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Harald Fuess (ed.)

The Japanese Empire in East Asia and Its Postwar Legacy

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Title: Shanghai Landing of the Naval Forces

Explanation: When the Japanese naval forces landed in Shanghai, they selected the Japanese elementary school as their headquarter. The sign at the gate warns,

“Beware of stonethrowing by the Chinese.”

Shanghai, June 1925 (Courtesy of Asahi Shinbun)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

Preface

Irmela Hijiya-Kirschnereit 9

Overview

Harald Fuess 11

Opening Remarks: Empire in the Age of Nationalism

Prasenjit Duara 15

II. ASIA IN JAPAN: THE DOMESTIC FOUNDATIONS OF JAPANESE IMPERIALISM

Japan's Asia in the Politics of a New World Order, 1914–19

Fred Dickinson 27

The Dream of One Asia: Ōkawa Shūmei and Japanese Pan-Asianism

Christopher W. A. Szpilman 49

A Comparative Study of the Tōyō Kyōkai and the Nan'yō Kyōkai

Hyung Gu Lynn 65

Technocratic Visions of Empire: Technology Bureaucrats and the "New Order for Science-Technology"

Janis Mimura 97

III. IMPERIALISM AT WORK: THE JAPANESE EMPIRE IN ASIA

Consumption as Resistance: The National Products Movement and Anti-Japanese Boycotts in Modern China

Karl G. Gertz 119

Economic Expansionism and the Military: With Special Reference to the Japanese Community in Shanghai in 1931 <i>Harumi GOTO-SHIBATA</i>	143
---	-----

The Taiwan Government-General and Prewar Japanese Economic Expansion in South China and Southeast Asia, 1900–1936 <i>Adam SCHNEIDER</i>	161
---	-----

IV. THE POSTWAR LEGACY OF THE JAPANESE EMPIRE

Resurrecting the Empire? Japanese Technicians in Postwar China, 1945–49 <i>Daqing YANG</i>	185
--	-----

In the Shadow of the Monolith: Yoshida Shigeru and Japan’s China Policy During the Early Cold War Years, 1949–54 <i>C.W. BRADDICK</i>	207
---	-----

Japanese Relations in Northeast Asia: China and Soviet Interference <i>Joachim GLAUBITZ</i>	233
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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS VOLUME	251
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I. INTRODUCTION

PREFACE

“Japan in Asia” is the title of a new research project launched by the German Institute for Japanese Studies (DIJ) in 1997. Even though questions of Japan’s relationship to the rest of Asia may at first glance appear to be timeless, they have taken on particular relevance since at least the beginning of the 1990s, where we observe in many spheres, in politics and economics as well as in culture and society in general, a new orientation in Japan towards Asia. Japanese attempts at redefining its relationship to what it perceives to be Asia, that is, East and Southeast Asia, are part and parcel of a global re-mapping since the end of the Cold War, and this process, which is still in the making and which also implies a re-definition of Japan’s relationship with “the West” will definitely affect the rest of the world as well.

At the DIJ with its multi-disciplinary set-up and its agenda of conducting research on modern Japan in the fields of the humanities, the social sciences, and economics, we try to tackle some of the numerous possible questions within this framework which we find are of particular relevance from our European perspective. The majority of our twelve research associates is presently involved in one way or another in this project. Needless to say, though, this research profits greatly from cooperation with other research institutions and specialists in the field. “Japan in Asia” is undoubtedly a much-studied topic already, and what is more, at the DIJ with its Japan-directed research, there is a constant need of tapping research on other Asian areas in order to place our findings in an adequate perspective. In its tenth year since its foundation in 1988, the anniversary edition of the DIJ yearbook *Japanstudien* is devoted to “Japan’s New Role in Asia.” By organizing workshops and conferences, as well as inviting specialists to contribute to our publications, we not only hope to create an environment conducive to better insight into our topic, but also to contribute to networking in the scholarly community beyond the borders of academic tradition and epistemological domains. The theme of “Japan in Asia” seems particularly suited to such an approach.

In the sphere of cultural studies, our research presently focuses on tendencies among Japanese intellectuals toward claiming a particular “Asian spirituality.” Analyses of literary texts, essays, and writings by scholars with a wide readership reveal that claim, attached to such keywords as animism, shamanism, and *reisei* (spirituality), to be rooted in an attempt to formulate a counter-culture against what has been experienced as a he-

gemony of “Western” thinking throughout much of Japan’s modern history.

Another focus of concern within the framework of “Japan in Asia” is Japan’s role in the process of integration in Asia. Political and economic aspects are so closely interwoven that an interdisciplinary approach appears to be the only feasible option, and is the one chosen by the DIJ. Whether it is the analysis of the domestic debate concerning Japan’s future role in Asia, or the influence of business and interest groups on Japanese foreign-policy decision making, or the economic relations between Japan and Asia in general and current changes regarding Japanese production networks within the Asian region in particular—all these findings have to be scrutinized under a grid of interrelated paradigms, one of these being the history of Japanese-Asian relations in the twentieth century. And this is where the present volume’s topic comes to the fore, because it provides an indispensable backdrop to our current study of “Japan in Asia.”

“The Japanese Empire in East Asia and its Postwar Legacy” is the title of a conference that was funded and organized by the DIJ in Tōkyō on 17 October 1997. Its purpose was to provide a historical background to the “Japan in Asia” project, especially in regard to the political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions of the interactions of Japan and the Japanese with Asia and Asians. The present volume includes most of the papers presented on this occasion.

The conference participants and authors come from different countries of Asia and Europe, and also the United States, the majority of them being in an early stage of their academic career, having recently completed or just finishing their doctoral dissertations. The present book could thus also be read as an indicator of what themes and subjects attract the imagination of today’s young historians of Asia.

Our thanks go to Prasenjit Duara, Professor of History at Chicago University, who gave the keynote speech at the conference and in the discussions provided invaluable feedback to the presenters. Without the keen eye of Nina Raj, the copy editor, numerous errors would have been overlooked. Special credit, moreover, is due to Harald Fuess, research associate at the DIJ, who, with relentless energy and enthusiasm, planned and organized the conference, and saw to the speedy publication of its results.

It is hoped that this volume will contribute to a better understanding of the domestic foundations of Japanese imperialism, its workings in Asia, and the empire’s postwar legacy as it manifests itself especially in Sino-Japanese relations.

Tōkyō, August 1998

Irmela Hijiya-Kirschner
Director, DIJ

OVERVIEW

Harald FUESS

When war broke out between Japan and China on 1 August 1894, most Western observers assumed that China would prevail because of its size, but the war turned out like the biblical fight between David and Goliath; the smaller combatant won with better weapons and tactics. What was a surprise to many had been the fruit of Japan's effort to modernize in the late nineteenth century, driven by a quest to maintain national independence and to attain equal status with Western nations. With the acquisition of its first colony, Taiwan, as the prize of its victory over China in 1895, Japan embarked on building an empire, just as Western powers had done before. The Japanese empire lasted for only half a century, and it vanished in the same way it had begun—in a war with China. The Second Sino-Japanese War, started in 1937, eventually led to the Second World War, which resulted in Japan's surrender and the dismemberment of its empire in 1945.

More than half a century has elapsed since the demise of Japan's empire, but because of its centrality in early twentieth century East Asian history, it still continues to attract the attention of numerous scholars. They, just as generations of scholars before them, reinterpret the past in light of the present, especially now that Japan's role in Asia is growing again in the fields of economics, politics, and culture. They usually place the creation, dynamics, and termination of the Japanese empire within worldwide trends of imperialism, nationalism, totalitarianism, and modernity with reference to particular circumstances and developments in East Asia.¹ They often differ in their respective overall assessment. On the one hand, are scholars who view Japan's pursuit of empire, at least in its earlier stages, as the normal course of action in a general climate of imperialism.² On the other hand, are those who call for new theoretical para-

¹ For an overview of the state of scholarship in English on the formal and informal Japanese empire see Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989); and Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996).

² Marius Jansen, "Japanese Imperialism: Late Meiji Perspectives," in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945*, 61–79.

digms to explain the special features of Japanese imperialism.³ In this conference volume, scholars from Europe, Asia, and the United States discuss the historical significance of the formal and informal Japanese empire. Prasenjit Duara in his opening remarks introduces the "East Asian modern," a regional discourse of the modern and the unique, as a background for the interpretation of the construction of empire in an age of nationalism. The other contributors, many of whom are just embarking on an academic career, are grouped according to three broad themes: the domestic foundations of Japanese imperialism, the workings of the Japanese empire in Asia, and the Japanese empire's postwar legacy.

The volume begins with four essays that assess the domestic foundations of Japanese imperialism. Fred Dickinson shows the place of Asia in the struggle for power among Japanese elites during the First World War, the end of which saw the dissolution of a national consensus for continental expansion. While recognizing the influence of international events and Wilsonian ideas on Japan, he stresses the initiatives of Japanese policymakers in the promotion of overseas expansion in order to distract from domestic issues. Christopher Szpilman then explains in a case study of the prominent intellectual Ōkawa Shūmei how pan-Asianism could appeal to an important stratum of the conservative prewar elite. With his pan-Asianism, Ōkawa justified Japan's mission to liberate Asia from Western influence, if need be by war. Hyung Gu Lynn describes the development and shifting goals of Japan-Asia associations. Members used the Japan-Asia associations to form interest networks in foreign affairs in a prewar polity often characterized as ridden by rivalry between different elite groups. Janis Mimura concludes this section with her examination of wartime state planning, especially in matters of technology policy and ideology. In the writings of members of the supraministerial Asia Development Board, she sees justifications for Japan's political dominance in Asia based on its technological leadership role. Also, she finds fundamental similarities in Japanese thought on technology policy with those of "reactionary modernist engineers" in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia.

The workings of the Japanese empire in Asia is the subject of the next three essays. Karl Gerth analyzes the rise of Chinese nationalism in the spread of an ethic of nationalistic consumption. This ethic increasingly defined consumption of Chinese goods as patriotic and became a force in sustaining anti-Japanese boycotts. Harumi Goto-Shibata shows how Japanese on the turbulent frontier turned economic imperialism into more vi-

³ Japanese imperialism is called "backward imperialism." See Peter Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895–1910* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

olent forms of imperialism. Her study of the Japanese community in Shanghai reveals how businessmen increasingly relied on the navy instead of the consulate to protect their commercial interests in the face of anti-Japanese boycotts. Adam Schneider examines sub-imperialist drives for economic expansion in colonial Taiwan. Motivated by a desire to lessen dependence on trade with metropolitan Japan, the Taiwan Government-General promoted economic integration with South China and Southeast Asia, but trade failed to take off until the mid-1930s, when the policy of industrialization for Taiwan became effective.

The three final three essays focus on the empire's postwar legacy, especially for Sino-Japanese relations. Daqing Yang describes the existence of a continuity in Sino-Japanese economic and technical cooperation in the immediate postwar period, which was only terminated by the incipient Chinese civil war. Chinese authorities and Japanese managers encouraged Japanese contributions to Chinese technology development, and many Japanese experts remained in China after 1945 to work. C.W. Brad-dick examines diplomatic history without diplomatic relations. In the early Cold War, when no official ties existed between Japan and China, powerful Japanese politicians sought a special relationship with China, which they viewed foremost as an Asian country and only secondarily as a communist country. Joachim Glaubitz discusses Sino-Japanese diplomacy before the normalization of diplomatic relations. He credits the Chinese leadership for astute manipulation of Japanese public opinion and politicians to obtain a treaty on China's terms.

OPENING REMARKS: EMPIRE IN THE AGE OF NATIONALISM

Prasenjit DUARA

The understanding of the Japanese imperial and colonial legacy varies considerably among different communities. The world outside Japan, on the one hand, knows of the horrors and atrocities, a knowledge that obscures all other dimensions of this historical experience in part because of the Japanese government's own domestic agenda and refusal to come to terms with the past. Post-war Western (principally American) scholarship has tended to focus, on the other hand, upon the developmental consequences of the spread of Japanese formal and informal models of governance. This is most evident in the three-volume series on the Japanese empire collectively edited by Ramon Meyers, Mark Peattie, and Peter Duus.¹ While generating a wealth of new research which often had the effect of redressing the view of Japanese expansionism as an unmitigated disaster for all concerned, the modernization paradigm led to a set of related questions: what were the developmental consequences of Japanese colonialism in comparison with other colonialisms? Why were these developmental consequences kept relatively obscured (or why were the Japanese colonizers so unloved by the colonized)? What was the reason for the failure of this expansionary project?

