Some Observations, thoughts and a working perspective for Covid-19 challenges in Japan: Adaptive governance under high systemic risk

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Covid-19 as it stands

in Japan
• [https://covid19japan.com/](https://covid19japan.com/) as of 25 May 2020
  • c.a. 275.4 thous. Tested
  • 17.3 confirmed (positive)
  • 14.1 recovered
  • 0.856 deaths
    4.95% case fatality rate
    6.4 deaths per million

in Germany
  • c.a. 3,147.8 thou. tested (limited in number)
  • 180.3 confirmed
  • 161.2 recovered
  • 8.37 deaths
    4.6% case fatality rate
    99.6 deaths per million
What characterizes Japan’s approach so far includes

• Cluster-focused (prioritized)

• Yet-low-level of PCR test cases

• (Soft) “State of emergency” was declared at the national government and also at local governments’ level

• “Jishuku” request (voluntary restraint efforts strongly requested by governments, without legal enforcement and penalties)

• Without complete lockdowns (“80%” activity cut efforts strongly requested to each individual and corporation by the governments at national and local levels.)

• Governments’ (particularly at national level) slow decision and implementation process to provide quick supports for economic survival measures.
• “Not so impressive(?)” risk/crisis communication capability” by top national leaders; in contrast with some local governors and mayors who look much better and confident. (Osaka model, Tokyo alert, Tottori ‘SMART governance approach’(named by Okada), etc.)

• Specialists’ advisory board (mostly from infectious diseases and public health) was set up by the national government. The board takes an influential role but there remains room for improvement.

• National governments’ “Criteria for decision-making” are considered so far not well-formalized or consistent; accountability problems..
But one may argue: so far, Japan is not so bad (or relatively doing well) in performance


- **Lower deaths** in number and rate
  - Japan: 4.95% case fatality rate; 6.4 deaths per million
  - Germany: 4.6% case fatality rate; 99.6 deaths per million

  ↓ Some specialists say: reasons may include
- (Scarcely so far) Avoiding **medical care collapses**.
- **Cluster-focused approach works** (at least in the initial stage)
- Japanese people’s health-and clean-minded culture and attitudes, conformity pressure, etc. seem to be somehow working (e.g. face-mask effective?)
- Or **FACTOR “X”??**
My viewpoint and approach

- Roles of National vs. Regional, Local (Community) Planning and Management
- Participatory Risk Governance (vs. More top-down)
- Adaptive Risk Governance (vs. Non-adaptive)
Two points to be highlighted

• Roles and Relations of National, Regional, Local (Community) Planning and Management to be redesigned

• Adaptive Governance (SMART) and Participatory Risk Governance to be more promoted at more local levels

□ Policy implications also for Integrated Disaster Risk Governance (e.g. Nankai Trough Mega-earthquake Disaster)

□ How urban planning and design needs to be changed?
Persistent (Catastrophes) Disruptive Stressors (PDS)

Community

Mega disaster

Infectious disease (like Coronavirus)

Climate change dynamics

Demographic change

Globalization
SMART Governance

- Small(er) and Solid(er)
- Modest and Multiple
- Anticipatory and Adaptive
- Responsive and Risk-concerned
- Transform (change)

Participatory Governance at regional and local levels
Spiral dynamics of transformation

More anticipatory instead of reactive
Question #0
Japan’s Halfhearted Coronavirus Measures Are Working Anyway
BY WILLIAM SPOSATO | MAY 14, 2020, 4:01 PM  FOREIGN POLICY

• Despite indifferent lockdowns and poor testing, Japan seems to be skipping the worst of the pandemic.

• It is difficult to know if the country has just been lucky or if it’s a matter of good policy. ❓❓❓

https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/14/japan-coronavirus-pandemic-lockdown-testing/

My point is: we should pay more attention to coping capacity of local governments and communities: SMART Governance seems to be working relatively well so far.
(My) Questions: WHYs?

• WHY #1?: Japan is considered “UNPREPARED for this New Coronavirus affection; less so for Germany?

