anti-nuclear power stations (*han genpatsu*) to nuclear power phase-out (*datsu genpatsu*) (SR4: 9):

“When the Chernobyl accident happened in 1986, the quality of the Japanese anti-nuclear movement changed significantly. This can also be seen in the language use: until then we were ‘anti-nuclear (*han genpatsu*)’ because nuclear power stations came to our regions. After 1986 – and a reason for this might be that after Chernobyl Takagi Jinzaburō went to many conferences overseas – and during these international conferences the word ‘phase-out’ was used and he translated this back into Japanese, so we started to use the word ‘nuclear phase-out (*datsu genpatsu*)’, and from then on the movement changed into a movement for a political withdrawal from nuclear power. And so while today there are still anti-nuclear movements in the regions, since Chernobyl most people in urban areas have been working on ‘nuclear phase-out’.”¹⁶⁷

During the same time, consumer and organic food businesses as well as mothers' groups and recuperation stay groups for children connected to the movement. Especially in urban areas, new organizations were founded (SR14: 3; SR13: 4). This period also saw the development of many new meso level anti-nuclear movement networks, for example the Let's Stop Nuclear Power Tōkyō Movement (Genpatsu Tomeyō Tōkyō Kōdō),

¹⁶⁷ 「86年にチェルノブイリの事故が起きた後、日本の中での反原発の運動がかなり質的にも変わったんですね。言葉で言うのと、それまでは自分たちの地域に原発が来るのに反対する「反原発」という。86年からは、多分これは、[...] 高木仁三郎さん [...] はチェルノブイリの後、海外の会議なんかに行っていて、国際会議等々で「フェーズアウト」という言葉が使われているということを経験して、日本語に持ち込んで、「脱原発」という言葉を使い始めて、それ以降の運動というのがある種、政策的に原発から撤退していくような運動というふうに変ってきています。それでももちろん今でも、各地域で反対の運動があるのに加えて、やっぱりそのチェルノブイリの後は、都市部の人たちが「脱原発」ということで動き始めた。」

at that time the biggest network in Tōkyō. This network is still active today although it changed its name slightly to Let's Stop Nuclear Power Tōkyō Network (Genpatsu Tomeyō Tōkyō Nettowāku) (SR17: 35).

Starting in 1988, there was also an initiative to launch a nuclear phase-out law in which besides others the Let's Stop Nuclear Power Tōkyō Movement was involved and the CNIC took a central organizing function. At that time, activists assembled about 3.5 million signatures in support of the law, which they submitted to the Diet. Unfortunately the law did not even come to debate (EA2: 15; SR17: 32). Another important campaign of the 1990s in which many new and old organizations cooperated was the Akatsuki-maru campaign. The Akatsuki-maru is a nuclear transport ship which transports nuclear fuel rods to and from Japan. For this campaign, movement actors connected with many organizations and governments of countries along the ship's route and thus broadened the international connections of the movement. Movement activists cooperated intensively with a number of parliamentarians and lawyers to get information about the ship's route, which was a successful strategy (SR18: 16,18,25,150). The Akatsuki-maru campaign overlapped with an anti-MOX fuel campaign against the use of mixed oxide fuel (MOX) (cf. section 1.2.2), or in other words against the use of plutonium in Japanese nuclear reactors. At the beginning of the 1990s, Takagi Jinzaburō tried to establish a no-MOX network but this network never became as active as intended (SR14: 3):

“[...] there was a very big international conference organized by CNIC, former head of it Takagi Jinzaburō and he invited people from all over the world who were experts working to try to stop the use of plutonium. So this big symposium was about plutonium. So during that meeting there were many citizens, citizen group people, and I proposed forming a network called Plutonium Action Network. And there was Plutonium Action Kyōto, Plutonium Action Hiroshima, whatever. So I proposed that. Well, the network didn't really function although we did communicate with each other.”

Even so, there is still a mailing list in frequent use called 'no-mox.' In the 1990s, then, the anti-nuclear movement grew significantly and became more complex, involving a broad range of organizations from various backgrounds, and reaching a new degree of networkedness.

In the 2000s, besides organizing around issues such as the nuclear reprocessing plant in Rokkashō (Aomori prefecture), the accidents in the fast breeder reactor Monjū (Fukui prefecture), and the protests against the Kaminoseki plant (Yamaguchi prefecture), the anti-nuclear movement also came into contact with pro-renewable energy activists (SR15: 32,108; CM1:

69; SR19: 93). One of the key figures at that time arranged for a national exchange conference about strategies for changing the government's energy policy. Although the conference drew about 130 participants and hoped to form a network, it never became active and remained only in the form of the 'epp' mailing list (cf. section 4.2.4.1) (SR19: 73):

"epp is now only a mailing list which was made at the time when we assembled hundreds of people and wanted to organize a national exchange forum for nuclear phase-out. Originally it was supposed to be a tool for this network. Now, only this [mailing list] remains."¹⁶⁸

Around the year 2000, renewable energy activists launched an initiative for a law to introduce a Feed-in-Tariff (FIT) for renewable energy after the German model,¹⁶⁹ but this initiative also remained unsuccessful (SR19: 97):

"In Germany around 2000, a FIT system for solar power came into being. And in 1998, when Iida Tetsunari returned from Sweden to Japan, and decided to stay in Japan, we wanted to do something in Japan, too. And we wanted to introduce a FIT, and under the name of Law for the Promotion of Renewable Energy, it became a draft law and was about to be discussed in the Diet. It failed."¹⁷⁰

In conclusion, some of the relational patterns that evolved during previous anti-nuclear movement waves are still in place today.

¹⁶⁸ 「[epp]は]メーリングリストなんですけど、本当はなんか脱原発の全国交流会をつくりましょうというので始まって何百人かが集まったときに、じゃあメーリングリストつくりましょうってことになって、それでつくったので。本当はそういうネットワークのうちの一手段という、そういう感じなんです。今、あれだけ残っている。」

¹⁶⁹ The German Feed-in-Tariff model as defined by the Renewable Energy Sources Act (*Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz*) is a legal guarantee that renewable energy producers may feed energy into the national grid as well as earn stable revenue from it. This way it is supposed to promote renewable energy production. The initiative in 2000 to introduce a similar law in Japan remained unsuccessful. However, after the Fukushima disaster then-Prime Minister Kan Naoto launched a Feed-in-Tariff in the style of the German model which, despite some flaws, shows a positive effect on the growth of the renewable energy sector in Japan (DeWit 2014).

¹⁷⁰ 「ドイツでも実際そのFITが太陽光に対してとか動きだしたのは2000年ぐらいなんですよ。だから1998年に[...] 飯田哲也さんがちょうどスウェーデンから日本に復帰をして、もうずっと日本だということになっていったので、[...] それで日本で[...] 何やろうか。よし、FITを作ろうっていう、そういうことでそれが自然エネルギー促進法という名前です。実際に法案になって、国会でやりとりをする直前までいった。できなかった。」

Movement actors navigate these structures to use the window of opportunity opened up by the Fukushima accident to create new forms of action, integrating old and new groups to mobilize the largest possible number of people. However, latent structures such as the divide between the anti-nuclear weapons and the anti-nuclear power movement,¹⁷¹ different styles of cooperation ranging from strictly hierarchical to loosely networked; and complex network overlaps, have a significant influence on today's cooperative movement structures and also influence relational patterns with political actors.

4.4.2 NATIONAL NETWORKING

Many anti-nuclear groups emerged in the 1960s, with the rising number of nuclear power station construction projects in mostly rural areas. While in the beginning, these groups also organized public protests, they gradually focused more on actions such as lawsuits and question-and-answer sessions with the electric power companies as well as with the relevant local authorities (SR13: 5). Over the years, these groups developed regional and inter-regional networks. Some of the regional networks are famous for their strength. A particularly strong regional movement exists in Niigata prefecture, where the local anti-nuclear groups are well-connected with labor unions. Because of this strong regional movement, the governor of Niigata prefecture opposed the recommissioning of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear plant after it was taken off the grid for safety inspections after 3.11. Another strong regional movement exists in Kagoshima prefecture; it gained even more strength through further intensive networking after the Fukushima accident. Other regional networks are now being formed to resist recommissioning and draw attention to the insufficiency of evacuation plans in case of a major accident – and through this to stop nuclear power altogether (SR4: 63–64):

“Many groups are rooted in the regions. And since 3.11, in the regions, there are many small organizations, for example in Kagoshima prefecture. And all of them formed networks and work together to stop recommissioning and for accurate evacuation plans.

¹⁷¹ As pointed out in section 1.2.2 this divide goes back to the ideological cleavage around the question of the peaceful use of nuclear technology which became manifest for the first time in the 1960s. While parts of the anti-nuclear movement at the time supported the peaceful use of nuclear technology for the purpose of energy production but wanted to stop the production and use of nuclear weapons, others were concerned about the use of nuclear technology for either purpose.

If they don't do that, they work to stop nuclear power, so there are movements from these two sides. More and more of such networks are formed, especially after 3.11. And in regions where these networks are well run, they have gained more influence because they do question-and-answer sessions with the local authorities and are active in many other ways. And also, there are lawsuits to stop the operation of all nuclear plants. I don't know what's going to come of it, and it's not like it just started, it started last year but the conclusion is still going to take some time, but for these lawsuits new networks have been formed and the movement is getting bigger in the nuclear regions. So, Kagoshima is getting strong, and a place which has been strong before is Niigata. In Niigata, citizens' movements and labor unions formed a movement, they have been well connected for a long time and because of that, the Niigata governor did not give permission for the recommissioning of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant, and this was possible is because of the Niigata movement. So in that sense, Niigata has a strong influence. There are not many that have influence at the national level."¹⁷²

The regional anti-nuclear movement in Fukushima is generally considered weak although it experienced a major surge after the Chernobyl accident: new groups formed, bringing in female participants especially. However, over the years the groups have dispersed and only

¹⁷² 「多くの団体はそれぞれの地域に根差してやっています。それで 3.11 の後はそれぞれの地域で、幾つか例えば鹿児島県だと、そこにも幾つかの小さい団体がある。それらがみんなネットワークをつくって、一緒に再稼働反対をやるうとか、防災計画をきちんと作る。できれば原発は止めようみたいな、そういう二つの側面で運動をしていますね。そういうネットワークがどんどんできてきているのが、割と大きな 3.11 以降の特徴だと思います。そのネットワークがうまく機能している所は、それぞれの地域での発言力も割と強くなってきているから、行政交渉をしたりとか、そういうのを活発に進めようとしている。それから今、全部の原発に対して、運転差し止めの裁判が行われているんですね。これはどうなるのかよく分からないんだけど、まだ始まったばかりと言うとおかしいけれど、去年から始まっているので、結論はもうちょっと先になるけれども、裁判でまたネットワークができていとかいうことで、各原発のある地域は、だんだんと動きが広がってきてはいますよね。うまく広がっている所、いろいろなネットワークが作り上げられている所は、それぞれの地域で発言力が強い。だから鹿児島は割と強くなっているし、前から強い所は新潟です。新潟は市民運動とか労働組合の人たちがやっていた運動とかは、昔からうまくリンクしてやっていて、そういうのがベースになって新潟県の知事さんも、新潟の柏崎刈羽原発の再稼働には否定的だというふうな状況になっているんですけど、そういうのをうまくつづけてきたのは、新潟の運動をやってきた人たちで。そういう意味では新潟は非常に強い影響力を持っている。国政レベルで強い影響力を持っているところがあまりない。」

individuals remained; they merged into a single, loosely organized group, the Nuclear Phase-Out Fukushima Network (Datsu Genpatsu Fukushima Nettowāku) (SR16: 29–32):

“The Nuclear Phase-Out Fukushima Network was made of many small networks. [...] There were such groups in Fukushima, Aizu, and Kōriyama. And it was quite a number of people but it became fewer and fewer, and the Nuclear Phase-Out Fukushima Network merged into one single group. Over a period of 25 years.”¹⁷³

Inter-regional networks can be found especially among groups engaged in anti-nuclear lawsuits. Here, lawyer’s groups or networks usually form the links, but many local groups not only monitor the nuclear plants in their neighborhoods but also in other regions, exchange this knowledge, and support each other during their respective lawsuits (SR13: 97). In the early 1990s, regional groups in Fukushima cooperated with Tōkyō-based groups in a lawsuit to oppose the use of MOX fuel in the Fukushima plants. Although they lost the lawsuit, the issue was eventually discussed in the prefectural government and as a result the governor at that time stopped the project.¹⁷⁴ However, this governor and his family were pressured so he had to leave office and the next governor reversed the decision (SR15: 26–29):

“There was a plan to use MOX fuel in the Fukushima plant, and it was used, but when the plan became known, we did a lawsuit to stop it, and we did it together with CNIC and we assembled about 1500 plaintiffs. [...] And there was also [A] from Fukurō no Kai, [...] and together we did this activity, a lawsuit, but it was a lawsuit to stop operation, a normal lawsuit would have taken more than 10 years, and lawsuits to stop operation are much shorter. I think it ended within 2 years, but we went to Fukushima every second month for hearings. [...] So we went to the court every second month and after that we went to the Fukushima prefecture authorities. [...] We lost

¹⁷³ 「脱原発福島ネットワークは、いくつかの小さなネットワークだったんです。[...] 福島とかいわきとか、会津とか郡山とか、そういうグループができてたの。そこに、ある程度的人数がいたんだけど、だんだん少なくなって、それで脱原発福島ネットワークっていうグループ自体が、一つのグループになってしまったんですね。25年の間に。」

¹⁷⁴ Steiner (1980) emphasizes the difficult position of prefectural governors and mayors between the local electorate and the national or/and prefectural governments. Such local politicians are elected directly and are responsible for the management of the localities, including the receipt and allocation of funds that often stem from the national or/and prefectural government.

the lawsuit. But we went to Fukushima every second month and told them why this [MOX] is dangerous and discussed it with them, so that the people from the Fukushima nuclear commission that had to listen to us every time somehow thought this was bad [...] so that the Fukushima governor at that time promised to stop MOX use. But [...], due to a bribery case in the family of the governor and the suspicion of him being involved too, it came to a prosecution and conviction, although recently, I am thinking that he was probably innocent and this was the doing of the nuclear mafia, but well, he lost his position after that and MOX was used.”¹⁷⁵

Another case in which regional groups cooperate with groups located in Tōkyō is the NO to Nukes at Kaminoseki YES to Seto Inland Sea Nature Conservation Citizen's Network (Kaminoseki Dō suru Netto), a network of groups in Tōkyō and adjacent communities of Kaminoseki town in Yamaguchi prefecture, where Chūgoku Electric Power Company¹⁷⁶ plans to construct new nuclear facilities on the coastline of the Inland Sea, a fertile marine area. One of the adjacent communities is Iwajima Island, home to a very active anti-nuclear community for over 30 years and the main reason that construction plans were stopped. This community is composed mainly of fishermen and farmers; they contacted consumer organizations and organic food businesses all over Japan to buy their products directly. Although the business venture was not successful, the

¹⁷⁵ 「福島原発はMOX燃料を使う予定があったんですけども、そのうちに使いたけども、その予定があったときに差し止め裁判をして、そのときは情報室も一緒にやって [...] それから私たちは、あとは 1500 人くらい原告が集まりましたので [...]。あとは福島老朽原発の会っていう [A][...] ですけど [...]、そういう活動して、それが、裁判といっても差し止め裁判で、裁判で何十年ってかかりますけど、差し止め裁判は短いんですね。多分 2 年以内で終わったと思うんですけど、2 カ月にいっぺん、福島の裁判所に行って、審審っていうのをします。[...] それで 2 カ月にいっぺん、法廷に行って、その後福島県庁に行って [...]。[...] 裁判としては負けてしまったんです。でもなんでこんなに危ないのか [...] そういうことを 2 カ月にいっぺん福島に行って、そういうふうな論点でやっていたので、福島の原子力安全対策課の人とも、何ていうか、向こう、毎回聞いてくれるので、まずいんじゃないかなと多分思ってくれたと思うんですね、[...]、当時の福島県知事は MOX 燃料を使うのを停止するって言ってたんです。ところが、[...] 福島県知事のご家族の方が、何人か贈収賄事件の関わってるんじゃないかっていうことで福島県知事も起訴されて有罪判決、まあ最近なつたんですけども、それも私は無罪だと思ってるんですけども、原子力マフィアのほうがはめたんだと思うんですけども、その後、失脚をして MOX 燃料が動かされて [...]。」

¹⁷⁶ Electric power provider in Japan's Chūgoku region, comprising the prefectures Hiroshima, Okayama, Shimane, Tottori, and Yamaguchi.

organizations stayed connected. When construction plans were revived in 2009, they founded the Kaminoseki Netto (SR17: 53; Kaminoseki Dō suru Netto 2016). Yet another example of a national network on a regional issue is the National Network against the Rokkashō Reprocessing Plant to Stop Radioactive Contamination (Rokkashō Saishori Kōjo ni Hantai shi, Hōshasen Osen o Soshi suru Zenkoku Nettowāku) or Soshi Netto for short, which is a network of regional and national consumer organizations in operation since 2007 (SR17: 62).

There are thus multiplex networks of regional and inter-regional anti-nuclear groups¹⁷⁷ founded in different time periods, having comprehensive experience with lawsuits and in engaging with local and national authorities. Despite some tensions between Tōkyō and the regions in terms of Tōkyō groups not understanding regional grievances, and regional groups not being able to see the large picture (cf. above; MFN6: 56), the groups interviewed for this study are aware that these networks are important. Within these networks, it is particularly important that the Tōkyō-based groups make use of their geographical closeness to the political centers (SR14: 19):

“[...] this networking is a key work for us and the way we’ve been able to. Like our big success in stopping the use of plutonium fuel in regular reactors in Japan, that was through networking. So what [our organization] is about is, networking between the local area where the nuclear power plant is located and the cities, the surrounding cities, bringing the two, citizens and legislators together, exchanging information so what the local city works on and feed it back to the local area and both use the new information back and forth [...].”

Although some of these groups feel it is a weakness that the movement consists mainly of small organizations, others argue that they are so well networked that despite this diversity they do not feel weak and that effective networking has actually contributed to successful actions (MFN6: 56; SR8: 100):

“The fact that the civil sector is very weak, it’s not only about the nuclear power issue, and in many ways this is a weak point of Japanese society. So it is extremely important that the civil sector gets stronger.”¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁷ Hanibuchi (2005) finds a similar patterning of regional and national networks of Japanese NGOs in the ODA field.

¹⁷⁸ 「やっぱり市民セクターがすごく弱いというのは、原子力の問題だけじゃなくて、いろんなことでもすごく日本社会の弱点だと思うんですね。だから、そこは市民セクターが力を付けていくっていうことがすごく大事なんで。」

The actors realize that the anti-nuclear movement in Japan does not have a central headquarters or a central leader, but each region has a number of leading figures. In many cases, and besides events assembling organizations nation-wide, these regional anti-nuclear celebrities contribute to establishing ties among movement groups because they are often invited to speak all over the country (SR16: 40,126; SR4: 85–86):

“It might be a strength or a weakness of the Japanese anti-nuclear movement, but on a national level, there is no national center or headquarters. If we had a headquarters those people could lead the Japanese movement, but somehow such a thing didn’t come into being. So on a national level, it’s impossible to say, there is one central person, but there are a number of people who are very engaged. [...] And in the regions [...] there are people who are like regional leaders. And these people are very active and they play well with others and so it becomes quite a big movement.”¹⁷⁹

As indicated in previous sections, since the nuclear accident, the movement for renewable energy is on the rise, leading to the formation of regional and national renewable meso level networks such as the Shimin Denryoku Renraku Kai (People’s Power Network). This rise, however, is possible because of already existing networks. At the very center of this development is the NPO ISEP, which since 2000 had been building networks with groups and businesses engaged in renewable energy production. ISEP’s focus since its beginning, besides doing research on renewables (also in cooperation with various universities), is to connect people, build good relations to prefectural and local governments, and write policy proposals on the national level (SR12: 12):

“[...] we organized a network for a law on the promotion of renewable energy, GEN, and many groups and citizens joined this network. [...] So, we did policy proposals and engaged in lobbying activities and tried to get this law realized but at that time, in 2000 we couldn’t do it; still, we continued with our activities and on a regional level we did

¹⁷⁹ 「日本の脱原発運動の長所かもしれないし欠点かもしれないんだけど、あまり全国的なレベルで、ナショナルセンター的なヘッドクォーターがないんです。だからヘッドクォーターがあれば、その人が日本の運動をリードしていくことになるんだけど、なぜかそういうのをつくってこなかったんですね。だからあんまり全国的に見て、この人がっていうのは見当たらないけれども、すごく活発に動いている人は何人かいます。[...] それから各地域で、[...] それぞれの地域のリーダー的な人がいますよね。[...] その人たちが積極的に取り組んでいるので、そしてうまくジョイントしてやっているの、結構大きな動きになっておりますよね。」

many things, also with renewable energy groups. For example in the field of wind power with the Japan Wind Power Association, or hydropower with the National Hydropower Promotion Association, with business groups like that, we formed a network, JREP, Japan Renewable Energy Platform, that was in 2008.”¹⁸⁰

The pro-renewable sphere is very well connected internationally. A bridge between the renewable energy and anti-nuclear movements is ISEP's leader Iida Tetsunari, with his background in nuclear sciences (SR12: 7,19,41). His presence might be a reason for the sentiment among e-shift members that the connection between the two movements came about naturally (cf. section 4.3.2).