While acknowledging and absorbing the moral significance and research contributions of these two perspectives, it is important to demarcate a field of inquiry where neither the modernization nor the nationalist paradigms are so central that they conceal other developments. Without rehearsing the extensive critique of these paradigms—themselves over twenty years-old—let me suggest that these paradigms belong roughly to the same moment or period as Japanese imperialism itself and themselves need to be historicized in relation to this imperialism. In these brief introductory remarks, I want to suggest some ways in which we might view Japanese imperialism as sharing many of the same assumptions of these

¹ Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989); and Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996).

paradigms, which in turn represented the dominant global forces of the twentieth century, namely nationalism and modernization. How might this view produce a different agenda of research? In an era where the ideological dominance of nationalism is being challenged by globalization, the historical picture of East Asia and the world will almost certainly have a different look. As several essays in this volume suggest, both imperialism and nationalism were represented by several different agents and actors with complicated and uncertain relationships to the imperial or national cores. Doubtless, many of those who have been accused as "collaborators" will be found to have had legitimate human reasons for doing what they did. Moreover, some "traditional" arrangements will be found to have more globally sustaining value than modernization projects. Yet I am not sure that the alternative morality is sufficiently developed to allow us to call for a definitive break with the old paradigms. The powerful epistemological and moral underpinnings of the old paradigms have informed our own generation's view of the world too deeply for that.

Japanese imperialism took shape within the normative context of modernization and nationalism. First, an East Asian discursive language of the modern (and, hence, of the unique) emanating principally from Japan, circulated in the colonies of Korea and Taiwan and, somewhat less conspicuously, in the Chinese mainland. To be sure, this was a regional mediation of a global trend, but this discourse included distinctive ways of demarcating and representing the spheres of modernity and tradition, state and society, and nation and self. Despite the destructive violence of Japanese imperialism, this imperialism also had to engage, experiment with, and extend this modernizing process—a process that both this violence and reactive nationalism has tended to obscure.

The second context is the transition in world domination from the ideology of imperialism to the ideology of nationalism. The first half of the twentieth century was not only a period when nationalism became hegemonic—when the nation-state system expanded from a European/Northern club to cover most of the globe—but it was one when the surplus of nationalism in the nineteenth century that was imperialism came to be ideologically rejected as foreign to nationalism. Indeed, nationalism now began to define itself as anti-imperialist. Bruce Cumings has suggested that the latecomers to imperialism like Germany and Japan found it particularly vexing to confront this change in the rules of the game whereby imperialism came to be seen increasingly as illegitimate.²

² Bruce Cumings, "The Legacy of Japanese Colonialism in Korea," in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945*, 485.

Yet in many important ways, all nationalisms had to adapt to these new ideological conditions. Both imperial and national states were modern state forms driven by a territorial imperative, and the imperialist or expansionist tendencies of the new nations had to be concealed in nationalism's new ideology. Perhaps conceal is not the right word. Nationalism in this era devised new political forms; forms that were supranational but not overtly or traditionally imperialist. Pan-Asianism, Manchukuo, *kōminka* were the Japanese expressions of this new political form. What is interesting is that there are parallel—though not the same—new political forms which seek to accommodate the expansionist tendencies of the new nations, such as China or India with regard to their shaky claims on their peripheries.

What I am calling the East Asian modern is, first of all, part of the global circulation of discourses of the modern. Once the world comes to be composed of homological nation-states, these states frequently pursue the common goals of scientific modernity, adopt similar or related models to achieve these goals, encounter many of the same problems, and resort to similar solutions. Thus we have the ironic phenomenon of nations proclaiming their authenticity as the mark of their uniqueness even as most other national cultures are doing the same. But of course the global determination is mediated and specified by local, national and regional trajectories both historical and contemporary. Thus we need to focus on the regional mediation of global and national discourses. In this context, we have to establish not only why East Asia is a region, but what is the region of East Asia. Both historical (historical interaction, shared language and culture) and theoretical research are involved here because the cultural geography of East Asia—or what it means and to whom—is a changing one. Thus for instance, the imperial Chinese saw the old tribute region including Burma and Nepal as part of East Asia, whereas the Japanese in the interwar era increasingly saw Siberia and Central Asia as part of this region.

While I am not equipped to speak for the Korean role, central to the formation of the East Asian modern is, of course, the interaction of the Japanese and the Chinese. The conditions of interaction in this region from 1900 to 1945 include Japanese strategic, military, economic, and cultural projects in China; Chinese students, professionals and political exiles in Japan and their return; and the re-importation of the Japanese lexicon of modernity. A large number of studies in English, Chinese, and Japanese have adequately covered the interactions of this period. Among the many, they include the work of Tam Yue-him, Sanetō Keishū, Marius Jansen, Akira Iriye, Douglas Reynolds, and Joshua Fogel. This is an indispensable base for our studies, but I also believe we need to chart out some

new ground relating to the discursive interactions producing the commonly held assumptions about modernity in East Asia and the kinds of subjectivities these generate. Furthermore, while like the above scholars, I can see the historical relationships and parallels as the basis of this encounter, I also see an East Asian modern being produced by this encounter. In other words, we cannot simply invoke historical relationships to explain this modern, but have to see how history is often shaped and reconstituted as a *resource* to serve contemporary imperatives and even construct a new East Asia.

An example of the use of history as a reconstituted resource can be found in the lexicon of modernity. Thousands of specialized and common words, compounds, and phrases of classical Chinese provenance—such as *geming/kakumei* or *fengjian/hōken*—were given new and different meanings in the modern discourses formulated in Japan. When they were brought back to China, this lexicon gave the appearance of a continuous history and a transparent relationship to the Chinese and East Asian past. In actuality, this “lexical effect” incorporated modern Chinese into a new, regional East Asian discourse of the modern formulated first by the Japanese. Indeed, these linguistic transactions perhaps brought modern Chinese, Koreans and Japanese—a temporal community—discursively closer to each other than, for instance, to their peasants. But to be sure, the discursive encounter is not restricted to lexical transfers. This exchange is accompanied by several other modes of cultural interactions.

The profile of the East Asian modern that I want to consider and that is significantly a product of the Japanese dominance of the area is constituted around the question of authenticity. In the era of nation-states, all nations, regardless of whether or not they were imperialistic, were preoccupied with two temporal or historical issues: the universally recognized goal of achieving progress in linear time, and, a less recognized, but equally universal, imperative of having to constitute a core of timeless authenticity. The authentic refers to the true qualities, character, and values that cultures and nations seek to secure while they pursue the goals of modernity, or in other words, while the nation lives in linear time when all is flux and change. Thus the authentic is not only the true but also the unchanging within change, it is identity in a world where all is change. There is a definite tension between the order of authenticity on the one hand, and the order of History or change understood as successive and linear and necessary for both capitalism and modernity on the other. Indeed, this core of authenticity is necessary for the nation’s claim to sovereignty and to withstand the incursions of global capitalism. But the relationship between the two orders is not only conflictual and allows

an elaborate traffic of authorizations and delegitimations between the two.

The order of authenticity is politically very important because it locates the source of authority in a society and can empower those who control this realm. It endows a cultural inviolability to those who can speak for it: whether it be the Shōwa restorationists, the Afghan Taliban, American paramilitarists, or Lee Kuan-yew's anti-Western Confucian essentialism. Internally, it subordinates the individual to the rhetoric of the collective, and externally, it provides an authoritative shield from charges from other states or nations. Often the issue of rights emerging from territorial sovereignty and rights emerging from authentic traditions tend to coalesce: the state has sovereignty because it claims to embody the authenticity of a people and their territory.

The sources of authenticity, their modes of representation, and their effects on subject or identity formation in East Asia were profoundly shaped by—though rarely identical with—Japanese discourses of the authentic. In addition to the better-known influence of “modernizing” categories, such as local self-government or progressive history, I have examined the influence of Japanese discourses of such varied sources of authenticity as the locality or *xiangtu/kyōdo*, the primitive, the self-sacrificing woman, and pan-Asianism. To be sure, the nature of the influence is itself quite varied. Thus, whereas many of the categories and periodization schemes of modern Chinese history until the 1920s were modelled on Japanese ones,³ in the case of the local or *xiangtu*, which pervaded a range of knowledge practices from literature to geography to rural reform, Japanese discourses shaped one of two influential Chinese models. In yet other cases, Japanese penetration of the mainland and efforts to incorporate “primitive” peoples within Japanese narratives of belonging, led to Chinese formulations of the “primitive” and the periphery in response. We are familiar with how many of the Japanese colonial cultural practices in Korea, such as archaeology or folklore, were absorbed by Korean nationalists into their narratives of Korean greatness.⁵ Let me conclude this short essay by turning to one of these sites of discursive interaction: pan-Asianism in China. Through this instance I hope not only to

³ Prasenjit Duara, “The Regime of Authenticity: Timelessness, Gender and National History in Modern China,” forthcoming *History and Theory* 37 (October 1998).

⁴ Fu Sinian, 1928. “Zhongguo lishi fenqizhi yanjiu” in *Beijing Daxue Rikan* April 17–23 (Reprinted in *Fu Sinian quanji* vol 4: 176–85).

⁵ Roger L. Janelli, “The Origins of Korean Folklore Scholarship,” *Journal of American Folklore* 99 (1986): 24–49 and Cumings, “The Legacy of Japanese Colonialism in Korea,” 478–96.

show how the Japanese role in East Asia has to be seen in relation to the two new contexts of the twentieth century, the production of a regional modernity and the hegemony of nationalist ideology, but also how the specificity of Japanese imperialism or military expansionism especially affected the situation.

Pan-Asianism, which perhaps emerged first in Japan toward the end of the nineteenth century and developed a worldwide response during the Russo-Japanese War from a range of Asian leaders such as Sun Yat-sen and Rabindranath Tagore, embodied a variety of meanings. I do not want to reduce this variety to a single interpretation even though it will obviously be necessary to find certain common points of reference. Indeed, to anticipate my conclusion, I believe that Japanese militarism which gained a great deal from this meaningful variety that was pan-Asianism, tended, in the course of its headlong plunge into the Pacific War, to appropriate and reduce its meaning to a single hegemonic one that eliminated alternative visions embedded in pan-Asianism that sought to redeem or reconstruct modernity.

We can see differences in Japanese pan-Asianist thought even in the early stages when we look at the ideas of Okakura Tenshin and his associates, for whom the construction of an alternative civilizational foundation was of greatest importance, and those, for instance, of Ōkawa Shūmei, whose pan-Asianism was backed by a strong nationalist impetus, as discussed in this volume by Christopher Szpilman. Hashikawa Bunso has advised us that the use of pan-Asianism to further Japanese nationalism or imperialism was probably as strong as the desire to basically strengthen Asia.⁶ In China, too, pan-Asianist movements were numerous and strong in the first half of this century, but have been basically ignored in the historiography. Here too there were significant differences. There were those "redemptive modern societies" who believed that Eastern religions such as Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism produced a common civilizational, moral, and spiritual fount in the different Asian countries. By turning to these religions, the morally rejuvenated East would be able to redeem true modernity from the decadent West. Some of these societies, such as the Morality Society (Daodehui), the Red Swastika Society, the Dao Yuan, claimed to have many millions of followers; at the very least they had a much larger following than did the May Fourth societies and groups. They were engaged in philanthropy and moral and religious education. Another kind of pan-Asianism that developed in China was based on Sun Yat-sen's vision

⁶ Hashikawa Bunso, "Japanese Perspectives on Asia: From Dissociation to Co-prosperity," in *The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions*, ed. Akira Iriye (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), 328–55.

of the traditional "kingly way" (*wangdao*), the ideal of rule by moral suasion allegedly pursued by ancient emperors. The way in which Sun and his followers shaped this pan-Asianism also incorporated a strong anti-imperialist dimension, the ideological basis of a kind of united front of colonized nations. Yet another use of pan-Asianism in China was the rhetoric used by the Kuomintang state to appeal to the minority peoples on the peripheries of the Chinese nation to join the nation on the basis of their common brotherhood and animosity toward imperialism.

Despite these differences, it is clear that certain basic conditions had to emerge before such ideologies could flourish as they did. Pan-Asianism embodied an authenticity that was ironically located not in the nation but in a civilizational ideal. The idea that the most authoritative and authentic values arose not out of the nation but from a transnational, civilizational source was, actually and very simply, an effort to mirror the source of authority of Western imperialism: the Christian and Enlightenment civilization of Europe. We shall defer the question of how nations come to, or seek to, appropriate this civilizational authenticity until a later stage of our analysis. The interesting historical question that arises is with regards to when it becomes possible to assert that there is a plurality of civilizations. Through much of the Meiji period, the notion of civilization (*bunmei/wenming*) refers particularly to Enlightenment values as also in China for the period between 1900 and 1920. It is around the time of the First World War when a European critique of material civilization is also launched that a singular notion of civilization referring solely to Enlightenment values is perhaps decisively dethroned. And yet there were surely efforts to construct an alternative Eastern civilization earlier (as with Okakura and Ōkawa). Was it perhaps based on a Christian vision of alternative civilizations that was more catholic than the Enlightenment conception? What role might the Congress of World Religions held in Chicago in 1893 played in constructing the foundations of plural civilizations? At any rate, the securing of the idea of a plurality of civilizations in the aftermath of World War I has much to do with the emerging global force of nationalism.

