

**Gendered social movements
in post-3.11 Japan:
A survey report**

Barbara Holthus



Gendered social movements in post-3.11

Japan: A survey report

Abstract

In the wake of the triple disaster of March 11, 2011, hundreds of social movement groups formed nationwide to call for the cessation of nuclear power in Japan as well as to demand the protection of children, in particular, from radiation fall-out. These groups' activities, including large-scale protests, peaked in the summer of 2012. This period has been termed the "rebirth" of social movements in Japan, following a long period of invisibility since the 1970s. Activity levels picked up again in 2015 when the Japanese government pushed a highly controversial bill through the Diet which impacted Japan's military position in the world and laid the foundations for amending Japan's post-war constitution. Once again Japanese gathered for large-scale protests. A gap in quantitative research on the issue of social movements in post-3.11 Japan led to a survey of close to 80,000 Japanese regarding their political views, personal values, social movement awareness and active participation, conducted in late 2017 (principal investigator: Naoto Higuchi, now Waseda University). Findings from the quantitative analysis show social movement mobilization and participation, as well as personal values and political views to be significantly gendered. It is the first time that such large-scale data has been collected, and it gives statistical proof and support to many of the previous existing studies, which have been primarily qualitative in nature.

Keywords:

Japan, March 11, political participation, social movements, gender roles, anti-nuclear demonstrations, anti-security legislation demonstrations, mobilization, demonstrations.

Gendered social movements in post-3.11

Japan: A survey report

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This survey report is the first English access point to the survey, which is the basis for the Japanese edited volume, Higuchi, Naoto and Mitsuru Matsutani (ed). 2020. *3.11 no shakai undo: 8mannin no dēta kara wakatta koto*. Tokyo: Chikuma shōbō. For a more in-depth analysis of the issue of gender, see the chapter by Holthus und Higuchi within the volume.

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1. Introduction

The Great East Japan Earthquake hit Japan on March 11, 2011, causing the triple disaster of earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear meltdown of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. These events resulted in more than 17,000 people missing or dead, thousands injured, and tens of thousands displaced from their homes and quickly triggered anti-nuclear protests throughout the country, though primarily centered in the capital Tokyo. Mobilization of social movement groups and their protests peaked in July 2012, and their numbers declined rapidly thereafter. In 2015, Japan saw a second peak in mobilization numbers, this time in response to the Diet passing the National Security Act legislation. This legislation is seen by many as an effort by the Abe government to pave the way for changing Japan's constitution, namely Article 9, which prohibits Japan from building first-strike military capabilities. The new security legislation allows Japan's military, called the Self-Defense Forces, to engage overseas. Together, these issues of contention, along with issues which have resulted in protests since 2011, most recently smaller-scale anti-Olympic protests (Ganseforth 2020), mark the largest protest wave Japan has seen since the 1970s, an era in which Japan experienced the almost complete absence of social protests and would witness the invisibility of civil society for decades (Steinhoff 2017).

A significant amount of research on the resurgence of social movement activities since 2011 has been conducted, yet the majority of that research has been qualitative, small-scale studies. Therefore, a Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (KAKENHI #17H01005) project, a Japanese nationally funded research project headed by principal investigator Naoto Higuchi (formerly of Tokushima University, now Waseda University), enabled a large-scale survey undertaken in December 2017. Close to 80,000 Japanese in the larger Tokyo metropolitan area were surveyed. Questions focus on understanding who was sympathetic to the 3.11 movement, who was mobilized, who participated in the protests, and most importantly their reasons. The goal was to understand what distinguishes the participants from the non-participants and to understand the role values and political views play in this.

The research team under the leadership of Naoto Higuchi consists of Mitsuru Matsutani (Chukyo University), Keiichi Satoh (University of Helsinki), Hiroshi Ohata (Meiji University), Kikuko Nagayoshi (Tohoku University), Shun Harada (Kinjo Gakuin University) and Barbara Holthus (author). First findings of the team were jointly presented on January 27, 2019 at a symposium entitled "Social Movements in Post-3.11 Japan" at Sophia University. An edited volume in Japanese was published in June 2020. This survey report is the first English-language publication to present an overview of the data.

Here, in order to structure the findings, this survey report uses gender as the main but not sole control variable. In general, studies on issues of gender regarding social movement mobilization and participation point to issues of biographical availability, of gendered concern for certain social issues, of different ways of entry into social movements, and gendered roles within movements. Yet how this plays out in the post-3.11 social movements in Japan has to date not been studied in detail through a quantitative approach.

The analysis uses univariate, bivariate, and multivariate statistical tests. As a service to the academic community, this survey report also features the full-length English translation of the questionnaire in its appendix. The raw data will be made available to the public through the data archive of the University of Tokyo (SSJDA) by 2022.

2. Issues of gender in social movement mobilization and participation

After the triple disaster of March 11, 2011, Western research on social movements in Japan prominently featured women, and particularly mothers, giving the impression that they were the majority within and at the forefront of social movements and social activism blossoming after the disaster (e.g. Freiner 2013; Holdgruen and Holthus 2015; Tiefenbach and Holdgruen 2014; Novikova, 2016, 2017; Slater, Morioka & Danzuka, 2014; Sternsdorff-Cisterna, 2019). But is that really the case?

Existing Western research was mostly conducted on a small scale, with interview or ethnographic data on movement groups and participants, lacking large-scale survey data to support their claims. Therefore, this large-scale dataset of close to 80,000 people living in the larger Tokyo metropolitan area, which is the basis for this working paper, helps to put the above view into perspective. Does gender matter to social movement participation in post-3.11 Japan? And if so, how and why? How gendered was the mobilization and participation in both Japan's post-3.11 anti-nuclear and anti-security legislation movements? Are there differences between the movements? Does the data confirm the many ethnographic and qualitative studies, or will the survey data show something different?

In Western research on social movements in numerous countries, not just Japan, several overarching themes emerge. Activism and social movement behavior is found to be gendered in pretty much all countries to varying degrees. Depending on which movement or movement organization is studied, either women or men are found to be more active in sheer numbers than the other sex.

Nonetheless, the majority of quantitative studies demonstrate a significantly higher male participation rate.

Though men outnumber women when it comes to participation in demonstrations, more women than men are sympathetic to movement issues and goals. In the US, (heterosexual) women are more likely to be generally supportive of LGBTQ rights (Swank and Fahs, 2012). Women are more concerned about environmental issues in general and nuclear risks in particular (Kimura and Katano, 2014; Kimura, 2016), especially mothers with young children in comparison to fathers (Holthus et.al 2015).

Gendered recruitment into social movements is identified in diverse studies. Whereas men tend to get contacted on the street, through contacts in their involvement in formal institutions, women are more likely to get involved through their social networks (Kuumba, 2011; Cable, 1992). This also relates to the higher incidence of women working in the home and therefore structurally available to be recruited by kin and friends, and because they have a wider informal network (Kuumba, 2011 re. South Africa; Neuhouser, 1998 re. Brazil). In the case of Japan, Hasunuma (2019) finds that women who have lived abroad, speak English and have a history in peace activism are more likely to be politically active after returning to Japan.

Women are generally more active in social movements when they are parents than their male counterparts (Terriquez, 2011). Women are mainly active in grassroots activism (Zemlinskaya, 2010), in voluntary or neighborhood organizations (Iezzi and Deriu, 2013), and in less obtrusive, small-scale activities (LeBlanc 2003), whereas men are found to be more politically active in trade-unions and party politics (Iezzi and Deriu, 2013). In Japan, slightly higher numbers of women than men vote in elections, yet women organize more in local than national politics (Maeda, 2005; Nakano, 2018).

Within social movements, a gendered task division is often reported (McAdam, 1992; Cable, 1992; Thorne, 1975; Kuumba, 2011). Concerning protest culture, the literature is divided on the issue of gender. Women may actively engage in street protests and make contact with politicians (Buranajaroenkij et al 2016), but some scholars argue that it depends on the protest issue itself: women are said to attend demonstrations around care issues in greater numbers than men, while men outnumber women for anti-racist or social security issues (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001).

Four common patterns of explanation for why we see differences along gender lines emerge from the literature: gendered socialization, gendered biographical (un)availability, gendered social life (public/private divide), and a strategic use of gender, specifically the maternal role.

Socialization

One of the barriers to gender-equal participation in social movements lies in the dissimilar socialization of men and women, reinforced by persistent gender norms. A US study asserts that girls face more barriers in mobilizing than boys, arguing that girls are socialized to not actively engage in social movements and that parental opposition to participation in protests for girls is higher than for boys (Gordon, 2008). Social restrictions to participate are also coming from husbands or male relatives in a study on South Africa (Kuumba, 2011). For Germany, gendered socialization is strong, influencing girls' consciousness as not being fit to engage politically (Pfanzelt and Speis, 2019). In the case of Japan, it is argued that gendered socialization stems at least in part from the education system (Pharr 1998).

Private/public divide and political views

According to Zemlinskaya (2010), gendered activism emerges due to the division along the private and public, meaning that women generally are still more bound to the domestic area than men. Women inhabit formal political positions less often than men. They are the majority in the grassroots beginnings of a social movement, whereas once the movement becomes more institutionalized, men begin to occupy more formal positions (Robnett 1996).