For national networking or networking among regional groups, various mailing lists of which some have been introduced in previous sections play a decisive role. The mailing lists serve mainly to exchange information but they are also the space where issues are filtered. According to the issue, groups are formed or call for participation, whether it is ad hoc operational groups (*jikkō iinkai*) for the organization of particular events, or mid- to long-term loosely structured networks or formal coalitions (SR13: 188; SR4: 52). These new networks then eventually produce another mailing list. The downside of this mode of operation is that some activists, especially those at the center, are tired of landing on yet another mailing list, because often the same information is cross-posted to various mailing lists at the same time (SR19: 259–261):

“[...] in any case, there are many mailing lists. [...] That's why I often say 'no, thank you' if another one is made and I am being asked whether I want to join.”¹⁸¹

Interestingly, the motivation to cooperate does not seem to be influenced by possibilities to tap funding. Many organizations emphasize that

¹⁸⁰ 「[...]自然エネルギー促進法推進ネットワークというGENっていうんですけども、そういうものを立ち上げまして、それがネットワーク活動をいろんな団体とか市民の方とか入っていただいて [...] そうやって政策提言したり、いわゆるロビー活動をしたり、してなんとかそれを実現しようとしたんですけども、結局 2000 年の段階では実現しなかったということでその後も活動を続けて、地道にいろいろ活動が続けてたんですけども、そういう中で自然エネルギーのいろんな業界団体があるんですね。例えば風力発電だと、日本風力発電協会とか、あと、小水力だと、全国小水力利用推進協議会とかとかですね、そういう業界団体の方に集まっていたいただいたネットワークも立ち上げたんですね、それは、JREPっていうて、Japan Renewable Energy Platformって、2008 年ぐらいに立ち上げてですね。」

¹⁸¹ 「メーリングリストはとにかくいっぱいある。[...] だから新しいのができて「入る？」って言われても、「もういい」とかって言う場合が結構。」

funding is scarce, but they barely talk to other organizations about it. As mentioned above, e-shift receives funding from Takagi Fund, which is the biggest donor in the field. Takagi Fund receives a huge number of applications every year and tries to share the 'pie' as fairly as possible; most grants range between 300.000 and 500.000 Yen and a maximum of one million Yen.¹⁸² In other words, none of the organizations can hope to receive a really substantial amount. An average movement organization in the anti-nuclear field thus relies mainly on membership fees, which usually range between one and three thousand Yen per month; event entrance fees; and donations (which they ask for at almost every event). Internationally connected organizations can of course tap other financial resources, whether by applying to international foundations or by receiving funds from their international networks (SR14: 19; SR15: 11; SR13: 19,36,40,156).

4.4.3 RELATIONS TO POLITICAL ACTORS

In general, relations between movement actors and politicians in the Diet are not stable because the composition of the Diet changes with each election. Even if a good relationship to a Diet member is established, this may only last for one electoral period. For the movement, the Social Democratic Party is traditionally the closest partner, while the Communist Party has moved closer to some extent, especially since the nuclear accident. There are also some politicians in the Democratic Party who support the movement but overall the party remains split over the nuclear question (EA2: 73). Furthest from the movement is the Liberal Democratic Party, the party of the current Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, although even within the LDP there are members favoring a nuclear phase-out (cf. section 4.2.5.1; EA2: 73).

However, Diet members with whom movement actors have a good relationship are valuable because they are one of their most important means to access the policy-making process (P1: 10). Although some movement groups are participants in the government advisory councils managed by the bureaucracy of the respective ministries, relations to bureaucracy personnel remain rather formal and in question-and-answer sessions can become quite aggressive (EA2: 82; SR12: 25; CM1: 59,61; SR4: 33). Some movement actors note critically that in Japan, the bureaucracy generally has more influence on policy-making than the politicians. For them, this means that their access to the policy-making process is less influential than one might hope (SR19: 195):

¹⁸² Equates to about 2,500, 4,000 and 8,100 Euro as of December 2016.

“In Japan, although legislation should be lawmaker-initiated, most laws are made by the bureaucracy. And it’s only now that from time to time we see lawmaker-initiated laws pass, until just recently this did not happen at all.”¹⁸³

Policy-making in Japan is generally a difficult process because it aims for consensus, meaning that Diet members often do not speak honestly about their opinions and refrain from critiquing superiors. The general frustration of movement actors with this aspect of the policy-making process is palpable (SR10: 20):

“[...] the policy decision-making process in Japan is a little difficult because there is the ambition of having consensus. And still, or, at the same time, people are not willing to speak honestly, criticizing each other, especially not superiors. [...] I believe that Japan now is in a stage where the individual opinions of people in the bureaucracy and in the industry and in the parliament and government are very different from the policy.”

There are some key movement actors who ensure cooperation with Diet members, often through the Diet member’s secretaries (SR19: 54). These relations of course are not easy to manage, sometimes because of the secretaries; sometimes because of the Diet members themselves. In some cases, Diet members who in the past cooperated with the movement changed their party affiliations and disengaged (SR18: 40):

“When [A] went to the DPJ, the contact became difficult. It is still possible to talk to [A] personally, but the secretary changed and doesn’t let us meet [A]. So this [contact] became useless.”¹⁸⁴

But there have also been other Diet members who were active movement members themselves, letting movement actors use their offices to send faxes, etc. (SR18: 150). Such cooperative Diet members also sometimes introduce movement actors to fellow Diet members (EA2: 73). Diet members, from their side, occasionally also ask movement members for information about certain topics; in response movement actors hold small study groups or lectures (SR18: 41). Movement actors on the other hand have tried to establish a regular news report for distribution in the Diet,

¹⁸³ 「日本は今でも議員立法はできるけど、ほとんど官僚がつくっている法律なんですよね。で、議員がつくった法律が通ったりするっていうのは、今はちょくちょくあるんですけど、ひと頃は全くなかった。」

¹⁸⁴ 「[...] が民主党に行ってから、全然コンタクトっていうかね。本人と話はあるんだけど、秘書さんが変わっちゃって全然会わせてくれないんだよね。それで駄目になっちゃったんだけどね。」

intended to update members on the latest news concerning nuclear-related issues. Movement actors consider it crucial that Diet members receive alternative information, because usually all the information Diet members get is from the bureaucracy. This is also the motivation for trying to contact and talk to Diet members directly (SR19: 142). Initiatives such as the regular anti-nuclear news report, however, have not been realized so far because of a lack of resources (SR19: 44).

In the political sphere, movement actors sense the strong influence of the nuclear power companies, the vendors, and the nuclear suppliers on Diet members and bureaucracy (SR10: 20):

“[...] the old energy strategy, giving priority to nuclear expansion, has a significant inertia in the bureaucracy and amongst the politicians. The bureaucracy and the politicians have formulated the strategy; the strategy has been implemented in collaboration with electric power companies and parts of the vendor industry, the nuclear reactor suppliers in Japan.”

The influence of such pro-nuclear actors is also visible in the regions where nuclear power plants are sited. The prefectures and communities who serve as nuclear sites receive substantial financial resources through these channels, thus weakening local anti-nuclear movements in those regions. Some organizations are thus generally suspicious of the government. Some of them even abstain from applying for NPO status because they do not want to make their names and resources public (SR13: 15):

“In Japan, the conditions to receive NPO or NGO status are strict. The government has to approve it, so the groups have to provide lots of information, for example the members’ names and so on, and we pursue activities against the government, so I think that it is not necessary to make individual names public; that is why we absolutely won’t do it.”¹⁸⁵

4.5 CASE SUMMARY: E-SHIFT’S NETWORK AND MOBILIZATION PROCESS

e-shift, the Tōkyō-based coalitional meso level network which is mainly composed of experienced anti-nuclear and pro-renewable energy actors,

¹⁸⁵ 「日本の場合、NPO とか NGO は、取得するためには条件が厳しい。政府が認可するという形になっているので、その団体の情報をかなり、提供しなければならない、例えば、メンバーの名前とかいろんなね、私たちは政府に反対する活動をしてますし、そういう個人の名前を提出する必要は全然ないと思ってるし、それで、一切それをしてないんです。」

emerged immediately after disruptive event of the scale of a major nuclear accident triggered by a natural disaster. It emerged from a latent social movement structure shaped by structural relics of previous movement waves and general movement rules of conduct. Of special interest in this case is the divide between traditional and progressive groups, different action repertoires, and cooperative patterns. The network-coalition emerged organically in a complex field of overlapping networks (formal and informal) and across different movement communities. It emerged in the context of a broader society largely unsupportive of public protest, and with limited access to the policy-making process by civil actors.

In this context and within the general movement wave which could be observed after 3.11, e-shift actors describe the emergence of their network as a natural process guided by a shared desire to meld anti-nuclear and renewable energy ideas, and supported by a general feeling of wanting to do good for the environment. The undertaking was fueled by a sense that the disaster presented a historical window of opportunity for change in the orientation of Japanese energy policy. Within a field of many small informal and some professional groups, a professional group took up the lead to build the broadest network possible, first with close partners, and then by using the multiple networks in which the core partners are embedded to draw in more participants. As many core members had experience in advocacy-related activities, and there was a perceived lack of advocacy expertise in the traditional anti-nuclear movement, and because experienced public protest organizations were already taking over the task of organizing public demonstrations, the decision for pursuing a less visible policy-oriented joint action repertoire came naturally.

The structure of social bond-type ties among the core members and transactional-type ties between the core and the periphery results from this process of emergence on the basis of the network patterns in latent times. This structural core-periphery pattern ensures a large number of participating organizations, enhancing the legitimacy of the network's claims and its impact; it also enables an extensive flow of information and know-how. The loose connectedness of many actors also lowers the likelihood of conflict along old fault lines, since organizations can engage as much as they like but also withdraw anytime without risking complete disconnection. The strong and largely professional core and its resources, especially personnel, ensures the continuity of the network-coalition. On the other hand, the core-periphery pattern diminishes the possibility for peripheral organizations to bring their issues to the core, leading to frustration and eventually withdrawal among this group of members.

5 SHIENHŌ SHIMIN KAIGI (SHSK): NETWORKING FOR NUCLEAR VICTIMS' RIGHTS

Shienhō Shimin Kaigi (SHSK) was founded on July 7, 2012, about two weeks after the June 21 passage of the Act Concerning the Promotion of Measures to Provide Living Support to the Victims Including the Children Affected by the TEPCO Nuclear Accident in Order to Protect and Support their Everyday Lives (Tōkyō Denryoku Genshiryoku Jiko ni yori Hisai shita Kodomo o Hajime to suru Jūmin nado no Seikatsu o Mamori-Sasaeru tame no Hisaisha no Seikatsu Shien nado ni Kan suru Shisaku no Suishin ni Kan suru Hōritsu), hereafter Nuclear Victims Support Act (or Kodomo Hisaisha Shienhō). This law recognizes the government's responsibility to take care of nuclear victims and acknowledges the right of evacuation to all people affected by nuclear contamination. However, the Support Act does not outline concrete measures for victim support. Movement organizations formed SHSK to influence the process of turning the law into policy measures¹⁸⁶ oriented towards victims' real needs.

In conformity with the structure of section 4, the following sections cover the action profile, the relational patterns, as well as SHSK's emergence from existing latent civil structures. The final subsection 5.5 summarizes SHSK's network and mobilization process.

5.1 ACTION PROFILE

The following analysis of SHSK's common project and joint action repertoire, i. e. the action profile of the coalition, is based on data provided by the coalition's website and complemented by interview and participant observation data.

¹⁸⁶ As the title of the Nuclear Victims Support Act indicates, the purpose of the Act is to promote measures for supporting victims. It instructs the responsible ministries to develop concrete policy measures (*kihon hōshin*) in support of victims by reducing possible health impacts no matter whether victims choose to evacuate, remain, or return from/to radiation-affected areas. The Act itself does not evaluate concrete support measures; it also does not provide a budget. It also does not outline the scope of the areas covered, nor does it define the acceptable annual radiation dose limit for residents, which serves as a premise for the determination of the areas covered. The law thus is more of a guideline, leaving great room for interpretation and implementation. However, it does require the ministries to take into account the opinions of disaster victims in the implementation process.

5.1.1 COMMON PROJECT

The founding statement on SHSK's website starts with a short introduction describing the organizations the coalition is composed of (Shienhō Shimin Kaigi 2015):

"We are organizations of victims of the Fukushima nuclear accident and victims' support organizations."¹⁸⁷

Highlighting the composition of the network right at the beginning of their foundation statement indicates that they draw much of their legitimacy from the fact that they represent directly affected people, who are then also supported by a number of support organizations. The following section describes the impact of the nuclear disaster on the population (Shienhō Shimin Kaigi 2015):

"The nuclear disaster led to the release of high amounts of radiation. In a situation where there is no sure scientific knowledge about the health impact of radiation, many affected residents, especially parents with children, have fled from radiation exposure, evacuated, and have had to radically change their way of living."¹⁸⁸

Here, the members point out that from their point of view it is especially the struggle to correctly evaluate the health risk of low-level radiation exposure which has a particularly destructive effect on people's lives. The imminent danger of radiation exposure triggered by the accident represents the reason for the coalition's existence. The founding statement then praises the achievement of the Nuclear Victims Support Act (Shienhō Shimin Kaigi 2015):

"[The Nuclear Victims Support Act] acknowledges that residents of areas where radiation exposure beyond a certain amount can be presumed, may freely decide to evacuate, stay, or return to the affected areas and that the state takes responsibility and provides support. This represents a large step towards the realization of the 'right to evacuation' we have been advocating for. It [the law] also

¹⁸⁷ 「私たちは、2011年3月11日に発生した福島原発事故の被災者団体及び被災者支援団体です。」

¹⁸⁸ 「福島原発事故は、大量の放射性物質の放出を引き起こしました。放射線の健康への影響に関する十分な科学的知見が存在しない中、多くの被害住民、とりわけ子どもを持つ親が、被ばくを避けて避難し、あるいは生活のあり方を変えることを余儀なくされました。」

contains regulations to limit the health impact of radiation through regular health check-ups and financial relief for the costs of medical care.”¹⁸⁹

Here, the Nuclear Victims Support Act is evaluated as an important step towards the fair treatment of people affected by the radiation released by the nuclear disaster. They acknowledge the law's recognition that people make choices to evacuate or to stay in contaminated areas. Moreover, the law acknowledges state responsibility for the accident and ensures support to all victims. The next passage, however, indicates the weaknesses of the law (Shienhō Shimin Kaigi 2015):

“On the other hand, the Nuclear Victims Support Act does not indicate the borders of the supported areas nor does it determine concrete support measures. In order to push for the recognition of all areas that exceed an annual public radiation dosage of 1msv as ‘areas of support’, and to obtain support measures desired by victims, it is necessary to secure participation of victims and victims’ support organizations in the general plan as determined by this law, as well as in the decision-making process concerning concrete policy measures.”¹⁹⁰

Thus, they argue that in their view in order for the Nuclear Victims Support Act to keep its promise, citizen participation in the transformation of the law into concrete policy measures taking into account the real needs of victims is imperative. To ensure the implementation of needs-oriented policy measures and to contribute to the reduction of health-related impacts SHSK was founded (Shienhō Shimin Kaigi 2015):

“In order to reduce the exposure to radiation released by the Fukushima nuclear accident, and thus to decrease the health impact

¹⁸⁹ 「この法律は、一定の線量以上の放射線被ばくが予想される「支援対象地域」からの避難や、同地域における居住、帰還について、被災者が自らの意思によって行うことができるよう、国が責任をもって支援しなければならないと定め、私たちが求めてきた「避難の権利」の実現に向けた大きな一歩が踏み出されました。また、放射線による健康等への被害を防ぐための、定期的な健康診断や医療費の減免に関する規定も盛り込まれています。」

¹⁹⁰ 「一方、原発事故子ども・被災者支援法には、支援対象地域の範囲や、具体的な支援策については盛り込まれていません。公衆の被ばく限度である年間1ミリシーベルトを超える放射線被ばくを余儀なくされている地域全体を「支援対象地域」とし、被害者が求める具体的な支援策を獲得するためには、同法が定める基本計画やその他の具体的施策の決定過程において、被災者団体や被災者支援団体の参加を確保する必要があります。」

of radiation, and with the purpose of realizing concrete support measures for the victims, we make the voices of nuclear victims heard in the implementation of the Nuclear Victims Support Act. To this aim, we have founded the 'Genpatsu Jiko Kodomo Hisaisha Shienhō Shimin Kaigi'."¹⁹¹

Besides trying to influence the implementation process by approaching related actors, they also seek to improve information exchange among victims and victims' support organizations. Finally, they seek to give the public a better understanding of the law and its implementation process (Shienhō Shimin Kaigi 2016b).

SHSK is thus a meso level network clearly focused on bringing victim's voices into the process of transforming a law into concrete policy measures. Consequently SHSK appeared to be an ad hoc coalition serving the single purpose of influencing the implementation process. However, the coalition continued its activities even after a significant amount of time had passed after the basic policy concerning victims' support measures had passed in October 2013. Most significantly, the coalition organized a large symposium in Tōkyō on June 21, 2015 about two years after the passage of the basic policy under the title 'We still need the Nuclear Victims Support Act!'¹⁹² in an effort to revive the spirit of the Support Act (Shienhō Shimin Kaigi 2016a). By facilitating networking and information exchange among themselves and by assuming the task of informing the public, they share a similar action profile with e-shift – even though the coalition does not seek as much to remain open and connect to new organizations along the way. They are also less oriented towards empowering the broader public, instead keeping the focus on direct support of victims while informing the public.¹⁹³ One reason to

¹⁹¹ 「私たちは、原発事故子ども・被災者支援法について、その運用に原発事故被害者の声を反映させ、被害者のための具体的な支援策を実現することで、福島原発事故に起因する放射線被ばくを低減し、放射線の健康等への影響を回避することを目的として、「原発事故子ども・被災者支援法市民会議」を設立します。」

¹⁹² 「やっぱり、支援法でしょ！」

¹⁹³ In her comparative analysis on victims' movements in Japan and South Korea, Arrington (2016) holds that victims' movements need to carefully balance between claiming redress from political allies and mobilizing public support. She emphasizes that "claimants who gain elite allies only after mobilizing broader societal support tend to achieve more redress" (2016: 5). In the case of SHSK, a coalition focused on influencing the implementation process of an established victim support law, this balance might even be more difficult to maintain as elite allies have already fulfilled their role in passing a law; consequently, the level of public attention has also decreased.

rather stay among themselves may be their involvement with victims' organizations, which sometimes deal with very personal issues. They are certainly careful to keep such information confidential and filter it before it goes public (cf. section 3.1.5).




Figure 15. SHSK: Joint Project.

The argumentative structure of SHSK's discursive output is shaped by their support of the achievements of the Nuclear Victims Support Act, and a heavy critique of the failure to translate it into concrete policy measures. On the website, SHSK offers detailed information about the Victims Support Act, repeatedly referring to it as "groundbreaking"¹⁹⁴ mainly for two reasons. First, they praise its acknowledgment of the 'right to evacuation', the 'right to stay', as well as the 'right to return', thus supporting the 'right of self-determination' and choice for all affected people. Second, because it assumes the premise that there is no scientific evidence about the health impact of low-level radiation, it thus pledges to prevent health effects from any amount of radiation exposure. Moreover, they say the law is special because it was not proposed by the government but by a large alliance of parliamentarians from multiple parties in

¹⁹⁴ 「画期的」

cooperation with citizen groups – and passed the Diet unanimously (Shienhō Shimin Kaigi 2016b).

Nevertheless, the law has a number of weaknesses because it remains largely “aspirational rather than practical” (Fukuda 2015: 192). Thus, the consultations for the basic policy (*kihon hōshin*) became the focus of attention. On the day the Victims Support Act passed, FoE published a joint statement with a number of organizations, some of which later formed SHSK, in which they raise their main concerns: first, that the law does not fix the boundaries of the ‘areas of support’ (*shien taizō chiiki*), and second, that it does not provide a concrete budget for the measures it outlines. In this statement the organizations also demand that the annual radiation dosage standard used to determine the ‘areas of support’ should not exceed an annual dosage of 1msv and that concrete support measures be implemented as soon as possible (FoE Japan 2012).

Looking at the issues and topics of SHSK events over time, two periods can be distinguished. The first period is after the passage of the Nuclear Victims Support Act in June 2012 and before the implementation of the basic policy in October 2013. This period is marked by the organization of regional forums to make the contents of the law known especially to the population in affected areas, and by actions pressuring the government to quickly implement the law. During this first phase, the main points of contention were the delay in the implementation of the law, as well as the call for participation of victims and citizens in the process.

During this first period, in summer 2012, SHSK held a number of study groups and seminars in affected areas to publicize the Support Act, in particular concerning the possibility of health recuperation stays (*hōyō*) for children and housing support for families. As it became clear in the runup to the December 2013 general elections that the the LDP would come back into power, they realized that the enacted policies would likely not deliver what the Support Act promised. SHSK increasingly focused their activities on lobbying Diet members, demanding that the Support Act not be rendered “boneless”¹⁹⁵, a term that still resonated widely in the coalition during my fieldwork in 2013 and 2014. The main conflict was that the government was favoring an annual standard amount of 20msv – the maximum dosage recommendation in case of a nuclear emergency, according to the International

¹⁹⁵ 「骨抜き」

Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) – while SHSK favored a 1msv standard, previously promised to the public by lawmakers – in accordance with ICRP recommendations for reference levels in normal times (FoE Japan 2013).¹⁹⁶

Between January and March 2013, supported by a number of parliamentarians, SHSK organized Diet hearings of victims. In November 2012 an SHSK member organization organized a visit to Japan by The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights, Anand Grover. When his report was published in May 2013, SHSK members took the lead in promoting its contents, which very much reflect victims' and victims' organizations' voices from a human rights and more specifically a right-to-health perspective.¹⁹⁷ Following this, on the first anniversary of the Support Act in June 2013, SHSK organized events to renew the push for its quick implementation.

Finally, in August 2013, the Reconstruction Agency published a basic draft policy; the response was discontent among the member organizations. In a joint statement published on August 30, 2013, SHSK lists seven points of critique. Under point one, the members complain the policy does not reflect victims' voices and that the Reconstruction Agency did not organize public hearings of victims during the process. Points two and three disapprove of the determination for "areas of support". The basic policy does not determine an annual radiation dosage standard but keeps the regulations in line with the recommen-

¹⁹⁶ The 2007 ICRP recommendations for radiation exposure recommend limits of lower than 1msv for public exposure in planned situations, 1–20msv constraints for occupational exposure, and a 20–100msv reference level in case of a radiological emergency, according to Wrixon (2008). On March 21, 2011, the ICRP published a paper on the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Accident, in which they stress that the reference level for the public in nuclear emergencies according to their 2009 guideline is 20–100msv. Once the radiation source is under control, in contaminated areas the reference level should be 1–20msv per year with a long-term goal to reduce levels to below 1msv (International Commission on Radiological Protection 2011).