• WHY #2?: Japan’s (PCR) tests in number are considered “low” as compared with Germany, South Korea and other countries.

• WHY #3?: Japan looks not so bad as far as minimizing the number of deaths---- the same with Germany.

• WHY #4?: Some local governments look doing better in adaptive governance than the national government.
National government?

• Yes, there seem some policies introduced and constantly revised by the national government.
• Japanese national government’s approach so far is: reactive, reactive,... adjustment approach (a very limited (passive and static) type of adaptive management)
• Lack of formalization, transparency and accountability.
• Lack of leadership to provide a nation-wide consistent policy directive endorsed by national roles of coordination and resource redistribution among regional and local governments and communities.
National government (and the Parliament) were slow to decide, change and act.

- Unprepared for this type of special new coronavirus epidemics/pandemics
- It seemed there was some lag time that could have been strategically made use of while China, Korea and Italy were fighting with this pandemics.
- Balancing economy and other high-priority political issues (e.g., Tokyo Olympic 2020) with coronavirus crisis, which seemed to have delayed their decision.
- Lack of strong leadership (the central tower) at the national/central level
- Japan’s constitutional and legal systems as constraints (preventing governments from enforcing people to follow their orders)
- Governments’ monitoring people’s behaviors and privacy
In contrast, some local governments (Osaka, Tokyo, Hokkaido, Tottori, etc.)

- they started with reactive but later more anticipatory, proactive governance. (a good balance of top-down and bottom up strategies on a smaller, self-organized scale)
Illustrations and evidence (as of 12 May, 2020)
Some Prefectures are doing better than The National Government
Some local governments and communities tend to be quicker and more focused than the national government.

- 28 Feb.: Governor of Hokkaido Pref. Government: the first to declare a state of emergency at Hokkaido Pref. level
- (2 March: Prime Minister Abe suddenly requested nation-wide closure of elementary, secondary and senior high schools.)
- 19 March: Governments of Osaka Pref. and Hyogo Pref. requested emergent need to stop inter-prefecture movements for the coming three holidays (20-24 March).
- (16 April: Prime Minister Abe declared the first version of the state of emergency)

Influencing the national government?
• 5 May: Prime Minister Abe extended the State of Emergency till 30 May. (without any criteria to judge when and how to stop (exit))

• 5 May: Mr. Yoshimura, Governor of Osaka presented the Osaka Model with criteria to judge when and how to stop (exit)) the administrative request for business sectors to minimize their operations.

• 14 May: Prime Minister Abe relaxed the State of Emergency, possibly with some criteria to judge when and how to stop (exit))

Influencing the national government?
• 14 May: the Governor of Osaka has declared to remove the Osaka state of emergency based on the committed criteria.

• 15 May: the Governor of Tokyo is to present the Tokyo Model (“Tokyo Alert”)

• Local governments and the National government seem in (healthy, democratic?) tension. Hopefully, both could work more communicatively from now on.

• Local cultures and people’s behaviors seem to be involved.

• Closer to frontlines and more sensitive and driven to enhance coping capacity in an integrative manner.
“Osaka Model”: Criteria for judging if the “Jishuku” (voluntary restraint) request can be relaxed or removed by the governor of Osaka Prefecture

1. New coronavirus cases (7 day average) not attributable to known clusters < 10 persons per day

2. Positive rate of those PCR-tested (7 day average) < 7 %

3. Number of ICU hospital beds occupied < 60 %.

Based on constant surveillance and data collected

When all of the three criteria are met, Jishuku requests will be relaxed step by step so as to allow social economic activities to recover gradually.
Tottori Prefecture’s coping capacity challenged

◆ Some prior experience with Pandemic 2009H1N1

• Quick awareness and preparation for this Covid-19.
• 21 Jan., Special Headquarter to fight with COVID-18
• Decision to distribute to medical care people face masks stocked for natural disasters
• 20 Feb, Timely arranged a meeting with prospective stakeholders and they all agreed and acted to rapidly increase the capacity of accommodating coronavirus-affected patients in hospitals from 12 to 322 beds (completed on 22 April 2020)
• Only three coronavirus cases (as of 20 May 2020)
Tottori Pref. is to be the first to introduce a drive-through PCR test system, and also strengthen the ICU ECMO treatment method.
Germany and Japan Comparison
(Ortwin Renn and Norio Okada share the following views.)