Those who are more liberal are said to be more likely to participate in social movements (Dalton 2008, 2010). Political party identification affects the likelihood of participation: each additional point to the right on the political party identification scale decreases the probability of participating. Women in general tend to be more liberal than men, thus we would expect to see higher participation numbers among women, while at the same time the hurdles to joining one's first social movement are higher for women. But the higher the hurdle, the more commitment, and thereby the higher the likelihood to transition to also following social movements once that hurdle has been taken (McAdam 1992).

Biographical (un)availability

Female participation in social movements has been cited as resulting from women having more free time to dedicate to social causes. Recent scholarship suggests the opposite. A study on environmental activism in Canada speculates that women's invisibility in activism might in fact be due to their biographical *unavailability* due to family responsibilities and their double burden of outside work and family/childcare work (Tindall et al. 2003). Similarly in Japan, marriage and childrearing are understood to lead to female inactivity in social activism, especially when both partners are employed full-time, as women still do the majority of housework and thus suffer from the double burden (Maeda 2005). Men's engagement in social movements is unrelated to family status. Research therefore

remains divided on the question of how biographical (*un*)availability does or does not contribute to women's participation.

Strategic use of the mother role

The limited range of positive identities available to women is one of the reasons they actively employ their motherhood identity in their activism (Neuhouser 1998; Shriver et.al. 2013). This often strategically used recourse to the 'maternal frame' (Zemlinskaya, 2010) can be found in depth in literature on Japan in regards to the anti-nuclear movement, neighborhood associations, and political activities (Kimura, 2015; Holdgrün and Holthus 2015; Lenz, 2006; Leung, 2011; Tsuji, 2017; Takeda, 2006; Le Blanc 1999). Beyond Japan, the use of the motherhood identity is also commonly linked to involvement in environmental issues, anti-toxic waste activism (Brown and Ferguson, 1995; Hamilton, 1985; Krauss, 1993), and anti-nuclear issues (Culley and Angelique, 2003).

3. Data and methodology

The data used here comes from a web-based survey conducted in December 2017. In addition, the research team also conducted a smaller-scale mail-in survey for comparative reasons; that data, however, is not presented in this report. A survey agency was hired to conduct the web survey among its registrants who range between the ages of 20 and 79 and selected those who live in the greater Tokyo metropolitan area. As per the question on representativeness of the data, overall, those registered with web survey companies are in general not fully representative of the population in regard to age and education: they tend to be slightly younger and more educated than the general population. In other social indicators as well as social values, however, the survey company respondents have shown to reflect society at large.

The web-based survey was answered by a total of 77,084 respondents, with an almost equal number of responses by gender (40,887 men, 36,197 women). The questionnaire consists of 42 questions and 189 variables. Of these, all but four are quantitative questions and are analyzed here in this report. The analysis of the four qualitative questions is omitted here due to the richness and sheer number of responses. The survey questions can be organized into seven broad categories as listed in Table 1. The full questionnaire in English translation is appended to this survey report. In the following, the findings for each question are presented, organized within broad categories. The analysis presents descriptive statistics, as well as bivariate (cross tabulation) and multivariate statistical tests (ANOVA, t-tests of statistical significance). Gender is the main control variable.

4. FINDINGS

4.1. Socio-demographics

53 percent of the 77,084 web survey respondents identify as male, 47 percent as female. For details on the subsequent findings, see Table 2. Where not stated otherwise, questions were answered by all survey participants. Almost 40 percent of respondents reside in Tokyo (39.3%), followed by 26 percent in Kanagawa, 18.5 percent in Saitama and 16.1 percent in Chiba. The majority are long-time residents, as 92 percent responded that they were already residing in the Kanto area on March 11, 2011, the date of the triple disaster of earthquake, tsunami, and subsequent nuclear meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi powerplant.

Table 1: Question categories

Demographics	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Gender• Age• Residence• Marital status• Household size• Existence and age of children• Education• Household income• Social class• Employment
Politics: participation through voting, emotions and views on political issues and processes, political views	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Voting in past House of Representative election• Voting in past district level election• Voting in last gubernatorial election• General political party support• Emotions regarding parties, politicians, social movements, countries• Political views on distinct issues• Views on political processes
Personal values 3.11 related questions	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Personal values• Region of residence on March 11, 2011• Personal connection to Fukushima• Impact of the 3.11 triple disaster
Well-being / life satisfaction	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Life satisfaction• Emotional well-being• Social network
Media usage	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Information channels about politics• Frequency of SNS usage• Frequency of SNS usage on political issues
On social movements: knowledge of, feelings about,	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Knowledge about social movements• Activities participation (type and frequency)

and own mobilization and participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participation in demonstrations • Channels into demonstration participation • Reasons for participation in demonstrations • Feelings about the social movements post-3.11
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The survey participants are between the ages of 20 and 79, with the majority (29.9%) in their 40s. Only 8 percent are in their 20s and 3.2 percent in their 70s. The majority of respondents are married (63.5% of men, 59.7% of women). 18.8 percent live alone, while the majority (30.8%) live together with one other person. 6.5 percent of respondents live with 5 or more people together in one household. 55.5 percent of respondents have children. The age of the youngest child greatly varies, ranging from newborn to age 56. 19.5% of the children are between the age of 0 to 5, so not yet enrolled into elementary school, and 32.4 percent of respondents have children up to the age of 19.

On social class indicators, we find the respondents reflecting Japan's society at large, with significant gender differences in many aspects. The annual household income of the respondents varies from less than 1 million (2.1%) to 15 or more million (13.4%) yen annually. The majority (51.6%) have an income between 3 and less than 9 million yen. Income distribution is highly gendered, with men reporting significantly higher income than women. In addition, a higher percentage of women report not knowing their annual household income. In total, 40.2 percent of respondents identify as middle class, 32 percent as upper-middle.

As to education, the overall majority of respondents (54.0%) have a degree from a 4-year university or even a graduate degree. However, there are significant gender differences, as 66.2 percent of the men graduated from a 4-year university or attended graduate school, whereas only 40.2 percent among the women did so. On the other hand, 28.4 percent of women attended a 2-year college or technical school, in contrast to 8.8 percent of men. The same highly significant gender differences are also found in regard to employment, with 59 percent of men being regularly employed (women 27.5%), while 29 percent of women are in part-time or temporary employment (men 11.4%), and 31 percent of women are full-time housewives (versus 0.9% of men who stated to be house husbands).

Table 2: Characteristics of sampled population

Variable	Frequency (n)	Valid Percent (%)
Gender		
Men	40887	53.0%
Women	36197	47.0%
Age (20-79)		
20-29	6205	8.0%
30-39	16451	21.3%
40-49	23068	29.9%
50-59	16405	21.3%
60-69	12520	16.2%
70-79	2435	3.2%
Marital status		
Married	51184	66.4%
Not married	25900	33.6%
Having children		
Yes	42811	55.5%
No	34273	44.5%
Household size		
1	14476	18.8%
2	23759	30.8%
3	18903	24.5%
4	14976	19.4%
5	3756	4.9%
6	848	1.1%
7	228	0.3%
8	50	0.1%
9+	88	0.1%
Age youngest child (ages 0-56)		
0-5	5941	19.5%
6-19	9897	32.4%
20+	14663	48.1%
Social class awareness		
Upper	1484	1.9%
Upper-middle	24639	32.0%
Middle	30954	40.2%
Lower-middle	14743	19.1%
Lower	5264	6.8%
Residency		
Saitama	14289	18.5%
Chiba	12400	16.1%
Tokyo	30318	39.3%
Kanagawa	20077	26.0%
Residency on March 11, 2011		
Kanto area	70934	92.0%
Elsewhere	6150	8.0%
Income (yen)		
< 1 million	1652	2.1%
1 < 3 million	8079	10.5%
3 < 6 million	22532	29.2%
6 < 9 million	17283	22.4%
9 < 12 million	9663	12.5%
12 < 15 million	4251	5.5%
15 million or more	3283	4.3%
Don't know	10341	13.4%
Education		
Middle school	1468	1.9%
High school	20110	26.1%
2-year college / technical school	13889	18.0%
4-year university / graduate school	41617	54.0%

Gender differences are also found in the content of the work people engage in. These differences are most significant in regard to upper-level administration work, which is performed by 24.3 percent of men, but only by 2.6 percent of women. On the other hand, 44.5 percent of women are so-called office staff, whereas only 18.5 percent of the men are. Yet there are no gender differences for sales staff or those engaging in agricultural work. For more details on gendered employment patterns, see Table 3. Furthermore, we find significant differences in the size of the companies that men and women are employed in: Whereas larger percentages of men are either employed in the smallest size companies with 1 to 4 employees or in companies with employees over 100 employees or government offices, women to a higher degree work in small companies between 5 and 99 people. It should be noted that it is only large-size companies over 300 employees that are legally required to provide more work-life balance provisions for their employees and generally are considered more prestigious to work for.

Last but not least, 84.9 percent of women report to not hold any kind of leadership position in their workplace, compared to 45.3 percent of the male respondents. Along with fewer leadership positions, women are also on average less likely to be allowed to decide their own working hours compared to men (On the question “Can you decide your own working hours?”, women register a mean score of 2.56 and men 2.24, with 1 being able to decide, and 4 not being able to decide). Overall, these gendered patterns we observe here are part and parcel of Japan’s continuing gender gap within society, with no radical shift in sight. If anything, the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 is only worsening that situation.