¹⁹⁷ Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees every individual "the right to a standard living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing, and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control". Paragraph 2 of the same article especially protects motherhood and childhood (United Nations (2015 [1948])). Thus, from this perspective, the state is responsible for providing the necessary infrastructure to assure access to physical and mental health to every individual.

dations adopted previously, allowing up to 20msv¹⁹⁸ (Reconstruction Agency 2013b: 2). According to SHSK, the international common standard for annual radiation dosage is 1msv, and even legal regulations concerning victims of the Chernobyl accident in Ukraine and Belarus recognize a ‘right to evacuation’ for people living in areas with an annual average dosage of 1 to 5msv. The supported areas thus include only areas of Fukushima prefecture directly adjacent to the compulsory evacuation zone closest to the nuclear plant (including a total of 33 villages). Although other parts of Fukushima prefecture and neighboring prefectures are also affected by the radioactive fallout of the disaster, these areas are designated ‘semi support areas’ (*jun shien taizō chiiki*), in which only a limited number of specific support measures are endorsed, such as radiation checks for food served in school cafeterias. Point four criticizes that the proposed estimation of individual radiation exposure with a personal dosimeter¹⁹⁹ does not take into account the localized accumulation of radioactive substances, nor does it contribute to the reduction of these substances. This measure is instead a pretext for hurrying people to return. Point five holds that the basic policy does not contain new measures to facilitate evacuation; all measures it contains to lighten the burden on evacuees have already been realized through the Package of Measures for the Support of Victims from the Nuclear Disaster (Genshiryoku Higai ni yoru Hisaisha Shien Shisaku Pakkēji) from the Reconstruction Agency in March 2013, and do not represent an improvement (Reconstruction Agency 2013a). Under point six SHSK members vent their concern that the basic policy appears to favor people who return to the contaminated areas rather than supporting those trying to re-establish their lives elsewhere – such as through job search support. Point seven

¹⁹⁸ In April 2011, the Ministry of Education sent a notice to Fukushima prefecture concerning a Temporary Way of Thinking about the Decision to Use Schoolyards and School Buildings in Fukushima Prefecture (Fukushima-ken nai no Gakkō no Kōsha Kōtei nado no Riyō Handan ni okeru Zanteiteki Kangaekata ni tsuite). In this document the ministry, based on the advice of the Nuclear Safety Commission and ICRP recommendations, allowed the use of schoolgrounds where an annual dosage of 20msv could be estimated. See Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (2011).

¹⁹⁹ Since 2011, different affected communities in Fukushima prefecture have distributed personal dosimeters to sampled populations over a certain time period (ranging from a couple of weeks to about three months) in order to estimate personal external radiation exposure. In the case of Kōriyama city for example, the individual exposure of school children has been and continues to be measured (Kōriyama City (2016).

finally criticizes that the policy provides limited evaluation of the health impact: it is confined to an expert conference. Health checks include only thyroid cancer, psychological problems, and lifestyle diseases, and do not include blood tests and electro-cardiograms – thus covering only a fraction of diseases which may be triggered by low dose radiation exposure (Shienhō Shimin Kaigi 2013a).

Public comments on the draft were open between August 30th and September 23rd, 2013. In order to increase the number of public comments, SHSK members held a press conference, started a public comment campaign calling for the population to send in their opinions, and organized a hearing of victims for Diet members. On September 30th, they also organized a meeting with different ministries to hand in a petition specifically concerning the 1msv standard.

The second period of SHSK action began after the passage of the basic policy on October 11, 2013 which, according to SHSK, took into account neither victims' claims nor the public comments (about 4.900) (Shienhō Shimin Kaigi 2013b). On October 11, they staged a public protest and press conference in front of the Prime Minister's office. After the intensive first phase of action, event postings on the website became less frequent. However, in the first half of 2014, SHSK organized events to study the situation in Chernobyl, especially in terms of potential long-term consequences as well as to discuss the latest developments and impact of government regulations (MFN9). In September 2014 the coalition addressed the issue of the imminent phase-out of victim housing support. In March 2015 they organized conferences in Fukushima and Tōkyō to study the health effects thus far, as well as the problems victims face in relation to the health care system (Shienhō Shimin Kaigi 2016a).

In conclusion, SHSK is a coalition of victims' organizations and victim support organizations clearly focused on a single issue, namely the inclusion of victims in the policy-making process. Specifically, SHSK seems to ensure victims' right to evacuation as well as the needed financial and logistical support. Besides these policy-focused activities, member groups also exchange expertise and information among themselves, and inform the public about their activities.

5.1.2 JOINT ACTION REPERTOIRE

In order to influence the implementation of the Nuclear Victims Support Act, SHSK employs a less visible joint action profile. Between June 21, 2012 and June 21, 2015, within a period of three years, the coalition posted 85 events on its website. Most events, 39 in total, are study-related symposia, study meetings, forums, and seminars. Many of the forums and

seminars took place in affected areas such as Fukushima city, Kōriyama city, or Iwaki city in Fukushima prefecture, but also areas that received evacuees such as Yamagata city in Yamagata prefecture or Sapporo city, Hokkaidō prefecture.

SHSK Joint Action Repertoire 2012–2015	
Symposia, Study meetings, Forums, Seminars	39
Policy Proposals, Submission of Signatures, Petitions	15
Assemblies (<i>shūkai</i>) and Inner-Parliament Assemblies (<i>innai shūkai</i>)	13
Press conferences, Press releases	5
Question-and-Answer Sessions (with governmental agencies) (<i>kōshō</i>)	4
Hearings of Victims	3
Lobbying	2
Regional Counseling Sessions	2
Public Comment Campaigns	1
Appeal/Protest in front of the Prime Minister's office	1
	85

Table 11. SHSK: Joint Action Repertoire (June 2012–June 2015, data from website).

The second largest proportion of their action repertoire is directly policy-related and includes policy proposals, petitions, and signature submissions. 15 of the activities fall into this category. The third largest action category with 13 events includes inner-parliament and other assemblies. These three largest categories are followed by press conferences and press releases (5), question-and-answer-sessions (4) and hearings of victims in the Diet (3), lobbying (2), and regional counseling sessions (2). A public comment campaign and public protest play a subordinate role; both took place only once.

The activities of SHSK have thus been largely focused on studying the Victim Support Act, making its contents known to affected people, gathering their voices, and taking them to the Diet in the form of policy proposals. These efforts are supplemented by the organization of assemblies and hearings of victims in the Diet and responsible ministries; in a more confrontational form also through question-and-answer sessions, a public comment campaign and one public protest action. On the whole, the joint action repertoire reconfirms the coalition's focus on a specific issue: building a structure to involve victims in the policy implementation of the Support Act.

5.2 RELATIONAL PATTERNS

The following subsections analyze the relational patterns behind SHSK's action profile, which greatly influence the content and shape of the action profile. Section 5.2.1 characterizes the coalition's composition in terms of the date of foundation of its member organizations, their organizational types, and their original fields of action. Section 5.2.2 investigates the SHSK's broader network by correlating events and participating actors. This section focuses on the centrality of certain actors in the network and identifies the main target actors and their position in action. Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 are based on data provided by the SHSK website. The following sections analyze the actors' perceptions of the coalition's internal relations (section 5.2.3) with special regard to core members, lines of conflict, and the relations or embeddedness of the coalition in the broader movement (section 5.2.4). The coalition's relationship to outside actors such as the political arena and the broader society is treated in section 5.2.5. These sections are based mainly on interview and participant observation data. This subsection thus provides a comprehensive picture of the coalition's internal and external relational patterns.

5.2.1 NETWORK COMPOSITION

SHSK follows a formal membership adherence procedure based on recommendation by other member groups; at least one group representative must participate in the monthly or bimonthly internal meetings of the coalition (cf. section 5.2.3.1). SHSK lists 68 members on its website, of which 17 qualify as administrating and 51 as participating organizations. Of all listed member groups, 49 were founded after the nuclear accident; 19 already existed (Shienhō Shimin Kaigi 2015).

Foundation Date of the Participating SMOs	
before 2011	19
after 2011	49
	68

Table 12. SHSK: Foundation Date of the Participating SMOs
(data from SMO websites).

The majority of member organizations were founded after the accident, indicating that a broad and quick micro level mobilization concerning victims' issues took place leading to the foundation of a high number of movement groups. Furthermore, on the meso level these new organiza-

tions rapidly connected to others including long-standing experienced ones. Without them, the formation of a coalition such as SHSK would not have been possible.

Most member organizations are private organizations, 45 out of 68; the number of NPOs is 12, plus two tax-exempted NPOs. Besides these two status categories we also find three public corporations, two business corporations, a labor union, a food cooperative, an international NGO,²⁰⁰ and a local politicians' network.

Types of Organization	
Private Organization	45
NPO	12
Public Corporation	3
Business Corporation	2
Tax-exempted NPO	2
Labor Union	1
Food Cooperative	1
International NGO	1
Communal Politicians' Network	1
	68

Table 13. SHSK: Types of Organization (data from SMO websites).

The distribution of organization types is connected to the fact that most organizations were founded after the accident. Even if a new organization aspired to apply for NPO status, too little time had passed to complete the necessary procedures at the time SHSK was inaugurated. One of the organizations interviewed during field work in 2013, was finalizing its NPO application around that time (SR7: 9).²⁰¹

²⁰⁰ As already indicated, NGO is not a legal status in Japan. However, many organizations characterize themselves as NGOs especially when they are involved in developmental issues and operate mainly overseas. The international NGO (INGO) that participates in both network-coalitions introduced here is Peace Boat. Peace Boat does not have a legal status as NPO in Japan because it finances its activities through a chartered passenger ship, but it has been recognized by the United Nations' Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) as INGO.

²⁰¹ Thus, a tendency to institutionalization of newly founded movement organizations can be observed; hinting at the fact that these civil organizations consider the issue of radiation and radiation protection a problem which will be salient for a long time.

Primary Issues of Concern of the Participating SMOs	
Child Protection	21
Evacuees and Evacuee Support	13
Health Recuperation Stays	13
Environment	6
Anti-Nuclear	4
Information	3
Peace	1
Human Rights	1
Safe Food	1
NGO/NPO Support	1
Citizen Science	1
Social Welfare	1
Women	1
ODA	1
	68

Table 14. SHSK: Primary Issues of Concern of the Participating SMOs
(data from SMO websites).

Most participating groups are engaged primarily in issues concerning child protection, followed by evacuee support and health recuperation stays. Besides groups explicitly concentrating on these issues, member groups are also involved in environmental, anti-nuclear, information, peace, human rights, safe food, NPO support, citizen science, social welfare, women, and ODA²⁰²-related issues. SHSK is thus a coalition of diverse organizations working together on victims' issues such as child protection from radiation, evacuation, and organizations providing health recuperation stays for children. The majority of the remaining organizations focused on primary issue fields not directly connected to the impact of the nuclear disaster supposedly existed from before the accident. They broadened their fields of action after the accident and bring in their different expertise to advocacy-related action.

²⁰² Official Development Assistance.

Action Repertoires of the Participating SMOs ²⁰³	
Networking (among individuals)	16.8%
Advocacy (e. g. policy proposals, petitions, question-and-answer sessions)	16.1%
Symposia, study groups, lectures	12.6%
Health recuperation stays	11.2%
Networking with other SMOs (nationally and internationally)	6.3%
Health consultations	6.3%
Information dissemination	6.3%
Radiation measuring	5.6%
Education	4.9%
Counseling (e. g. welfare, rights)	4.2%
Lifestyle (radiation-free food, furniture, day care for elderly)	4.2%
Fundraising	2.1%
Direct protest action (e. g. demonstrations)	2.1%
Law suits, ADR ²⁰⁴	0.7%
Organization of volunteers	0.7%

Table 15. SHSK: Action Repertoires of the Participating SMOs
(data from SMO websites).

²⁰³ As most organizations engage in more than one form of action, results are presented as percentages.

²⁰⁴ Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is a less confrontational and in most cases faster solution compared to regular litigation. According to Feldman (2013), nuclear victims' compensation in Japan is regulated by the Nuclear Damage Compensation Act from 1961. This law holds nuclear power suppliers responsible for covering claims up to 120 billion Yen. If claims exceed this amount the government may cover for the rest. In the case of the Fukushima accident, the government augments TEPCO's fund. Nuclear victims now have three possibilities to claim compensation: directly through the Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation managed by TEPCO; through the Center for Nuclear Damage Reconciliation under the supervision of the Ministry of Education – here the procedure follows ADR regulations; – and through regular litigation. Arrington (2016: 191–193) points out that these multiple paths to redress are the result of a number of “compromises among politicians and between the state and the nuclear plant's operator, Tōkyō Electric Power Company (TEPCO)” who “took up the question of compensation so quickly after the disaster [that] redress claimants did not have the time or the impetus to build up broader societal pressure specifically for comprehensive redress”. The consequence of this was that “[a]lthough Prime Minister Kan Naoto [...] acknowledged the government's shared responsibility

The action repertoires of the participating organizations shows that one of the most important activities of member groups is the networking among individuals (16.8 %).

This shows that connecting individuals, movement building, and providing services to affected people are central activities for coalition members. Almost equally important are advocacy related activities at 16.1 %; many groups endeavor to convey the people's voices to the authorities. Study-related activities such as symposia or lectures take up 12.6 % of the action repertoire of the participating organizations showing that members engage in providing knowledge about victim-related issues. This is followed by health recuperation stays at 11.2 %, thus about one tenth of the participating organizations' activities relate to the organization of health camps for children. National and international networking with other SMOs at the meso level is 6.3 % of the repertoire. Many organizations along health recuperation stays for children also offer health consultations (6.3 %). Another 6.3 % of the repertoire is devoted on information dissemination, an activity which is also important to connect with new people. 5.6 % of activities are radiation measurement of food, soil, and air. Counseling concerning victims' rights and access to welfare and lifestyle-related activities (such as the provision of radiation-free food, natural furniture or day care for elderly) both occupy 4.2 % of the repertoire. Fundraising (2.1 %), direct protest action (2.1 %), law suits or ADR (0.7 %), and volunteer organization (0.7 %) play a minor role in the action repertoire of the participating organizations.

To conclude, most SHSK member organizations are involved in promoting networking among individuals which is related to movement building but also to helping victims help themselves. The overall profile of the action repertoire of participants clearly leans towards advocacy at different levels of the polity, study-related activities and the provision of health care for children. It is thus not surprising that the action repertoire of SHSK also concentrates on advocacy and study-related forms of action.

for having long promoted nuclear power, the duty to compensate victims fell primarily on TEPCO". Thus, the Kan government "faced the challenge of ensuring that TEPCO could compensate victims without going bankrupt". In August 2011, the Diet finally "enacted legislation creating a fund that injected billions of dollars of government aid into TEPCO [...] to facilitate both the compensation and the cleanup processes".

5.2.2 RELATIONS IN ACTION

The SHSK affiliation network, showing the network's relations through joint events, is based on the events posted to their website under the section 'activity report'.²⁰⁵ The website lists 85 events in total in which 115 organizations participated. The graphic showing the affiliation network which relates events (blue squares) to participating organizations (red dots) resembles e-shift with core SHSK members at the center of event organization and participation and a periphery of organizations with only limited participation (see figure 16). However, at quite a number of events, SHSK acts as the only organization involved or only cooperates with one other organization.

Compared to e-shift, in relation to the difference in total numbers of participating organizations, in SHSK's network there are more organizations at the center that seem to function as bridges to the SHSK-focused events on the left-hand side. These organizations include a number of mothers' organizations or networks such as the National Parents' Network (Kodomo Zenkoku); a regional mothers' network in the Kantō area (Kodomo Kantō Netto); 3a Kōriyama, a group based in Kōriyama city (Fukushima prefecture) devoted to protecting children from radiation; and also a national network of pediatricians (Zenkoku Shonikai Netto). There are also groups which focus on gathering and distributing information about radiation and other disaster-related information, such as the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster Information Center (Fukushima Genpatsu Hisai Jōhō Renraku Sentā), the regional Aizu Radioactivity Information Center (Aizu Hōshanō Jōhō Center), and the Citizen's Radioactivity Measuring Station (CRMS) based in Fukushima.

There are also a number of victims' and victim support organizations such as Peach Heart, Sapporo Musubiba, the victims' organization network National Movement of Nuclear Victims (Genpatsu Jiko Hinansha Zenkoku Undo), as well as the Japan Civil Network for Disaster Relief in East Japan (JCN). Besides victims' organizations, there are also lawyers' organizations involved, such the Lawyer's Association of Fukushima Prefecture (Fukushima-ken Bengoshi Kai) and Nichibenren (Japan Federation of Bar Associations), the most long-standing organization of lawyer's associations in Japan. Equally important in the network seem to be individual experts and evacuees, who are often invited to speak at events. Close to these groups and quite central are some of the more professionalized, long-standing organizations such as Fukurō no Kai, FoE, SAFLAN

²⁰⁵ 「活動報告」

(Save Fukushima Children Lawyers' Network), Greenpeace, and Peace Boat, which seem to provide bridges to the events headlined by SHSK.

Looking at the embeddedness of governmental actors in the network (in green, figure 17), it is clear that compared to e-shift, these actors seem less peripheral and more integrated into the network. There are actors from the communal as well as the prefectural levels, i. e. from the lower end of the polity. City and prefectural councils have an ambivalent position in the network, as they are often the target of the activities of the civil groups but also occasionally collaborators in critiquing the implementation of the Act from their local perspective. Moreover, there are actors in the political sphere who support SHSK and collaborate with them, such as a group of prefectural politicians who cooperate to promote the Support Act (Shienhō Suishin Jichitai Giin Renmei) and a group of Diet members with the same purpose (Kodomo Hisaisha Shien Giin Renmei). Conflictual relations must be assumed with the Reconstruction Agency, the Environmental Agency, and the Ministry of Education, the most important actors in implementing the Support Act.

Similar to e-shift is the central position of media actors in the network. In the case of SHSK, the alternative internet news station OurPlanetTV (OP-TV) has a particularly central position and is supportive of the coalition's cause. The fact that there are no other media-related actors central to the network indicates either that these contacts are not made by SHSK but in the name of other members, or that they are made in SHSK's name alone. Therefore, it could be that many events were conducted by SHSK alone, or simply that SHSK did not post all press contacts as events on its website. Besides media actors, parliamentarians also hold a position in the middle of the graphic, sharing connections through a number of events. As in the case of e-shift, relations to this group of actors are hybrid; some parliamentarians cooperate, others are the target of coalition activities.

In summary, SHSK draws heavily on information gathered by organizations in the affected regions, especially concerning radiation issues and victims' needs. In order to enhance legitimacy and to give a neutral/professional assessment of the situation, the network relies on expert evaluations. However, they also foreground the emotional side of the issues by having victims and/or evacuees speak at their events. Additionally, they share cooperative relations with a number of political actors on different levels of the polity while remaining sharply focused on influencing the main implementing agencies: the Reconstruction Agency and the Environmental Ministry.

The eigenvector analysis (figure 18) shows the most central SHSK actors based on the organizations' co-participation in movement events




Figure 18. SHSK: Eigenvector Centrality.

and their adjacency to other central actors. According to this analysis, SHSK's most central organizations are FoE and the regional network of mothers' groups in the Kantō area: Kodomo Kantō Netto. Overall, and especially in comparison to e-shift, the overall distribution of centrality is not so clearly structured.

Although there are quite a number of peripheral organizations, there are many organizations with a high or similar degree of centrality, especially on the right side of the graphic (figure 18). This might be because SHSK is a relatively closed coalition while e-shift continuously tries to integrate new groups. Among the most central governmental actors are the Reconstruction Agency as well as the city councils.

The analysis of actor centrality suggests that victims' organizations are most influential in formulating and expressing the coalition's common project while professionalized movement organizations such as FoE or SAFLAN translate this message into the policy-making process with the support of lawyers' associations and parts of the polity. SHSK has less intensive relations with the mainstream press and is not as strongly oriented towards reaching broader society. In terms of spreading their message they remain focused on mobilizing victims by sharing knowledge about victims' rights.

5.2.3 INTERNAL RELATIONS

As the previous sections have shown, within SHSK a group of central actors can be identified which has a strong influence on the coalition's action profile. The following sections substantiate this finding from the actors' perspective by looking at their perceptions of the coalitional structures in which they are embedded, the positions of core members, and their handling of internal cooperation and conflict.

5.2.3.1 Coalitional Structures

SHSK's website lists 17 managing organizations (*unei dantai*) and 51 participating organizations (*sanka dantai*). This working structure is explained in the operating statement (*unei yōryō*) which sets down the management structure (*unei taisei*) of the coalition. In order to become a participating organization, an organization must be either a victims' or a victim support organization and must approve of the coalition's objective. Additionally, the organization must be approved by the managing organizations and is required to send a representative to the regular meetings. The managing organizations recommend a council of responsible delegates (*sewa-nin kai*) who can by majority rule decide on SHSK's administrative procedures. The council of responsible delegates also votes for a

designated speaker (*daihyō sewa-nin*) to represent the coalition and decides which participating organizations can become managing organizations. At the time of foundation, FoE and Save Fukushima Children Lawyer's Network (SAFLAN) served as administrating offices (Shienhō Shimin Kaigi 2016c). As a result, SHSK follows a strict membership policy and a democratically decided inner hierarchy between participating and managing organizations led by a delegates' council. This implies that although SHSK aims to improve networking among victims' organizations, its network structure has a protectionist character and requires consistent participation.

During my fieldwork in late 2013 and early 2014, SHSK decided to hold the regular meeting on a bimonthly basis meaning that after the official implementation of the Support Act in October 2013, they reduced their activities to a certain degree. Moreover, some of their meetings included only the managing organizations and main delegates. These meetings were not open to the public and my wish to participate was declined underlining the rather closed character of the coalition (MFN8) (cf. section 3.2.2).

Although SHSK formally controls access to the coalition, the member organizations are conscious of being embedded in a variety of networks simultaneously. Networking is an important tool for information exchange and maximizing the impact of the coalition's work. For some of the more professionalized members, SHSK is an influential, important network and the regular meetings play a central role in their activities (SR1: 21):

“Talking about something bigger, about the Nuclear Victims Support Act I talked about the other day, we built a group called ‘Kodomo Hisaisha Shienhō Shimin Kaigi [SHSK]’ for which SAFLAN currently does the administration. There are now about 50 member organizations. And we meet every third Friday of the month and discuss what needs to be done next. This group was founded in July 2012, after the Support Act had passed in June, and we meet regularly and collaborate.”²⁰⁶

²⁰⁶ 「もう少し大きい話だと、今、先日話した子ども被災者支援法については、「子ども被災者支援法市民会議」というグループを作って、今サフランが事務局をやってるんですけども。そこはもう多分 50 何団体ぐらい構成団体があります。それは、毎月第 3 金曜日の夕方に集まって、今後どうしていこうかという議論をするということです。ずっと支援法ができた 2012 年の 6 月の次の月に、7 月にそういうグループを作りまして定期的に集まって活動をしていたりします。」

Cooperating under the aegis of SHSK helps broaden the audience, improves connections to victims and their organizations, and enhances their impact on the government (SR1: 43):

“When we do something together with other organizations, our audience broadens, and it becomes easier to approach victims, I think. [...] Additionally, when we do things with many organizations, we have more influence on the government; that is why in most cases we act together with others.”²⁰⁷

Moreover, for the professional, Tōkyō-based organizations, networking with victims’ organizations is the basis of their activities (SR1: 43):

“Generally speaking, we are not nuclear victims ourselves, so I think it is of particular importance to work with victims. That is because we think that it is our task to support their activities. So for us, it is most important to really act together with victims, I think.”²⁰⁸

Clearly, the more experienced, professional organizations based mainly in Tōkyō define their main task in terms of gathering victims’ voices. To legitimize their work, they require strong ties to victims and their organizations. This deference results in cooperative and friendly relations between Tōkyō-based organizations and victims’ organizations in the affected regions.