The transnational source of national authenticity, or in other words, the yearning of the nation to transcend its territorial limits toward a transnational ideal turns our attention to the second context: the growth of the hegemony of nationalist ideology over imperialist ideology. Fred Dickinson's paper in this volume speaks to the important role of Woodrow Wilson's doctrine of the right to self-determination in facilitating this transition. In addition, the support of the Soviet Union for nationalisms all over

⁷ Prasenjit Duara, "Transnationalism and the Predicament of Sovereignty, Modern China 1900–1945," *American Historical Review* (October 1997).

the colonized world as well as in addressing the national question within the Soviet Union, played a significant role in this transformation. As mentioned above, this had the effect of eliminating the rhetorical justification for expansionism without removing the territorial imperative to expansion embedded in the nation-state. Consequently, I have suggested that new political forms appeared, and pan-Asianism was one such expression. As the transnational supplement of nationalism, pan-Asianism could, of course, be practically used for expansionism, but as the source of civilizational authenticity it was always also something more than nationalism.

Japanese imperialism both inherited and transformed the relationship with pan-Asianism that had been developing interactively from the beginning of the twentieth century between various Japanese pan-Asianisms and mainland ones. On the one hand, the militarists, who clearly sought to extend Japanese national power, fostered and propagated these movements; on the other hand, they sought to appropriate these multi-oriented movements for the purposes of the military regime during the Pacific War. Japanese pan-Asianism was welcomed or supported by many pan-Asianist groups in China and by many anti-Western nationalist movements in other Asian countries, such as in Indonesia and the Indian National Army led by Subhash Chandra Bose. In Manchukuo, for example, the puppet government of the Japanese military brought all of the different kinds of Chinese redemptive societies, such as the Morality Society and the Red Swastika Society, under its aegis soon after it established its power and assimilated them into its pan-Asian vision of *wangdao*.

At the time the Chinese redemptive societies encountered the Manchukuo regime, there was a remarkable convergence of ideological interests between them and certain currents in Japan. Similar “redemptive” societies in Japan, such as the Shibunkai, combining Confucianism and Shinto as the spiritual alternative to excessive materialism and individualism, had begun to grow in strength from the 1920s, particularly as social unrest grew under worsening economic conditions. Asian moral systems emphasizing ethical responsibilities were celebrated as alternatives to capitalism and Marxism, both Western doctrines. By the 1930s, the redemptive rhetoric of elite Confucian societies and the right wing nationalist and militarists not only began to come together but were also assimilated in an active political and educational program by the Japanese government.

⁸ Warren H. Smith, *Confucianism in Modern Japan: A Study of Conservatism in Japan's Intellectual History* (Tōkyō: The Hokuseido Press, 1959), 154–66.

Thus it was that Manchukuo state had at its disposal an ideology and language with which to forge an alliance with the redemptive societies in Northeast China. Under the Kuomintang government in Nanjing, these redemptive societies were prohibited and persecuted, largely because their religious and, often, popular religious orientation earned them the opprobrium of superstition and backwardness. Like the Kuomintang, the Manchukuo government censured the “superstitious” character of the redemptive societies, but instead of seeking to eradicate the societies themselves, it saw in them the potential for their transformation into state-controlled civic organizations. In this new political framework, the Morality Society became what in Japanese was called a *kyōka* (*jiaohua* in Chinese) organization—an agency engaged in welfare and enlightenment of the people.

Were these Pan-Asianist societies then co-opted by the Japanese military? Was their redemptive ideology which sought to produce a different society peopled by individuals engaged in spiritual and moral cultivation and rejecting what they considered were the artificial boundaries of nationality and ethnicity hijacked by the Japanese military and subordinated to (someone else’s) nationalist ends? I have studied the records of one of these societies—the Morality Society. Without going into the details, it is clear that the society got a chance to flourish as it had never had before under a regime which professed to pursue its own goals of a Confucian morality (*wangdao*) and “Eastern spirituality.” Indeed, there appears to have been considerable cooperation and even enthusiasm among the active members of the society with the regime’s social and ethical goals. The personal narratives of the Chinese women lecturers of this society reveal some of the motives that led them to the Morality Society. Again and again, we see the importance of their faith in Buddhism and the way in which the Morality Society, which demanded a commitment to public service to the point of self-sacrifice, had opened up this path of service to the world for women. For the first time, says one woman, women could, like men, devote themselves to the social good. Once a woman had satisfactorily served the in-laws, it was incumbent in the next phase to serve the world, in accordance with Buddhist teachings. A Mrs. Chen emphasizes not only the value of self-sacrifice that women had cultivated in the home, but how these values could purify the world once women engage in public service. This same woman later reveals the different ways in which her parents were good people and the way in which she could be a morally pure person. Her parents were good people of a village or a county; she is a good citizen of the nation and the world. While there

⁹ Manzhouguo Daodehui bianjike, ed., *Disanjie Manzhouguo Daodehui daode jiangxi yulu* (Xinjing: Manzhouguo Daodehui Huijike, 1936).

were certainly instrumental goals intermixed in their narratives, I have—against the usual cynical view of pan-Asianism—presented this glimpse of some subjectivities which were shaped by the pan-Asianist programs of the society and the state.

And yet it is just as clear that when the chips began to fall, the regime became more and more committed to its own interests and that of the Japanese nation. Everywhere, in Indonesia as in Manchukuo, what initial enthusiasm there was for the new order and “co-prosperity” began to evaporate. Pan-Asianism had once stood for a yearning among nationals to transcend the confines of a system which their universalizing spiritual values could not sanction. Its co-emergence with a nationalism devoted to rectifying the injustices of imperialism endowed it with a promise to build a new order beyond the nation. And yet in the end, it was the expansionist imperative within nationalism that succeeded in reducing it to one of its political instruments with which it could expand its power under the rhetoric of brotherhood. Whether or not the rhetoric of brotherhood itself would have yielded equal citizenship rights can never be fully known—although the very idea of *kōminka* would suggest that some version was perhaps inevitable. In any event, that the rhetoric of Asian brotherhood could never be fully emptied of meaning is perhaps evident from the essays in this volume by Christopher Braddick and Joachim Glaubitz, who demonstrate the continued popular interest in China that pervaded Japan in the 1950s, 1960s, and beyond.

II.
ASIA IN JAPAN:
THE DOMESTIC FOUNDATIONS OF
JAPANESE IMPERIALISM

JAPAN'S ASIA IN THE POLITICS OF A NEW WORLD ORDER, 1914–19

Fred DICKINSON

INTRODUCTION

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 ushered in a period of feverish speculation regarding the shape of the post-Cold War world. Among the areas of debate has been the likely direction of the centerpiece of American strategy in Asia in the Cold War period, Japan. But analysts have had very little to guide their forecasts of Japanese foreign policy in the twenty-first century.

Academic studies of Japan in English offer a one-dimensional portrait of Japanese decision-making in the modern era. While Meiji Japan's (1868–1912) founders are hailed for steering their country into the modern age, in the foreign policy realm, they appear as powerless pawns of international events. Highlighting Japan's "opening" to the West at the barrel of a gun, diplomatic historians describe the country from the nineteenth century as forever disadvantaged on the international stage.¹ Prejudiced by the record of U.S.-Japanese relations after 1945, specialists of international affairs speak of Japanese statesmen as "determined to follow" international trends.² Both of these images are, of course, a far cry from the well-established portrait in the popular literature in English and in Marxist studies in Japan of aggressive Japanese imperialists set to conquer Asia, if not the world.

Without stigmatizing modern Japan's preeminent policymakers as unrepentant imperialists, this paper aims to restore a sense of agency to the academic discussion of Japanese foreign policy. Japanese statesmen have neither been primarily "victims" nor predominantly passive actors on the international stage. They have, rather, actively attempted to shape their relations with the outer world.

¹ Peter Duus goes so far as to argue that such disadvantages merit the creation of a new theoretical category of imperialism for Japan, called "backward imperialism." See Peter Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895–1910* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

² See Richard D. Leitch Jr., Akira Kato, and Martin E. Weinstein, *Japan's Role in the Post-Cold War World* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1995), 6.

This has been true especially of Japanese relations with Asia. Intellectual historians have recently reminded us of the centrality of Asia in Japanese efforts to shape a national identity in the modern era. Harry Harootunian has highlighted the role of nativist scholars in transforming a Sino-centric into a Japan-centric world in the eighteenth century.³ And Stephan Tanaka has analyzed the conscious efforts of Japanese historians in the first half of the twentieth century to establish Japanese leadership in Asia by locating China, or "*shina*," within a Japan-centric history of East Asia, or "*tōyōshi*."⁴ As an intellectual construct, Asia becomes with these scholars less an objective circumstance to which Japanese elites responded than a blank slate upon which those men fashioned their own image.

Both Harootunian and Tanaka suggest that Japan's intellectual separation from China played an integral role in Japanese aggression on the continent in the 1930s. But intellectual transformations alone do not precipitate major international events. Rather, Japanese statesmen actively aimed to shape their relations with Asia in another arena much more directly related to diplomatic decision-making: politics. If the intellectual separation of Japan from China laid the critical groundwork for Japanese aggression in the 1930s, it is the place of China in Japanese domestic politics that had the greatest bearing upon Japan's specific foreign policy choices in the first half of the twentieth century.

This essay examines the place of Asia in Japanese politics during a pivotal event in the twentieth century: World War I. With the distraction of the great powers to Europe after 1914, the Great War became a time of intensified Japanese diplomatic activity in Asia. The war also marked a critical turning point in the politics of Asia in Japan. Until 1918, Japan's policy-making elite spoke with one voice of the wisdom of strengthening Japanese influence on the Asian continent. And Japan's Asian, particularly China, policy was a critical focus of its turbulent domestic political battles. With the growth of the Japanese economy and the American redefinition of allied war aims, however, the consensus upon continental expansion dissolved. The primary focus of political discussions, moreover, shifted to issues of political reform. The transformation of the politics of China during the first great political, economic, social, and ideological watershed of the twentieth century would have a profound effect upon the direction of Japanese diplomacy in the interwar period. It should also

³ Harry D. Harootunian, "The Functions of China in Tokugawa Thought," in *The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions*, ed. Akira Iriye (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), 9–36.

⁴ Stefan Tanaka, *Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

bear lessons for Japanese foreign policy after the final turning point of the century, the end of the Cold War.

THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT OF JAPANESE IMPERIALISM

Diplomatic historians describe the origins of Japanese imperialism in Asia primarily in the context of national defense. As one renowned specialist argues, Japanese empire-building in the nineteenth century marked “an entirely reasonable approach to security in an era when much of the world and most of Asia seemed divided up between the powers.”⁵ But unlike China, after three bombardments of the Satsuma and Chōshū domains in the 1860s, the great powers never physically menaced Japan. On the contrary, Japanese policymakers enjoyed virtually a free hand to construct their own empire in Asia unimpeded. Nor was foreign policy the primary concern of Japanese statesmen in the nineteenth century. Rather, after having forced over two and a half centuries of feudal rule to a close, they faced the much more formidable task of molding a modern unified nation state from over 270 autonomous feudal domains.

The primary context of nineteenth century Japanese imperialism, in other words, is not the international balance of power but the domestic context of nation-building. Within that framework, Japanese expansion in Asia appears less an exercise in national security than in national self-definition. Modern Japan's founders engaged China in war in 1894 not to protect from imminent invasion. They did so to become a great power. At a time when a foothold in China had become a benchmark of national power, Japanese leaders chose more than simple survival. They aimed, in the words of famed educator Fukuzawa Yukichi, to become the “leader of Asia.”⁶

THE POLITICS OF ASIA IN IMPERIAL JAPAN

If the quest to become “leader of Asia” served to define the Japanese nation, it also became the basic adhesive of Japanese politics. The disparate political forces that came to comprise the Meiji state coalesced for the first

⁵ Marius Jansen, “Japanese Imperialism: Late Meiji Perspectives,” in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945*, ed. Ramon Myers and Mark Peattie (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 76.

⁶ Kimitada Mina, “Fukuzawa Yukichi's ‘Departure from Asia’: A Prelude to the Sino-Japanese War,” in *Japan's Modern Century*, ed. Edmund R. Skrzypczak (Tōkyō: Sophia University, 1968), 25.

time with Japan's spectacular victories over China in 1895.⁷ And Japanese statesmen came to regard a vigorous pursuit of rights in Asia as an integral component of their political mandate. The failure to secure Japanese rights—such as the inability to obtain all of Sakhalin Island or a war indemnity after the Russo-Japanese War—guaranteed widespread criticism, even violent protest. Japanese policymakers in 1914, then, unanimously welcomed the war in Europe as an opportunity to strengthen Japanese rights in Asia. Although pursued by men of different political stripes, all major foreign policy initiatives undertaken during the war sought to fulfill this aim.

A consensus upon continental expansion, however, did not mark the end of politics in Japan. On the contrary, one of the distinguishing characteristics of the Meiji polity was political turbulence. For modern Japan's founders created a political system incapable of regulating competing demands among the new class of elites. Instead of assuring the hegemony of the architects of the new system as intended, full sovereignty in an emperor who did not actually rule guaranteed a perpetual jockeying for position among would-be policymakers: the elder statesmen, members of the civilian and military bureaucracies, and, increasingly in the twentieth century, members of Japan's rising political parties. If the pursuit of leadership in Asia was a given in Taishō era (1912–26) politics, then, Asian, particularly China affairs, were a central locus of the turbulent political battles that were a legacy of the Meiji polity. Like the more celebrated political campaigns against oligarchic rule and for universal manhood suffrage, the quest for leadership in Asia became a critical component of the turbulent struggle for power among Japanese elites in Taishō Japan.

THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS AND FOREIGN MINISTRY SUPREMACY

Japan's primary foreign policy initiatives vis-à-vis Asia during the Great War have been the subject of meticulous research. The Twenty-One Demands, the movement to depose Chinese president Yuan Shikai, the Nishihara loans, and the Siberian Intervention have been highlighted primarily for their significance in the history of Japanese diplomacy. But each initiative had an explicitly domestic political component as well. As such, they reveal Japanese policymakers as less slave to international

⁷ For an illustration of the evolution of national symbols and surge of national sentiment during the Sino-Japanese War, see Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 88–89; 135–36.

events than active architects of their own destiny. They are, in short, clear representations less of the strategic pull than of the political push of policy-making vis-à-vis Asia in Taishō Japan.

The list of negotiating points presented by Japan to Beijing in January 1915 and known derisively as the “Twenty-One Demands” enjoys a prominent place in the history of Japanese foreign policy. Together with the Siberian Intervention of 1918, historians regularly describe the demands as a critical step in Japan’s eventual march to war against China in the 1930s.⁸ But while the initiative did play a critical role in the rise of Chinese nationalism and turned the favor of American President Woodrow Wilson against Japan, its primary import in the history of modern Japan lies not in its lessons for Japanese diplomacy. Rather, the demands offer one of the clearest demonstrations of the political significance of Asia, particularly China, in Imperial Japan.

Appeals for a comprehensive agreement with China flooded the Ōkuma Shigenobu administration (April 1914–October 1916) from all quarters at the outbreak of the Great War. Analyses of Japanese foreign policy during this period tend to stress the complicity of the most extreme elements in Japanese politics in the formulation of the demands.⁹ But the Black Dragon Society was only one among a wide assembly of more orthodox foreign policy actors in the fall of 1914 pressing for a thorough negotiation of Japanese rights. The number of these petitions indicates the overwhelming political momentum for continental expansion in Japan in 1914. They reveal, as well, the degree to which most negotiating items as eventually formulated by Foreign Minister Katō Takaaki were accepted as a matter of course in Tōkyō. Indeed, while the demands appeared for the first time as one package, none were remarkable in the context of previous Japanese approaches to Beijing or of the accepted rules of great power competition in China since the Sino-Japanese War.¹⁰ Katō Takaaki titled his negotiating instructions, in fact, “Solution of Pending Problems.”¹¹

⁸ See, for example, Toyama Shigeki, Imai Seiichi, Fujiwara Akira, *Shōwashi* (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 1959), 7.

⁹ Both Marius Jansen and Usui Katsumi stress the complicity of Uchida Ryōhei and the Black Dragon Society in the formulation of the demands. See Marius Jansen, *The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), 180; Usui Katsumi, *Nihon to Chūgoku: Taishō jidai* (Tōkyō: Hara Shobō, 1972), 58–60.

¹⁰ For a detailed analysis of the routine character of the Twenty-One Demands in the context of great power competition in China since the Sino-Japanese War, see Fred Dickinson, *War and National Reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914–1919* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, forthcoming), chapter III.

¹¹ Itō Masanori, *Katō Takaaki*, 2 vols. (Tōkyō: Katō Haku Denki Hensan Iinkai, 1929), II, 155.

And even Yoshino Sakuzō, who would become the most ardent advocate of democracy in Imperial Japan, would describe the initiative as the “bare minimum” necessary.¹²

Even as they expose the powerful political momentum for a strong China policy in Tōkyō, the Twenty-One Demands reveal China policy as a central arena for the basic struggle for power in Taishō Japan. That struggle had exploded in full force in 1913 when for the first time in the history of Imperial Japan a coalition of political parties had toppled an oligarchic cabinet. The Taishō political crisis, as this event is known, revealed the bankruptcy of oligarchic politics less than twenty years after their formal institutionalization. And the subsequent cabinet of Admiral Yamamoto Gonnohyōe (February 1913—April 1914) exacerbated political tensions by promoting the interests of the majority Seiyūkai party and the navy against members of the powerful military-bureaucratic Yamagata faction.

The Twenty-One Demands deserve a place in Japanese political history as prominent as the Taishō political crisis or the Yamamoto cabinet. For in his decisive control of both the substance and timing of negotiations with China, foreign minister and president of the Dōshikai party, Baron Katō Takaaki, handily outmaneuvered the three most powerful contenders for power in Taishō Japan: the elder statesmen (*genrō*), the army, and the Seiyūkai. The Twenty-One Demands are important not as evidence of escalating continental ambitions in Tōkyō but as a decisive victory for cabinet and Foreign Ministry supremacy in the making of foreign policy.

Since their creation of the mechanisms of a modern state in the 1880s, modern Japan’s founders had wielded decisive control in the shaping of Japan’s domestic and foreign policies. While after the turn of the century they no longer enjoyed a direct hand in policy-making as official members of the cabinet, in their capacity as elder statesmen, these men continued to exert a powerful influence. Field Marshal Yamagata Aritomo, in particular, used a vast network of supporters in the civilian and military bureaucracies (the Yamagata faction) to exercise a commanding voice after the death of his chief oligarchic rival, Itō Hirobumi.

Foreign Minister Katō utilized Japan’s China policy first to take aim at the lingering power of the *genrō*. While the elder statesmen expected to participate in the important policy-making process at a time of national crisis, Katō seized the opportunity of war in Europe to entirely exclude the *genrō* from decision-making. Katō single-handedly orchestrated a cab-

¹² Yoshino Sakuzō, *Nisshi kōshōron* (Tōkyō: Keiseiron, 1915), 255–56; cited in Mitani Taichirō, *Shinpan Taishō demokurashii: Yoshino Sakuzō no jidai* (Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1995), 156.

inet decision for war against Germany on 7 August and informed the elder statesmen of the decision, and of a proposed ultimatum to Germany, only after the fact. He ignored *genrō* advice in September to send a special envoy to negotiate a comprehensive agreement with China, but chose instead to pursue his own agenda via the Foreign Ministry representative in Beijing the following January.

Japan's generals had become a powerful political force after the military victories over China and Russia. The Imperial Army had surged from thirteen to nineteen divisions after the Russo-Japanese War and had begun to compete with the Foreign Ministry in China by creating a network of its own representatives throughout the Asian continent. This network attempted, unsuccessfully, to intervene in the Chinese revolution in 1911.¹³ But Japan's generals viewed the outbreak of war in 1914 as another opportunity to advance army power via military operations on the continent. Foreign Minister Katō had hoped to deprive the army of such a chance by arranging for the peaceful transfer to Japan of German concessions in Shandong.¹⁴ But having failed to avoid a military campaign, Katō moved swiftly after the Eighteenth Division's seizure of the German fortress at Qingdao in November 1914 to defuse army momentum by replacing operational troops with occupation forces. To avert army interference in subsequent negotiations with China for a comprehensive agreement, Katō delayed the start of talks until these occupational troops assumed their place.¹⁵ And after discussions began in January 1915, he doggedly deflected the army's bid for military action against China.

Since its creation in 1900, the Seiyūkai party had boasted the greatest political strength in the Imperial Diet. Its president, Hara Takashi, moreover, had steadily expanded party influence to the House of Peers, the civilian bureaucracy and to Japanese colonial government. Katō used his command of the nation's important China policy to deal as resolutely with his greatest political party rival as with the *genrō* (elder statesmen) and army. He refused to entertain queries in the Thirty-fifth Diet (7–25 December 1914) regarding his plans for Sino-Japanese relations. And he

¹³ For details, see Kitaoka Shin'ichi, *Nihon rikugun to tairiku seisaku* (Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1978), 93–96.

¹⁴ Itō, *Katō Takaaki*, II, 83–85. To give Berlin ample time to capitulate without a fight, Katō set an ultimatum deadline of seven days, rather than the customary 48 hours.

¹⁵ Governor-General of Korea, General Terauchi Masatake, would lament Katō's failure to begin negotiations before the withdrawal of operational troops from Shandong. Tanaka Giichi kankei monjo, Terauchi to Tanaka, 27 January 1915 (Kensei Shiryō Shitsu, National Diet Library, Tōkyō).

convened the Diet early and orchestrated an early dissolution to prevent Seiyūkai interference with his discussions with President Yuan. Finally, he hoped that successful talks in Beijing would facilitate a Dōshikai victory in the upcoming general election. While the negotiations dragged on as Japanese voters went to the polls, the Dōshikai would, nonetheless, shatter the Seiyūkai's fifteen year Diet majority in March 1915.

Katō pursued talks with China in 1915, then, in an attempt both to define Japan's position in Asia and his own political position at home. He was so successful on both counts that he transformed the Japanese political canvas. Before the war, the confrontation between the expanding Seiyūkai and the primary casualty of its advances, the Yamagata faction, had marked the chief political drama of Imperial Japan. But by decisively commanding the approaches to China, Katō emerged as the preeminent policymaker in Tōkyō. Field Marshal Yamagata would soon abandon his campaign to destroy the Seiyūkai to concentrate upon the more formidable task of suppressing Katō. He would twice assemble the group of four remaining *genrō* to pressure Ōkuma, first to exclude the foreign minister from the policy-making process, then to remove him from office.¹⁶ Meanwhile, Tanaka Giichi, then major general, bemoaned the low "authority of the military vis-à-vis the Foreign Ministry."¹⁷ "There is little hope," he grieved, "for application of the principle that peace can be preserved through arms."¹⁸ On Yamagata's command, Tanaka worked to nudge from office War Minister Oka Ichinosuke, whose cooperation with Katō according to Yamagata presented an "obstacle to the progress of national business."¹⁹ As for Katō's chief political party rival, Seiyūkai President Hara Takashi complained bitterly of the political effect of the foreign minister's initiatives. The declaration of war against Germany, he suspected, aimed to "buttress the cabinet by directing public sentiment outward."²⁰ And the military pressure applied

¹⁶ At the 24 September 1914 meeting with Premier Ōkuma, the *genrō* commanded Ōkuma to make the fundamental decisions in foreign policy himself in consultation with the *genrō*, after which he was to "compel the foreign minister to obey this." Tokutomi Ichirō, ed., *Kōshaku Yamagata Aritomo den*, 3 vols. (Tōkyō: Hara Shobō, 1969), III, 912. At the 25 June 1915 meeting with Ōkuma, the elder statesmen would call directly for the removal of Katō from office. Itō, *Katō Takaaki*, II, 48; Yamagata hoped, as well, to "destroy the Doshikai." Hara Keiichirō, ed., *Hara Takashi nikki*, 6 vols. (Tōkyō: Fukumura Shuppan, 1981), IV, 100 (18 May 1915) (hereafter, cited as *Hara nikki*).

¹⁷ Terauchi Masatake kankei monjo 315–32, Tanaka to Terauchi, 20 January 1915 (Kensei Shiryō Shitsu, National Diet Library, Tōkyō).

¹⁸ Terauchi monjo 315–34, Tanaka to Terauchi, 3 February 1915.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ *Hara nikki*, IV, 26 (14 August 1914).

on China on the eve of the general election was “not external but internal diplomacy.”²¹

REMOVING YUAN SHIKAI ABROAD AND THE ENEMIES OF MILITARY-BUREAUCRATIC RULE AT HOME

Fortunately for Yamagata, Katō left the Ōkuma cabinet with Home Minister Oura Kanetake in August 1915 after the latter was accused of buying votes for army expansion. But the foreign minister's resignation did not end the political jockeying that had greeted the outbreak of war in Europe. On the contrary, Japan's next major China policy initiative, the movement to depose Chinese President Yuan Shikai in the spring of 1916, became the next conspicuous attempt to reorder power relations at home.

The policy to depose Yuan began as a modest warning to the Chinese president in October 1915 not to reintroduce imperial rule in China. In light of the domestic unpopularity of the May 1915 Sino-Japanese treaties that were the product of the Twenty-One Demands, Yuan hoped to buttress his own power by donning the robes of the august former occupants of the dragon throne. The reshuffled Ōkuma cabinet issued the October warning on the grounds that such an initiative would bring civil chaos to China and threaten “peace in the Far East.”²² But Yuan's actions were less critical as a threat to stability in Asia than as a challenge to Japanese cabinet and Foreign Ministry claims to be the preeminent foreign policy decision-makers in Japan.

Foreign Minister Katō, as we have seen, had used a powerful demonstration of Japanese leadership in China to establish cabinet and Foreign Ministry supremacy. But there were immediate signs of the limits to Japanese leadership. No sooner was an agreement with Beijing concluded than Chinese authorities began capitalizing upon loopholes in the May treaties to fortify their own position in Manchuria.²³ Yuan's proposed assumption of the emperorship offered further proof of the limits of Japa-

²¹ *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*, 23 March 1915, 2. Katō had relented in march to a temporary expansion of Japanese military presence in Shandong by overlapping the fresh and old troops during the regular troop rotation period. But he continued to refuse army appeals for military action.

²² Foreign Ministry text of warning to Yuan; Gaimushō, ed., *Nihon gaikō bunsho: Taishō jidai*, 36 vols. (Tōkyō: Gaimushō, 1964–87), 1915, II, 99–100.