Table 3: Employment-related questions

	Women	Men	TOTAL	
Q2: employment				***
regularly employed	27.5% (9942)	59.0% (24134)	44.2% (34076)	
part time/temp/contract work	29.0% (10504)	11.4% (4642)	19.6% (15146)	
self-employed	5.0% (1804)	9.3% (3814)	7.3% (5618)	
company manager	0.5% (171)	3.9% (1601)	2.3% (1772)	
student	1.6% (578)	0.8% (326)	1.2% (904)	
full-time housewife/-husband	31.0% (11236)	0.9% (374)	15.1% (11610)	
not working	5.4% (1962)	14.7% (5996)	10.3% (7958)	
TOTAL	<i>n</i> = 36197	<i>n</i> = 40887	<i>n</i> = 77084	
Q3: work content				***
specialized, artistic work	21.7% (4863)	26.4% (9020)	24.5% (13883)	
Upper level admin. work	2.6% (584)	24.3% (8320)	15.7% (8904)	
office staff	44.5% (9978)	18.5% (6341)	28.8% (16319)	
sales staff	10.9% (2436)	10.0% (3409)	10.3% (5845)	
service work	15.7% (3523)	7.1% (2412)	10.5% (5935)	
technical work	4.1% (928)	11.1% (3787)	8.3% (4715)	
security work	0.2% (43)	2.2% (753)	1.4% (796)	
agriculture work	0.3% (66)	0.4% (149)	0.4% (215)	
TOTAL	<i>n</i> = 22421	<i>n</i> = 34191	<i>n</i> = 56612	
Q4: size workplace				***
1 to 4 people	11.3% (2527)	13.5% (4600)	12.6% (7127)	
5 to 29 people	17.3% (3879)	11.9% (4073)	14.0% (7952)	
30 to 99 people	14.0% (3150)	11.9% (4063)	12.7% (7213)	
100 to 999 people	26.1% (5855)	25.3% (8650)	25.6% (14505)	
1000 + people	28.2% (6329)	32.8% (11225)	31.0% (17554)	
public employee	3.0% (681)	4.6% (1580)	4.0% (2261)	
TOTAL	<i>n</i> = 22421	<i>n</i> = 34191	<i>n</i> = 56612	
Q6: position in workplace				***
manager	3.1% (705)	11.3% (3847)	8.0% (4552)	
<i>bucho</i>	0.9% (193)	9.0% (3073)	5.8% (3266)	
<i>kacho</i>	2.2% (484)	15.1% (5151)	10.0% (5635)	
<i>kakaricho</i>	4.1% (923)	12.2% (4160)	9.0% (5083)	
foreman	2.5% (551)	4.8% (1654)	3.9% (2205)	
no position	84.9% (19028)	45.3% (15501)	61.0% (34529)	
other	2.4% (537)	2.4% (805)	2.4% (1342)	
TOTAL	<i>n</i> = 22421	<i>n</i> = 34191	<i>n</i> = 56612	
FOR THOSE AGE 60-79:				
Q8: main work at age 50-59				***
specialized, artistic work	16.1% (697)	20.8% (2203)	19.4% (2900)	
administrative work	4.7% (205)	50.9% (5407)	37.5% (5612)	
office staff	25.7% (1115)	8.9% (949)	13.8% (2064)	
sales staff	7.6% (329)	5.1% (546)	5.9% (875)	
service work	8.5% (370)	2.7% (290)	4.4% (660)	
technical work	2.6% (111)	6.5% (691)	5.4% (802)	
security work	0.1% (6)	2.1% (226)	1.6% (232)	
agriculture work	0.0% (2)	0.2% (25)	0.2% (27)	
I didn't work	34.7% (1506)	2.6% (277)	11.9% (1783)	
TOTAL	<i>n</i> = 4341	<i>n</i> = 10614	<i>n</i> = 14955	

4.2. Politics: Voting and convictions

Not only do Japanese men and women differ significantly in several of the main socio-economic indicators, as shown above, but also their political views and voting behavior are highly gendered. Table 4 presents the findings from several questions within the survey, which ask for voting behavior for several of the past elections. The main findings remain similar, which is that about 10 percent or more men than women voted for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the ruling party. For example, in the 2017 House of Representatives election, 33.0% of the men but only 21.9% of the women voted for the LDP. In the question of overall preferred party, the gender gap was even higher, with a 12.2 percentage point difference (29.1% of men voting LDP, and only 16.9% of women). The second pattern in voting behavior is women answering significantly more frequently that they either “did not go to vote at all”, that they “forgot”, or that they “did not want to answer” the question. In addition, a much higher percentage of women than men report not to like *any* political party (69.2% of women, 50.4% of men). This corroborates other studies which have found that Japanese women’s attitudes toward politics overall is rather negative. Socialization at home and the lack of political education in the Japanese school system play crucial parts in explaining this.

Table 4: Political views: Voting

	Women	Men	TOTAL	
2017 House of Repr. Vote (Q18)				***
LDP	21.9% (7941)	33.0% (13489)	27.8% (21430)	
Rikken minshutō	11.6% (4207)	15.5% (6346)	13.7% (10553)	
Kibō no tō	8.0% (2886)	9.6% (3930)	8.8% (6816)	
Kōmeitō	2.6% (946)	2.1% (843)	2.3% (1789)	
Kyōsantō	4.5% (1624)	5.1% (2102)	4.8% (3726)	
Nippon Ishin no kai	1.2% (425)	1.7% (683)	1.4% (1108)	
Shamintō	0.4% (144)	0.3% (131)	0.4% (275)	
independent	1.2% (421)	1.4% (555)	1.3% (976)	
I left the ballot blank	1.7% (618)	2.1% (858)	1.9% (1476)	
I did not go to vote	28.5% (10319)	18.3% (7483)	23.1% (17802)	
I forgot/don't want to answer	18.4% (6666)	10.9% (4467)	14.4% (11133)	
TOTAL	n = 36197	n = 40887	n = 77084	
2017 District level vote (Q19)				***
LDP	26.5% (6865)	35.1% (11721)	31.4% (18586)	
Rikken minshutō	17.9% (4643)	22.6% (7555)	20.6% (12198)	
Kibō no tō	10.5% (2714)	10.4% (3468)	10.4% (6182)	
Kōmeitō	4.8% (1246)	4.0% (1352)	4.4% (2598)	
Kyōsantō	6.7% (1737)	6.6% (2190)	6.6% (3927)	
Nippon ish in no kai	2.6% (672)	4.2% (1405)	3.5% (2077)	
Shamintō	0.7% (169)	0.6% (184)	0.6% (353)	
Nihon no kokoro	0.2% (63)	0.3% (100)	0.3% (163)	
other	0.5% (125)	0.6% (187)	0.5% (312)	

I left ballot blank	2.6% (683)	2.2% (745)	2.4% (1428)
I don't remember/ want to answer	26.9% (6961)	13.5% (4497)	19.3% (11458)
TOTAL	<i>n</i> = 25878	<i>n</i> = 33404	<i>n</i> = 59282

2016 Gubernatorial vote (Q20)

Koike Yuriko	35.4% (5303)	35.9% (5505)	35.6% (10808)
Masuda Hiroya	6.0% (900)	10.0% (1532)	8.0% (2432)
Torigoe Shuntaro	5.2% (786)	9.0% (1383)	7.2% (2169)
Uesugi Takashi	1.1% (164)	1.7% (259)	1.4% (423)
Sakurai Makoto	0.7% (111)	1.5% (236)	1.1% (347)
Mac Akasaka	0.5% (80)	0.8% (121)	0.7% (201)
other	2.1% (322)	2.6% (398)	2.4% (720)
I returned a blank ballot	1.9% (289)	3.2% (492)	2.6% (781)
I did not go to vote	21.5% (3223)	17.5% (2682)	19.5% (5905)
I don't remember/ want to answer	18.1% (2717)	12.8% (1967)	15.4% (4684)
I did not have voting rights/ not live in Tokyo	7.2% (1085)	5.0% (763)	6.1% (1848)
TOTAL	<i>n</i> = 14980	<i>n</i> = 15338	<i>n</i> = 30318


Overall preferred party (Q21)

LDP	16.9% (6115)	29.1% (11911)	23.4% (18026)
Rikken minshutō	4.9% (1772)	8.7% (3568)	6.9% (5340)
Kibō no tō	1.7% (616)	1.8% (726)	1.7% (1342)
Minshintō	0.5% (196)	1.2% (489)	0.9% (685)
Kōmeitō	2.4% (852)	2.1% (866)	2.2% (1718)
Nippon ishin no kai	0.9% (312)	1.9% (795)	1.4% (1107)
Kyōsantō	2.7% (966)	3.2% (1295)	2.9% (2261)
Shamintō	0.4% (134)	0.5% (188)	0.4% (322)
Jiyūtō liberal party	0.1% (51)	0.4% (150)	0.3% (201)
Nihon no kokoro	0.2% (60)	0.3% (117)	0.2% (177)
other	0.2% (90)	0.4% (164)	0.3% (254)
I don't like any political party	69.2% (25033)	50.4% (20618)	59.2% (45651)
TOTAL	<i>n</i> = 36197	<i>n</i> = 40887	<i>n</i> = 77084

Support for Governor Koike is on par for women and men in the gubernatorial vote in 2016 (see Table 4, Q20 above), despite the governor (see Figure 1) being significantly more popular with women voters than men. Figure 1 shows the mean scores for the feelings towards numerous issues: political parties, prominent politicians, social movements, and certain countries. Respondents were asked to rank their feelings on a Likert-scale from 1 (“I hate”) to 10 (“I like”). As in Table 4 above, feelings for the ruling party and the ruling prime minister are significantly more positive for male than female respondents. The same goes for anti-Korean and anti-Chinese sentiment, which also is stronger among men than women.