Besides establishing and maintaining ties to victims’ organizations, professional organizations also draw in their national and international connections. One organization with good international ties is very conscious about deploying this potential for SHSK’s common goal (SR6: 101):

“[O]ur role within that network is pretty much that of a supporting role in terms of whether it’s publicity or organizational or for example, the network is holding an event and we have more resources not necessarily financially but in terms of access to volunteers or [...] [other] mailing list[s]. [...] or for example if translations are needed and also getting opinions from international experts on,

²⁰⁷ 「やはり他の団体と一緒にやったほうがオーディエンスも増えますし、当事者へのアプローチも簡単になるということだと思いますので。[...] 多くの団体がやっているとというふうに、また政府から見ても影響力を与える上でもよりよいということで、大体どっかと一緒に活動することが多いですね。」

²⁰⁸ 「一般論として言えば、特に私たちは原発事故の被害者本人ではないので、当事者の方と一緒にやるっていうことはすごく重要なことなんだろうんですよね。私たちあくまで彼らの活動をサポートするのが仕事であると思ってますので。やはり実際の被害者の方と一緒に活動するっていうのは、私たちににとって一番重要なことなんではないかなと思います。」

you know, human rights or these kinds of things. Using the, rather than the very core member of that network, a lot of these different supporting is depending of what's needed at the time and so on. And so we see that as an organizational capacity, in that sense."

For victims' organizations on the other hand, most of which formed after the disaster fueled by anxiety and anger, participation in the coalition focuses their activities on a concrete goal, prevents demobilization, and provides opportunities for developing ideas on long-term strategies (SR7: 6):

"In 2011, probably until February, March [2012], we moved with a lot of energy, but many of us did things on top of children and work, and so our organization also became less active and exhausted and we had financial problems, so that at many levels, our movement loosened and was kind of stagnating; for us, it was impossible to address the problems by ourselves. And last summer there was the mobilization for the Support Act and a citizen's assembly to deal with it was founded. So we joined it and decided to concentrate our activities on the Support Act [...]. [...] [When it became clear that] if it [a radiation limit] would not be included in the policy guideline we couldn't do anything about it, we wanted to put our thoughts in action. So if the law wasn't going to determine the limit for radiation exposure, then let's say it one more time, we thought, and so we started our 1 millisievert campaign [...]." ²⁰⁹

Thus, the victims' organizations need the support of the professional organizations. From them they learn how to better organize themselves and improve their possibilities to influence policy-making. For this group of organizations, connections to big organizations are necessary for realizing their goals, so networking in general is a central activity. And

²⁰⁹ 「特に 2011 年の 12 月の年内から、そうですね、2 月、3 月まではガーって勢いで動けたんですけど、やっぱりそれぞれみんな子育てや仕事を抱えながらやってる人も多くて、自分たちの団体の動きもだんだん疲れてきたり、疲弊したり、経済的に成り立たなかったり、いろんな条件で動きが緩く、どうしても停滞しがちになってくる中で、じゃあ、それを全体に呼びかけてやるっていうふうには、なかなかならなくて。ですから今回、去年の夏からは原発事故子ども被災者支援法が一つ、大きく立ち上がったので、それを取り組む団体の市民会議というのができたんですね。そこに加わることで、支援法を中心に取り組もうよ [...]。 [...] 施策という形で降りてこないけどもできないっていうようなこともあるので、もうちょっと私たちの思いを届ける形っていうのがあってもいいんじゃないかって。支援法が基準を作らないなら、私たちはやっぱりそこだよってもう 1 回言っていこうっていうことで、この 1 ミリシーベルトっていうのをキャンペーンしようっていうのも、どっちかっていうと事務局の中心メンバーの中で考えて、今、提案してることなんですね。」

besides the realization of a concrete goal, participation in a coalition such as SHSK represents a possibility for extending existing networks even further, especially to the international sphere (SR9: 154):

“We have to connect with others all the time, I think. In any case, we have to continue to connect, I think. That is, we are going to continue with our activities and we do our best, and I think that somehow people with the same thinking will connect with us and of course, FoE and the other big organizations continue to connect and so certainly we are also going to connect and I think that if in the future we can make it a worldwide movement, that would be wonderful. So in any case, it's all about connecting. We do not have a lot of power so our only chance is to unite the small power of every individual.”²¹⁰

In practice, the working relations within SHSK are technical and fixed in nature; member organizations know their place and role, and focus clearly on their concrete common goal. The coalition has clear requirements of its member organizations, especially concerning regular participation in coalition meetings. Consequently, the meetings play a central role in the working structures of the coalition (SR1: 21):

“We have regular meetings once a month. Generally, we come together there and discuss, that is our basis. Besides this, we use email and the telephone and so on.”²¹¹

The two coalition meetings in which I participated during fieldwork were spent studying particular issues (the laws and regulations concerning the support for Chernobyl nuclear disaster victims in Ukraine; health care for *hibakusha*²¹² in Nagasaki and Hiroshima; recommendations by international organizations such as the IAEA); exchanging information from other network meetings (such as the national network for children's

²¹⁰ 「これは限りなくつながっていくしかないと思いますね。とにかくつながり続けていくしかないと思います。だから、私たちの活動がずっとこのまま、努力もしていきますけど、世界中の同じ思いの人たちともやっぱりいずれはつながっていくと思うし、もちろん FoE とか、ああいう大きなところはつながってやってるわけだけど、私たちもきっとそこに入っていって、将来は世界中でやっぱりそういう動きにしていければ素晴らしいと思うけどね。とにかくつながっていくってことだと思いますけどね。私たちって権力とか大きな力はないけど、一人一人が持つてる小さな力を結集する以外ないですよ。」

²¹¹ 「市民会議の定例ミーティングっていうのが月に 1 回ありまして。基本的にはそこに集まってみんなで相談するというのが基本です。あとは、メールとか電話とかいろいろあると思うんですけども。」

²¹² People affected by radiation.

recuperative stays) and other recent developments in the lives of victims; and deciding whether action needs to be taken and if so, how (MFN9; MFN10). The regular public meetings are usually moderated by one of the administrating organizations, using the previously determined agenda that has usually been posted beforehand on the website. The meetings often take place in a conference room in the Diet buildings.

5.2.3.2 Core Members

The formal working procedures of SHSK as laid down in their operating statement (cf. previous section) as well as the eigenvector analysis (section 5.2.2), suggest that the managing organizations form the core of the network. Network members repeatedly referred to the administrating organizations FoE and SAFLAN as the core (SR6: 99; SR5: 66; SR9: 153; SR1: 20). Kodomo Zenkoku Netto, the national parents' network, the victim support organization Musubiba, and the regional parents' network Kodomo Kantō Netto are also central, despite the fact that the latter two are not managing organizations (SR7: 67):

“SHSK probably has about 50 organizations now. There are about 10 and maybe a couple of other organizations that are involved in management [...] and Kodomo Zenkoku is involved, too, and the organizations that regularly meet and talk about what to do next are SAFLAN, and FoE, and also Musubiba, and although they are not members [i.e. a managing organization] there is Kodomo Kantō Netto which is very active.”²¹³

This quote indicates that activity levels of member organizations have changed over time and so has the perception of them by other network members. However, FoE and SAFLAN have been consistently central to SHSK as they are the ones who administrate and guide the coalition during coalition meetings (MFN9; MFN10). Although FoE comes from an environmental background, the organization does not bring in aspects from their own agenda (in particular the anti-nuclear energy field) but remains focused on victim's issues and the management of the coalition. SAFLAN's primary action field is victim support

²¹³ 「支援法の団体が今、50 ぐらいだったかな？ その中で運営に携わる団体っていうのが 10 いくつあって [...] 運営団体というものに一応、全国ネットも入っているので、常に次、何を取り組むかみたいな話し合いをしているのが、このサフラン、福島の子どもたちを守る法律家ネットワークのサフランとか、FoE さんとか、そうですね、あとのむすびばさんなんかは常にやり取りしながら、あとこっちには入っていないんですけど、今、すごくやり取りしてるのは関東ネットさんってあって [...]。」

especially legal support, so its action profile overlaps with SHSK significantly. Nevertheless, the fact that SAFLAN as one of the most central actors in the network is an association of lawyers pushes the coalition's overall action profile towards an argumentative discourse relying heavily on legal terms.

Clearly, considering the role of core members in the coalition, it can be said that the managing and especially the administrating organizations are central, but they keep their individual agendas in the background while victims' and parents' organizations take center stage in determining the content of action.

5.2.3.3 Cooperation and Conflict

As the previous sections have shown, the formal structure as well as the concrete goal of SHSK influences relational patterns within the coalition. Specifically, this pattern is shaped by professional organizations who take on the administrative and logistical tasks, thus allowing newly founded victims' organizations' claims to the relevant governmental agencies. This group of mainly Tōkyō-based organizations shares social bond-type ties while connected to a periphery of mainly regional victims-related groups, which contribute information about the situation on the ground. In contrast to e-shift, the majority of SHSK member organizations were founded after the disaster; because they do not carry a long movement history their relations are less ideologically pre-structured. This is part of the reason why the internal relations of the coalition have less potential for ideologically motivated conflict.

During the meetings, the atmosphere among the representatives is generally harmonious. They study, comment upon, and interpret new regulations; provide updates on the latest discussions of government advisory councils members have attended; and exchange information about the effects of the latest developments on the lives of victims. At times, they become indignant about the reports, and discussions become emotional. In such situations, the administrating organizations often defuse the situation and bring participants back to the issue by suggesting what could be done legally or by presenting options for giving word to parliamentarians or the media about certain issues. In such discussions, they also ask what they can do as a coalition, and what they may better address in other combinations (MFN9; MFN10).

The general mood in the coalition is very cooperative and focused on a concrete goal they wish to reach together. There are of course disagreements as well (SR1: 43):

“Well, it’s not as if when acting together, there are no different opinions and ideas, so in such situations it is necessary to talk about it and to find a solution.”²¹⁴

The occurrence of conflicts when people act together is considered natural here, and member organizations endeavor to solve issues by talking to each other taking into account all arguments and finding a compromise. This cooperative attitude towards conflict resolution can be interpreted against the background that there are fewer ideological rifts within SHSK than e-shift and that SHSK has a clear goal stemming from the concrete grievances of affected people.

5.2.4 RELATIONS TO THE BROADER MOVEMENT

The next section introduces SHSK’s role in the broader movement, gives insight into the multiplexity of the coalition, and explores its cooperative and conflictive relations to the broader movement field.

5.2.4.1 SHSK’s Role in the Movement

Within the nuclear victims-related anti-nuclear movement, SHSK plays an important role in providing a space for information exchange and, significantly, to study and discuss issues. As already indicated in previous sections, less experienced organizations profit from the exchange with professional groups and take this knowledge and expertise back into their respective broader networks. This applies particularly to knowledge about legal procedures and possibilities for influencing policy-making. SHSK is also important for amplifying victims’ voices and making them heard in the national political arena as well as in the international sphere. Within the broader movement SHSK thus performs professionalized advocacy and lobbying.

5.2.4.2 Multiplexity

The biggest and most active meso level networks connected to SHSK are the Kodomo Zenkoku Netto, the national parents’ network and the 311 Ukeire Netto, a national network of citizen organizations providing health recuperation stays for children from affected areas. The Kodomo Zenkoku Netto has over 300 member organizations nation-wide, some of which have also built regional networks under the umbrella of Zenkoku

²¹⁴ 「ただやはり、いろいろ活動するにあたって意見の対立とか方針の違いっていうのは出てくるということもなくはないので、そういったときは議論をしたり調整をしたりしなくちゃいけないというところはありますけれども。」

Netto, e. g. the Kodomo Kantō Netto in the Kantō area. This mothers' or parents' movement to protect children from radiation mobilized after the accident. After the disaster, concerned mothers searched for alternative information on radiation on the internet and started communicating with other concerned mothers via social media. This led to the organization of mailing lists and later to physical meetings, and the foundation of groups that then quickly connected with other groups regionally and nationally. Many of these groups started to measure radiation in their cities, especially at playgrounds near schools and kindergartens; voiced concerns about the radiation levels in food served in schools; and called upon communal and regional authorities to protect children from radiation exposure (SR9: 13–31; SR7: 2–6).²¹⁵ Because of their anxiety and anger about the authorities' handling of the situation, these groups of affected people share a high level of commitment. Consequently their position and concerns have a lot of influence within SHSK, especially when it comes to confrontations with governmental agencies.

The 311 Ukeire Network is a network of organizations engaged mainly in the organization of health recuperation stays for children from affected regions. It developed about one year after the disaster, when evacuation flows started to slow down and it became clear that many people would continue to live in contaminated areas. In order to provide support to children in these areas, they organize holiday camps in different regions to reduce internal body radiation levels (Ukeire Zenkoku Kyōgikai 2015a). Among SHSK's members, this group of organizations is particularly interested in observing and influencing the implementation of recuperation-related regulations.

Besides these two meso level networks SHSK is also connected to radiation measuring groups and to evacuee organizations all over Japan through individual organizations that are members in other networks as well. SHSK also shares ties to victims' organizations that are primarily

²¹⁵ Holdgrün and Holthus (2016) indicate that the mothers' groups in Kodomo Zenkoku Netto can be divided into two types of activists: the "openly concerned" and the "radicals". The "openly concerned" mothers or parents avoid demonstrations as form of protest, favoring alternative forms of action which they hope will be more successful; the group of "radicals" are also willing to join in demonstrations. These two activist types can be distinguished from "secretly concerned" and "not concerned" parents. According to the authors many of the newly formed mothers' groups follow a strategy of "babysteps" towards their goal of protecting their children from radiation; they focus on local-level activities such as writing petitions to the local authorities, attending local assembly committee meetings, and/or meetings with local politicians.

concerned with living support and of which some focus on lawsuits to win compensation. In spring 2015, these victims' organizations founded a national network named Genpatsu Jiko Higaisha Dantai Renraku Kai, Hidanren for short (Nuclear Accident Victims' Organizations Information Assembly) which seeks to exchange information on victims-related lawsuits and which generally wants to determine responsibility for the accident (Hidanren 2015).

In SHSK thus flows together information from various stakeholders in nuclear victims' issues: groups of parents and others interested in limiting the effect of radiation on the population, supported by groups supplying them with information on radiation levels, as well as evacuees fighting for living support and compensation. This group of directly affected stakeholders overlaps with movement communities of professional organizations that are embedded in other national and international environmental, peace, and human rights networks; ensuring information flow, mutual support, and the exchange of expertise. Moreover, meso level ties to lawyers' organizations such as Nichibenren, the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, and to local lawyers' groups provide for the flow of legal expertise.

5.2.4.3 Cooperation and Conflict in the Movement Field

SHSK shares ties to e-shift and CCNE though multiple member organizations, but these networks never officially cooperate with one another. While the publications of e-shift and CCNE, particularly e-shift's Booklet No. 5 and the CCNE Report, address victims' issues and include the issue field in their strategy for nuclear phase-out, SHSK and victims' organizations never work directly on the issue of nuclear energy. The separation of the victims' and energy issues was palpable, too, at the many events I attended during fieldwork. A representative of a mothers' organization describes the phenomenon this way (SR9: 133–136):

“We don't address it explicitly, but it is kind of a natural precondition. Nuclear phase-out is self-evident. It doesn't become a topic of conversation. It seems self-evident. [...]. But, for many people it doesn't seem that way. Limiting radiation exposure and nuclear phase-out somehow seem to be different.”²¹⁶

²¹⁶ 「テーマにわざわざはならないんですけども、当たり前の前提な感じですかね。脱原発はもう当たり前ですかね。話題は特に上らないですね。それが当たり前みたいな感じ。[...] ただ、一般的にはそうでもないらしいですね。脱被ばくと脱原発は、どうもちっと違うところがあるみたい。」

This statement suggests that SHSK members respect those parts of the anti-nuclear movement working towards nuclear phase-out but that they consider their issue distinct and try to keep the two issue areas as separated as possible.

Despite this separation, there seem to be no larger rifts in the broader victim-related movement field. Instead, the newly founded victims' groups are well-supported by a wide variety of citizen groups, as this mothers' group representative describes (SR9: 107–108):

“So I met this person who was involved in citizen movements for a long time, an elderly person. And this person was involved in a number of networks. And when we wanted to organize a public lecture, we asked them to let us present our ideas as mothers. And we asked them to support us, as a backup. And they really helped us a lot; there were about 50 people who came to help the day of the lecture. [...]. [They were from] many different kinds of groups. There were people who said they wanted to make a library, people working on waste issues, and on political problems too, of course, so people from various networks came.”²¹⁷

Clearly, large parts of civil society even from completely different issue fields are supportive of the nuclear victims' claims, helping them to take the stage without pushing forward their own claims or at least keeping them in the background on such occasions. It can thus be concluded that within the broader movement field, SHSK and its members do not encounter much criticism or counter-action.

5.2.5 RELATIONS TO THE OUTSIDE

The following sections characterize the quality of relations between SHSK and actors outside the civil sphere, i. e. political actors and the broader society. This analysis shows the influence of these relational constellations on the network structure and dynamics in the mobilization process, and how these structures affect the joint action profile.

²¹⁷ 「長く市民活動やってきた人とも知り合ったんですよ、ご年配の。で、その人たちはネットワークもいっぱい持ってるんですよ。で、この講演会をするときに、アイデアはお母さんたちのアイデアでやらせてほしいと。で、バックアップ、その裏で支える役をぜひやってほしいってということでお願いして、その人たちもすっごくいっぱい配ってくれて、当日その人たちのお手伝い 50 人来てくれたんです。[...] いろいろあります。例えば図書館を頑張って造りたいと言っている人たちとか、ごみ問題やってる人とか、政治問題ももちろんですけど、もう、いろんなネットワークの人来ましたよ。」

5.2.5.1 Relations to the Political Arena

During the creation of the Nuclear Victims Support Act, before the foundation of SHSK, relations between civil actors and a number of diet members were very cooperative. A representative of a civil organization and later an SHSK member very active at that time described relations like this (SR15: 52):

“The Nuclear Victims Support Act was done, and it was, I heard, a first in constitutional politics for all parties, all parliamentarians, all Diet members to agree to a law, plus, it was a lawmaker-initiated legislation, so it was citizens and Diet members who came together and made the law, that is what I think [...]. This law was created by affected people, that is, Abe Tomoko who is not party-affiliated, and Kawada Ryūhei at the time from Minna no Tō wrote the draft by listening to Fukushima mothers’ and fathers’ voices, and Abe Tomoko is a pediatrician herself so she really knows about the health issues. And citizens were also involved and although these were very weak parties, like real outsiders, Mrs. Tanioka from the DPJ was very energetic about it and she really brought in the DPJ which was governing party at that time, moreover, there was the LDP, and so Kōmeitō was also positive about it. For the LDP, there was Mori Masako who brought the LDP in, and miraculously a law was written based on the precautionary principle – because it is not known whether there are health effects by radiation or not – determined to protect the children; a law with such good content would never have been created by the Japanese government.”²¹⁸

²¹⁸ 「子ども・被災者支援法っていうのができて、これは憲政史上初めての全党派、全員、全会派一致の法律っていうふうに聞いているんですけど、しかもその、議員立法で市民と国会議員が一緒になって作ったっていうふうに、私は思っているんですけど [...] この法律はもともとは当事者の、無党派の阿部知子さんと、当時みんなの党の川田龍平さんがドラフトを書いて、福島のお母さんとかお父さんの意見を聞きながら、ドラフトを書いて、阿部知子さんは小児科医だから、健康問題についても詳しいんですね。それで、市民も加わって行って、本当に弱小政党の弱小なんですけども、異端的な人たちなんだけども、民主党の谷岡さんがすごく精力的に、当時民主党の谷岡さんがすごく精力的に民主党内でもまとめてくれて、当時の与党だったんですけども、これでいくと、あとは、自民党、まあ公明党はまあまあ賛成してるんで、あとは自民党なんですけども、自民党についても森まさこさんが、自民党内まとめてくれて、奇跡的にすごい、放射能に害があるかどうか分からないから、予防原則に基づいて子どもを守れっていう、日本政府からは絶対出てこないようないい内容の、法律ができたんですね。」

Directly after the disaster, there was a number of Diet members from almost all parties who consented to a law that was written based on the concerns of the affected people, in particular of parents wanting to protect their children. Even though civil organizations did not trust the government, which usually brings draft laws to vote in the Diet, they developed a cooperative working relationship with a number of parliamentarians during this time. In an interview by the internet TV station OP-TV on June 14, 2012 at the occasion of the initiation of debate of the draft law in the Special Committee on Reconstruction after the Great East Japan Earthquake in the House of Councilors (San Giin Higashi Nihon Dai Shinsai Fukkō Tokubetsu Iinkai), the Diet member Tanioka Kuniko (DPJ) expressed her gratitude and appreciation for the citizens', victims' and lawyers' participation in the making of the draft law (OurPlanet TV 2012):

“Making such a law as the governing party, one which in a sense negates the current government's policy, was only possible because we did it together with all citizens, with all the people from Fukushima, and all those people who are working for the people in Fukushima. We couldn't have done it alone in Nagatachō²¹⁹, if there hadn't been all those people from outside, that is exactly the way it is, I think. There were many people who helped to connect us, for example the lawyers' association, which organized inner-parliament assemblies again and again. And then all those who came to the study meetings and told their stories, and there were more and more parliamentarians shedding tears as they listened and so there were more and more members of the governing party who came to think the same way. That's how the enthusiasm and momentum was created and in the end it that's what broke the government's and the bureaucracy's resistance.”²²⁰

²¹⁹ District of Tōkyō where the Diet buildings are located.