²³ Claiming that under article five of the South Manchuria, Eastern Inner Mongolia Treaty Japanese civilians in Manchuria were now legally covered under Chinese police law, the Chinese government in July advised the removal of Japanese police stations in Chouyang in Liaoyuan county. In the beginning of October, the

nese power. Evidence of weakness in China raised doubts about the ability of the architects of the May treaties to effectively conduct Japan's foreign policy. While they had little bearing upon stability in Asia, then, Yuan's actions impinged directly upon the political survival of the Ōkuma cabinet. Justice Minister Ozaki Yukio, author of a November cabinet resolution to withhold recognition of a Yuan monarchy, worried that the "army clique" would use Yuan's demonstration of strength to destroy the cabinet.²⁴ As a journalist close to the Foreign Ministry informed Seiyūkai president Hara Takashi, the decision to warn Yuan aimed to avoid the criticism that Ōkuma was a "stooge" of the Chinese president.²⁵

The modest warning to Yuan not to introduce imperial rule would evolve by March 1916 into a hostile attempt to depose the Chinese president. Like Premier Ōkuma in October, the primary architect of the new plan, Tanaka Giichi, now lieutenant general and vice chief of the Army General Staff, would describe the notably more aggressive posture in terms of security in East Asia. Yuan's inability to suppress domestic opposition, he noted, threatened "peace in the Far East."²⁶

But, as with the October cabinet decision, the evidence in the field in March 1916 pointed to Yuan's strength, not weakness. Tanaka aggressively solicited cabinet support for a campaign to depose the Chinese president after reports from general staff representatives in China noted Yuan's likely success in suppressing domestic rebellion.²⁷ As in October, the Chinese president's actions threatened less peace in Asia or Japanese security than the cabinet's public image. A Chinese show of strength, Tanaka complained bitterly in January, was equivalent to "ignor[ing] the face

Japanese press reported Chinese claims to their former legal rights over Korean residents in Jiandao, near the Sino-Korean border. This directly contradicted a 13 August Japanese cabinet declaration that the new treaties superseded the Jiandao Treaty of 1909, which had assigned legal dominion to China; see Usui Katsumi, "Nanman, Tōmō jōyaku no seiritsu zengo," in *Tai-Manmō seisakushi no ichimen*, ed. Kurihara Ken (Tōkyō: Hara Shobō, 1966), 126–27.

²⁴ In an extraordinary cabinet session called on 3 November to discuss Yuan's intransigence; *Hara nikki*, IV, 142 (6 November 1915).

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 136 (14 October 1915).

²⁶ Hamaomote Matasuke monjo, no. 15, Tanaka to Banzai, 17 January 1916; in "Hamaomote Matasuke monjo," comp. Yamaguchi Toshiaki, in *Kindai Nihon to higashi Ajia*, ed. Kindai Nihon Kenkyūkai (Tōkyō: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1980), 221–22.

²⁷ Advisor to the Hubei Regular Army, Colonel Teranishi Hidetake, for example, informed General Staff Second Division Chief Fukuda Masatarō on 1 February that if the Japanese government did not decide by mid-month to tacitly support the revolutionary party in China, "the probability that Yuan pacifies Yunnan and establishes imperial government is great;" Hamaomote monjo, no. 27, Teranishi to Fukuda, 1 February 1916, in *ibid.*, 230.

of Japan.”²⁸ More specifically, it jeopardized Tanaka and the Imperial Army’s new centrality in Japan’s foreign policy decision making.

Indeed, Tanaka’s orchestration of the movement to depose Yuan represented a major shift in the locus of policy-making in Japan. While he had served as foreign minister, Katō Takaaki had, as we have seen, excluded Tanaka and his fellow generals from any role in the making of foreign policy. By January 1916, however, after Katō’s resignation and his own promotion to vice chief of the general staff, Tanaka had wrested control of Japan’s continental policy from the inexperienced new foreign minister, Ishii Kikujirō. He had done so by commanding the network of Japanese army representatives that had been established in China after the Russo-Japanese War.²⁹

Tanaka formulated his China policy to be highly advantageous to the Imperial Army. Echoing army ambitions at the time of the 1911 Chinese revolution, he called not simply for the elimination of Yuan Shikai but for a major expedition of Japanese troops to China in the name of containing civil war.³⁰ Yuan’s suppression of rebellion in south China in the spring of 1916, then, threatened not simply to nullify Japanese cabinet support for rebellion. It jeopardized the potentially enormous political benefits to the army of a major military campaign on the continent.

THE NISHIHARA LOANS AND TERAUCHI SUPREMACY

Tanaka’s plan for a major expedition of Japanese troops to China evaporated with the death of Yuan Shikai in June. The failure of his scheme, like evidence in the fall of 1915 of serious leaks in the Sino-Japanese treaties, offered the occasion for another major reorganization of power relations in Tōkyō. The Terauchi Masatake cabinet emerged in October 1916 as an attempt by the Yamagata faction to restore the waning power of military-bureaucratic rule. General Terauchi stood second in command in the faction and fashioned a “transcendental” government divorced from all party affiliation.

²⁸ Hamaomote monjo, no. 15, Tanaka to Banzai, 17 January 1916, in *ibid.*, 221–22.

²⁹ Among the key army representatives in the field through whom Tanaka briefly commanded Japan’s approaches to China were Lieutenant General Aoki Norizumi, Lieutenant Colonel Taga Muneyuki, Colonel Banzai Rihachirō, and Colonel Teranishi Hidetaka.

³⁰ See the series of letters between Tanaka and representatives of the army general staff in China in Hamaomote monjo: nos. 41 (Tanaka to Banzai, March 1916), 61 (Tanaka to Morioka, May 1916), 64 (Tanaka to Aoki, 20 May 1916), in *ibid.*, 239, 253, 255.

The public reacted angrily to this first non-affiliated cabinet since the Taishō political crisis.³¹ But the chief political drama of the Terauchi years transpired not between the soldier-premier and the champions of representative government. Terauchi diffused the political pressure in the Diet by coopting some of its leaders in a new deliberative body, the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs. The greatest political challenge to the new premier, rather, came from within the Yamagata faction itself. While he owed his premiership to factional patriarch Yamagata, Terauchi had indicated upon assuming office that he would not be bound by the field marshal's commands.³² Rather than welcome Yamagata associate Hirata Tōsuke to the new government, the general granted the pivotal post of vice premier to Hirata rival Gotō Shinpei. And following a pattern since the end of the Russo-Japanese War, Terauchi, to Yamagata's great surprise, assigned budget priority to the navy.

One of Terauchi's most conspicuous attempts to throw his political weight was in the arena of China affairs. Following the advise of Gotō and others, the new premier distinguished himself from his predecessor via a declaration of change in Japan's approaches to China. The March 1916 cabinet decision to depose Yuan Shikai had been kept from the public. Terauchi now exposed the conspiracy and vowed, in his first official statement on China in January 1917, to refrain from interfering in the country's internal affairs.³³

The Nishihara loans, which would become the centerpiece of Terauchi's China policy, would hardly constitute non-interference in Chinese domestic politics. Premier Duan Qirui would make full use of Japanese largesse to subdue his political enemies. But as an exercise in financial diplomacy, the loans are justifiably noted by historians as a departure from the military schemes of Tanaka Giichi. They also reflected the new financial power enjoyed by Japan. Thanks to the expansion of markets for Japanese arms, shipping, and textiles since the outbreak of war, Japan en-

³¹ *Ōsaka Mainichi Shinbun*, 6 October 1916; in *Terauchi Masatake naikaku kankei shiryō*, ed. Yamamoto Shirō, 2 vols. (Kyōto: Kyōto Joshi Daigaku, 1985), I, 441.

³² During discussions with Premier Ōkuma in July 1916 over an eventual transfer of power, Terauchi had informed Yamagata that he was no longer a child, and could not, therefore, listen to everything that the elder statesman said. Oka Yoshitake, ed., *Taishō demokurashii no seiji: Matsumoto Gōkichi seiji nissshi* (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 1957), 13 (19 July 1916 diary entry).

³³ Gaimushō, *Nihon gaikō nenpyō narabi ni shuyō bunsho, 1840–1945*, 2 vols. (Tōkyō: Hara Shobō, 1965), I, 424–27.

joyed a balance of payments surplus by 1916 for the first time in its history.³⁴

But Terauchi and deputy Nishihara Kamezō devised the new loan policy not simply to utilize the new foreign policy instrument at their disposal. The January declaration of change may not have signalled a genuine shift to non-interference in Chinese domestic affairs. But it did mark a substitution of the chief foreign policy actors. Tanaka Giichi, as we have seen, had, since January 1916, monopolized the approaches to China by directing members of the army general staff in the field. If he hoped to wield any authority in the foreign policy arena, Terauchi had to neutralize this impressive network of Tanaka subordinates. Indeed, the new premier's advisors were unanimous in their counsel that Tanaka be removed from the position of vice chief of the army general staff.³⁵

Simple cabinet declarations had no effect upon the vice chief's clandestine operations. The Ōkuma regime, after all, had budgeted monies after Yuan Shikai's death to dissolve the military operations aimed at deposing the Chinese president. But these funds had been diverted by the same men who had orchestrated the anti-Yuan plot to schemes against the new regime of Duan Qirui in Beijing.³⁶ Nor did General Terauchi, serving as premier outside of the military chain of command, enjoy any authority over operational planning in the General Staff. The new prime minister vowed, therefore, to maneuver around Tanaka's network via a policy that he could hope to command: financial diplomacy. The Nishihara loans, in other words, reflected not only the availability of a new instrument of diplomacy. They marked a specific attempt by Terauchi to outflank the network of continental military advisors that Vice Chief of the General Staff

³⁴ By 1916, Japan had transformed a consistent annual balance of payments deficit from 1903, which had reached 106.6 million yen in 1913, to a healthy excess of 604.7 million yen. Kazushi Ohkawa and Miyohei Shinohara, eds., *Patterns of Japanese Economic Development: A Quantitative Appraisal* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 334.

³⁵ This included Gotō Shinpei, Communications Minister Den Kenjiro and Chōshū elder Miura Gorō, who spoke of Tanaka as "the epitome of the China problem." For Gotō, see Terauchi monjo 27–50, Gotō to Terauchi, 3 October 1916. For Den, see *Hara nikki*, IV, 224 (12 October 1916). For Miura, see *Hara nikki*, 229 (5 November 1916). Miura also informed Terauchi of a consensus among party leaders Hara and Inukai, and Itō Miyoji on the need to remove Tanaka; Terauchi monjo 441–46, "Miura shishaku danwa yōryō (12 October 1916)," in Yamamoto, *Terauchi naikaku shiryō*, I, 187. Den and Hirata Tōsuke agreed in a discussion in November on the advisability of dismissing the vice chief of staff; Den Kenjiro nikki, 17 November 1916, in Yamamoto, *Terauchi naikaku shiryō*, I, 146.

³⁶ Terauchi monjo 208–15, 16, 17, Nishihara to Terauchi, 24, 26, 29 December 1916, in Yamamoto, *Terauchi naikaku shiryō*, I, 160–166, 169–171.

Tanaka Giichi had used to monopolize the approaches to China under Premier Ōkuma.³⁷

The most exciting drama of the Nishihara loans, then, unfolded not across the negotiating table between Nishihara and members of the Duan regime, but between the two chief contenders for foreign policy leader in the Terauchi regime, Nishihara Kamezō and Tanaka Giichi. Tanaka was able to foil Nishihara's first attempts to establish ties between Terauchi and Duan.³⁸ And he aimed during a personal mission to China in the spring of 1917 to secure the political supremacy of President Li Yuanhong, with whom the General Staff had developed a close rapport, over the recently deposed Premier Duan.³⁹ But by July, Duan would establish decisive military control in Beijing. And via 200 million yen in loans to the Chinese premier, Terauchi and deputy Nishihara would finally control Japan's approaches to China.

SIBERIA AND THE REVITALIZATION OF ARMY AND EMPIRE

In the first half of the Terauchi regime, then, Tanaka and the Imperial Army were rendered as powerless in the prosecution of Japan's continental aims as they had been at the hands of Katō Takaaki in 1915. Added to the budget priority that Premier Terauchi continued to grant the navy, this represented a humiliating loss of political power. By 1917, however, there appeared an even more serious challenge to army authority: the fundamental transformation of the world order.

Historians of Europe and the United States have long recognized the transforming effects of the Great War in their respective countries. Unlike the main European belligerents, Japan's wartime experience was, of course, less one of destruction than of production. The Japanese economy thrived as its industries filled wartime orders from the allies and entered new markets opened by the withdrawal of European power from Asia.

³⁷ Terauchi had directly confronted Tanaka in early October for his reckless schemes on the continent. *Hara nikki*, IV, 223 (11 October 1916). But in response to Miura Gorō's petitions in early November to remove the vice chief of staff from power, the premier suggested that "there is another means;" *Hara nikki*, IV, 229 (5 November 1916).