• Emphasis on Governance (SMART governance Model)
• Main Objective: to find the best effective and fair balance between national (federal) and regional (local) level
• Four main targets:
  – The central government should provide the means for local communities to develop the coping capacity to effectively deal with crisis such as Covid-19
  – The central government should provide the general guidelines and intervention points (when action is required) but leave it to the local units to decide how to implement and enforce these guidelines.
  – The central government needs to have a nationwide monitoring system in place so that it is informed about the performance of each unit and the general diffusion of the disease
  – If critical targets are exceeded or local units are unable to issue effective management measures the central government should be well prepared to intervene and make sure that further spread is prevented
Common Lessons

- Invest in resilience not only efficiency
- Allow plurality of knowledge and management styles but make sure they all follow the same rationale
- Be sure that decisions about measures include an analysis of positive and negative side effects (trade-offs)
- Be sensitive to local conditions and special circumstances
- Rely on an adaptive and inclusive governance structure (SMART model)
- Socio-cultural contexts to be well-reflected.
Anyway, it’s too early to make any concluding assessments

• We all are just in the initial co-learning stage to cope with Covid-19.
• It is expected to become decade-long marathon challenges triggered by Covid-19.
• In Japan, Germany, etc.
• In a local town or community, big cities, prefectural regions, and the nation of Japan.
• SMART governance under Persistent Disruptive Stressors may serve a useful working framework to address this super-systemic risk issues.
Covid-19 Adaptive Marathons series
-All Japan, Prefectures, Cities, local communities...
The Second Wave
Interacting Marathon Systemic Risk Spiral Paths

The First Wave

JAPAN’s Coping capacities

All Japan

A local community

GERMANY’s matter!
Thank you for your kind attention!
Appendix
How are they related from IDRiM perspective?

Mega Earthquake and Coronavirus Compared

• Nankai Trough Mega Earthquake Disaster
• High uncertainty and complexity
• Long-lasting with multiple waves of shocks (twin or triple mega-shocks conceivable)
• Preparedness matters
  (Not well-prepared.)
• Enforcement or Adaptive Change of People’s attitudes/behaviors
  (Not by enforcement)
• Coping capacity development matters
  SMART governance at regional and community levels

• COVID-19
• High uncertainty and complexity
• Long-lasting with multiple waves of shocks
• Preparedness matters
  (Not well-prepared.)
• Quarantine and Border control
  Tests and Isolation
• Enforcement or Adaptive Change of People’s attitudes/behaviors
  (Not by enforcement)
• Coping capacity development matters
  SMART governance at regional and community levels

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Negative impact: Covid-19 delaying Nankai Trough Earthquake Preparedness

- [https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASN4V6GSHN4QUTIL03R.html](https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASN4V6GSHN4QUTIL03R.html) (Asahi Shinbun news April 26, 2020)
- 60 percent not yet prepared for designating “pre-disaster evacuation areas” for Nankai Trough Earthquake Disaster
- Coronavirus may be delaying the process.
Types of governance

Conventional governance

- Fixed plan of action
- Practice to follow
- No change of rule
- Uniform and homogeneous
- Framework is given
- Conventional inertial force

SMART governance

- Practice and implementation
- Flexible plans of actions to support
- Resilient room for change of rule
- Diverse and heterogeneous
- Working framework (hypothesis) to be tested and revised
- Anticipatory and adaptive dynamics
Types of governance

**Conventional governance**
- Stable and determined state
- Limited span of time
- Non-systemic risk environment

**SMART governance**
- Unstable and high uncertain state
- Longer span of time
- Systemic risk environment
National government  Local government
with local communities