²²⁰ 「こんな法律は、ある意味で政策、今の政府の政策を否定するような政策を与党で作ろうとしてるわけですから、これはその本当に国民のみなさんと福島のみなさん、あるいはその福島のみなさんのために働いているみなさんと一緒に、だから永田町の中だけでは絶対作れないぞって、外での人たちと一緒にじゃなきゃ作れないぞって言われて、その通りですねって言って。で、それを本当に多くのみなさんがもうつなげるためにやってくださって、その弁護士会もそうなんだけど、何度も何度もその院内集会をひらいてくださったりというようなことがあって。そしてその多くの方々が勉強会に駆けつけて体験を語っていただいたりとか、本当に波だを流しながらそれを聞いている議員たちがだんだんその与党の議員の中でも見方が増えたという状況の中でどんだん熱を持ってきたし、勢いもってきたという形で、その勢いが最終的には政府の抵抗だとか、官僚の抵抗と言われるものを突き破ってきたと思います [...]。」

While these two quotes indicate cooperative ties with a number of “parliamentarians with a heart”²²¹ (SR7: 20), SHSK members in general have a confrontational relationship with the government and the bureaucracy which further hardened after it became clear that the law’s implementation would not be in accordance with its original spirit. As a mothers’ organization’s representative describes, there is a need to work with both Diet members and the bureaucracy (SR9: 156):

“There is a need to make politicians and bureaucrats move. That’s because politicians are weak, now. [...] The Social Democratic Party is very weak, and the Communist Party has only done very little. And, well, they are not getting along well, really, they do not cooperate which is another problem. So, we have to make politicians get stronger. Those politicians, they really have to study more. Diet members really do not study. That is really a no go.”²²²

While continuing to work with cooperative Diet members, SHSK members are very disappointed and displeased by the ministries’ and government’s strategies to disregard the spirit of the law (SR7: 20):

“[...] we really had the impression that it [the law] contained the feelings of the affected people, that Diet members with a heart put together these thoughts and so it is most important to mobilize strength to not let it [the law] be robbed of its bones, that is the most important precondition now to protect the children from radiation and that was the spirit at the time. However, these days, it’s clear that the Reconstruction Agency and the government are following a strategy to not make it [the law] work.”²²³

²²¹ 「心ある国会議員」

²²² 「政治家動かすことと官僚動かすことと両方必要ですね。ちょっと政治家が力が弱いので、今ね。[...] 社民党自体はとても弱いし、共産党がちよっと頑張ってたけど。どうなんだろう、あそこがまた仲悪いんだよね、本当、一緒にやらないから、あれがまた問題だけど。政治家にもうちょっと力を付けてもらうしかないですね。もうちょっと勉強しないと駄目だね、政治家はね。国会議員だって本当に勉強してないから。駄目、全然駄目だよ。」

²²³ 「[...] 本当に被災当事者の思いを組んでできた、それを心ある国会議員がその思いを組んでできた法律だっていう実感があったので、これを本当に骨向きにしないためになんとか力を尽くすのが、今、放射能から子どもを守るためにも一番、最前線じゃないかってそのときは考えてやったわけですが、がですよね？ もうすでに復興庁とか政府側はそれをいかに動かさないかという作戦を練ってたっていうのがこの間、報道されましたよね。」

SHSK members now try to influence government advisory councils as well as Diet members, local politicians and authorities. Besides direct contacts, members and their multiplex networks also support the legal cases of victims that have the potential to alter some of the regulations. Moreover, through the international connections of some members, they also mobilize international organizations, such as the United Nations Human Rights Council (cf. section 5.1.1) in order to indirectly influence Japanese institutions. Even though they are angry and losing hope that they will be able to effect real change, member organizations see it as their task to continue with pressuring the government to listen to them (SR2: 119):

“I think it is most important everybody believes it’s the citizens’ activities that little by little lead to a situation where the government which usually does not listen at all, listens, has to listen to them.”²²⁴

In conclusion, while sharing cooperative ties to a number of parliamentarians, SHSK members generally have conflictive relations with governmental actors to the point where they feel completely disregarded by the polity.

5.2.5.2 Relations to the Society

SHSK’s focus is less on the creation of an encompassing movement and more on uniting victims and giving them a voice vis-à-vis governmental actors. Nevertheless, how victims’ issues are perceived in the broader society is related to the legitimacy of their claims. Generally, the members’ work on victims’ issues is well received by much of society. A representative from a professional organization with international connections pointed out that they gained societal trust by working on the Fukushima issue (SR2: 96):

“[...] well, there are [people] who say that because we are taking over the task of working on the Fukushima problem, they trust us. I think we might say that the level of societal trust and something like familiarity has increased.”²²⁵

²²⁴ 「全く政府が何も聞いてないのかっていうと、少しずつは、政府も聞くっていうか、聞かざるをえないような状況を、市民の動きが作っている部分があるので、そこはみんながもっと確信を持ったほうがいいのかなというふうには思いますね。」

²²⁵ 「[...] やっぱ福島の問題とかをやってくれてるっていうことで、信頼をするというような部分ですね。社会的な信頼度とか、親しみみたいなのは増したのかもしれないっていうふうに思いますね。」

Another representative of a mothers' organization stated that the use of the term 'citizen' (*shimin*) (cf. section 1.2.1) has become 'normal',²²⁶ thus, meaning that the idea of an 'active citizen' is no longer limited to a particular group of people (SR7: 95):

"Before 3.11, the term 'citizen' was a dead word, I think. Citizens, that's us, but when I said 'Citizen Radiation Measuring Station', I remember thinking 'I didn't use the term citizen before', but now isn't it true that people use 'citizen' naturally?"²²⁷

However, some members fear losing supporters if they reveal their opinions about the nuclear energy issue; they do not want to distract from the focus of their work which is to help victims. Good relations to the affected population are very important to them. Especially the newly emerged mothers' groups demonstrate the necessity to caring for the grassroots particularly because the first wave of political activities by mothers ebbed somewhat (SR7: 94):

"This is something that people don't know, but when the mothers first rose up, many of them did not participate in elections and didn't even know what a petition was, but these people started petitioning local authorities about school food, to demand radiation measurements, and decontamination [...]. There are people like this all over the country. Although these activities stagnated, probably because there was no immediate goal, this doesn't mean that it has vanished, and because of that, even though it might be rather invisible, there is something, how do you say, that is going to keep on for a long time because there is a need to fight against it and to push forward; and even if it is rather invisible, I expect its roots are strong. Even if we can't grow higher, the roots can spread and get stronger. [...] So, I think it is important to be embedded in everyday life. If the move-

²²⁶ As pointed out by Avenell (2010) (cf. also section 1.2.1), Japanese activists or people becoming activist struggle with the way of how to define themselves. While most of them dislike the term 'activist' as it is widely connoted with violent forms of action, many prefer the term 'citizen' (*shimin*). However, the use of the term 'citizen' to legitimize and mobilize action is not new. In times of raising activism it seems natural that more people feel the need to define and justify their activities and hand in hand with this goes the 'normalization' of the use of the term.

²²⁷ 「[...] 3.11 前って市民という言葉も死語だったと思うんですね。市民って、私たちだから、市民放射能測定所っていうときに、市民なんて使ってなかったよねって思ったのを覚えているので、でも、今、当たり前前にみんな市民って言ってるじゃないですか？」

ment acts all on its own and the activity gets cut off from the life of the individual, it turns into something different.”²²⁸

Generally, SHSK actors note that public interest in their issues has decreased and that especially within Fukushima prefecture it has become taboo to talk about the dangers and fear of radiation. The affected population is divided on how to estimate the danger of radiation exposure and the topic is difficult to talk about even among friends (SR16: 262):

“A friend of mine used to be a farmer and has given up organic farming. That person was an organic farmer for 30 years, so it’s very frustrating. When that person said that just because it [the product] is grown in Fukushima, people wouldn’t eat it, I couldn’t say that is because it is dangerous. So there is an atmosphere of not being able to say something, even to people we’re close to.”²²⁹

The increasing taboo around the issue of radiation might be due partly to government-sponsored risk communication, a program aimed at reducing fear of radiation²³⁰ and implemented in school curricula (SR16: 263):

²²⁸ 「なかなかそれが目をふいてこないんだろうなとは思いますが、やっぱり一番、最初にお母さんたちが立ち上がったときに、選挙も行っていなかったような陳情なんてなっているような人たちが自治体に給食のことで陳情に行ったり、放射線測ってくれとか除染してくれっていうことで請願に行ったり [...]、そういう形でやった人たちが全国に出たわけですね。それは決して、今、停滞してたり、今、特に何かって向かってないかもしれないけど、それが消えてなくなったわけではないので、一つ、そういう目がふいたっていうことは、何だろう、この先の何かずっとずっとずっと今、反対にたたかれて押さえつけられているものが大きいから、パッと目が出てこないけれども、根は張ってるんじゃないかなと期待はしてるんですね。上に伸びることができなくても、根を張っていくことで広がって、より強いものになるっていうことはあると思うので。[...] 生活に根差していくことっていうのが大事なんじゃないかなと思ったんですね。なんか運動だけが独り歩きしていたり、自分の生活と切り離されたところでの活動になっていっちゃうところで何か違うものになっていってしまう。」

²²⁹ 「農業をやってる友達が、有機農業を辞めたんですよ。[...] その人は30年も有機農業をやってきて、すごく悔しいわけですね。福島っていうだけで、人は食べてくれないっていったときに、だってそれは危ないじゃないっていうことも、なかなか言えないんですよ、やっぱりね。そういう言えない雰囲気っていうのが、親しい仲でもあるのね。」

²³⁰ Kimura (2016: 2) points out that “[a]fter the most acute crisis was over, there emerged a plethora of risk communication programmes run by the government and industry”. In general, risk communication programs aim to inform citizens about public risks. In Japan after 3.11, many of these programs targeted women in particular, because the risk perception of radiation differed significantly between men and women in the affected areas and women seemed

“On the whole, Fukushima is moving towards reconstruction [...]. And they have integrated radiation safety education into school education. Like radiation is dangerous but it exists in the natural environment too and even if one gets on a plane, one is exposed and it is necessary in medicine, too [...]. That creates a situation where it is difficult for children to say something. Even if their parents say that it’s dangerous, they can’t say that at school.”²³¹

In the face of this downplaying the danger of radiation exposure, some of the movement activities, especially of those mothers’ groups, seek to connect informally with other parents and provide safe spaces for the discussion of radiation-related issues. One example of this activity is a shared initiative between mothers’ groups and an alternative filmmaker who produces documentaries about radiation from the victims’ perspective. Mothers’ groups or individuals can rent a documentary on DVD and organize small, informal film screenings while drinking tea, providing an opportunity to talk in a relaxed atmosphere (EFN19). Such occasions can also be used to offer information about health recuperation stays for children or about independently organized health check-ups for children in regions not covered by governmentally financed health checks (EFN14).

In conclusion, SHSK shares good relations with large sections of Japanese society but has a different supporter base than e-shift which focuses on the issue of nuclear energy. Generally, SHSK members feel socially respected in their task of caring for nuclear victims. However, a strong governmental discourse that, in their eyes, downplays the danger of low-dose radiation exposure creates an atmosphere that renders having a critical position impossible – especially among the affected people in Fukushima and its surrounding prefectures. Movement organizations, particularly parents’ organizations, thus pay special attention to maintaining good relations with those in the affected population who might think critically of the government’s management of the situation.

to be the more fearful population. However, many victims especially those in the movement feel that the ways in which radiation risk is communicated through these channels downplays risks connected to low dose radiation exposure. Nevertheless, these different perceptions result in deep rifts within the affected population.

²³¹ 「全体的に見れば、福島は復興という方向性にドンドン行っている [...] 学校教育の中に、放射線の安全教育みたいなものを取り入れてるんですよ。放射線は危ないけれども自然界にもあるし、飛行機に乗れば被爆もするし、医学にはなくてはならないものだって [...] その中で子どもたちも言いにくい状況っていうのは、多分あると思う。親がどんなに危ないって言っても、学校の中ではそれを言えない。」

They do so by providing safe spaces for open discussions and by organizing concrete support such as health recuperation stays, health check-ups, and legal advice. The strong government-sponsored risk communication discourse and the ongoing taboo against radiation issues might be a reason for SHSK's careful membership procedure and discreet handling of victims' issues, as they intend to support victims and not add to their burden by unnecessarily exposing them.

5.3 NETWORK EMERGENCE

As in the case of e-shift, SHSK emerged during a wave of social activism after the nuclear disaster in Fukushima. More specifically, the coalition arose from the informal cooperation of civil groups involved in the writing of the Nuclear Victims Support Act. As the majority of SHSK member organizations were founded after 3.11 (cf. section 5.2.1), the emergence of these new civil groups was a precondition for the formation of SHSK. The following two subsections trace how these new groups and networks emerged by drawing on the example of mothers' groups which are some of the most central actors in SHSK. Also examined is the later process of emergence of the coalition SHSK and how this has influenced the relational patterns and thus also the action profile as outlined in the previous sections.

5.3.1 EMERGENCE OF VICTIMS' GROUPS

Along with evacuee groups, concerned parents' networks had a particularly strong influence on the Nuclear Victims Support Act. The Act points to children as a particularly vulnerable group of victims, as shown in its official name: Act Concerning the Promotion of Measures to Provide Living Support to the Victims, Including the Children Affected by the TEPCO Nuclear Accident in order to Protect and Support their Everyday Lives. This subsection explores the emergence of the National Parents' Network (Kodomo Zenkoku Netto) as an example of the formation of victims' groups and networks.

In the founding process of local mothers' or parents' groups, social media played a crucial role. A founding member of a local group started to keep a lookout for other concerned mothers on Twitter because it was difficult to find like-minded people otherwise (SR9: 13):

"At first, there was the nuclear accident. And there was nobody to talk with about it, even when I looked around. But I have a friend

who also lives in [A city] whom I talked to. And in exchanging emails, we cheered each other up, and I wanted to find like-minded people, yeah, and she also tried to find [people]. What we used most was Twitter. I didn't use Twitter before, and I couldn't imagine finding like-minded people like that. So, first I followed [A city], and then people who followed [A city], I followed all people from [A city]. [...] And then, I followed people who seemed to have children and who seemed to worry and when we followed each other, I sent direct messages, saying that I am [Mrs. B] from [A city]. I am worried about radiation; would you like to connect with me? And each of us did this tirelessly. At that time, when we found somebody, we were utterly happy."²³²

This small group of people then started to follow local radiation measurements being done at a university campus in the city. When levels started to rise, they began to do their own measurements and shared this information on social media. After this, they became active in stopping the annual spring swimming pool cleanings at schools by approaching the local educational board. Afterward, the people involved decided to rent a conference room and gathered to a get-together to exchange opinions. In this way, the local group came into being (SR9: 19–20). Next, they connected to other parents' groups in neighboring cities and prefectures and started a project to map regional contamination. From this, a regional network of parents' groups emerged which then joined to form a national network (SR9: 24–31). The networking among the groups continued via social media but also by exchanging name cards at events (SR9: 31):

"Well, the base was the internet. We made it by using the internet. Besides this, when one of us got an [announcement for] a lecture and

²³² 「最初原発事故が起こって。[...] このことを話せる人がいなかったわけですよ、周り見回してもね。で、何しろ私が話していたのは、同じ [A 市] に私の親友が 1 人住んでるんですよ。で、彼女とメールのやりとりをしてお互いに励まし合って、仲間を探したかったんだけど、彼女は、彼女も探そうとしたかな。一番使ってたのは Twitter なんですね。私、Twitter やったことがなくて、何しろ仲間を見つけるためにはそこの中で見つける以外は思い付かなかったんですね。で、[A 市] をまずフォローして、[A 市] をフォローしてる人、[A 市] の人を、もう片っ端からフォローしていったんです。[...] で、この人心配してそうかなとか、子どもがいそうな人をフォローして、お互いにフォロー同士になったらダイレクトメッセージを送って、私は [A 市] に住んでいる [B] です。放射能についてとても心配しているんですけども、私とつながっていただけませんか。一人一人、一人一人、もうコツコツコツコツやって。当時は 1 人見つかったって言えば、もう大喜びな感じだった。」

went, we exchanged name cards with others and connected; [one of us] did that a lot. The same person was also very active with the SHSK.”²³³

The national parents' network was founded in July 2011 by a group of people who came together by chance and who wanted to connect more broadly. So they organized a national network kick-off meeting and called for participation via social media (SR7: 2–3):

“When the feeling of wanting to connect more broadly became stronger among us, a group of people who had met by chance decided to call for a kick-off [conference] [...] and within one week, a conference hall for 400 people was completely booked, although we did not use Twitter or Facebook much at that time. Just by posting it on Twitter and our homepage, so many people came together for the kick-off. At that time, the atmosphere was really enthusiastic.”²³⁴

After its foundation, the national network held a series of meetings to intensify connections but also in order to develop an action profile (SR7: 22):

“The first of such network meetings was in July, right. After that, we had one in August, November, and December, in total three times that year [2011] we held meetings of about 100 people, and these were group representatives who wanted to discuss about what to do, and groups who wanted to connect, or individuals who wanted to do something. So, depending on the different topics and interests, for example the present situation in Fukushima, we have to do something to support Fukushima, or we have to have [the children] participate in health recuperation camps, or we need to have more measuring stations, or we have to do something about the radiation limits in food products;

²³³ 「だから、基本的にはネットですね。インターネットでつくってました。あとは、なんか講演会があるってキャッチしたら行ってみて、そこの団体と名刺交換してつながるとか、そういうことはすごくやってくれてました。で、支援法市民会議も、その彼女がずっと頑張ってる。」

²³⁴ 「もっと大きくつながりたいっていう思いがどんどんみんな強くなってきたところに、たまたま出会った人たちで、じゃあ、とにかくキックオフで一度、集まろうっていうことになって [...] そこが 400 人の会場が、ほんの 1 週間で満席、しかも平日の午後だったんですけど、1 週間で Twitter と Facebook はまだそのころあんまり使ってなかったですね。もう Twitter とホームページで呼びかけて、そのくらいの人が集まってキックオフをやったと。そのときの熱気はすごかったんですけど。」

matching the different topics we organized speakers and by exchanging information we discussed and became active; we did an impressive kind of ‘seed-planting’.”²³⁵

From the beginning, parents’ connections to citizen-run radiation measuring stations, as well as to groups providing health recuperation stays for children were strong. Some of these initiatives might even have been founded at such parents’ meetings or might have at least recruited members on such occasions.

To conclude, many of the victims’ organizations that emerged after 3.11 first mobilized through social networks such as Twitter and Facebook and then came together in physical meetings. Fueled by worries, anger, and insecurity these groups formed rapidly into regional and national networks and also came into contact with professional movement organizations from other movement fields.

5.3.2 THE EMERGENCE OF SHSK

SHSK was founded after the Nuclear Victims Support Act passed the Diet in June 2012 in order to ensure the participation of victims in the implementation process. During the writing of the Nuclear Victims Support Act, some newly founded victims’ groups intermingled with professional organizations from various backgrounds and later cooperated with a group of parliamentarians to produce a draft law. While the civil groups were content with the spirit of the law, they were disappointed that it contained neither concrete policy measures nor a budget proposal. The Diet left the implementation of the law to the government and the ministries. In order to influence the implementation of the law, civil organizations founded the coalition SHSK with the purpose of making victims’ voices heard in the process.

²³⁵ 「こういったネットワークミーティングっていう形で、最初が7月ですよ。その後8月、11月、12月だったかな、その年のうちに3回ぐらい100人規模くらいのミーティングを開いて、そのときとにかく何かやろうと思っている団体の代表であるとか、つながろうと思っている団体さんとか、もしくは個人で何かやりたいと思ってる人とかが参加して、テーマ別に、例えば、福島は今、とにかく福島支援をしなければいけないとか、とにかく保養に出さなくちゃいけないとか、あと、測定所を作らなくちゃいけないとか、あと食べ物の基準のことをなんとかしなくちゃいけないとか、そういった興味を持ったテーマごとにこちらからも情報提供者を呼んで、情報提供をしつつ、そこで話し合って、そこからアクション、目が出てくるような種まきをしたんですね。」

Right after the disaster many long-standing civil organizations (especially from environmental and human rights backgrounds), as well as newly founded lawyers' organizations, went to Fukushima to find out more about the situation on the ground. They connected to local people and groups and in some cases provided local groups with ideas on what to do next (SR16: 183):

"After the accident, FoE, Fukurō no Kai, and others came to Fukushima many times and pointed the way. We ourselves, we were in great confusion and we had no idea what to do next because we were completely absorbed with managing our daily lives. But they provided us with many ideas. People came with instruments to measure radiation at my house which hadn't been done before. Radiation levels and food products and so on. And because so many people came to help we came to see what we needed to do ourselves, I think. So, we all got to know each other. It wasn't so many people so that we were all connected, and I thought it was good that they were going to work on the Support Act."²³⁶

In cooperation with Fukushima Minpō, a local newspaper, some of these organizations also organized a Fukushima victims' needs survey (SR15: 52), while others provided legal help (SR1: 2–3). These connections then led to the formation of a network for a Nuclear Victims Support Law (SR6: 99–100):

"[...] for the [Nuclear Victims Support Law], I think, SAFLAN [...] and FoE Japan [...] have played an important role. And, ah, basically, immediately after the disaster, especially local people started to talk about the right to evacuate; because the government standards were so bad. So, and some volunteer lawyers started to help in each case and so on. Like a legal case. That they have the right to evacuate and they are eligible to get compensation, official compensation for that. And then, I think, SAFLAN and FoE made a co-team and established

²³⁶ 「事故の後に、FoE Japan とか、フクロウの会 [...] とかが、福島に何回も通ってきて、いろんな方向性を示してくれたことがあるのね。私たちは私たちが大混乱の中に居たから、次にどういうことをやっていくかっていうことも、自分が生きていだけで精いっぱいだったっていうのもあるのね。でも、彼らがいろんな方向性を見つけてくれた。私の家には測定機を持った人たちが来てくれて、測を始めてくれたんですね。放射線量、食べ物とかのね。いろんな人たちが助けに入ってきてくれる中で、自分たちのやるべきことが見えてきたんだと思うんだよね。そこで、大体、もうみんな、顔見知りというか。それはたくさんの人ではなかったから、みんな、つながりができてきたから、こっちで支援法のことをやるって言えば、それはすぐ分かったね。」

the Network [for a Nuclear Victims Support Law]. But the [Nuclear Victims Support Law] network, I think those lawyers and NGO activists and together with parliamentary, or with many parties made a really strong and intensive effort to make that law to support the Fukushima victims and they, it was I think inactive in June last year. It was, I think, half a year or more process to make that. And so, at that enactment, at that time the [Nuclear Victims Support Law] network was lost [...].”