Figure 1: Feelings towards political parties, countries, etc. (Q22)


(Answer categories given on a ten point, Likert-like scale with 1 = “I hate” and 10 = “I like”)



Note: All items show statistically highly significant gender differences with $p = .000$ ***

Continuing this trend, male sympathy for the right-wing Anti-Korea/China movement is higher than that of the female respondents. However, women are more sympathetic towards both other social movements, but more so to the anti-nuclear than the anti-security law movement. A decrease in sympathy from the anti-nuclear to the anti-security movement can be observed for men as well (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Feelings on the anti-nuclear and anti-security law movements (means comparison)



Question 23 (see Table 5) continues to ask about similar sentiments regarding highly politicized issues. Here, the question is asked if respondents agree or are against seven given issues. Answers range from 1 (agree) to 5 (against), and 6 (“I do not know”). For determining mean scores, the last category 6 was excluded. The sum of the findings is that once again, all items show statistically highly significant gender differences. Men tend to be more conservative, as a comparison of mean scores reveals higher agreeableness with official visits to Yasukuni, the constitutional reform of Article 9, and the official politics of the ruling prime minister, “Abenomics” among men. Regarding the issues related to the two social movements under investigation, women are more opposed than men to the security legislation, to the restarting of nuclear power, and are more in favor to abolish all nuclear power. This confirms that women are more strongly opposing the issues at hand and are more positive towards the social movements.

Table 5: Opinions on political issues (Q23)

(Answers range from 1 (agree) to 5 (against), and 6 (“I do not know”))

	Women		Men	
	M	SD	M	SD
Official visits to Yasukuni	2.87	1.104	2.83	1.352
Article 9 reform	3.33	1.160	2.96	1.393
SDF Security legislation	3.18	1.093	2.84	1.343
Restart nuclear power plants	3.57	1.111	3.17	1.376
Abolish all nuclear power	2.94	1.099	3.30	1.340
Japan-Korea Consensus on Comfort women problem	2.98	1.044	2.68	1.279
Abenomics	3.18	1.004	3.02	1.202

$n = 36197$ (women), 40887 (men)

Note: All items show statistically highly significant gender differences with $p = .000$ ***

Table 6 lists the findings from Question 24, which further asks about political convictions and the degree of agreeing (1) to disagreeing (5) with a total of 11 statements. Also here we find highly significant gender differences for all items. Men on average identify more as conservative, women more as politically left. And women's responses show them as having more pessimistic views on politics, as seeing themselves as more powerless than men, and as wishing for a higher degree of involvement of normal citizens in important policy decisions. Women feel more powerless about the ability to influence politics and, even more so, do not see the opinions and hopes of the people reflected in politics. This feeling of powerlessness increases linearly with the decline in education, meaning it is lowest among those with a 4-year university or a graduate school degree, and highest among those with only middle school education.

Furthermore, a larger percentage of women than men agree with the statements "Large-scale demonstrations have no power to influence politics", and "Demonstrations are scary". If we look at differences by age, we see the gender differences remaining though declining, but drastic differences can be found between the age cohorts: Young women and men find demonstrations the scariest. The scariness sees a linear decline with age, meaning the oldest age group, those age 70 to 79, is least likely to agree with the statement that demonstrations are scary (see Figure 2). Overall, this demonstrates a dire and negative view on politics among the female respondents in comparison to the men in the survey.

Table 6: Political convictions (Q24)

(The statements were presented using a five point, Likert-like scale, with 1 = "agree" and 5 = "disagree")


	Women		Men	
	M	SD	M	SD
Citizen like me have no power to influence politics	2.42	1.114	2.69	1.185
The opinions and hopes of the people are not reflected in politics at all	2.12	.954	2.38	1.069
Pretty much all politicians only think about their own advancement	2.01	.943	2.15	1.019
Most people vote, so it makes no difference if I vote or not	3.32	1.202	3.58	1.197
Demonstrations are scary	2.53	1.049	2.87	1.100
Even large-scale demos have no power to influence politics	2.71	1.015	2.91	1.089
Important policies should be decided by referendum of the people	2.21	.936	2.48	1.093
Important policies should be decided on as much as possible by citizens	2.32	.915	2.48	1.029
Public opinion is often more important than the opinion of politicians and the elite	2.71	.891	2.93	.980
Conservative or liberal: I am conservative	2.83	.803	2.79	.987
Left or right: I am left	3.06	.762	3.27	.992

n = 36197 (women), 40887 (men)

Note: All items show statistically highly significant gender differences with $p = .000$ ***

Figure 3: Views on “demonstrations are scary” by age and gender

(Answer categories were presented using a five point, Likert-like scale, with 1 = “agree” and 5 = “disagree”)



4.3. Values

The findings of significant gender differences in regard to political values and attitudes are further buttressed by the answers to Question 25 (see Table 7). A comparison of means shows in eight of the nine statements significant differences of opinion. For example, the fact that men on average agree more to statements like “It is natural to teach about the flag and the national anthem in schools” supports our understanding of the more conservative mindsets of the male respondents. The largest gender gap in values can be found in the last three statements regarding family values: on the importance of children in a marriage, on the acceptability of homosexual relationships, and on the question on separate surnames in marriage (an issue debated for decades yet still not a possibility for Japanese). The data clearly shows men’s much more conservative family values in comparison to those of women.

Table 7: Personal values (Q25)

(The statements were presented using a five point, Likert-like scale, with 1 = “agree” and 5 = “disagree”)

	Women		Men		Sign.
	M	SD	M	SD	
We must always respect people of authority	3.27	.926	3.29	1.004	***
Those questioning traditions and customs will eventually have problems	3.22	.820	3.21	.908	.661

The best way to know what to do in this complex world is to trust leaders and experts	3.27	.842	3.42	.905	***
I am proud of being Japanese	2.30	.912	2.19	.971	***
It is natural to teach about the national flag and the national anthem in schools	2.55	.986	2.38	1.102	***
Post-war education needs to tell children even more about patriotism and citizens' responsibilities	2.86	.971	2.77	1.090	***
It is not important to have children even if one is married	2.26	1.045	2.81	1.135	***
Homosexual relationships are acceptable.	2.10	1.011	2.73	1.140	***
After marriage, separate surnames are okay	2.35	1.069	2.74	1.136	***

Question 26 (see Table 8) of the survey focuses on social values, the role of government in society, environmental protection, and social equality. What we see is in all but one statement a continuation of the previous gendered value system. Male respondents to a higher degree see the economy as more important than the environment, and environmental problems as solvable by science and technology. Women are, on average, more concerned about the environment, yet at the same time display more fatalistic views about the state of the environment, as women are more likely to believe that environmental problems cannot be solved.

Table 8: Social values (Q26)

(Answer categories given on a four point, Likert-like scale with, 1 = "closer to A" and 4 = "closer to B")

	Women		Men	
	M	SD	M	SD
A) Income should be more equal vs. B) larger income differences as incentives needed	2.38	.730	2.50	.800
A) Government should take more responsibility to ensure everyone's welfare vs. B) people should take more responsibility for themselves	2.35	.739	2.44	.778
A) Increase the number of foreigners living in Japan vs. B) decrease the number of foreigners	2.68	.736	2.63	.801
A) Japanese government spends too much money for foreigners living in Japan vs. B) has not spent enough money	2.18	.746	2.21	.803
A) Environmental problems can be solved with science and technology vs. B) cannot be solved	2.37	.686	2.26	.783
A) Japanese society worries too much about environmental problems vs. B) should worry more	2.96	.642	2.83	.739
A) Competition is the source of social vitality and diligence vs. B) Competition is harmful and brings out the worst in people.	2.27	.672	2.13	.712
A) Environmental protection is more important than economic advancement vs. B) economic growth is more important	2.31	.658	2.44	.725

n = 36197 (women), 40887 (men)

Note: All items show statistically highly significant gender differences with *p* = .000 ***

4.4. Personal affectedness through 3.11

The following questions are posed in order to understand if a higher degree of having been personally affected by the triple disaster of March 11, 2011 has led to greater sympathies for and higher participation rate in the anti-nuclear movement. Question 27 (see Table 2 above) asks where one lived at the time the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake occurred. In Question 28 (see Table 9) respondents are asked about their personal ties to Fukushima, the hardest hit area of the disaster. Respondents could check all applicable options. Overall, men are more personally tied to the area, most frequently due to having a relative or friend from the area.