• Conventional governance

• Bureaucratic sectional control

• Cross-sectional and top-down coordination seemingly poorly exercised

• Conventional combined with SMART governance

• Local autonomy combined with participatory governance

• Some prefectural and municipal governments are so far doing well, others not
Why are we so slow in removing bottleneck such as in PCR test upscaling? How can we be more anticipatory and adaptive?
Organizational bottlenecks blocking seamless workflows at different levels

Private sector operations

Government-run operations

Bypassing A
Level 1
Task 1

Inquiry counter

Level 2
Task 2

Test center

Level 3
Task 3

Designated Hospital

Private sector operations

Entrance counter

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A. The national (or local) political leader should own this wide perspective (landscape) and exercise strong top-down coordination!
B. Speedy capacity expansion prepared and exercised for each task process!
(by making use of the expected time lapse till full capacity)
C. With a broad perspective in hand, strong political will and power should be exerted to bypass bottlenecked processes (Sector-based administrators resist to interact with outsides.)
Remove bottlenecks (Small, Middle, Large)
PCR Test cases

Check

C

d

Action

(step 1)
Small change at the first bottleneck

Action

d

Plan

Do

D

P

(step 2)
Small change at the next bottleneck

The second action plan made and implemented: Opening a local restaurant in the former school.

(step 3)
Small change at the third bottleneck

The action plan as a hypothesis should be practiced and tested: Opening a local restaurant in the former school.
• Switch from reactive to anticipatory and proactive

• Run on the main tack but set up another track for another operation due soon

• Become prepared for another mode of critical situation by making best use of the time gained before the first track operation reaches its full capacity.

• Ready to shift focus to another track while running on the first track in parallel.
WHY #1?: Japan is considered “UNPREPARED for this New Corona virus affection; less so for Germany? What kinds of lessons?

• Anyway, no country was well-prepared; so was Japan.

• How can we switch timely from reactive to more anticipatory, proactive adaptive approach?

• Why not anticipate and feed-forward our lessons to the next and one after next virus WAVES (PDSs) in a longer span of time!
WHY #2?: Japan’s (PCR) tests in number are considered “low” as compared with Germany, South Korea and other countries

• How can we switch timely from reactive to more anticipatory, proactive adaptive approach?

• Starting with the cluster approach looked fine in the first stage. But why is it so slow and difficult for Japan to move to the next stage? Timely switching to increasing the number of PCR (and other) tests in parallel with the cluster approach.

• My working hypothesis (adaptive governance) proposed
WHY #3?: Japan looks not so bad as far as minimizing the number of deaths

- Quite possibly, it was a kind of “so far viable” strategy intended by the National Government advised by the “Specialists’ advisory board” set up in March 2020.
- Citizens seemed quick to enhance Japan’s health and clean living styles (face masks, washing hands, having space between persons, etc.) Maybe also “conformity culture” prevents infection from spreading.
- Given “request-based order” instead of “legally enforced change of action and order.” (and privacy-concerned information management and legal systems, etc.)

- But without enough testing and checking the number of infected people, can we be so optimistic to go mainly with the current approach?
  ⇒ Definitely, “NO.”
WHY #4?: Some local governments look doing better in adaptive governance than the national government.

• How can we switch timely from reactive to more anticipatory, proactive adaptive approach?

• It looks so far that SMART governance works much better and effective for local governments and smaller communities.
Toyonaka City (Osaka Pref.) officials voluntarily support the City-run Hospital by making hospital gown substitutes from plastic hospital gowns.

27th April 2020

https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2020042600112&g=soc
Private-sector also joins in adaptive governance (by forming new partnerships)

- A sporty yacht company produces medical gowns
- High-tech companies produce high-quality face masks
- Tourist-oriented hotels offer idle rooms for light infected patients or for medical staff who wish to stay close to their hospitals and to stay separate from their family members
- The list goes on as “viable practices for their survival efforts as well as for offering urgently needed support.
Change request

Perfectionism (linear logic)

Local government Headquarter

Local government branches, (Local private sector) and Community

Coronavirus Crisis

Top-down

National government Headquarter
(Private sector central office)

National government Regional branches
(Regional Private-sector)

Adaptive practice (spiral logic)

Bottleneck