The informal Nuclear Victims’ Support Law Network (Genpatsu Jiko Kodomo Hisaisha Shienhō Nettowāku) was composed of a number of civil organizations that later formed SHSK, Nichibenren (Japan Federation of Bar Associations), and JCN (Japan Civil Network) which is engaged mainly in disaster relief activities (SR7: 17–18):

“Before the passage of the Nuclear Victims Support Act, there were many NGOs like FoE, Greenpeace, and lawyers which were active, and well, if there was going to be a law, we should be involved in making it, and so we developed a framework in order to produce something as quickly as possible and so we formed the Nuclear Victims Support Law Network. And this was composed not only of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations and JCN, an organization working not only on the nuclear accident but which is also a big national network for disaster relief, both these organizations are, well, they’re not the government but their position is close to the government, but besides these there was a citizen’s assembly, so the network was made of three organizations; and all kinds of groups could register for the citizen’s assembly.”²³⁷

Citizen groups could not participate in the Nuclear Victims’ Support Law Network individually because Nichibenren feared difficulties if the participating organizations changed constantly (SR7: 18):

²³⁷ 「もともと支援法ができる前から、こういう法律を作ろうということで動いてらした NGO とか FoE さんとか、あとグリーンピースさんとか、あと弁護士さんたちがずっと動いてきていて、一応、法律が通ったっていうことで、じゃあ、これ中身を作っていくなくちゃいけない、そのための仕組みをすごい、いち早く作って出して、原発事故子ども被災者ネットワークというのをまず一つ作って、それは日弁連と JCN っていう原発事故だけではない、震災支援の大きな日本中のネットワークで、どちらかというと、なんでしょうね、政府っていうんじゃないんですけど、割と中間的な立ち位置にある JCN という団体と、あと市民会議という団体の三つが入ったネットワークというのが一つできて、その市民会議にいろんな団体が登録をするっていう形をとったんですね。」

“That is because Nichibenren is an organization of lawyers, and if they had to write down all the names of the different organizations that joined and left the cooperation [anytime they published an opinion paper etc.], it would get difficult to move, so we made a citizens’ assembly where citizens’ organization could enter freely, and we formed a network with Nichibenren and JCN to be in the position to make policy proposals [...].”²³⁸

Members of the citizens’ assembly then called for participation of various groups they were connected with through other networks. However, the Nuclear Victim’s Support Law Network which in the making of the law cooperated with a number of parliamentarians dissolved after the law was enacted, making way for the formation of SHSK to further secure victim participation in the implementation process.

Central to the call for participation in SHSK were as already indicated, FoE, SAFLAN, a Fukushima parents’ group, Fukurō no Kai, and Greenpeace. These organizations were also crucial to establishing ties between Fukushima victims and the establishment in Tōkyō. Just like e-shift members, SHSK member organizations describe the process of emergence of their coalitional network as a natural process (SR5: 66). Even though the actors perceive loose cooperation among civil groups as natural, SHSK took the form of a rather closed coalition with membership rules instead of adopting an informal network form of organization. One reason for this decision may be motivated by wanting to be fully recognized by the more conservative organizations that tend to cooperate with the government.

5.4 LATENT RELATIONAL PATTERNS

Because of the large proportion of newly founded groups within SHSK, the coalition does not carry the weight of history and past experiences of cooperation as does e-shift. However, many of the leaders especially in the victims’ movement were already active citizens before the disaster occurred.

Many of the most active people in the mothers’ movement were engaged in the child care or in the environmental fields before becoming

²³⁸ 「それは日弁連ってやっぱり弁護士さんが登録している団体なので、いろんな団体が出たり入ったりするといちいちこう書けなければいけないっていう、それはちょっと動けなくなってしまうので、市民会議というのは自由に市民団体が入れるものとして一つ作って、そこは日弁連とJCNと一緒にネットワークを組んで、より制作提言的な立ち位置にっていうことで [...]。」

active in the protection of children from radiation. More than half of the regional mothers' groups in the national network were founded after the disaster. The already existing member groups had worked on various issues but changed the focus of their activities after 3.11 (SR7: 44):

"There are many different kinds of groups: regional groups working on children, or regional groups working on nuclear power stations, or from quite different environmental fields, which started organizing health recuperation stays for children, for example. So, we're by no means composed of mothers' groups only, but mothers are characteristic of our movement because they were the ones who stood up in all the regions. Up until today, our main managing members are mothers."²³⁹

For the organization of local events, some mothers' groups drew extensively on their existing environmental movement connections (SR9: 79–83):

"We asked Tanaka Yū to come. In the past, I worked together with Tanaka Yū. [...] That was a movement for the protection of the rain forest. [...] And his talks are very interesting, plus, they make you think. It's energizing, so I wanted the mothers to have the opportunity to listen to him, so I asked him to come. But it wasn't just a lecture, at the entrance we had, you know, a booth with many different citizens' groups, like us, so they could present themselves and talk about their activities."²⁴⁰

Among the latent relations before the disaster, connections to the environmental field predominate. One of the leading lawyers in the victims' movement used to work for an environmental organization before becoming a lawyer (SR1: 2):

²³⁹ 「子どもについて活動している地域の団体だったり、あと、原発について活動してる地域の団体だったり、あと全然違う自然系の何か活動をしている団体が保養活動を始めたとか、いろんな団体があります。決してお母さんたちだけの団体じゃないんですが、でも特徴的なのが、やっぱりそういった地域で子どもを守るんで立ち上がったお母さんたちの動きが、立ち上げのときにも、現在、事務局に居るメンバーもそういった人たちが中心なので、そういった特色はあると思うんですね。」

²⁴⁰ 「田中優を呼んだんです。私、田中優と昔活動一緒にしてたんですよ。[...] 熱帯雨林の保護運動なんです。[...] で、彼の話はすごく面白いし、プラス思考になるんですよ、すごく。なんか元気が出るので、お母さんたちにこの話は聞かせたいと思っていて、で、彼を呼んでね。で、講演会だけじゃなくて、私たちみたいに市民活動してる人たちを、エントランスに発表の、何ていうかな、発表のブースを出してもらったんです。」

“Before I became a lawyer, I worked for an environmental NGO. [...] After that, when a law school system was established in Japan, I thought I’d become a lawyer, and that’s what I did. [...] And then there was the disaster and after the disaster, one of my former friends from an environmental NGO went to Fukushima and started various activities. So he said to me ‘You are a lawyer now, so do something as a lawyer’, and so I started giving talks about various issues in Fukushima.”²⁴¹

Prior connections of a number of individuals in the victims’ movement, in particular to the environmental movement explains the enormous speed with which newly founded local groups connected to more professional ones such as the environmental organization FoE, which became central to the activities of SHSK. These professional organizations based in Tōkyō gathered local voices in this way and used their existing networks to other organizations and connections to parliamentarians to further ensure victim participation in the policy-making process.

In conclusion, although a number of victims’ groups were newly founded without prior movement experiences, through social media they were able to connect quickly to other groups and individuals who had collaborated with less visible, small, local citizens’ groups many of which were embedded in the environmental movement. These individuals and groups contributed their expertise and further movement connections. Those connections then facilitated the exchange with Tōkyō-based professional organizations having experiences in policy-making and relations to political actors.

5.5 CASE SUMMARY: SHSK’S NETWORK AND MOBILIZATION PROCESS

In contrast to e-shift, SHSK is a coalition with the clear focus on making victims’ voices heard in the implementation process of the Nuclear Victims Support Act, which was enacted in June 2012. The coalition, which requires formal membership, emerged from an informal network of cooperating civil groups which, together with the National Federation of Bar Associations (Nichibenren) and the Japan Civil Network (JCN), a

²⁴¹ 「私はもともと、弁護士になる前は環境 NGO の職員をしていたんですね。[...] その後、日本にロースクールという制度っていうのができまして、弁護士になろうと思って弁護士になって。[...] で、震災があって震災の後、当時の環境 NGO の仲間が福島に入っているんな活動を始めていて。私に対しても「お前弁護士になったんだから、弁護士としてなんかやれ」ということで声かけて、福島でいろいろなお話をするようになったんですね。」

national disaster relief organization, connected to a number of parliamentarians and contributed greatly to the formulation and enactment of the Nuclear Victims Support Act. The network of civil groups that later became SHSK was composed of professional movement organizations, mainly from environmental and victim support backgrounds, and networks of small, local victims' and victims' support organizations from all over Japan (half of which were founded after the nuclear disaster in March 2011). As the majority of SHSK member organizations are involved with evacuee issues and protecting children from radiation, it is natural that these issues are the strongest in the joint action profile of the coalition. It is nevertheless remarkable that the central professional organizations do not use the coalition to further their own core issues, but instead integrated the victims' issue into their own action profiles, functioning as transmitters of victims' voices into the policy-making process. In terms of the action repertoire, the fields of action the single members engage in largely correspond with the kind of actions they engage in as SHSK members: advocacy and study-related issues.

The networking between small local victims' groups and the Tōkyō-based professional organizations was advanced by both sides. Considering it their civil duty, professional organizations actively sought contacts to affected people in order to better represent them in the political sphere of Tōkyō. Among the newly founded local groups there were some individuals with prior experience of participation in primarily less visible civil action, especially in activities concerning environmental issues. In addition to the personal contacts of individual members to larger civil networks, social media played a decisive role in first connecting individuals to forming groups – and then in connecting groups on the meso level. The formation of the large victims' networks and their connections to professional organizations was thus enabled by latent civil network structures composed mainly of less visible small local groups and their ties to larger nationally and internationally operating organizations. These existing structures explain the enormous speed with which information was exchanged and cooperative networks were formed.

The core-periphery structure of SHSK, less decisive than the e-shift case, can be traced back to the relationship between professional Tōkyō-based organizations at the core and small local organizations at the periphery. However, the organization of events is more equally shared between the Tōkyō-based coalition members, which often invite victims from the structural periphery to events in order to better represent 'real' victims' voices. Relations among coalition members are generally cooperative; members regard the occasional conflicts that arise as natural when many different people come together and seek to solve them through

open dialogue. Both the cooperativeness and the willingness to have open discussion are clearly related to the goal of the joint action profile and the straightforward operational structures of the coalition.

Relations to society and to the political arena have particularly strong influences on the action profile and SHSK's embeddedness in the broader movement. Despite being aware of the interrelatedness of the two issues, SHSK actively tries to keep victims' issues separate from the nuclear energy issue because of their different supporter bases in society and the polity. This is because the nuclear energy issue is still regarded by many people in Japan as ideologically charged (cf. section 4). Keeping the victims' issue apart from the energy issue increases the chance of bettering the situation for victims in a way recognized by broader society. Besides this, SHSK members share cooperative relations with actors from almost all parties in the political arena, many of whom want to do something for the victims but do not wish to get actively involved in the energy issue because their party-affiliation or the influence of industrial actors militates against doing so. The different perception and evaluation of the victims' and energy issues in society and the political arena thus, besides the main action expertise of the central organizations, indirectly influences the joint action repertoire, which tends to employ less visible advocacy-related types of action. This also has an influence on the organizational form; the formal coalition SHSK has formed is arguably better for being taken seriously by the conservative political actors with whom SHSK seeks to work.

6 NETWORK MOBILIZATION PROCESSES AFTER 3.11

The coalitional networks e-shift and SHSK both emerged within a general anti-nuclear movement wave after the nuclear disaster triggered by the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami in March 2011. Both networks engage mainly in advocacy-related anti-nuclear activities. But while e-shift concentrates on the issue of nuclear energy phase-out, SHSK focuses on making nuclear victims' voices heard in the implementation process of the Nuclear Victims Support Act, enacted in June 2012.

Using the political opportunity created by the disaster, e-shift pushes for change in Japanese energy policy in the political arena, while also seeking to form a broad national movement for energy change. As a result, they engage in citizen empowerment by providing know-how and expertise to any interested organization or individual activist. Because of these activities, e-shift takes the form of a network-coalition, emphasizing openness but at the same time carrying out concrete actions to influence policy-making, empower citizens, and form a movement to foster change from the bottom up.

e-shift was founded right after the disaster, meeting for the first time only two weeks later (on March 31, 2011) and is thus a first-generation network of the movement wave after 3.11. SHSK formed following an informal collaboration of citizen groups which, in cooperation with other actors (Nichibenren, JCN, Diet members) contributed greatly to the enactment of the Nuclear Victims Support Act in June 2012. SHSK emerged from this informal cooperation of citizen groups and is thus a second-generation network, taking the form of a formal coalition in order to influence the policy implementation process and to empower victims in particular. While e-shift is still active at the time of writing, SHSK became largely inactive after the implementation process of the Nuclear Victims Support Act was terminated in October 2013. However, SHSK members continue to cooperate either through a third-generation network called National Movement for the Recognition of Support for Nuclear Victims (Genpatsu Jiko Higaisha no Kyūsai o Mitomeru Zenkoku Undō) or in ad hoc coalitions around specific issues.

In the case of the Japanese anti-nuclear movement, the nuclear disaster clearly triggered a wave of anti-nuclear related activism shaped by intensive networking among new and old movement organizations and divided largely according to the actors' perceptions of two different issue fields: nuclear energy and nuclear victim support. Different networks taking different organizational forms emerged around these two issue

fields. Nevertheless, the organizational composition of the two networks from both issue fields shows that they overlap significantly. The most important organizational bridge between actors in the two issue fields is the environmental movement community, but there are also consumer organizations and traditional anti-nuclear movement groups engaged in both fields.




Figure 19. Overlapping Movement Communities.

While respecting each others' work and needs, victims' and pro-renewable energy groups operate farthest from each other. And, as the previous sections have shown, many victims' groups prefer to keep away from traditional anti-nuclear rhetoric. There are tensions between some groups from the traditional anti-nuclear field and more progressive actors from the renewable energy and environmental field. This leads to the first research question formulated at the outset of this research (cf. section 1.4):

3. Why do the networks choose their particular action profiles?
How do the relational patterns of the network samples influence their action profiles?

e-shift's common project is nuclear phase-out and a shift to renewable energy, aiming at concrete policy change leading to a complete reorganization of the Japanese energy environment. The network-coalition employs an action repertoire composed of making policy proposals;

advocating for citizens' groups; engaging in study-related activities to lobby Diet members; and empowering citizens to foster change from the bottom up. The common, combined project of nuclear phase-out and renewable energy arises from the organizational composition of the network, which is rooted mainly in the environmental, anti-nuclear, renewable energy, and consumer fields. Organizations from these backgrounds form the nucleus of the network and are thus the most influential when it comes to agenda-setting and developing strategies on how to reach their goals. The most central organizations are also the most experienced with advocacy-related activities so it seems natural that the overall network would draw on this potential and expertise rather than engaging in protest activities. Another reason for the advocacy-based joint action repertoire is that in the broader anti-nuclear movement effective protest-organizing networks were already in place when e-shift came into being. e-shift thus adopted a complementary role by focusing on a less visible action repertoire.

e-shift's inner structure of a small core and large periphery is connected to the network's goal to contribute to help build a broad and welcoming movement. This structure allows for the participation of groups and individuals from all kinds of backgrounds, providing for the cross-fertilization of ideas and exchange of experiences from different fields, while allowing participants to invest into the cooperation as much as they can and to retreat anytime their resources or will to do so are exhausted. This necessity to keep participation and withdrawal from the network open is necessitated by the condition of civil society in Japan, which is composed of many small groups with few resources and only a limited number of big, professional organizations with stable resources (cf. section 1.2.1). While there is some conflict when peripheral organizations feel disregarded, the distinctive loose core-periphery network structure helps reduce conflicts especially along the ideational fault lines stemming from previous movement waves. The network also adopts this particular pattern because of its relationship to the political arena. In order to have a greater impact there, movements generally need as many participants as possible; this is particularly so in the case of Japan where access to policy-making for civil actors is quite limited especially for those civil actors with contradicting opinions to the ones of the government.

SHSK's common project on the other hand is to influence the policy implementation process of the Nuclear Victims Support Act, to make victims' voices heard in this process, and to preserve what they call the 'real spirit' of the Support Act in the concrete policies that result from it.

Like e-shift, SHSK employs an advocacy-oriented action repertoire, including study-related activities within and outside the Diet, making policy-proposals, and questionings of authorities. Besides seeking to influence important actors in the implementation process, their activities also serve to empower and support victims.

This common project of the coalition arises from the composition of the network, which consists mainly of victims' organizations; mothers', evacuees', radiation measuring, and victim support groups such as groups organizing health recuperation camps for children. In e-shift the most central and thus most influential organizations actively influence the common project of the network. In SHSK, the most central organizations take on a more intermediary role, instead guiding discussions and providing expertise on sharing victims' claims in the appropriate way with the appropriate governmental authorities. Although some of the most central organizations also provide ties to e-shift, in other words to the anti-nuclear energy movement, SHSK or the nuclear victims' movement keeps their primary issue separate firstly because they feel the issues are distinct, but also because they fear losing support with broader Japanese society if they sympathize too openly with the ideologically charged anti-nuclear energy movement.

Another reason for SHSK to take the formal coalition approach is because member groups cooperated with a number of conservative actors and had good relations to a number of parliamentarians from all parties during the writing of the Support Act. Taking the form of a formal coalition allows them to be taken more seriously by established actors in the political arena. Moreover, requiring member organizations to participate regularly enhances their ability to work effectively and share the work load more equally. The formal membership requirements foster a certain degree of closeness of the network, which also helps to keep sensitive victims' issues private.

The networks' action profiles are highly influenced by the actors' perceptions of their chosen issues, which in turn depend on their primary issues themselves; the organizational networks in which they are embedded; and their experiences of cooperation and conflict in previous movement waves. The networks' action profile and in particular their chosen action repertoires are also heavily influenced by outside factors such as the general accessibility of the policy-making process, contacts to other political actors as well as the degree of support for the movements in the broader society. Thus, the general organizational structures of the anti-nuclear movement in Japan seem rather stable. This leads to the next research question:

4. Are there changes in relationship patterns and working procedures at a movement's meso level following the initiation of a new movement wave? Or are movement meso level structures rather resistant to change?

e-shift's emergence was possible because of existing ties among members who later became the core of the coalition-network who drew on their respective movement networks to call for participation. These core members are experienced movement organizations with knowledge about relational structures in the movement sphere and expertise in dealing with the political arena. They interpreted the political opportunity created by the disaster as a real chance for change. Anger about the current energy policy and the government's mismanagement of the nuclear disaster in general was strong enough to bridge, for the first time, the divide between the anti-nuclear and environmental movement communities. In the case of SHSK, the formal coalition-type network emerged from an informal cooperation that had been successful in contributing to the enactment of the Nuclear Victims Support Act. However, the coalition was preceded by the nationwide emergence of large numbers of victims' groups (mothers, radiation measuring, evacuees etc.) in the aftermath of the nuclear disaster. Ties between these newly emerged victims' groups and professional movement organizations in Tōkyō were facilitated by previous movement experiences and existing contacts victims' group members had with groups in Tōkyō. At the same time, professional Tōkyō-based groups actively sought connections to affected people, feeling it was their task to help and support them. The newly founded groups were thus quickly integrated into existing civil society structures, and their voices transmitted to the appropriate authorities.

In sum, the scale of the nuclear disaster had the effect of bridging the existing environmental and anti-nuclear movement communities, paving the way for cooperation in the form of a network-coalition. It triggered the rise of victims' groups (including nuclear evacuees and concerned parents), which quickly formed national networks and together with professional actors from other fields formed a coalition to fight for victims' rights. Actors from both networks describe their emergence as a natural process. My analysis also shows that most civil actors are simultaneously engaged in various movement networks, be they old or new. We can thus assume that an organic form of networking is a predominant tool for Japanese social movement organizations especially in salient times. Japanese social movement organizations are embedded in broad and overlapping networks that include groups from different movement communities. Anytime an issue of joint interest arises, organizations start

	Latent Relational Patterns	Emergence	Relational Patterns	Action Profile
e-shift	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> from previous movement waves anti-nuclear weapons vs. anti-nuclear energy (since 60s) regional anti-nuclear group structures (<i>himi gempatsu</i>) in place, CNIC central (since 70s) 'invisible civil society' (since 70s) since 1986, urban citizen groups for nuclear phase-out (<i>datsu gempatsu</i>) pro-renewable energy (since 2000) national networking regional and interregional networks of local anti-nuclear groups, mainly engaged in lawsuits, strong connections to lawyers before 3.11 some of these regional networks had diminished (e.g. in Fukushima prefecture) cooperative ties between regional networks and Tokyo-based groups networking a major tool: many individuals traveling the country mailing lists central to political actors unstable because Diet members change traditionally closest: SDP generally difficult, bureaucracy (and industry) more influential than politicians some SMOs suspicious of government, no trust 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> emergence in general movement wave after 3.11 FoE first networked with other befriended core members (ISEP, Gensuikin, Daichi, Kikō Netto), then all drew on their respective networks to call for an open forum for discussion: first meeting March 31, 2011 networking a 'natural process' first time for anti-nuclear and environmental actors to come together first joint event in June 2011 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> network composition most from before 2011 mostly private organizations or NPOs most from environmental, anti-nuclear, renewable energy fields most activities advocacy or study-related relations in action large periphery, small core target actors: METI, Nuclear Safety Commission, Government, National Policy Unit, other Ministries hybrid relations: press, parliamentarians central actors: FoE, ISEP, CNIC, Greenpeace, Daichi internal relations regular meetings, open to everyone working teams but loose internal structures, new network formation mailing list central core: FoE administrator; ISEP, Kikō Netto, Gensuikin, Daichi, two individual activists close conflicts: core vs. periphery, older vs. younger people, traditional movement vs. NPO people; Tokyo-based vs. regional groups relations to the broader movement through policy-work complementing protest-work of others providing a vision on 'how-to' loose structure is progressive compared to 'old' style patterns cross-fertilization through multiplexity cooperation with CCNE, Mayors, SHSK (through shared members) conflicts along ideological lines (e.g. old vs. progressive) relations to the outside to the political arena: confrontational, but necessity of good relations with individual actors (esp. parliamentarians) to society: feeling of being empowered by anti-nuclear sentiment, difficulty of engaging people permanently disappointment because anti-nuclear sentiment does not influence voting behavior in nuclear regions the issue is taboo 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> common project energy shift, nuclear phase-out movement-building citizen empowerment joint action repertoire policy proposals study-related activities lobbying publicity

Table 16. e-shift Results.