Table 9: Personal ties to Fukushima

Q28	Women	Men	TOTAL
Either being from Fukushima pref. or having lived there	2.5% (905)	3.3% (1354)	2.9% (2259)
Has relative or friend from Fukushima pref.	17.2% (6229)	18.1% (7420)	17.7% (13649)
Has friends from Fukushima who live in the capital area	11.5% (4157)	13.5% (5510)	12.5% (9667)
Evacuees are/were neighbors or at workplace	3.4% (1239)	4.1% (1686)	3.8% (2925)
Not applicable	71.9% (26010)	69.6% (28439)	70.6% (54449)
TOTAL	<i>n</i> = 36197	<i>n</i> = 40887	<i>n</i> = 77084


n = 36197 (women), 40887 (men)

Note: All items show statistically highly significant gender differences with $p \leq .001$ ***

The evaluation of the personal, societal, political, and economical impact of the triple disaster post-Fukushima is addressed in Question Q29 (see Figure 4). Respondents could choose whether a statements “fits” or does not fit, on a scale from 1 to 4. The statement resulting in answers with the most significant gender differences is “I started to be careful about food and drinking water”. Women’s mean score is 2.39, men’s 2.64, or differently stated, 58.3 percent of women agreed or kind of agreed with that statement, whereas it was only 45.5 percent of men. Women in Japan are much more likely to be in charge of household grocery shopping and preparing meals, even more so when married and/or a parent. Thus women’s closer affinity to food preparation in daily life, by choice or not, seems to be contributing to the gendered concerns about radioactive contamination of food.

Figure 4: Impact of triple disaster on self and society

(Answer categories given on a four point, Likert-like scale with, 1 = “fits” and 4 = “does not fit”)




As motherhood, as stated above, is considered an important influencing factor for participation in social movements, let's look at parenthood as an indicator for worries about radiation contamination in post-3.11 Japan. If we filter out those that are parents, we see the gender gap mounting even further: 63.4 percent of mothers, but only 48.2 percent of fathers say they are concerned. Thus the parental role, and in particular the role of mother, is correlated with an even more elevated concern regarding radiation. Furthermore, when looking only at parents with children who were between the ages of 0 to 5 at the time of the March 11, 2011 events, the percentage of concerned parents rises even more for both mothers and fathers (66.4% of mothers, 52.4% of fathers) (see Figure 5).

This gives statistical evidence to suggestions by earlier qualitative studies that, because children are particularly vulnerable to radioactive contamination, parents are particularly worried. As it is a cultural norm that mothers are to be the protectors of their children and are the ones who should be providing for their children's food and nutrition, they would feel a particular obligation and sense of

duty to protect their children and therefore are also more likely to worry about the potential dangers coming from food contamination through radiation.

Figure 5: Impact of Fukushima accident: I started to be careful about food and drinking water



4.5. Well-being, life satisfaction, and social connectedness

Three questions in the survey focus on understanding the respondents' well-being and their social connectedness, an important element of life satisfaction. Question 13 asked on a scale of 1 to 5, from “always” to “never”, about the existence of certain negative feelings: the higher the score, the less prevalence of negative feelings. Consistent in all indicators, men have a higher mean score, indicating female respondents to exhibit more negative feelings: they reported to feeling more nervous, more restless, and more worthless than male respondents (see Table 10).

Table 10: Experience of negative feelings

(This was measured using a four point, Likert-like scale, with 1 = “always” and 5 = “never”)

Q13	Women		Men	
	M	SD	M	SD
feeling nervous	4.00	1.141	4.23	1.049
feeling desperate	4.30	1.042	4.42	.980
feeling restless	4.06	1.053	4.22	.989
feeling low	3.94	1.141	4.16	1.062
not feeling up to anything	4.07	1.093	4.22	1.025
feeling worthless	4.19	1.131	4.38	1.019

Note: All items show statistically highly significant gender differences with $p \leq .001$ ***

On the other hand, mean scores for life satisfaction show that the surveyed women are more satisfied with their lives than the men (Table 11). This confirms previous research on gender differences in well-being among the general public yet is at odds with the findings above.

Table 11: Overall life satisfaction by gender

(This was measured using a four point, Likert-like scale, with 1 = “satisfied” and 4 = “not satisfied”)

Q14	Women (M)	SD	Men (M)	SD	Sign
overall life satisfaction	2.24	.800	2.29	.813	*** .000

Question 15 (see Table 12) focuses on the social network of respondents, by asking “In the last year, who did you consult with about problems you had”, allowing for multiple answers. As expected from previous research on gendered social ties in Japan, women exhibit a larger social network than men. This is exemplified by more than half of the male respondents (53.2%) stating to have had no one to discuss problems with (26.7% among female respondents).

Table 12: Social network

Q15	Women	Men	TOTAL
Family, relatives	53.7% (19427)	32.4% (13242)	42.4% (32669)
Neighbors	4.3% (1555)	1.1% (469)	2.6% (2024)
Colleagues	19.3% (6994)	16.6% (6783)	17.9% (13777)
Friends	45.1% (16328)	16.8% (6874)	30.1% (23202)
Other	2.5% (903)	1.6% (641)	2.0% (1544)
No one	26.7% (9657)	53.2% (21772)	40.8% (31429)

Note: All items show statistically highly significant gender differences with $p \leq .001$ ***

4.6. Media usage for political information

The influence of social media, both for the facilitation of information (truthful or otherwise) as well as for its potential for the mobilization of people across the political spectrum, has shown to have grown exponentially in recent years in Japan and elsewhere. The events of March 11, 2011 were the the impetus for many Japanese to jump into the world of social media. For many, trust in social media eventually superseded trust in mainstream media such as NHK (Holdgruen and Holthus 2015).

Question 40 (see Table 13) asks how respondents gather information on political and social issues. For all different types of media, the gender differences for usage are statistically highly significant.

Whereas larger percentages of men consult radio, newspapers, books, or websites, women consume TV, reviews, blogs, and social media in greater numbers. Table 14 further confirms the higher intensity of social media usage among the female respondents. Yet among those that are active on social media, significantly more men engage in writing and disseminating their own content on social media than do women (see Table 15).

Table 13: Media consumption

(Answer categories for each type of media in the survey ranged from 1 = “use often” to 3 = “not using at all”. For the analysis, this was recoded into 1= “use” and 2= “not use”.)

Q40	Women	Men	TOTAL
TV (news)	91.5% (333116)	90.4% (36974)	90.9% (70090)
TV (variety shows)	79.4% (28726)	71.8% (29352)	75.3% (58078)
Radio	21.9% (7941)	36.2% (14818)	29.5% (22759)
Newspaper	44.6% (16157)	62.7% (25622)	54.2% (41779)
Books, magazines	39.0% (14118)	48.0% (19609)	43.8% (33727)
Reviews	45.3% (16390)	35.2% (14398)	39.9% (30788)
Internet news	89.3% (32325)	91.4% (37382)	90.4% (69707)
Internet blogs	58.3% (21119)	55.7% (22762)	56.9% (43881)
SNS, Twitter, Facebook, etc.	41.6% (15069)	35.3% (14418)	38.3% (29487)
HP, info from org. (e.g. newsletters)	14.8% (5371)	20.4% (8357)	17.8% (13728)

Note: All items show statistically highly significant gender differences with $p \leq .001$ ***

Table 14: Intensity of social media usage

(Answer categories ranged from 1 = pretty much daily to 3 = I do not use it. For the analysis, this was recoded into 0= “not use” and 1= “use (daily or sometimes)”)

Q41	Women	Men	TOTAL
Look at content by others	64.0% (23163)	55.4% (22664)	59.5% (45827)
Writing comments to other people's postings	30.5% (11037)	24.3% (9916)	27.2% (20953)
Sharing and disseminating postings by others	20.6% (7453)	17.5% (7171)	19.0% (14624)
Posting myself	31.2% (11296)	26.0% (10617)	28.4% (21913)

Note: All items show statistically highly significant gender differences with $p \leq .001$ ***

Table 15: Social media activities

(Answer categories ranged from 1 = “done often” to 3 = “I do not do it”. For the analysis, this was recoded into 0= “no” and 1= “yes”)

Q42	Women	Men	TOTAL
I have written about my opinion or thoughts on Twitter or social media	14.2% (5126)	16.9% (6898)	15.6% (12024)
I have disseminated my opinions and thoughts widely through Twitter or social media	10.1% (3654)	11.1% (4552)	10.6% (8206)
I wrote my opinions and thoughts as comments to newspaper articles or video sites	7.8% (2820)	12.5% (5106)	10.3% (7926)
I discussed a lot about my opinions with friends and acquaintances on internet and social media sites.	9.8% (3554)	12.0% (4924)	11.0% (8478)

Note: All items show statistically highly significant gender differences with $p \leq .001$ ***

4.7. Mobilization and participation in post-3.11 social movements

We come now to the core of the questions related to the engagement in post-3.11 social movements. Table 16 shows the findings from Question 12, which touches upon aspects of social engagement, asking about membership in diverse kinds of social groups. Respondents could identify themselves as members and state the degree of their engagement. We find that a significantly larger percentage of men are members in neighborhood associations, labor unions, shopping street associations, political groups or parties, and environmental, *machizukuri*, or 3.11 support groups. No significant gender differences are found for membership in hobby, religious, or volunteer groups. Coop (the consumer movement) and PTA (parent teacher association) are the only two groups where we find a significantly higher percentage of female members. These two groups are centered around the role of the housewife and mother, and membership affirms their “duties”.