³⁸ Specifically, Nishihara suspected the hand of General Staff officer Aoki Norizumi in the Chinese Guomindang's refusal to sanction the dispatch of a special-Chinese envoy from the new Duan Qirui government in Beijing to Tōkyō in November 1915; Terauchi monjo 208-13, Nishihara to Terauchi, 12 December 1916, in Yamamoto, *Terauchi naikaku shiryō*, I, 155-56.

³⁹ See Takakura Tetsuichi, *Tanaka Giichi denki*, 2 vols. (Tōkyō: Tanaka Giichi Denki Kankōkai, 1958), I, 653-58.

But while devastating human and material losses transformed European politics and society, economic growth had profound social and political consequences in Japan. Most conspicuous was the rise of private industry and capital and the explosion of labor unrest. Prime Minister Terauchi decried the new “wind of luxury and frivolity” that now gripped Japan and considered the increasing frequency of work stoppages “most troubling.” In October 1917, he urged an assembly of police bureau chiefs to promote a mood of “frugal industry and simplicity” and a spirit of loyalty and patriotism.⁴⁰

The transformation of Japanese society within was facilitated by a pivotal event without: the American declaration of war. The United States entered the war in April 1917 seeking not merely a resolution to the European conflict. President Woodrow Wilson declared his intention to eliminate war for all time. To do so required a complete transformation of international politics. For the largest war the world had ever known, Wilson held, had sprung from the misguided practices of the “old diplomacy:” from balances of power, the quest for empire, the competition for armaments, and international negotiations behind closed doors. To prevent the recurrence of another great war, the president proposed a cooperative international association of states (a League of Nations), the self-determination of peoples, peaceful economic competition, and open covenants.

Wilson’s rejection of the “old diplomacy” was equivalent to a condemnation of the national trajectory of modern Japan. For Japanese statesmen, like their European counterparts, had followed the practices of the “old diplomacy” in their quest for international respectability since the mid-nineteenth century. The American president’s censure of German “militarism,” moreover, translated in Tōkyō into a condemnation of Japan’s national polity. For modern Japan’s founders had followed the example of Imperial Germany in creating a highly centralized system of military-bureaucratic rule. After having been hailed abroad for the military conquest of China in 1895 as the “pioneer of progress in the Orient,” then, Japan in 1917 suddenly appeared to stand upon the conservative side of world change. As Kenseikai orator Ozaki Yukio noted in a January 1918 interpolation in the Diet, “although the Western allies are trying to destroy militarism, the Terauchi cabinet is trying, at home and abroad, to strengthen and protect it.”⁴¹

It is this context of a fundamental questioning of the world order and the Japanese state in which Japanese statesmen drafted plans for the last great foreign policy initiative of the war: the Siberian Intervention. Anal-

⁴⁰ Oka Yoshitake, *Tenkanki no Taishō* (Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1969), 89.

⁴¹ Ōtsu Junichirō, *Dai Nihon kenseishi*, 10 vols. (Tōkyō: Hara Shobō, 1970), VIII, 163–64.

yses of the intervention typically discuss it within the context of a transformation in the balance of power in the Russian Far East.⁴² The Russian revolution of 1917 produced a political vacuum in Siberia and threatened the spread of Bolshevik power. Indeed, allied governments proposed a joint expedition to Vladivostok precisely to deal with the Bolshevik advance.

But Japanese aims in the Russian Far East in the fall of 1918 are less understandable in the context of a Bolshevik advance in Siberia than within the framework of Japanese politics at home. They are less a response to an external threat than they are reflective of an unprecedented opportunity. As we have seen, since the outbreak of war in Europe, Japanese policymakers had enthusiastically seized the political momentum in Tōkyō for a stronger Japanese position in Asia by promoting ever more aggressive policies in China. The political vacuum in Siberia offered another great opportunity to advance Japanese continental interests. With the war winding down in Europe, moreover, Japanese statesmen recognized the occasion as very likely the last such opportunity. As Japanese troops embarked for Vladivostok, Tanaka Giichi hailed the chance for a “display of national authority at the end of the war” as the “crowning act of the Empire.”⁴³

But the opportunity for a major expedition of troops to the Asian continent assumed particular significance in light of the social and political changes sparked in Japan by wartime economic growth and America’s entrance into the war. To many, the rising popularity of motion pictures and the Asakusa opera and the explosion of labor strife signalled social dissipation. Wilson’s appeals to make the world “safe for democracy,” moreover, played directly into the hands of the enemies of military-bureaucratic rule. Members of the transcendental Terauchi cabinet, then, relished the opportunity presented by a new military campaign on the continent to shore up the bases of military-bureaucratic rule. Finance Minister Shōda Kazue advised Terauchi in late January to “use relations with Russia to direct domestic trouble outward.”⁴⁴ And Communications Minister Den Kenjiro insisted that, as with the Sino- and Russo-Japanese

⁴² See, for example, the classic studies of the expedition, Hosoya Chihirō, *Shiberia shuppei no shiteki kenkyū* (Tōkyō: Yūhikaku, 1955) and James Morley, *The Japanese Thrust into Siberia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957). While both men offer detailed analyses of policy battles in Tōkyō, they describe the expedition primarily as a reaction to the spread of Bolshevik power.

⁴³ Takakura, *Tanaka denki*, II, 141–42.

⁴⁴ Terauchi monjo 297–20, Shōda to Terauchi, 30 January 1918, in Yamamoto, *Terauchi naikaku shiryō*, II, 45.

wars, with an expedition of troops to Siberia, “national opinion will uniformly return to militarism.”⁴⁵

The likely political effects of an expedition to Siberia were particularly attractive to the Imperial Army. For, in addition to their loss of control of Japan's continental policy and continuing budget inferiority to the navy, Japanese economic growth and Wilson's pronouncements directly challenged the *raison d'être* of Japan's generals. The surge of private capital produced decreasing willingness to support large military expenditures. And Wilson's rejection of empire and armaments struck at the heart of a force that had been created in the 1880s to project Japanese power upon the Asian continent. The Imperial Army's founder, Yamagata Aritomo, not surprisingly, worried about the army's loss of “public sympathy” due to wartime economic growth.⁴⁶ And he objected fiercely to Wilson's vision of a new world order. “I wonder,” he protested in March 1918, “if militarism and imperialism are really so hateful?”⁴⁷

Two weeks after the American declaration of war, Vice Chief of the General Staff Tanaka Giichi informed Premier Terauchi of a grandiose plan to restore the slipping power of the Imperial Army. Conceived as a revision of the 1907 Basic Plan of National Defense that had served as the basic outline of military strategic planning, Tanaka's “Draft for Army Preparedness” hoped to commit both the navy and the government to an unprecedented program of expansion for the army.⁴⁸ The problem was how to justify the 57 percent increase in size of the standing army.

It was precisely at this time, as the army scrambled to stem the continuing erosion of its position vis-à-vis the government and the navy, and when even its chief *raison d'être*, continental empire, had been called into question, that opportunity knocked in the Russian Far East. Confronted with Premier Terauchi's austerity, Tanaka's “Draft for Army Preparedness” did not go anywhere after its submission in April 1917. By September 1918, however, Japan's generals had committed the government and the navy not only to the mobilization of ten divisions to Siberia. They had obtained sanction, as well, for Tanaka's colossal program for army expansion. The Siberian Intervention, then, provided Yamagata and the general staff with tangible cause to re-anchor Japanese defense firmly upon the

⁴⁵ *Hara nikki*, IV, 421 (26 July 1918).

⁴⁶ The field marshal worried particularly about the effects of the rice riots. Tokutomi Sohō *kankei monjo* 40–42, Yamagata to Tokutomi, 5 September 1918, in Itō Takashi et al., eds., *Tokutomi Sohō kankei monjo*, 3 vols. (Tōkyō: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1985), II, 395.

⁴⁷ Yamagata, “Jikyoku iken (15 March 1918),” in *Yamagata Aritomo ikensho*, comp. Oyama Azusa (Tōkyō: Hara Shobō, 1966), 360.

⁴⁸ Kitaoka, *Nihon rikugun*, 326.

continent and to justify an enormous expansion of army power.⁴⁹ After having been displaced by the financial diplomacy of Nishihara Kamezō, Yamagata and Tanaka succeeded, as well, in steering their way back to the center of foreign policy decision-making via the restoration of a military solution to Japan's continental interests.

DISSOLUTION OF A CONSENSUS ON ARMY AND EMPIRE

If the Siberian intervention offers a glimpse of the continuing political potential of expansion in Asia, it also marks, nonetheless, a turning point in the politics of Asia in Taishō Japan. The expedition may have advanced the domestic position of Yamagata and the Imperial Army in the immediate term. But it did nothing to address the long-term threat to military-bureaucratic power posed by economic growth and Woodrow Wilson's appeals for democracy and internationalism. Like members of the Terauchi cabinet, Yamagata had hoped that a major military operation on the continent would help stem the dissipation in public consciousness spurred by economic change and Wilson's pronouncements. At a time when peaceful coexistence had become the catch phrase of the day, the field marshal insisted that the war had proven, rather, the importance of armaments. "The Great European War," he observed in June 1918, "has done away with the delusion of the promoters of peace and demonstrated that the complete independence of all states must be preserved through enormous war preparations."⁵⁰ An expedition of troops to Siberia, he had explained to Seiyūkai President Hara Takashi in March, would help to "raise the idea of militarism among the people."⁵¹

Unfortunately for Yamagata, the expedition did no such thing. Expecting to witness a spontaneous burst of enthusiasm for military conquest on the scale of that seen for the Sino- and Russo-Japanese Wars, the architects of the intervention, rather, faced civil protest throughout Japan. One day after the official announcement of Japanese participation in an expedition, the most dramatic effect of wartime economic growth leapt into the national headlines. An inflationary spiral of rice prices brought two million protesters to the streets in a rampage of burning and looting that required

⁴⁹ Lieutenant General Ōi Shigemoto, Commander of the Twelfth Division sent to Siberia in August 1918, later remarked that the Imperial Army had seized upon the American proposal to rescue Czech forces in Siberia as the "perfect pretext to deploy troops on the continent." Shinobu Seizaburō, *Taishō seijishi*, 4 vols. (Tōkyō: Kawade Shobō, 1951), II, 536.

⁵⁰ Yamagata, "Kokubō hōshin kaitei ikensho (June 1918)," in *Yamagata Aritomo ikensho*, 373.

⁵¹ *Hara nikki*, IV, 376 (30 March 1918).

one hundred thousand troops to suppress. Yamagata viewed the bad timing of the rice riots with “unbearable regret.”⁵² And Lieutenant General Machida Keiu lamented the “cold stare” directed by the public at Japanese troops embarking for Vladivostok. “Compared to the hearty send-offs and welcomes and cries of ‘banzai’ resonating at the train stations and ports each time the expeditionary forces passed in the last two great wars,” he noted, “there is truly a world of a difference.”⁵³

LEGACY OF THE GREAT WAR IN INTERWAR JAPAN

Indeed, public sympathy for imperial conquest now seemed a luxury of the past. For the combination of wartime economic growth and Woodrow Wilson’s appeals for a new world order had decisively altered the place of Asia in the politics of Imperial Japan. While not even Yoshino Sakuzō had doubted the wisdom of pushing aggressively for Japanese continental interests in 1915, the Forty-First Diet (December 1918—March 1919) actively challenged the utility of sending 73,000 Japanese troops to the Russian Far East.⁵⁴ Japanese public opinion steadfastly hoped for great power recognition at Versailles of all of Japan’s wartime gains. But as the peace conference proceeded in the first months of 1919, public attention focused elsewhere. Rather than cheer Japanese wartime accomplishments with handsome floats and celebratory lanterns, Tōkyō trembled from signs of a new world order. In January, the Kenseikai’s Hamaguchi Osachi hailed the “great tide of democracy” that was “overwhelming the entire world at this moment.”⁵⁵ On 1 March an assembly of 50,000 students, merchants, and factory and clerical workers swarmed Hibiya park to rally for universal manhood suffrage. On 30 August the single union Yūaikai became a Japanese national federation of unions vowing “not to refrain from a struggle of martyrs” for expanded labor rights.⁵⁶ And Yoshino Sakuzō called in the spring and summer of 1919 for partial self-government in Ko-

⁵² Tokutomi monjo 40–42, Yamagata to Tokutomi, 5 September 1918, in *Tokutomi Sohō kankei monjo*, II, 395.

⁵³ Uehara monjo 102–19, Machida to Uehara, 28 August 1918, in *Uehara Yūsaku kankei monjo*, ed. Uehara Yūsaku kankei monjo kenkyūkai (Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1976), 484.

⁵⁴ See Tatsuji Takeuchi, *War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire* (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1935), 209–212.

⁵⁵ Hamaguchi Osachi, “Tōrai no sandai mondai,” *Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun* 5 January 1919; cited in Mitani Taichirō, “Taishō demokurashii no kenryoku to chishik-ijin,” in *Kokka to shimin*, ed. Kokka gakkai hyakunen kinen (Tōkyō: Yūhikaku, 1987), II, 69.