	Latent Relational Patterns	Emergence	Relational Patterns	Action Profile
SHSK	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> cooperative ties through previous collaboration on Nuclear Victims Support Act many leaders of victims' groups experienced in civil activities (child care or environment) professional organizations in Tokyo with connections to parliamentarians 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> formed following an informal successful cooperation to enact a Victims' Support Act (Network) victims' groups and networks emerge with help of social media at high speed after 3.11; quickly connect to professional groups FoE, SAFLAN, Fukushima parents, Fukurō no Kai, Greenpeace central to call for participation emergence a 'natural process' 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> network composition most from after 2011 mostly private organizations and NPOs most from child protection, evacuee support, health recuperation camp, or environmental fields most activities related to networking among individuals, advocacy, studying, or services to support victims relations in action large periphery, a number of SMOs at the core target actors: Reconstruction and Environmental Agency hybrid relations: prefectural and city councils, parliamentarians, media supportive relations: Prefectural Politicians and Diet Members to Support the Victims Support Act, OP-TV central actors: FoE, SAFLAN, Kodomo Zenkoku, Kodomo Kantō Netto, Fukurō no Kai, CRMS, 3aKoriyama internal relations regular meetings (not always open to public); strict membership requirement clear inner working structures, regular participation required born of previous cooperation, new network formation core: FoE and SAFLAN main administrators Tokyo-based groups and victims' groups rely on each other (main goal of the coalition); conflicts a natural occurrence relations to the broader movement performing advocacy work providing legal expertise and access to policy-making fostering movement activities of mothers, evacuees, measuring health recuperation groups (multiplicity) collaborating with CCNE and e-shift through shared members drawing a line between nuclear energy and victims' issues widely supported by broader civil society relations to the outside to the political arena: cooperative with a large number of parliamentarians, confrontational with government and bureaucracy to society: supported by society, trust in their SMOs, taboo of issues in Fukushima prefecture 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> common project influencing implementation process of the Nuclear Victims Support Act victims' support and empowerment joint action repertoire study-related activities policy proposals questionings of authorities

Table 17. SHSK Results.

to network and cooperate immediately, adopting organizational forms appropriate to the issue and greatly influenced by outside factors such as the accessibility of the political process, potential political support, and the degree of backing received from broader society. The networks and relational patterns that serve as the basis for the formation of these cooperative task forces are influenced by previous experiences of cooperation and conflict. Rifts can occur due to contradicting political ideologies, different types of organizations (e. g. less visible type networks vs. NPOs), or different preferred action repertoires.

7 CONCLUSION

The intention at the outset of this research was to provide a better understanding of the impact of a disruptive event on a social movement's intergroup or meso level relational patterns and thereby broaden the study of mobilization processes of social movements. The lack of an analytical model to grasp such processes required me to develop a network mobilization model using theoretical premises of political process theory, network theory, and relational sociology. This analytical model facilitates a comprehensive analysis of the mobilization process after a disruptive event by relating coalitional networks' action profiles to past and present relational patterns at the intergroup level from the perspective of actors. The model provides insight into the underexamined connection between the visible activities of a movement in a phase of high mobilization, and the relational dynamics triggered by the disruptive event, which are influenced by patterns during latent movement phases.

In a second step, the analytical model was applied to the case of the Japanese anti-nuclear movement after the disruptive event of a nuclear disaster in Fukushima prefecture in March 2011. Methods included a quantitative structural analysis of affiliation networks to provide visual images of sampled networks, and qualitative content analysis of various types of qualitative data to access actors' perceptions of the relational dynamics in which they are embedded. Appropriate coalitional networks were sampled and data on them were gathered during a phase of fieldwork in Tōkyō between September 2013 and May 2014. Data was collected from websites and movement publications, as well as through intensive participant observation as participant observer of movement events, coalitional network meetings, and qualitative semi-structured interviews with movement organization representatives.

The two sampled advocacy-oriented coalitional networks that emerged after the Fukushima disaster – e-shift and SHSK – show that the impact of the nuclear disaster on movement network mobilization processes at the intergroup level was influenced by five factors: the movement's latent relational patterns; the actors' perceptions of the scale of the political opportunity triggered by the disruptive event; their perception of issue fields; the societal support for movement issues and action repertoires; and relational patterns to political actors. The following paragraphs characterize the ways in which each of these factors influenced meso level mobilization processes of the Japanese anti-nuclear movement after Fukushima.

1. Movement latent relational patterns

The latent relational patterns of movement actors pre-shape cooperative patterns in phases of high mobilization. Patterns of cooperation and conflict as well as experiences of past mobilizations lay the groundwork for possible collaboration between different movement communities. These experiences also influence the way in which movement actors establish or activate existing ties which in turn affects the speed at which networking happens and actors organize movement events. Movement patterns in latent times also impact actors' perceptions of issue fields arising after a disaster, because this creation of meaning is based on the actors' backgrounds, experiences, and discussions they exchange with their closest partners.

As the case of e-shift shows, the anti-nuclear energy and anti-nuclear weapons movement have been separated since the 1950s and have developed different issue perceptions. Within the anti-nuclear energy movement, the experience of the protests in the 1960s led to a networking pattern involving the organic building and dissolving of cooperative networks by individual activists and according to urgent issues. This time period also led to a divide between radical left and moderate progressive activists. With the expansion of the Japanese nuclear energy program and the building of nuclear power plants all around the archipelago in the 1960s and 70s, local and regional anti-nuclear groups emerged, as did networks of critical scientists. By 2011 these were diminished but still existed. In addition, there were citizen groups in urban areas which came into being mainly after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986. Moreover, subtle ties existed between environmental groups and groups solely focused on the nuclear energy issue. Based on these ties, environmental groups were able to bridge these two movement communities after Fukushima. The environmental community also brought in ties to actors in the renewable energy and consumer fields. The diversity of these different movement stakeholders, however, led to an organizational core-periphery pattern that integrates different groups but keeps a loose network structure while relying on core members to keep the cooperation going.

SHSK was formed on the basis of previous network cooperation and is thus a second-generation coalition. However, existing ties between key individuals and key groups from social welfare and environmental backgrounds contributed to the speed with which the first network cooperation could be formed. The environmental movement community has functioned as a bridge-builder among various movement communities. However, rifts continue to exist between many groups engaged in victims' issues and traditional anti-nuclear groups. Along with societal

and political factors, this leads to the separation of the victims' and energy-related issue fields.

2. Meso actors' perceptions of the political opportunity following the disaster

Meso actors perceived the political opportunity for change in Japanese energy policy as great enough to bridge different movement communities and foster cooperation between them despite ideological differences. In the case of e-shift, cooperation was facilitated by a core-periphery structure that allows for the avoidance of unnecessary conflict. However, the disaster was not able to bridge the anti-nuclear energy and anti-nuclear weapons movement communities. In the case of SHSK, victims' grievances were as extreme enough to trigger the formation of numerous new groups, and their integration into existing networks that included groups with a high level of experience in influencing the policy-making process. Although the sampled networks overlap (in the area of the environmental movement community in particular), there is no technical cooperation between them. If the chance for change triggered by the political opportunity is perceived as high, bridging and integration occur. In the case of the Japanese anti-nuclear movement, bridging and integration processes occurred, but the opportunity was not regarded as strong enough to form an encompassing anti-nuclear movement comprising all nuclear-related issue fields (energy, weapons, victims).

3. Actors' perceptions of issue fields

The actors' perceptions of issue fields are related to the nature of the disaster and the social problems it produces. The nuclear disaster in March 2011 opened up two issue fields: the concrete issue of nuclear victims and the more abstract issue of nuclear energy. The disaster led to widespread radioactive contamination in Fukushima prefecture but also in regions reaching as far as Tōkyō; it produced many people who must deal with the impact of radiation on their health. Even for those living in areas not directly affected by radiation, the disaster rendered the threat of contamination palpable, opening up space for discussions on the future of nuclear energy production in general, and on how to prevent future disasters in an earthquake-prone country such as Japan in particular. This definition of issue fields or fields of action is closely related to individual actors' backgrounds as well as to their embeddedness in broader movement networks. e-shift's rootedness in the environmental, anti-nuclear, and pro-renewable energy movements led to a common project of promoting renewable energy and through this also reaching the goal

of nuclear phase-out. SHSK members on the other hand work on behalf of victims' needs because their coalition is composed mainly of victims' and victims' support organizations. Besides these two factors, movement actors define their fields of action in relation to the mood in the broader society. This goes for cooperative patterns with political actors as well, because a precondition of accomplishing certain political goals is legitimacy and access to the political process.

4. General societal support for movement issues and action repertoires

The general mood of society as perceived by the actors has a strong influence on the interpretation of issues and arguments employed by movement actors; societal support for their claims enhances the legitimacy of the movement. The same is true for the chosen action repertoires. A positive resonance with broader society enhances network mobilization processes and reflects the perception of the scale of the political opportunity triggered by the disaster. The emergence of e-shift was motivated by raising anti-nuclear energy sentiment in the broader society; as the disaster demonstrated the risks connected to nuclear energy, e-shift actors felt the immediate need to equip the public with alternative ideas about supplying the nation's energy needs. However, because many groups in the traditional anti-nuclear movement are negatively associated with the radical leftist protests of the 1960s, such groups are only cautiously and very loosely connected to the network-coalition. In the case of SHSK, this perception has even led to an uncoupling from the energy issue in order to focus solely on victims' issues, despite that fact that many victims' groups support nuclear phase-out. Both networks pursue an advocacy and study-related action repertoire; however, both are reluctant to share information with groups having radical political views and/or favoring violent forms of protest. The public is generally negatively disposed toward such activities and pursuing such actions would heavily damage the movements' legitimacy. Thus, while e-shift does share ties to protest organizations, they insist that groups only employ peaceful means of protest.

5. Access to the political process and relational patterns with political actors

For civil actors, access to policy-making and relational patterns with political actors influence the structuring of issue fields and preferred organizational forms. For example, the divide between the energy and victims' fields is explained by the fact that these issues determine what

types of relations to different political actors can be established. Industrial stakeholders have significant influence on the political arena in the field of nuclear energy, but this is less so in the area of victims' issues. Although both sampled networks cooperated with assemblies of Diet members (*giin renmei*), cooperation in the victims' field was more successful as it led to the enactment of the Nuclear Victims Support Act. This was possible because a broad range of political actors, including the more conservative, could be integrated into the law-making process. SHSK members decided to take the organizational form of a formal coalition in order to be taken more seriously by such actors. In the field of nuclear energy, however, tensions between political actors are stronger; among conservative politicians in particular, pro-nuclear opinions are widespread. Because establishing cooperative relations to political actors was more difficult, broad citizen cooperation was necessary to increase the impact. In order to be able to build the broadest network possible, e-shift actors choose to cooperate in the form of a network-coalition.

In conclusion, my analytical model has proved useful in estimating the impact of a disaster on social movement structures, and for tracing a mobilization process by looking at actors' perceptions of relational dynamics at the intergroup level. The model proved easy to operationalize; through a combination of deductive and inductive analytical procedures it helped focus the researcher's attention on the multifaceted contents of movement actors' perceptions and interpretations of their relational environments while also providing analytical guidance. This combination also allows for the consideration of different social, political, and cultural contexts in the analysis of mobilization processes. By listening intensively to actors' voices, the results extended beyond processes in the sampled networks and also included structures and dynamics in the broader movement field, thus allowing for conclusions to be made concerning the cooperative cultures of specific social movements in specific national contexts. The cooperative networking culture in the Japanese anti-nuclear movement and related movement fields shows features of an organic networking culture; networking is daily business and for many actors represents one of their most important tasks. In the case of Japan, meso level networks often form and reform according to the above-mentioned factors. This confirms the need to take into account movement networks rather than individual groups when estimating strengths and weaknesses of specific civil societies – because such networking cultures may represent crucial movement resources.

Since the model is focused on the analysis of relational patterns at the intergroup level, it does not shed light on the motivations of individual movement adherents. However, it hints at strategies to develop future

visions that may motivate individuals to engage. The model does not objectively analyze the disaster and the resulting devastations and societal needs, but interprets these through the eyes of meso level movement actors, focusing on the actions triggered by these interpretations. With field access and the necessary language skills, the model can be applied to different national contexts, and thus extend research regarding the impact of disasters on social movement structures in different social, political, and cultural contexts. There is great need for further theoretical generalizations on the impact of disruptive events on movement structures.

To conclude, this analysis has shown that there is far more to social movements than what is publically visible. Too often, movements are only superficially interpreted through what is reported in popular media. Any kind of social phenomenon always deserves a second, much deeper look into the relational mechanisms that motivate it.

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APPENDIX

I. PUBLIC MOVEMENT EVENTS

Event Field Note (EFN)	Type of Event	Date, Location	Theme	Organizing SMOs (list not complete)
1	Symposium	10.09.2013, Tōkyō	"Let's Think about the Real Costs of Nuclear Power" – Talk Event	e-shift, Energy Green Sha, FoE
2	Film Festival	23.09.2013, Tōkyō	Tōkyō Peace Film Festival	Peace Film Festival Club
3	Demonstration	29.09.2013, Tōkyō	Abolition of Nuclear Power	MCAN
4	Symposium	03.10.2013, Tōkyō	"What can we learn from Fukushima?"	Mansfield Foundation
5	Symposium	13.10.2013, Tōkyō	3rd Citizen-Scientist International Symposium on Radiation Protection	Citizen Scientists for Radiation Protection
6	Talk	14.10.2013, Tōkyō	Talk by Kida Setsuko – A Nuclear Evacuee's Report to the UN	Tampoposha
7	Conference	22.10.2013, Tōkyō	First Official Presentation of the Report for a Nuclear Power Free Japan	CCNE
8	Symposium	06.11.2013, Tōkyō	"How to read the UNSCEAR Report" – Talk Event	HRN, FoE, Peace Boat, etc.
9	Symposium	16.11.2013, Tōkyō	Nuclear Zeronomics	e-shift, Mayors for a Nuclear Power Free Japan, etc.
10	Demonstration	21.11.2013, Tōkyō	Opposition to Secrecy Law	Nichibenren, etc.
11	Demonstration	01.12.2013, Matsuyama city, Ehime prefecture	NoNukes Ehime	MCAN, regional groups
12	Demonstration	06.12.2013, Tōkyō	Opposition to Secrecy Law	Nichibenren, anti-nuclear groups, politicians from JCP, SDP, DPJ, etc.
13	Demonstration	07.12.2013, Tōkyō	Dai Demo (Big Demo): Anti-war, Anti-TTP, Anti-Abe, Anti-Secrecy Law, Anti-nuclear	Miyake Yohei (candidate of the Green Party), Yamamoto Tarō (independent Diet member) etc.
14	Talk	09.12.2013, Tōkyō	The Victim's Support Law	Rokku no Kai
15	Study Meeting	15.12.2013, Tōkyō	"Towards Zero Nuclear – Report from a Study Tour to Germany"	Mayors for a Nuclear Power-free Japan, Peace Boat, Jōnan Shikin Kinkō, etc.
16	Conference	23.01.2014, Tōkyō	7th Session on CCNE Report	CCNE, Takagi Kikin
17	Citizen Seminar	08.02.2014, Tōkyō	"Radiation exposure and Aging – Radiation Induced Illnesses besides Cancer"	Takagi School
18	Conference	15.02.2014, Tōkyō	8th Session on CCNE Report	CCNE

Event Field Note (EFN)	Type of Event	Date, Location	Theme	Organizing SMOs (list not complete)
19	Video Screening, Network-Building	16.02.201, Tōkyō	"Kamarepocafé", Network Building, Dissemination of Documentaries	Kodomo Zenkoku Netto, Mama Rebo
20	Inner-Parliament Assembly	21.02.2014, Tōkyō	Disrespect of Public Comments Concerning the Energy Policy White Paper, Missing or Insufficient Evacuation Plans	e-shift, etc.
21	Foundation Meeting	21.02.2014, Tōkyō	Foundation Meeting, Talk by Wada Takeshi "The Possibility of Renewable Energy by Regional or Civic Initiatives"	Energy Green Sha, Tōkyō Green Power Network, etc.
22	Symposium	01.03.2014, Tōkyō	5 th Symposium: Living Conditions of the Victims and the Reality at the Fukushima Nuclear Plant	Kinkyūkaigi, FoE, Rekka Uran Kenkyūkai, Tampoposha, People's Plan, SAFLAN
23	Symposium	02.03.2014, Tōkyō	Three-Year Anniversary of 3.11, Talk Event	FoE, Palsystem, Patagonia, e-shift
24	Question-and-Answer Session	04.03.2014, Tōkyō	Questioning on Evacuation Plans (Hinan Keikaku)	Green Action, FoE, Ohi Genpatsu Tomeyō Saiban ni Kai, Mihama no Kai, Genshiryoku Kisei o Kanshi suru Shimin no Kai, Fukurō no Kai, Greenpeace, No Nukes Asia Forum Japan, No Nukes Asia Actions
25	Lawsuit	05.03.2014, Ōsaka city	Lawsuit to Stop the Ōi Nuclear Power Plant	Green Action, Mihama no Kai
26	Talk	07.03.2014, Tōkyō	Introduction of Radiation Monitoring Initiative of SAFECAST	Temple University
27	Symposium	11.03.2014, Tōkyō	Assessment of the Fukushima Crisis	Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation (JREF), CEO of Lawson Convenience Stores
28	Demonstration	15.03.2014, Tōkyō	"We won't forget Fukushima!"	Sayōnara Genpatsu
29	Question-and-Answer Session	18.03.2014, Tōkyō	Earthquake Risk Calculation	Genshiryoku Hatsuden ni Hantai suru Fukui-kenmin Kaigi, Sayōnara Genpatsu Fukui Nettowāku, CNIC, Wakasa Netto
30	Symposium	20.03.2014, Tōkyō	UN Human Rights Council Report about Fukushima and its Effects by Anand Grover	HRN, Anand Grover (UN Human Rights Commissioner), PRIME, JANIC, CNRS-LIA, JCN, Peace Boat, etc.
31	Forum	13.04.2014, Tōkyō	Nuclear Phase-out Forum	CCNE, etc.
32	Inner-parliament Assembly	15.04.2014, Tōkyō	28 Years Since Chernobyl – The Belarusian Experience and the German Citizen Movement	Groups from Belarus, Germany, FoE Japan, Chernobyl Josei Netto, Chernobyl Kodomo Kikin, Solar Complex, MEXT, Reconstruction Agency, KIZUNA Berlin
33	Law Suit	17.04.2014, Tōkyō	TEPCO Shareholders against TEPCO Management	TEPCO Shareholders
34	Inner-Parliament Assembly	08.05.2014, Tōkyō	Guidelines for a Nuclear-free Society	e-shift, CCNE, etc.

Event Field Note (EFN)	Type of Event	Date, Location	Theme	Organizing SMOs (list not complete)
35	Demonstration	11.05.2014, Tōkyō	“Women’s Walk for Life”; issues: nuclear power, peace, discrimination, equality	Women’s groups, Zeronomikuma, groups from Fukushima, Okinawa, Ainu cultural groups, anti-nuclear groups, peace groups, etc.
36	Inner-Parliament Assembly	14.05.2014, Tōkyō	The Housing Problem	SHSK, JCN, Nichibenren, Niigata prefectural council, evacuees, etc.
37	Seminar	26.05.2014, Tōkyō	The Right to Evacuation	e-shift, Palsystem, Fukurō no Kai, FoE, OPTV

II. NETWORK MEETINGS

Meeting Field Note (MFN)	Network	Date, Location	Type of Meeting
1	e-shift	03.12.2013, Tōkyō	Regular Meeting
2		09.01.2014, Tōkyō	Regular Meeting
3		10.02.2014, Tōkyō	Regular Meeting
4		03.03.2014, Tōkyō	Regular Meeting
5		10.04.2014, Tōkyō	Regular Meeting
6		07.05.2014, Tōkyō	Regular Meeting
7	SHSK	November 2013, Sapporo city, Hokkaidō prefecture	17th Regular Meeting; Permission to observe but not possible to travel to Hokkaidō on this date
8		17.01.2014, Tōkyō	Steering Committee Meeting; Permission to observe declined by email: “not open for non-members, steering committee only”.
9		21.02.2014, Tōkyō	18th Regular Meeting; Permission to observe
10		18.04.2014, Tōkyō	19th Regular Meeting; Permission to observe
11	Sayōnara Genpatsu	24.03.2014, Tōkyō	Regular Meeting

III. QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS

Interview-ee Category	Characterization	Location	Status	Source	Format	Language	Interview Length	Data Format
Expert-Activist (EA)	1 University Professor	Tōkyō	23.10.2013 Conducted in Person	Introduction by supervising professor	Conversation	English	ca 45 min	Subsequent Notes
	2 Former employee of anti-nuclear SMO, PhD candidate	Tōkyō, Australia	29.10.2013 Conducted in Person via Skype	Introduction by advising professor	Semi-Structured Interview	English	82 min	Interview Transcript and Subsequent Notes
SMO Representative (SR)	1 Child Protection from Radiation	Tōkyō	01.11.2013 Conducted in Person	Contacted at Movement Event	Semi-Structured Interview	Japanese	28 min	Interview Transcript and Subsequent Notes
	2 Human Rights	Tōkyō	12.11.2013 Conducted in Person	Contacted at Movement Event	Semi-Structured Interview and Informal Conversation	Japanese	27 min	Interview Transcript and Subsequent Notes
	3 Education about Radiation	Tōkyō	13.11.2013 Conducted in Person	Contacted at Movement Event	Semi-Structured Interview with group of 3 Representatives and Informal Conversation	Japanese	61 min	Interview Transcript and Subsequent Notes
	4 Anti-Nuclear	Tōkyō	21.11.2013 Conducted in Person	Contacted by Email	Semi-Structured Interview	Japanese	63 min	Interview Transcript
	5 Environment	Tōkyō	22.11.2013 Conducted in Person	Contacted at Movement Event	Semi-Structured Interview	Japanese	33 min	Interview Transcript
	6 Peace	Tōkyō	03.12.2013 Conducted in Person	Contacted at Movement Event	Semi-Structured Interview	English	82 min	Interview Transcript
	7 Child Protection from Radiation (national network)	Tōkyō	04.12.2013 Conducted in Person	Contacted at Movement Event	Semi-Structured Interview	Japanese	59 min	Interview Transcript and Subsequent Notes
	8 Nuclear Phase-Out	Tōkyō	21.01.2014 Conducted in Person	Contacted at Movement Event	Semi-Structured Interview	Japanese	51 min	Interview Transcript and Subsequent Notes
	9 Child Protection from Radiation (regional network) Kanto Netto	Chiba	24.01.2014 Conducted in Person	Introduction by SR7	Semi-Structured Interview	Japanese	67 min	Interview Transcript and Subsequent Notes
	10 Renewable Energy	Tōkyō	31.01.2014 Conducted in Person	Contacted at Talk Event	Semi-Structured Interview	English	47 min	Interview Transcript and Subsequent Notes
	11 Anti-Nuclear Network	Tōkyō	20.02.2014 Conducted in Person	Contacted at Coalition Meeting	Semi-Structured Interview with 2 Representatives	Japanese	64 min	Interview Transcript
	12 Renewable Energy	Tōkyō	21.02.2014 Conducted in Person	Contacted at Coalition Meeting	Semi-Structured Interview	Japanese	46 min	Interview Transcript and Subsequent Notes
	13 Anti-Nuclear	Kansai region	24.02.2014 Conducted in Person	Introduction by SR14	Semi-Structured Interview	Japanese	53 min	Interview Transcript