Table 16: Social engagement

Q12		Women	Men	Total	Sign.
Neighborhood assoc. (<i>jichikai, chōnaikai</i>)	Member, active	7.1% (2565)	8.2% (3364)	7.7% (5929)	***
	Member	43.0% (15548)	49.6% (20275)	46.5% (35823)	
	Not a member	50.0% (18084)	42.2% (17248)	45.8% (35332)	
Labor union	Member, active	1.5% (542)	3.1% (1264)	2.3% (1806)	***
	Member	16.3% (5894)	20.9% (8530)	18.7% (14424)	
	Not a member	82.2% (29761)	76.0% (31093)	78.9% (60854)	
Shopping street association	Member, active	0.4% (134)	1.3% (550)	0.9% (684)	***
	Member	2.5% (890)	5.1% (2102)	3.9% (2992)	
	Not a member	97.2% (35173)	93.5% (38235)	95.2% (73408)	
Political party or group	Member, active	0.5% (167)	0.8% (322)	0.6% (489)	***
	Member	1.4% (496)	3.1% (1281)	2.3% (1777)	
	Not a member	98.2% (35534)	96.1% (39284)	97.1% (74818)	
Coop	Member, active	6.2% (2258)	3.4% (1385)	4.7% (3643)	***
	Member	17.8% (6426)	13.2% (5382)	15.3% (11808)	
	Not a member	76.0% (27513)	83.4% (34120)	80.0% (61633)	
PTA or parent group	Member, active	4.8% (1743)	1.9% (770)	3.3% (2513)	***
	Member	14.2% (5126)	12.0% (4923)	13.0% (10049)	
	Not a member	81.0% (29328)	86.1% (35194)	83.7% (64522)	
Hobby interest group	Member, active	9.3% (3352)	9.4% (3831)	9.3% (7183)	.453
	Member	9.8% (3552)	9.6% (3908)	9.7% (7460)	
	Not a member	80.9% (29293)	81.1% (33148)	81.0% (62441)	
Religion or belief group	Member, active	1.5% (543)	1.4% (568)	1.4% (1111)	.284
	Member	2.6% (934)	2.7% (1100)	2.6% (2034)	
	Not a member	95.9% (34720)	95.9% (39219)	95.9% (73939)	
Environmental group	Member, active	0.3% (122)	0.6% (225)	0.5% (347)	***
	Member	0.8% (297)	1.3% (535)	1.1% (832)	
	Not a member	98.8% (35778)	98.1% (40127)	98.5% (75905)	
Volunteer group	Member, active	2.0% (727)	2.0% (802)	2.0% (1529)	.453
	Member	2.9% (1052)	2.8% (1130)	2.8% (2182)	
	Not a member	95.1% (34418)	95.3% (38955)	95.2% (73373)	
Community development group (<i>machizukuri</i>)	Member, active	0.3% (120)	0.8% (310)	0.6% (430)	***
	Member	0.7% (257)	1.6% (647)	1.2% (904)	
	Not a member	99.0% (35820)	97.7% (39930)	98.3% (75750)	
3.11 support group	Member, active	0.2% (79)	0.3% (114)	0.3% (193)	***
	Member	0.5% (169)	0.8% (327)	0.6% (496)	
	Not a member	99.3% (35949)	98.9% (40446)	99.1% (76395)	

Note: *** p < .001.

Figure 6 gives insights into the awareness of people regarding the existence of the two post-3.11 social movements: the anti-nuclear energy movement and the anti-security legislation movement. For both, we see the majority of respondents state an awareness of the movements but no particular interest in them. The second largest group answered that they were a bit interested, with women reporting “some interest” in significantly larger percentages. But more men than women stated a clear interest.

Figure 6: Awareness of social movements post-3.11



With 24.9 percent of male and 19.5 percent of female respondents interested in the anti-nuclear energy movement (respectively 19.5% and 12.8% interested in the anti-security legislation movement), the question becomes to what degree the interest resulted in actual participation in these movements and, when so, which form of participation. Table 17 shows the – once again – highly gendered results. Overall, the number of those active in social movements in the population is quite small. Among those active, the share of men is larger across the diverse categories – except in regard to donating to causes. More women than men say they donated to causes before March 11, 2011 (23.3% vs. 20.8% of men).

Table 17: Participation in social movements

(multiple answers were possible)

Q31	Women	Men	Total	Sign.
before 3.11/1.signatures	11.6%	12.1%	11.9%	*
before 3.11/2.participating in meetings	1.3%	2.2%	1.8%	***
before 3.11/3.donating	23.3%	20.8%	22.0%	***
before 3.11/4.petition	1.2%	1.5%	1.4%	***
before 3.11/5.writing tweets or blogs	1.4%	1.7%	1.5%	***
before 3.11/6.not applicable	70.4%	71.8%	71.1%	***
regarding anti-nuclear movement/1.signatures	8.7%	8.2%	8.5%	*
regarding anti-nuclear movement/2.participating in meetings	1.1%	1.5%	1.3%	***
regarding anti-nuclear movement/3.donating	5.8%	5.6%	5.7%	
regarding anti-nuclear movement/4.petition	0.8%	1.0%	0.9%	**
regarding anti-nuclear movement/5.writing tweets or blogs	1.7%	2.4%	2.0%	***
regarding anti-nuclear movement/6.not applicable	85.5%	85.1%	85.3%	
regarding anti-security movement/1.signatures	4.8%	5.7%	5.3%	***
regarding anti-security movement/2.participating in meetings	0.9%	1.4%	1.1%	***
regarding anti-security movement/3.donating	2.0%	2.5%	2.2%	***
regarding anti-security movement/4.petition	0.7%	1.0%	0.8%	***
regarding anti-security movement/5.writing tweets or blogs	1.2%	2.1%	1.7%	***
regarding anti-security movement/6.not applicable	92.2%	89.7%	90.9%	***
other/1.signatures	5.5%	6.4%	6.0%	***
other/2.participating in meetings	0.9%	1.5%	1.2%	***
other/3.donating	14.0%	12.3%	13.1%	***
other/4.petition	0.9%	1.2%	1.1%	***
other/5.writing tweets or blogs	1.4%	2.0%	1.7%	***
other/6.not applicable	81.5%	81.7%	81.6%	

Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Another form of social movement participation is public demonstrations. Only 1.9 percent of respondents reported having ever participated in a demonstration. 2.8 percent of respondents had participated in a demonstration before 3.11: 1.5 percent in an anti-nuclear demonstration, 1.4 in an anti-security legislation demonstration, and 1.9 percent in any other type of demonstration. The gender gap in demonstration participation is clear, and women consistently participate less than men (see Table 18).


Table 18: Frequency of participation in social movement demonstrations

Q32		Women	Men	Total	Sign.
Demo participation before 3.11	Have not participated	98.3%	96.0%	97.1%	***
	1 time	0.8%	1.4%	1.1%	
	2 to 5 times	0.6%	1.5%	1.0%	
	6 or more times	0.3%	1.2%	0.7%	
Anti-nuclear demo participation	Have not participated	98.9%	98.2%	98.5%	***
	1 time	0.6%	0.9%	0.8%	
	2 to 5 times	0.4%	0.7%	0.5%	
	6 or more times	0.1%	0.3%	0.2%	
Anti-security legislation demo part.	Have not participated	99.1%	98.2%	98.6%	***
	1 time	0.5%	0.9%	0.7%	
	2 to 5 times	0.3%	0.6%	0.5%	
	6 or more times	0.1%	0.3%	0.2%	
Other demo participation	Have not participated	98.8%	97.5%	98.1%	***
	1 time	0.7%	1.1%	0.9%	
	2 to 5 times	0.4%	0.9%	0.7%	
	6 or more times	0.2%	0.4%	0.3%	

Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Recoding the different activities for the anti-nuclear and the anti-security legislation movements and then looking at the participation by gender and age, we find that age matters significantly (see Figure 7). Whereas among the youngest cohort – those age 20 to 29 years – more men than women are active in either movement, in the oldest cohort– those ages 70 to 79 – more women than men participate. These could very well be people that had at one point been active in the earlier movements in the 1960s. The survey questionnaire does not allow for more than speculation at this point.

Figure 7: Movement participation (total of all types of participation) by gender and age



Recruitment into both the anti-nuclear movement as well as the anti-security movement functions differently for men and women. Women are more likely to be brought into the movements through personal connections: either invited or told about it by family or friends. Men, on the other hand, more frequently learned about it from the internet, social media, the newspaper, or TV (see Figure 8). This concurs with what we know from social movements generally. The gendered mobilization to the post-3.11 movements is therefore not unique to these movements. Also, men overwhelmingly make an individual choice to participate or not. Women join more often through their pre-existing social group (see Figure 9).

Figure 8: Trigger for participation in demonstrations





Figure 9: Social network for demonstration attendance



The type of participation in demonstrations does not exhibit statistically significant gender differences and is quite similar between both the anti-nuclear and the anti-security legislation demonstrations. Demonstrating in front of the parliament or the prime minister's residence, or the participation in regional movement demonstrations (*chiiki no undo*) were the most frequent activities for both men and women (see Table 19). Women more often ask family or friends to come along.