⁵⁶ Oka, *Tenkanki no Taishō*, 122–23.

rea and an end to the Japanese association with the pro-Japanese "military bureaucratic clique" in Beijing.⁵⁷

The economic and political changes ushered in by the Great War did not bring outright rejection of empire in Japan. But they did move continental expansion away from center stage in Japanese politics and slow the unrelenting quest for "leadership in Asia" that had typified the war years. Japan's ever tumultuous struggle for political power would in the 1920s revolve not around the quest for leadership in Asia but around issues of political reform: universal manhood suffrage, labor, and tenant rights. And the increased attention to greater political and fiscal responsibility would, by mid-decade, bring genuine reductions in both the Japanese empire and the armed forces.⁵⁸

Katō Takaaki's Kenseikai (after 1927 Minseitō) party dominated the turbulent politics of 1920s Japan. But it did so not, as its predecessor in 1915, via an aggressive promotion of Japanese continental interests. On the contrary, Katō deftly rode the popular wave for universal manhood suffrage and domestic political reform. Meanwhile, his foreign minister Shidehara Kijūrō kept China out of the major domestic political debates by rejecting the impulse to control events on the continent.

By coopting the most popular domestic political agenda of the day and downplaying the significance of crises in China, the Kenseikai and Minseitō decisively outmaneuvered their chief political rival, the Seiyūkai, in the 1920s and early 1930s. With its primary source of power among landed elites, the Seiyūkai, after all, stood at a decided political disadvantage after the adoption of universal manhood suffrage in 1925. Nor could it hope to defeat the Kenseikai with its conservative approach to the problem of rural and labor strife. Unable to compete in an era of liberal reform, the Seiyūkai, in the latter 1920s sought to shift the political dialogue from domestic reform to international crisis. Field Marshal Yamagata had responded to the social dissipation accompanying economic growth and Wilson's appeal for democracy and internationalism in 1917 by stressing the value of arms and empire. Likewise, the Seiyūkai created a vision of crisis in China in the latter 1920s to defuse the momentum of liberal reform at home.

⁵⁷ Yoshino Sakuzō, "Chōsen bōdō zengosaku," *Chūō Kōron* 34, no. 4 (April 1919): 122; Yoshino Sakuzō, "Peipin gakuseidan no kōdō o manba suru nakare," *ibid.* 34, no. 6 (June 1919): 1.

⁵⁸ Japanese troops withdrew from Shandong and Siberia in 1922, Japan agreed to naval arms limitations at the Washington Conference in the same year, and the Katō Takaaki cabinet paved the Imperial Army by four divisions in 1925.

LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR FOR POST-COLD WAR JAPAN

The Seiyūkai and its military-bureaucratic allies succeeded in the latter 1920s in tapping into a latent sentiment for Japanese leadership in Asia. By manufacturing an image of crisis in China and declaring the Kenseikai and Minseitō responsible, they destroyed the most powerful domestic force for democratic reform. They also shattered the chances for democracy itself and ultimately invited the obliteration of Imperial Japan.

In the era of peace that followed the Sino-Japanese and Pacific Wars, the United States replaced China as the central focus of Japan's domestic political battles. Japanese conservatives and progressives defined their respective positions not by their degree of enthusiasm for expansion in China but by their acceptance or rejection of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. A transformation of the place of China in Japanese domestic politics after the Great War had a profound effect upon Japanese diplomacy in the 1920s and 1930s. Similarly, the direction of Japanese diplomacy in the post-Cold War era will likely depend upon changes in the place of the United States in Japanese domestic politics.

While the historian must be wary of drawing parallels between two distinct eras, a few simple comparisons might be instructive. The first great watershed of the twentieth century, the Great War, complicated Japanese politics by advancing a new definition of national power. In place of militarism and imperialism, economic growth and Wilson's pronouncements offered the prospect of greater social mobility at home and peaceful cooperation abroad. Those who stood to lose most politically by the new order responded with a vigorous new drive for militarism and imperialism.

The last great watershed of this century, the end of the Cold War, offered another new vision of the world order. In the place of a polarized world poised on the brink of destruction, a relaxation of the Soviet-American rift raised the possibility of a less confrontational multi-polar world. But, as in 1918, there were powerful political forces in post-Cold War era Japan that benefited from a continuation of the old order. Just as Yamagata and the Imperial Army rose to power at the turn of the century via an aggressive pursuit of "leadership in Asia," the Liberal Democratic Party enjoyed thirty-eight years of uninterrupted rule from 1955 largely due to strong ties cultivated with the United States under the U.S.-Japan security alliance.⁵⁹ The immediate reaction of the LDP to the end of the Cold War,

⁵⁹ For an extraordinary look at the symbiotic relationship between the LDP and successive American administrations, see Michael Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

then, was not to weaken this centerpiece of United States Cold War strategy in Asia. It was to strengthen it.

As with Yamagata and the Imperial Army in 1918, however, there were signs in the 1990s that the LDP was swimming against the political tide in Japan. While Japanese public support for the U.S.-Japan alliance reached an all-time high in the 1980s, domestic criticism of the unwavering American military presence in Japan grew after the wide publicization of the rape of a Japanese schoolgirl by American servicemen in Okinawa in 1995. After yielding in the 1980s to a debate over political reform, disagreements over the direction of the U.S.-Japan alliance, moreover, returned to center stage in Japanese politics.⁶⁰ The degree to which the LDP's political rivals tap into domestic sentiment for a relaxation of ties with the United States will have a significant bearing upon the thrust of Japanese policy toward the U.S. in the post-Cold War era.

A change, in turn, in the place of the United States in Japanese politics will likely affect the position of Asia in the future political dialogue in Japan. The political momentum for continental expansion of course, dissipated after 1945. But the yearning for "leadership in Asia" did not. In the mid-1990s, rightwing political activists attempted to force the issue of disputed territory between Japan and its Asian neighbors to the center of the Japanese political stage.⁶¹ The degree to which this endeavor succeeds in the future will have a direct bearing upon Japan's post-Cold War relations with Asia.

⁶⁰ The Social Democratic Party, for example, cited conflict with coalition partner LDP over the new defense guidelines in its decision to forgo cooperation with the LDP in the summer 1998 upper house elections. "Shamin, getsunai ni yotō rīdatsu mo," *Asahi Shinbun*, 2 May 1998, 1.

⁶¹ Particularly, the dispute between Japan and China over the Senkaku Islands and that between Japan and Korea over Takeshima Island.

THE DREAM OF ONE ASIA: ŌKAWA SHŪMEI AND JAPANESE PAN-ASIANISM

Christopher W. A. SZPILMAN

This paper examines the career and views of Ōkawa Shūmei, political activist, best-selling writer, and advocate of Japan's divine mission on the Asian continent. Though, in its most obvious manifestations, this pan-Asian mission came to an end with Japan's defeat in the Second World War, Ōkawa's quest for uniquely Asian values, which was an integral part of this mission, appears still to have adherents in Japan today. Take, for example, the declaration, which, in 1994, the then Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro made to his Chinese counterpart Li Peng. "The Western concept of human rights," he asserted, "should not be blindly applied to all nations."¹ If Ōkawa were alive today, he no doubt would have approved of this statement made by the grandson of his two prominent pan-Asianist contemporaries, Marquis Hosokawa Moritatsu and Prince Konoë Fumimaro. After all, he dedicated his life to proving this proposition in a more explicit form, namely, that Western values of democracy, equality, and human rights do not apply to Asia. This fierce opposition to Western values, as I shall argue below, constituted the essence of Ōkawa's dream of one Asia.

At first sight, Ōkawa is difficult to classify. He was a man of seeming contradictions, a paradox. Though he clearly belonged in the right wing camp, he nevertheless sympathized with Bolshevik Russia and admired Lenin.² Though he denounced democracy, he was on friendly terms with Yoshino Sakuzō, the most influential proponent of democracy in Japan.³

¹ "Looking Casual, Japan's Prime Minister Flies Home," *New York Times*, 22 March 1994, A6. The recent dialogue between Japanese novelist-turned-politician Ishihara Shintarō and the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad, indicates that the Japanese form of pan-Asianism has supporters also outside Japan; see Mahathir Mohamad and Ishihara Shintarō, *"No" to ieru Ajia* (Tōkyō: Kōbunsha, 1994).

² See, for example, his glowing account of the Bolsheviks in chapter 7 of Ōkawa Shūmei, *Fukkō Ajia no shomondai* (Tōkyō: Chūō Kōronsha, 1993), 162–79; also *Nihonteki genkō*, in vol. 1 of Ōkawa Shūmei zenshū kankōkai, ed., *Ōkawa Shūmei zenshū* (Tōkyō: Iwasaki Shoten, 1961; hereafter OSZ), 384.

³ See letter from Yoshino to Ōkawa, dated 7 July 1926, reproduced in Ōtsuka Takehiro, *Ōkawa Shūmei* (Tōkyō: Chūō Kōronsha, 1995), 97.

He ardently supported the imperial institution,⁴ but his best-selling books were censored for lese majesty.⁵ He professed utter contempt for the *narikin* (*nouveaux riches*) businessmen of Taishō Japan, while accepting financial support from one of the most notorious of these *narikin*, Ishihara Hiroichirō.⁶ He was implicated in the terrorist incidents of the thirties, yet remained on friendly terms with Count Makino Nobuaki, whom this terror aimed to dislodge from power.⁷ It would be tedious to multiply such contradictions, but they certainly have deterred historians from tackling him.⁸

Historians have largely neglected to study Ōkawa but they agree that he was a pan-Asianist and a radical. Ōkawa owes his reputation as a pan-Asianist to his research activities and his writings. He owes his reputation as a radical to his membership in right wing organizations, his prison sentence, and his arraignment as a class A war criminal. To both he also owes his neglect by historians, who tend to avoid these two troublesome, yet seemingly related themes.

The neglect suffered by Ōkawa is curious when one considers that his one-time pan-Asianist partner Kita Ikki basks in the spotlight of academic attention. Kita Ikki's charisma, his socialist views, and his execution for his involvement in the February 26, 1936, putsch made him a popular figure for both the right and left wing after the war. Perhaps as a result, he has been the subject of many studies in both Japanese and English. Yet Ki-

⁴ For example, see *Nihon oyobi Nihonjin no michi*, vol. 1, OSZ, 49–52; see also Furu-ya Tetsuo, "Nihon fuashizumu ron," vol. 20 of *Iwanami kōza Nihon rekishi* (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 1976), 89.

⁵ Ōtsuka, *Ōkawa*, 140.

⁶ On the connection between Ōkawa and Ishihara, see Awaya Kentarō et al., *Ishihara Hiroichirō kankei monjo* (Tōkyō: Kashiwa Shobō, 1994) vol. 1, 302.

⁷ Itō Takashi, ed., *Makino Nobuaki nikki* (Tōkyō: Chūō Kōronsha, 1991), entries for 10 July 1924, 146; 13 July 1924, 147; and 27 February 1931, 431; see also, for example, Hashikawa Bunsō, "Kaisetsu," in *Ōkawa Shūmei shū*, ed., Hashikawa Bunsō, vol. 21 of *Kindai Nihon shisō taikei* (Tōkyō: Chikuma Shobō, 1982), 430 (hereafter *Ōkawa Shūmei shū*).

⁸ There are signs that this situation is changing, at least, in Japan. In this connection, the two recent books by Ōtsuka Takehiro must be mentioned: *Ōkawa Shūmei to kindai Nihon* (Tōkyō: Mokutakusha, 1990), and *Ōkawa Shūmei* (Tōkyō: Chūō Kōronsha, 1995). In English there is Mary Esthes Liebermann, "Ōkawa Shūmei and Japan's 'Divine Mission,'" Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1956, and two articles, one by Takeuchi Yoshimi, "Ōkawa Shūmei: Profile of Asian Minded Man," *The Developing Economies* 7, no. 3 (September 1969) (hereafter "Profile"), the other by George M. Wilson, "Kita Ikki, Ōkawa Shūmei and the Yūzonsha: A Study in the Genesis of Shōwa Nationalism," *Papers on Japan* 2, East Asian Research Center, Harvard University (August 1963). These, and scattered references to him in passing, represent the sum-total of the scholarship on Ōkawa in English.

ta's postwar reputation tends to exaggerate his actual prewar influence. Before the war most of his books were banned and those that were not were usually out of print. Consequently, few readers had access to them. Kita, moreover, never held an official position of any kind; he never taught at a university; he never even graduated from one. His much vaunted influence in the army was limited to "simple, junior grade officers, ignorant of social realities."⁹

Quite the opposite with Ōkawa. The near-oblivion he has been consigned to after the war downplays his prewar importance. Ōkawa wrote influential best-sellers; he received a doctorate from the Faculty of Law, Tōkyō Imperial University; he taught at prestigious universities; he headed the highly regarded research institute of the Southern Manchurian Railway; he had connections to leading politicians (e.g., Viscount Gotō Shinpei),¹⁰ the highest nobility (e.g., Marquis Tokugawa Yoshichika),¹¹ the Imperial Court (e.g., Count Makino Nobuaki), the highest ranks of the army (e.g., Nagata Tetsuzan, Tōjō Hideki);¹² Colonel Hashimoto Kingorō and other officers in the Sakurakai (Cherry Society) regarded him practically as their ideologue in residence.¹³ Ōkawa rather than Kita provided a blueprint (or at least an inspiration) for the military architects of the annexation of Manchuria. Already in 1926, for example, Ōkawa argued for the necessity of creating an independent Manchuria-Mongolia before an audience consisting of Itagaki Seishirō, Nagata Tetsuzan, Tōjō Hideki, Anami Korechika, and several other mid-ranking staff officers.¹⁴ In contrast to postwar historians, his contemporaries felt no doubt as to the greatness of Ōkawa's achievements. Even after Japan's defeat, senior Japanese foreign ministry officials believed "he was the most eminent theoretician and greatest expert on Anglo-American aggression of all the accused [at the Tōkyō Tribunal]." Since he was "no man to succumb to

⁹ Tanaka Ryūkichi, *Nihon gunbatsu antōshi* (Tōkyō: Chūō Kōronsha, 1988), 25; on Kita, see George M. Wilson, *Radical Nationalist in Japan, Kita Ikki, 1883–1937* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969).