Interviewee Category	Characterization	Location	Status	Source	Format	Language	Interview Length	Data Format
	14 Anti-Nuclear	Kansai region	05.03.2014 Conducted in Person	Contacted at Movement Event	Semi-Structured Interview and Conversation on the train	Japanese	73 min	Interview Transcript and Subsequent Notes
	15 Environment	Tōkyō	11.03.2014 Conducted in Person	Introduction by SR14	Semi-Structured Interview	Japanese	69 min	Interview Transcript
	16 Fukushima Victims Group	Fukushima	07.04.2014 Conducted in Person	Contacted at Movement Event	Semi-Structured Interview	Japanese	111 min	Interview Transcript and Subsequent Notes
	17 Safe Food	Tochigi	10.04.2014 and 20.05.2014 Conducted in Person	Contacted at Coalition Meeting	Informal Conversation and Semi-Structured Interview	Japanese	50 min	Subsequent Notes and Interview Transcript
	18 Anti-Nuclear	Tōkyō	02.05.2014 Conducted in Person	Contacted at Coalition Meeting	Semi-Structured Interview	Japanese	118 min	Interview Transcript
	19 Renewable Energy	Tōkyō	12.05.2014 Conducted in Person	Contacted at Coalition Meeting	Semi-Structured Interview	Japanese	72 min	Interview Transcript
	20 Anti-Nuclear, Energy Shift Network	Tōkyō	16.05.2014 Conducted in Person	Contacted at Coalition Meeting	Semi-Structured Interview	Japanese	48 min	Interview Transcript
Citizen Media (CM)	1 Alternative Film Maker, University lecturer	Tōkyō	10.01.2014 Conducted in Person	Contacted at Movement Event	Semi-Structured Interview and Informal Conversation	Japanese	68 min	Interview Transcript and Subsequent Notes
	2 Alternative Media Activist, University lecturer	Tōkyō	20.02.2014 Conducted in Person	Contacted at Movement Event	Semi-Structured Interview	Japanese	68 min	Interview Transcript and Subsequent Notes
Politician (P)	1 Social Democratic Party	Tōkyō	20.01.2014 Conducted in Person	Contacted at Movement Event	Semi-Structured Interview	Japanese	30 min	Interview Transcript

IV. INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS

- **Self-Introduction**
 - Introduction to the research project
 - Recording ok? Confidentiality.
- **Introduction of the organization**
 - Goal and means to reach that goal?
 - Foundation date? NPO status?
 - Financial resources?
 - Membership numbers? How to gain new members?
 - Internal organization?
 - Information flow? Where does information come from and where does it go?
 - Communication with members?
 - Media contacts?
- **Cooperation with other organizations**
 - Network/coalition memberships?
 - Reasons for cooperation?
 - Ways of communication?
 - Closest contacts with?
 - When cooperating, who does what?
 - Cooperation successful? Any bad experiences?
 - Own role in the movement field?
 - Within the movement field, which are the most influential organizations?
- **Reaction to the Fukushima Accident**
 - Any new projects? New goals? How to reach these goals?
 - Impact on membership numbers and financial resources?
 - Impact on media contacts?
 - New cooperation/networks/coalitions? Initial idea? Development over time? Who contacted whom first? How did you get connected? Description of process?
 - If member of e-shift/SHSK, own role in the network?
 - Recognizable social change?
 - Obstacles to the anti-nuclear movement's goals?

V. E-SHIFT BOOKLETS: ARGUMENTATIVE STRUCTURES

Publication	Title	Argumentative Structure	Contributing SMOs
March 2012	Four Reasons to Not Recommission Nuclear Power Plants	<p>This booklet starts with the argument that the Fukushima accident has shown that nuclear power is not safe. The authors state that as long as the details of how the accident occurred remain unknown, it is not possible to develop appropriate safety measures against future accidents. Moreover, the accident has shown that the safety regulations for nuclear power plants in Japan are not sufficient. Therefore, the discussion about recommissioning faces the following four issues:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Even if the Nuclear Regulatory Agency has been restaffed, control procedures have not been revised and the same staff (mostly members of the 'nuclear village') remained without anybody taking responsibility for the accident. 2. The safety of nuclear reactors cannot be guaranteed by stress tests because these are not based on real safety checks at the plants themselves but are based on mere computer simulations. Moreover, Japan's reactors are getting old and the simulations do not take into account the aging infrastructure. 3. Despite what the pro-nuclear discourse claims, the demand for electricity is satisfied even without any nuclear reactor running. 4. The rules say that before the recommissioning of a nuclear plant, the opinions of the surrounding prefectures and residents need to be respected. In the voice of the residents lies an enormous power to stop nuclear plants. <p>Pages 70 to 73 line out ten possible ways for citizens to stop nuclear recommissioning: To learn and disseminate information about about residents' opinions; to let local representatives know one's opinion; to let the nuclear regulatory agency and the Ministry for Economy know one's opinion; to observe the government's discussions about nuclear recommissioning and participate in hearings of government advisory commissions; let the power companies know one's opinion as consumers; sign petitions and talk to friends; participate in question-and-answer sessions, seminars and assemblies; participate in demonstrations and parades; write letters to the editors of newspapers and magazines; and participate in active organizations.</p>	Green Action CNIC Tampoposha ISEP Hangenpatsu Shimbun
September 2012	The Separation of the Grid from Power Generation for a Nuclear-free Society based on Renewable Energy	<p>This booklet is based on the assumption that a revolution of the electricity market is a precondition for a sustainable energy society and is also necessary for a nuclear phase-out. According to the authors, it is necessary to resolve the current system, in which ten electricity companies have a monopoly on the electricity market, and open the market to ensure fair competition. Although the Japanese electricity market can be considered somewhat free, as any citizen can own a power company, the grid is still owned by the big power companies who have no interest in letting competitors use it. Therefore the grid needs to be separated from power generation (hassōden bunritsu). This means the separation of power production (hatsuden), power transmission (sōden), and power distribution (haiden).</p> <p>The first step is to take the national grid out from under the control of the power companies and to found a national power transmission company. This transmission company then buys the power from the producing companies and sells it to regional distributing companies.</p> <p>In order to realize this, it is important to dissolve TEPCO, which because of compensation costs is basically bankrupt and only kept alive by the government and taxpayers' money.</p> <p>Decommissioning of the nuclear reactors can happen in a coupe of ways: decommission could be administered by a temporary 'new' TEPCO, or reactor decommissioning could be put directly under state responsibility.</p> <p>A new electricity system based on information and market principles needs to be used intelligently. Here, a Feed-in-Tariff (FIT) could</p>	Act Beyond Trust ISEP Fukushima University As- sociate Profes- sor Network for a Society based on Renewable Energy Kikō Network

Publication	Title	Argumentative Structure	Contributing SMOs
		<p>help to increase the percentage of renewable energy on the market. Another problem which needs to be solved in the opinion of the authors is the differing power frequency between eastern and western Japan. They propose that this should be done either by gradually adapting the frequencies or by strengthening direct current transmission. After this, a change from nuclear or fossil fuel as basic sources of energy to renewable energy should take place. The authors state that a common argument for why such a change is impossible is that renewable energy supply experiences variations due to weather and seasonal conditions. In order to balance such variations, highly advanced battery and other technologies that are technically still unfeasible would be needed. But this argument falls short in the eyes of the authors because renewable energy supply varies, as does the demand and supply of energy. If local communities were allowed to manage their energy needs intelligently, they could easily regulate such variations, as is for example the case in Spain.</p> <p>The authors emphasize the fact that Japan is far behind in developing renewable energies, a lag due to old ways of thinking among elites, including the industry, politicians, media, and scientists. In order to change these structures, the authors propose that a new policy and a team to realize this policy should be employed. Moreover, two new organizations should be founded: one to control and supervise the free energy market and a Ministry for Environment and Energy to promote renewable energy production. A related problem is that even now, the ministry staff turns over periodically every two years. However, in order to secure staff with enough expertise, this ministry should keep its staff for at least 10 years. Furthermore it is necessary to strengthen bureaucrats' thinking in terms of serving the government and not for their own interests. To this aim, the authors recommend a revision of the public employment system.</p>	
March 2013	The Liquidation of TEPCO for the Revitalization of the Japanese Economy	<p>The first section of this booklet first presents the reasons for why TEPCO has not gone bankrupt after the Fukushima accident despite its debt default and major capital deficit. Right after the accident TEPCO was stabilized by seven big financial corporations, among them Mitsui Sumitomo, Mizuho Corporation and Mitsubishi Tōkyō UFG. This has somehow been tolerated by the Ministry of Finance, despite being against the rules. According to the authors, there are three main reasons for why TEPCO's life has been prolonged this way: first, to protect TEPCO's stakeholders, who did not want to lose their financial claims even while wanting to profit from the cleanup at the Fukushima site. Second, the government and the Ministry for Economy, Trade and Industry did not want to take responsibility for cleanup procedures. The Ministry of Finance was also afraid of a nationalization of TEPCO because nobody could estimate the costs, especially those for reparations. The Financial Services Agency was also afraid that the Japanese market economy as a whole could get into trouble if it had to deal with a bad loan of such an enormous scale. The third reason is that if TEPCO went bankrupt, the monopoly of the ten electricity companies would crash because TEPCO is the financially strongest among the ten electric companies; it represents one third of the financial power of the electricity market.</p> <p>Another interesting question pointed out by the authors is why TEPCO has willingly assumed responsibility for reparations to victims. The authors suggest that TEPCO did so in order to assure its own survival. The reason for this is that article 16 of the Law for Reparations of Victims of Nuclear Accidents allows TEPCO to get financial support from the state in order to assure the payment of reparations. In the eyes of the authors, it is thus necessary to liquidize TEPCO in order to give Japan a fresh start for the future. This is necessary to assure the opening of the electricity market and the separation of the grid from the power-producing companies. De facto the country pays for victim reparations; it can still do so without the company. The authors fear that if Japan continues as before, it will be impossible to revitalize the economy because the costs of the Fukushima</p>	<p>Fukushima Action Project TEPCO Shareholders Law Suit Group Osaka University Associate Professor Tampoposha CNIC ISEP</p>

Publication	Title	Argumentative Structure	Contributing SMOs
		nuclear accident will not be resolved. Keeping up the system as it is with stakeholders like the big construction companies at the very core, the authors do not see a future. But if a new nuclear decommissioning business can be established, the minus can be turned into at least a small plus. Besides this, according to the authors, the old system also restrains important innovation. Therefore, protecting TEP-CO only delays finding a solution to lift or lighten the burden the Japanese economy carries since the Fukushima nuclear accident.	
July 2013	Nuclear Zeronomics: Grand Design of a Nuclear-free Society	<p>In the foreword of this booklet, the authors point out that in August 2012, for the first time, citizens had the opportunity to take part in discussing Japan's energy future by writing public comments on a draft law. More than 89,000 comments have been submitted, of which 87 % opted for a zero nuclear scenario and 78st% of these opted for a gradual phase-out. This resulted in the nuclear phase-out policy by the government at that time. In the meantime, the government has changed and so have its policies; still, e-shift wants to ensure that the will of the people will not be brushed aside. The authors point out that during the short weeks of discussion of the draft law it became clear that many young people in their 20s and 30s were worried about what could happen to the Japanese economy if nuclear power was phased out. This booklet is conceptualized in order to give this target audience an idea of how an energy shift can be realized without a negative effect on the economy. One way to realize change while contributing positively to the economy is what many small and middle-sized enterprises and citizens are doing: dissociating from big companies and the state and building their own renewable energy businesses. This is what for the authors defines the term 'Nuclear Zeronomics'. The authors argue that every citizen can be part of that process.</p> <p>In the first section of the booklet, the authors heavily criticize the Abe government's economic policy ('Abenomics') and point out that his program does not contribute to revitalizing the Japanese economy. In the eyes of the authors, it is a lie that the economy will crash without nuclear power. They point out that during the temporary halt of all nuclear plants there was no electricity shortage and that the economy did not suffer as much as the government had prophesized. Opening up the electricity market on the other hand could have a positive effect on the economy due to more competition and innovation, and contribute to a more stable energy supply because of more diversified production. The authors state that it is rather nuclear power which has a negative effect on the economy. Many official calculations ignore the real costs of nuclear power and make people believe that the increase in electricity prices comes from rising oil imports. According to e-shift, the rising prices are caused by the backend costs of nuclear power.</p> <p>Finally, the authors fear that Japan is far behind in the development of a renewable energy sector. It is apparent that the traditional industry obstructs the sector in Japan from innovating, while the renewable sector is growing exponentially worldwide.</p> <p>What is most important for Japan right now, in the authors' opinion, is for local communities to take back this commercial sector by building community power stations. In the past few years, many citizens have successfully started their own small renewable energy production stations to supply local communities.</p>	Keio University Professor for Economics ISEP Tōhoku University Professor
April 2014	The Nuclear Victims Support Act and the Right to Evacuation	In this booklet the authors discuss the situation of nuclear evacuees and their insufficient support by the government. At the time of writing, three years had passed since the nuclear accident. As reconstruction proceeds, many evacuees suffer from pressure to return to their homes in zones where evacuation orders have been lifted. For many, it is impossible to return due to lack of medical infrastructure, the devastation of their houses due to their long absence, and fear of high radiation levels. With the lifting of evacuation orders, compensation payments also stop. In September 2013, there were still 21,000 involuntary evacuees. There are also a huge number of voluntary	FoE Japan Fukurō no Kai SAFLAN Takagi School Voluntary Evacuee OurPlanet TV

Publication	Title	Argumentative Structure	Contributing SMOs
		<p>evacuees who left their homes because of radiation fears in areas not declared official evacuation zones.</p> <p>The authors point out that differing interpretations of the danger stemming from radiation have divided the population in Fukushima. In March 2011, evacuation had been ordered up to a 20 km radius from the plant. People in a 30km radius from the plant were recommended to evacuate. In 2012, evacuation zones were reorganized and in March 2014, three different types of evacuation zones were established. According to this reorganization, evacuation orders have been lifted and compensations are no longer being paid. The zones as of 2014 consist of: 'Zones in Preparation of an Evacuation Order Lift' (<i>hinan shiji kaijo junbi kuiki</i>; zones in which radiation dosage can be reduced to less than 20msv/year), 'Zones of Restricted Residency' (<i>ijū seigen kuiki</i>; zones in which it is less likely that a 20msv/year dosage can be ensured, but might be possible in the future; possibility to return temporarily), and 'Zones Difficult to Return to' (<i>kikan komnan kuiki</i>; zones in which it is very unlikely that in the nearer future the 20msv/year can be guaranteed. These zones exceed 50msv/year at the moment; the state is preparing for compensation payments for the loss of real estate property). Compensation payments discontinue three months after evacuation orders are lifted, and many people struggle to pay mortgages for their houses in the zones and apartment rent in their current location. Nevertheless, many evacuees, especially those with children, decide not to return. The authors accuse the government of not taking into account residents' opinions. Also, in many areas where evacuation has been lifted, infrastructure has still not been restored.</p> <p>The authors point out that the official government position is that a dosage of less than 100msv annually does not increase cancer risk significantly. They assume that this basic understanding led to very slow and rather limited evacuation (the American government had recommended evacuation for up to an 80 km radius). The authors blame slow government reaction for many children returning to school in April 2011 even in areas where radiation levels were very high, and despite parents calling for a delay in the start of the school year. According to the authors the problems with the evacuation policy can be summarized as follows: the standard radiation dosage of 20msv is too high; there has been no exchange/discussion with society; residents' voices have not been heard; residents could not decide whether to evacuate or not; evacuation orders came too late; the area for evacuation was too small; and radiation levels of the soil have not been taken into account.</p> <p>They complain that all this happened in a highly developed country such as Japan. In the case of Chernobyl, a law was passed 5 years after the accident defining areas with a yearly dosage of over 1msv as zones with a right to evacuation; 5msv areas as zones with evacuation duty; and areas with 0,5 msv as requiring regular observation. Moreover, the Chernobyl law includes the individual's right to decide whether to evacuate or not. And to those who decide to do so, the respective governments compensates their loss and provides medical services free of charge. The authors express that they do not understand why a similar regulation has not been put in place in Japan.</p> <p>The authors also object to the fact that the boundaries for evacuation areas are set according to radiation levels in the air only.</p> <p>The authors also complain that evacuees are being forced to return to their home towns by a number of factors. In 2013, the government published a plan to speed up return to the affected areas by offering a 'return allowance' of about 900.000 Yen per returnee to support their 'new life' back home. Currently, rent for evacuee housing is paid by the state and the community of origin (proportion 9 to 1, at least in the case of Fukushima prefecture). This is the reason for why, according to the authors, the communities of origin also have a strong interest in the return of their residents.</p>	

Publication	Title	Argumentative Structure	Contributing SMOs
		<p>Moreover, the renting of housing for evacuees is based on the Disaster Relief Act. The government argues that this law covers only short-term consequences of natural disasters. This is why the authors had high hopes that the issue of long-term support would be addressed by the Victims Support Act that passed the Diet in June 2012. However, the basic policy provided for such support only until March 2015. After that date, the authors note, it will be decided on a case-by-case basis. According to the authors, the main problems of the basic policy can be summarized as follows: first, the counseling of and advocacy for evacuees is left to civil society organizations. This is not necessarily wrong, but it does not replace general support for housing and employment. Second, evacuees qualify for the right to public housing. However, it is not clear how much public housing is available. Third, employment services are limited to the development of joint council meetings and support for working mothers and long-term unemployed people by private organizations. Among the 119 measures of the basic policy, there are 14 with new content. Of these, six measures concern the support of people who still live in or are returning to evacuation zones, but only three support involuntary evacuees.</p> <p>The authors continue that Anand Grover, UN special rapporteur for the right to health, published a report in May 2013 recommending that the standard radiation dosage for citizens should be under 1msv per year and that people should be allowed to decide for themselves whether or not to return to areas exceeding this dosage. Also, all evacuees should be supported equally. The ICRP also sets the limit for radiation dosage to 1 msv. The authors point out that these standards and arguments have been ignored by the Japanese government, which has based its policies on a radiation dosage of 100 msv/year. Under these circumstances, evacuees who wish to protect their families are forced to return, an unacceptable situation according to the authors.</p>	
June 2015	The Nuclear Regulatory Agency and the New Safety Regulatory Standards do not Guarantee Nuclear Safety	<p>This booklet is written by a Hosei University Emeritus Professor who, based on interviews with specialists and other data, wrote all four chapters of the book. In the foreword he starts with describing how he experienced the magnitude 9 earthquake and the following nuclear accident in Fukushima. When he heard that his university campus would likely become an evacuation center, he decided not to evacuate himself to western Japan as his daughter requested. He then continues that his interest in questions concerning nuclear power came when he heard about the Three-Mile-Island accident in the USA. With the accident in Chernobyl, people with an anti-nuclear opinion increased, but this could not stop the development of nuclear power in Japan. However, Fukushima led to an even bigger change in public opinion and thanks to this fact, in May 2012, Japan became nuclear free for the first time. He points out that the nuclear power issue is multifaceted and that his booklet only covers questions concerning the safety/danger of nuclear reactors in Japan under the current Regulatory Agency. When the new agency was founded, three of the five members were people with strong ties to the nuclear village. The new Regulatory Agency was founded without waiting for a thorough investigation of the reasons for the Fukushima accident and has been sold to the public as being able to prevent a similar accident from happening again. With the inauguration of this agency, the Guidelines on Nuclear Reactor Construction Investigation became invalid; they had stipulated that reactors should only be built in regions with a low population density. Ever</p>	Hōsei University Emeritus Professor, Interviews with: Kyushu University Professor/CCNE ^{xxx} , Tōkyō University Emeritus Professor/CCNE, a former nuclear engineer/NPO APAST ^{xxx} , Hōsei University Associate Professor

²⁴² Citizens' Commission on Nuclear Energy, a think-tank like organization with members from an activist as well as a scientific background, which published a "Policy Outline for a Nuclear Phase-out" in 2014.

²⁴³ NPO Union for Alternative Pathways in Science and Technology.

Publication	Title	Argumentative Structure	Contributing SMOs
		<p>since 3.11 the author has monitored the meetings of the committees conducting nuclear stress tests. Since the foundation of the NRA, he has also participated in these meetings. He has become more and more worried about this agency, especially because they do not take into account seismic activity.</p> <p>In the first chapter, the author gives an historical overview of the laws and regulations concerning nuclear power in Japan and points out how earthquake and tsunami risks have systematically been neglected. In the second chapter he then describes the introduction of stress tests after Fukushima, Prime Minister Noda's political decision to recommission the Ohi nuclear plant in the summer of 2012, the inauguration of the NRA and problems with the selection of the personnel. In chapter three, the author criticizes the methods of risk assessment, which have failed to take various parameters local into account, especially concerning security measures against air plane crashes or sabotage. Evacuation plans of the surrounding areas are insufficient, the author argues. Finally, Japanese rules and regulations concerning safety measures are in the author's view a lot weaker than those in the USA or the EU and completely ignore the risk of active earthquake faults and volcanic/seismic activity.</p>	

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