Table 19: Type of participation in demonstrations

Q37	Women	Men	Total	Sign.
Anti-nuclear demonstration participation				
at parliament or prime minister residence	47.9%	52.1%	50.6%	
regional movements	45.2%	40.1%	41.9%	
helping out at social movements or demos	15.6%	20.5%	18.8%	*
I invited family and friends to participate too	15.9%	13.2%	14.2%	
I provided info or disseminated info	19.1%	21.3%	20.5%	
other	2.0%	1.5%	1.6%	
Anti-security demonstration participation				
at parliament or prime minister residence	52.5%	56.1%	54.9%	
regional movements	41.9%	38.4%	39.5%	
helping out at social movements or demos	12.6%	16.4%	15.2%	
I invited family and friends to participate too	15.0%	14.4%	14.6%	
provided info or disseminated info	16.1%	18.0%	17.4%	
other	0.9%	1.8%	1.5%	

Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Towards the end of our questionnaire, we asked those respondents who in some form or another participated in either of the two movements if and how their lives had changed. Even though there are no statistically significant gender differences in the answers to these questions, more women state that participation affected them, such as “I began to value demonstrations and meetings more highly” and “My thoughts about nuclear power have changed”. Interestingly, there were only two statements that men saw as fitting their experience more than woman did: “I managed to find new friends” and “My way of living has changed”, pointing to the reality that participating actually helps men find a social network (see Figure 10). Women, on the other hand, were brought into the movements in larger numbers through friends and acquaintances, so they already knew people within. Men were more often making individual decisions to join, without knowing someone in the movements, and thus participation overall is more beneficial to enlarging the social networks of participating men.

Figure 10: Effects of social movement participation



5. Concluding remarks

This report represents a first overview of the rich data accumulated through a 2017 survey on the sympathy and motivation for and participation in two prominent social movements in post-3.11 Japan. The findings from the survey are presented separately for male and female respondents. We find significant differences in many aspects of Japanese men's and women's lives. These span not only demographics, political views, and values, but also the respondents' sympathy for and participation in the anti-nuclear and the anti-security legislation movements.

Women have more liberal political views, lead in the concern about radiation, in the support for abolishment of nuclear power, and the opposition to the security law legislation, and are more sympathetic to the respective social movements. Yet, at the same time, they exhibit more concern about the efficacy of movement participation. This could be seen as one of the reasons why the concern and sympathy for the movements and their issues do not translate into action when we look at patterns of mobilization and participation. This significant hurdle between concern/sympathy and actual participation can be found both for men and women; however, it is particularly pronounced for

women. Overall, only a small minority of men and women participate in these or other social movements in any capacity. Yet within this minority, the participation in either the anti-nuclear or the anti-security movements in post-3.11 Japan also sees highly gendered patterns. Furthermore, women are mobilized differently than men, as they are more likely to attend a rally with family, friends, or acquaintances, whereas men are much more likely to attend a demonstration alone.

It is the first time that such rich and large-scale data has been accumulated to give statistical proof and support to many of the existing studies, which until now had been primarily qualitative in nature. This study therefore confirms, substantiates, and expands our prior knowledge about the participation of Japanese in two important social movements in post-3.11 Japan, rather than contradicting or questioning the existing findings. This survey report presents the breadth of information from the survey. The edited volume by Higuchi and Matsutani (2020) and further studies in process by the research team members will be able to go deeper with their statistical analyses. The survey report briefly touched upon age as an important variable affecting female and male participation in social movements differently. The same goes for social class. Therefore, movement participation should ideally always be considered in terms of gender, class, and age.

Even though this survey report did not venture much into analyses to explain the apparent gender gaps, what has nonetheless become clear is that Japan maintains gendered political opportunity structures and, as the country is lacking in the formal political participation of women, Japanese women are not socialized to have a strong voice in public. As long as Japanese society remains this gendered at its core, we should not be surprised that confrontational politics, such as demonstrations, also continue to lack the equal participation of women.

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Appendix

Questionnaire for web-based survey *Shimin no seiji sanku* (Citizen's political participation)

Q1

Highest educational degree

- 1 Middle school
- 2 High school
- 3 2-year college/ technical school
- 4 4-year university/ graduate school

Q2

Type of current employment

- 1 Regularly employed
- 2 Part time, temp, work from home, contract work
- 3 self-employed
- 4 company manager
- 5 student
- 6 full-time housewife/househusband
- 7 not working

Q3

Content of current employment

- 1 professional or technical work
- 2 manager or senior administrator
- 3 clerical
- 4 sales staff
- 5 service work
- 6 manual work
- 7 security work
- 8 agriculture

Q4

How large is your workplace, in number of employees?

- 1 1-4
- 2 5-29
- 3 30-99
- 4 100-999
- 5 1000+
- 6 public employee

Q5

Describe your workplace and work content

- 1 workplace
- 2 work content

Q6

Position in company

- 1 Manager

- 2 Bucho
- 3 Kacho
- 4 Kakaricho
- 5 Foreman (Vorarbeiter, Baustellenchef)
- 6 No position
- 7 Other

Explain. _____

Q7

Can you decide your own working hours (overtime, start, end time,...)

- 1 I can decide
- 2 To some extent I can decide
- 3 Cannot really decide
- 4 I cannot decide

Q8

ONLY FOR THOSE 60 TO 79 YEARS OF AGE

In your 50s, what work did you hold the longest?

- 1 professional or technical work
- 2 manager or senior administrator
- 3 clerical
- 4 sales staff
- 5 service work
- 6 manual work
- 7 security work
- 8 agriculture
- 9 I didn't work

Q9

Are you married?

- 1 married by law
- 2 common marriage
- 3 not currently married (divorced or widowed)
- 4 never married

Q10

Household size, including oneself

- 1 1 (oneself)
- 2 2
- 3 3
- 4 4
- 5 5
- 6 6
- 7 7
- 8 8
- 9 9

Q11

Do you have children?

- 1 yes
- 2 no

11_1 If yes Age oldest child _____
11_2 If yes Age youngest child _____

Q12

What is your relationship to the following groups?

Answer options 1. Member, actively participating 2. member 3. Not a member

- 1 *Jichikai, Chōnaikai*, Neighborhood group
- 2 Labor union
- 3 *Shōtenkai* group, group of colleagues
- 4 political party, politicians group
- 5 Coop consumer group
- 6 PTA or parent group
- 7 hobby, interest group
- 8 religion, or belief group
- 9 environmental group
- 10 volunteer group
- 11 *machizukuri* group
- 12 3.11 support group

Q13

During the last month, what was the frequency of the following things?

Answer options 1. Always, 2. Often, 3, Sometimes, 4. Rarely, 5 Never

- 1 feeling nervous
- 2 feeling desperate
- 3 feeling restless
- 4 feeling low, and nothing can brighten the spirit
- 5 not feeling up to anything
- 6 feeling worthless

Q14

How satisfied are you overall with your life?

- 1 Satisfied
- 2 more or less satisfied
- 3 more or less unsatisfied
- 4 not satisfied

Q15

In the last year, who did you consult with about problems you had?

(please check all that apply)

- 1 family, relatives
- 2 neighbors
- 3 colleagues
- 4 friends
- 5 other

Explain _____

- 6 no one

Q16

In which social class do you see yourself?

- 1 upper
- 2 upper-middle
- 3 middle

- 4 lower-middle
- 5 lower

Q17

Household income last year

- 1 < 1 million
- 2 1 < 3 million
- 3 3 < 6 million
- 4 6 < 9 million
- 5 9 < 12 million
- 6 12 < 15 million
- 7 15 million and more
- 8 I don't know

Q18

Which party did you vote for in the last House of Representative elections (2017/10/22)?

- 1 LDP
- 2 Rikken minshu to Const. democratic party of Japan
- 3 Kibo no to Party of hope
- 4 Komeito Komeito
- 5 Kyosanto Communist Party
- 6 Nippon ishin no kai Japan Innovation party
- 7 Shaminto SDP
- 8 Independent
- 9 I left the ballot blank
- 10 I didn't go to vote
- 11 I forgot, I don't want to answer

Q19

In the last election, which party did you vote for on the district level?

- 1 LDP
- 2 Rikken minshuto Const. democratic party of Japan
- 3 Kibo no to Party of hope
- 4 Komeito Komeito
- 5 Kyosanto Communist Party
- 6 Nippon ishin no kai Japan Innovation party
- 7 Shaminto SDP
- 8 Nihon no kokoro Party for Japanese kokoro
- 9 A different party
- 10 I returned the vote blank
- 11 I forgot, I don't want to answer

Q20

In the last gubernatorial election (2016/7/31), who did you vote for?

- 1 Koike Yuriko
- 2 Masuda Hiroya
- 3 Torigoe Shuntaro
- 4 Uesugi Takashi
- 5 Sakurai Makoto
- 6 Mac Akasaka
- 7 other
- 8 I returned white election sheet

- 9 I did not go to vote
- 10 I forgot
- 11 I was not allowed to vote, I lived outside of Tokyo

Q21

Not related to the election, which political party do you favor/support?

- 1 LDP LDP
- 2 Rikken minshuto Const. democratic party of Japan
- 3 Kibo no to Party of hope
- 4 Minshintō Democratic party
- 5 Komeito Komeito
- 6 Japan Restoration party
- 7 Kyosanto Communist party
- 8 Shaminto SDP
- 9 Jiyuto Liberal party
- 10 Nippon no kokoro Party for Japanese kokoro
- 11 other
- 12 I don't like any political party

Q22

What are your feelings on the following parties, politicians, social movements, countries?

Answers on a scale from 1 = "I hate", to 10 = "I like"

- 1 LDP LDP
- 2 Rikken minshuto Const. democratic party of Japan
- 3 Kyosanto Communist party
- 4 Prime minister Shinzo Abe
- 5 Tokyo governor Yuriko Koike
- 6 Anti -nuclear movement
- 7 Anti China and Korea movement
- 8 Anti-security legislation movement
- 9 China
- 10 South Korea
- 11 USA

Q23

Are you for or against the following issues?

Answers: 1. Agree, 2. Kind of agree, 3. Neither nor 4. Kind of against, 5. Against, 6. I don't know

- 1 Official visits to Yasukuni shrine by the prime minister or ministers
- 2 Revision of article 9 of the constitution
- 3 Security legislation (for collective self defense)
- 4 restart the nuclear power plants
- 5 Stop all nuclear power plants
- 6 Japan-Korea consensus on the comfort women problem
- 7 Abenomics

Q24

How do you think about the following political opinions?

Answers: 1. I agree, 2. Somewhat agree, 3. Neither agree nor disagree, 4. Somewhat disagree, 5. disagree

- 1 People like me don't have any say about what government does
- 2 The opinions and hopes of the people are not reflected in politics at all
- 3 Pretty much all politicians only think about their own advancement
- 4 Most people vote, so it makes no difference if I vote or not

- 5 Demonstrations are scary
- 6 Even large-scale demonstrations have no power to influence politics
- 7 Important policies should be decided by referendum of the people
- 8 Important policies should be decided on as much as possible by citizens
- 9 Public opinion is often more important than the opinion of politicians and the elite
- 10 I am politically conservative
- 11 I am politically left leaning

Q25

What do you think about the following opinions?

Answers: 1. I agree, 2. Somewhat agree, 3. Neither agree nor disagree, 4. Somewhat disagree, 5. disagree

- 1 We need to respect people with authority
- 2 Those that question traditions and norms will cause problems
- 3 The best way to know what to do in this complex world is to trust in teachers and experts.
- 4 I am proud to be Japanese.
- 5 It is natural that national flags and hymns are taught in schools.
- 6 We have to evaluate post-war education in order to teach children more about patriotism and citizens' duties
- 7 It is not necessary to have children, even if someone is married.
- 8 Homosexual relationships are acceptable.
- 9 Married couples do not need the same last name— it is okay to have separate last names.

Q26

To which statement are you closer in supporting?

1. closer to A, 2. More or less closer to A, 3. More or less closer to B, 4. Closer to B.

- 1A Incomes should be made more equal.
- 1B We need larger income differences as incentives.
- 2A Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone in society is provided for.
- 2B People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves.
- 3A It is better to increase the number of foreigners living in Japan.
- 3B It is better to decrease the number of foreigners living in Japan.
- 4A The Japanese government has spent too much money for foreigners living in Japan.
- 4B The Japanese government has not spent enough money for foreigners living in Japan.
- 5A Environmental problems can be solved with science and technology.
- 5B Environmental problems cannot be solved with science and technology.
- 6A Japanese society worries too much about the future of the environment.
- 6B Japanese society should worry more about the future of the environment.
- 7A Competition is a source of social vitality and diligence.
- 7B Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people.
- 8A Protecting the environment is more important than economic growth.
- 8B Economic growth is more important than protecting the environment.

Q27

Where did you live when the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake occurred?

- 1 Lived in the capital (Tokyo, Saitama, Chiba, Kanagawa prefectures)
- 2 I lived somewhere else

Q28

In regard to Fukushima, which applies to you personally? Please check all that apply

- 1 I come from Fukushima prefecture or have lived there myself
- 2 I have a relative or friend in Fukushima prefecture
- 3 I have friends who live here in the metropolitan area but who originally come from Fukushima prefecture
- 4 In my neighborhood or at my workplace are/were evacuees from Fukushima prefecture
- 5 This does not apply to me.

Q29

How do you evaluate the impact of the earthquake disaster in eastern Japan and the accident of the Fukushima nuclear power plant on Japanese society? Please select those that are closest to your opinion. 1.

Fits 2. It kind of fits, 3. Kind of does not fit, 4. Does not fit

- 1 It has become economically difficult
- 2 Difficulties in everyday life
- 3 I started to be careful about food and drinking water
- 4 It had an effect on health
- 5 It strengthened my distrust of politics
- 6 I started to worry about Japan's future
- 7 My outlook on life has changed
- 8 An irreparable environmental destruction has occurred
- 9 The economy has turned bad
- 10 Politics has turned in a bad direction

Q30

Since 3.11, did you know about the following opposing social movements?

Answer 1: I didn't know, 2: I knew but was not particularly interested, 3. I was a bit interested, 4. I was interested

- 1 Anti-nuclear movement
- 2 Anti-security legislation movement

Q31

Since 3.11, did you do any of the following in regard to social movements? 1=yes

31.1 Before 3.11

- 1 Signatures
- 2 Participating in meetings
- 3 Donating
- 4 Petitioning
- 5 Writing tweets and blogs
- 6 Not applicable

31.2 Regarding the anti-nuclear movement

- 1 Signatures
- 2 Participating in meetings
- 3 Donating
- 4 Petitioning
- 5 Writing tweets and blogs
- 6 Not applicable

31.3. Regarding the anti-security legislation movement

- 1 Signatures

- 2 Participating in meetings
- 3 Donating
- 4 Petitioning
- 5 Writing tweets and blogs
- 6 Not applicable

31.4. other issues

- 1 Signatures
- 2 Participating in meetings
- 3 Donating
- 4 Petitioning
- 5 Writing tweets and blogs
- 6 Not applicable

Q32

How often have you participated in any of the following demonstrations?

1= have not participated, 2= 1 time, 3= 2 to 5 times, 4= 6 or more times

- 1 Any kind of demo participation before 3.11
- 2 Post 3.11: Anti-nuclear energy demo participation
- 3 Post 3.11: Anti-security legislation demo participation
- 4 Post 3.11: Participation in other kinds of demonstrations

Q33_1

What was the trigger to participate in anti-nuclear power demonstrations? 1= yes

- 1 Invited by family, friends
- 2 Heard about it from family or friends
- 3 Received info from the internet
- 4 Received info through social media
- 5 Received info through newspapers
- 6 Received info through TV
- 7 Received info through flyers on the street
- 8 Other

Q33_2

What was the trigger to participate in anti-security legislation demonstrations? 1= yes

- 1 Invited by family, friends
- 2 Heard about it from family or friends
- 3 Received info from the internet
- 4 Received info through social media
- 5 Received info through newspapers
- 6 Received info through TV
- 7 Received info through flyers on the street
- 8 Other

Q34

Why did you participate in anti-nuclear power demos and how did you participate? Please describe.

Open ended question

Q35

Why did you participate in anti-security legislation demos and how did you participate? Please describe.

Open ended question

Q36

Since 3.11, the first time you went to a demo, who did you go with? Please check all that apply.

- 1 attending demo alone
- 2 attending demo with family or partner
- 3 attending demo with friends or acquaintances
- 4 attending demo with the members of groups that I joined/that I am a member of

Q37_1

Regarding your participation in anti-nuclear demonstrations, please check all that fit. 1=yes

- 1 I participated in a demonstration at parliament or at the prime minister's residence
- 2 I participated in regional movements
- 3 I helped out a social movement or demonstrations
- 4 I invited family and friends to participate too
- 5 I provided information or disseminated information
- 6 Other

Q37_2

Regarding your participation in anti-security legislation demonstrations, please check all that fit. 1=yes

- 1 I participated in a demonstration at parliament or at the prime minister's residence
- 2 I participated in regional movements
- 3 I helped out a social movement or demonstrations
- 4 I invited family and friends to participate too
- 5 I provided information or disseminated information
- 6 Other

Q38

For those who participated in either the anti-nuclear or the anti-security legislation movement or demonstrations, in which way have you changed? Please answer each question accordingly. Answers: 1.

Fits 2. It kind of fits 3. Kind of does not fit 4. Doesn't fit

- 1 My thoughts about politics and society have changed
- 2 I began to value demonstrations and meetings more highly
- 3 My opinion on politicians and political parties has changed
- 4 My thoughts about nuclear power have changed
- 5 My thoughts about the security legislation has changed
- 6 More than before, I began to understand the limits of demonstrations
- 7 I managed to find new friends
- 8 A gap started to develop with my old acquaintances
- 9 My way of living has changed
- 10 I thought Japan will not be given up on

Q39

What is your opinion or what are your feelings about the social movements since 3.11?

Open ended question

Q40

How do you inform yourself about political and social problems?

Answers: 1. Use often, 2. Use sometimes, 3. Not using at all

- 1 TV (news)
- 2 TV (variety shows)
- 3 Radio
- 4 Newspaper
- 5 Books, magazines
- 6 reviews
- 7 Internet news

- 8 Internet blogs
- 9 SNS, Twitter, Facebook etc.
- 10 HP and information from organizations (e.g. newsletters)

Q41

How often have you been doing the following with SNS (services like Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, with which you share information, but not LINE). Please select the relevant ones

Answers: 1. Pretty much daily, 2. Sometimes, 3. Don't do.

- 1 Look at content from others
- 2 Writing comments to the postings by others
- 3 Sharing and disseminating postings of others
- 4 Posting myself

Q42

In the last year, about political and social problems, did you do any of the following with Twitter or other social media?

Answers: 1. Done often, 2. I have done, 3. I have not done

- 1 I have written about my opinion or thoughts on Twitter or social media
- 2 I have disseminated my opinions and thoughts widely through Twitter or social media
- 3 I wrote my opinions and thoughts as comments to newspaper articles or video sites
- 4 I discussed a lot about my opinions with friends and acquaintances on the internet and social media.