¹⁰ "Ōkawa Shūmei ryakuden," *OSZ*, vol. 1, 5; see also Ōtsuka, *Ōkawa*, 115.

¹¹ See Tokugawa Yoshichika, *Saigo no tonosama: Tokugawa Yoshichika den* (Tōkyō: Kōdansha, 1973), 122–67; also Ōtabe Yūji, *Tokugawa Yoshichika no jūgonen sensō* (Tōkyō: Aoki Shoten, 1988), especially chap. 3.

¹² See, for example, Tanaka, *Nihon gunbatsu antōshi*, 25.

¹³ On some aspects of Colonel Hashimoto's close friendship with Ōkawa, see, for example, Ōkawa Shūmei Kenshōkai, ed., *Ōkawa Shūmei nikki: Meiji 36 nen Shōwa 24 nen* (Tōkyō: Iwasaki Gakujutsu Shuppansha, 1986) (hereafter *Ōkawa nikki*), entries for 10 and 11 August 1922, 125–26 (It seems the two were on such friendly terms that they even went to brothels together.); see also a popular account in Matsumoto Seichō, "Sakurakai no yabō," vol. 4 of *Shōwashi hakkutsu* (Tōkyō: Bungei Shunjū, 1994), 102–3.

¹⁴ Hata Ikuhiko, *Shōwa no gunjintachi* (Tōkyō: Bungei shunjū, 1982), 93.

mental illness," they informed the young son of Marquis Hosokawa, "Americans poisoned him out of fear of the power of his arguments."¹⁵

Ōkawa was born in 1886 in Sakata, Yamagata Prefecture, son of a doctor. As a young boy, he received an education typical of a member of the local elite. In addition to the usual curriculum, he studied Chinese classics and modern foreign languages. Like so many other young middle-class Japanese in the Meiji period, Ōkawa came into contact with Christianity.¹⁶ Though he never became a Christian—he found the church hypocritical—Ōkawa was impressed by the universalistic claims of Christianity. It was probably as a result of this fleeting encounter with Western religion that Ōkawa developed a desire to discover a set of Asian values that would match the universalism of Christianity.

In search of some great universal truth, Ōkawa, as a middle school student, flirted for a while with the socialism of Kōtoku Shūsui¹⁷ but he rejected it, angered by the socialists' pacifist stance during the Russo-Japanese War. He found the universalism of socialism, as he had found the universalism of Christianity, too Western for his taste. Instead, he would dedicate his life to the quest for a Japanese, that is, an Asian alternative to the universalistic values of the West. For that reason, when, after graduating from the prestigious Fifth Higher School in Kumamoto, Ōkawa entered Tōkyō Imperial University, he did not enroll at the Faculty of Law as most ambitious young men would have done in his place. Instead, he chose to read Oriental philosophy and religion at the Faculty of Letters with Anesaki Masaharu, the famous historian of religion. It was at the Faculty of Letters that he acquired a theoretical foundation for his already pronounced pan-Asianist sentiments when attending the lectures of the well-known art historian and author, Okakura Kakuzō (Tenshin), one of the precursors of Japanese pan-Asianism.¹⁸

After graduating from the university in 1911, Ōkawa continued his study of Asian, and especially Indian, philosophy as an independent scholar. But his interest shifted to current affairs in 1913 when, by chance,

¹⁵ Hosokawa Morisada, *Hosokawa nikki*, vol. 2 (Tōkyō: Chūō Kōronsha, 1993), 479 (199), entry for 23 May 1946.

¹⁶ *Anraku no mon*, vol. 1 of OSZ, 773–74.

¹⁷ Like Kita Ikki, Ōkawa subscribed to the anarchist *Heimin Shinbun* as a middle school student. Immediately after graduating from middle school and before he entered the Fifth Higher School, Ōkawa spent some time in Tōkyō where he attended lectures by Kōtoku Shūsui, Sakai Toshihiko, Abe Isoo, and other socialists and anarchists. Details of Ōkawa's early interest in socialism, in Ōtsuka, *Ōkawa Shūmei to kindai Nihon*, 22–24.

¹⁸ On Okakura Tenshin and his significance, see, for example, Umehara Takeshi, ed., *Okakura Tenshin shū*, vol. 7 of *Kindai Nihon shisō taikēi* (Tōkyō: Chikuma Shobō, 1976), 378–412.

in a second-hand book store, he came across Sir Henry Cotton's New India. That book made him realize "the tragedy of India under British rule"¹⁹ and, as he recalls in his autobiography, transformed him "from a complete cosmopolitan (*sekaijin*) into an Asianist."²⁰

The transformed Ōkawa sought out the company of like-minded men. One of them was the right wing pan-Asianist journalist Mitsukawa Kame-tarō, who introduced Ōkawa to Kita Ikki. By 1920 the three pan-Asianists were active in the Yūzonsha, an organization, founded a year before by Mitsukawa and Ōkawa, and dedicated to domestic reform, the liberation of Asia, and discovery of an Asian, or more specifically a Japanese, alternative to Western universalistic values.²¹ To this end, the Yūzonsha published a monthly journal, *Otakebi*, with Ōkawa as a major contributor. But, though Ōkawa and Kita may have agreed on the importance of Japan's mission in Asia, their personalities were quite incompatible. They quarreled and, by 1923, the Yūzonsha had disintegrated without any concrete achievement.²²

Ōkawa, however, remained in the mainstream of Japan's right wing movement and pursued his quest for uniquely Asian values. He was a principal figure in two right wing organizations, the Gyōchisha (after 1925) and the Jinmukai (after 1931). He wrote editorials and articles for the Gyōchisha's monthly *Nihon*. But his writing for that periodical constituted only a small fraction of his literary output. Throughout the twenties and the thirties, Ōkawa published several popular books and essays on Asian and Japanese history, politics, and culture, in which he propounded the uniqueness of Japan and Asia. With these publications, he had established himself, by the late 1920s, as a leading rightist theoretician of his day. Nor did his success as a popular writer prevent him from pursuing an impressive professional and academic career.

In 1919 Ōkawa entered the research institute of the South Manchurian Railway, which in interwar Japan played an important role in gathering and analyzing information on Asia.²³ In 1927 Ōkawa was appointed director of the (now independent) institute and editor of its monthly publication, *Tōa*, which, under his editorship, served as a forum for pan-Asian ideas.

¹⁹ *Anraku no mon*, 788–89; Nojima Yoshiaki, *Ōkawa Shūmei* (Tōkyō: Shinjinbutsu Ōraisha, 1972), 47.

²⁰ *Anraku no mon*, 804.

²¹ Takeuchi, "Profile," 368–69.

²² For a sympathetic account of the Yūzonsha, see Doi Tadashi, "Taishō ishin no yakata: Yūzonsha no hitobito," *Shinseiryoku* 23, no. 6, (15 August 1979): 20–28; in English see Wilson's "Kita Ikki, Ōkawa Shūmei and the Yūzonsha."

²³ Unless otherwise stated, the following paragraphs are based on Ōtsuka, *Ōkawa*.

In 1921 Ōkawa's appointment as a professor at Takushoku Daigaku (Colonial University) launched his formal academic career that would continue intermittently until 1945.²⁴ Concurrently with his professorship, Ōkawa also cooperated in running a private center for the study of social education, Shakai Kyōiku Kenkyūjo (later known as Daigakuryō), housed within the grounds of the Imperial Palace. In 1926, he crowned his academic career with a doctorate from the Law Faculty of Tōkyō Imperial University for a dissertation on the origins and development of chartered colonial companies in the West.²⁵

At the same time Ōkawa managed to reconcile his theoretical academic pursuits with more "applied," active political involvement on behalf of pan-Asianist ideals. In the numerous public lectures he delivered throughout Japan in the late 1920s, Ōkawa advocated Japanese military expansion in China and castigated the Minseitō government for its intention to sign the London Naval Treaty that imposed limitations on the build-up of Japan's imperial navy.²⁶

Ōkawa followed his words with deeds. He participated in an abortive coup d'état in 1931, known as the March Incident, and, in May 1932, he aided and abetted the assassination of Premier Inukai Tsuyoshi by providing the plotters with "guns, ammunition, and a certain amount of money."²⁷ Though he received a fifteen-year prison sentence for his role in the assassination, he actually spent only sixteen months in prison.²⁸ Ōkawa certainly was no exception to the judicial tolerance which Japanese rightists enjoyed in the early thirties.²⁹

Far from harming his career, his criminal record even improved

²⁴ Ōkawa owed his first academic job to Viscount Gotō Shinpei, President of Takushoku University, "Ōkawa Shūmei ryakuden," vol. 1 of OSZ, 5.

²⁵ Ibid., 6.

²⁶ Hashikawa Bunsō, *Chōkokkashugi* (Tōkyō: Chikuma Shobō, 1964), 369.

²⁷ "Jiken jinmon chōsho," in *Ōkawa Shūmei shū*, 348.

²⁸ Ōkawa was initially sentenced to 15 years in prison (on 3 February 1934). On appeal, this term was leniently reduced to five years (24 October 1935). The authorities' generosity did not stop there, and Ōkawa was allowed to choose when he would start serving his sentence. He remained free for another six months, entering Tama Prison only on 16 June 1936. But he was not left there for very long. Due to efforts by Marquis Tokugawa and Shimizu Kōnosuke, he was released on parole on 13 October 1937. Ōtsuka, *Ōkawa Shūmei to kindai Nihon*, 220, Ōtsuka, *Ōkawa*, 160.

²⁹ Between 1920 and 1935 three Japanese prime ministers were assassinated: Hara Takashi (1921), Hamaguchi Osachi (shot 1930, died the following year as a result of the inflicted wounds) and Inukai Tsuyoshi (1932). None of the assassins nor their instigators received capital punishment and most emerged from prison relatively quickly, thanks to various amnesties, as did the assassins of Inoue Junnosuke and Dan Takuma.

Ōkawa's professional standing. In October 1937, that is, immediately after he had come out of prison, he became dean of colonial studies at Hōsei, one of Tōkyō's most prestigious private universities. He wrote more best-selling books, such as *Nihon 2600-nen shi* (1939). And he even began to play a minor role as a behind-the-scenes political broker. He enjoyed direct access to several cabinet ministers and occasionally even prime ministers required his services.³⁰ He was the moving spirit behind the Japanese government's bizarre and ultimately unsuccessful scheme to improve American-Japanese relations by obtaining American capital for investment in China (1939–40).³¹

After Japan's defeat, his connections with high-ranking government officials as well as with the radical Right led to his indictment as a class A war criminal, but he avoided a trial for reasons of mental incompetence. Diagnosed with syphilis of the brain, Ōkawa was released from prison,³² and, after he had recovered, he spent the rest of his life in seclusion, translating the Koran into Japanese (1949) and working on his autobiography, *Anraku no mon* (The Gate to Serenity). He died in 1957.

Ōkawa professed to be a pan-Asianist. Roughly put, pan-Asianism is a doctrine claiming that "Asia is one," the slogan coined by Okakura Tenshin, whom Ōkawa readily recognized as a major intellectual influence.³³ Okakura may perhaps be the best-known Japanese pan-Asianist, but he certainly was not the first. The pan-Asian tradition in Japan has been traced to the writings of such people's rights advocates as Ueki Emori and Tarui Tōkichi in the 1870s. In the 1880s, pan-Asianism was taken up by Tōyama Mitsuru and his Fukuoka-based Gen'yōsha, many of whose members, led by Uchida Ryōhei, subsequently (1901) formed the notori-

³⁰ For example, on 30 January 1939, Hiranuma Kiichirō, the newly appointed prime minister (5 January), sent a message to Ōkawa asking him to persuade Admiral Kabayama Sukehide to accept a position in his cabinet; *Ōkawa nikki*, 198; on 1 February 1939, Ōkawa called on the Education Minister, General Araki Sadao, at his official residence; *ibid.*, 199; on 16 February 1939 he visited the Justice Minister, Shiono Suehiko, at his official residence to intercede on somebody's behalf, *ibid.*, 201.

³¹ Kusunoki Seiichirō, "Ōkawa Shūmei to tai-Bei seisaku," *Nihon Rekishi*, no. 474 (November 1987): 54–70.

³² Ōtsuka, *Ōkawa*, 186–87; Kobayashi Masaki's documentary movie entitled *Tōkyō saiban*, captures the moment when Ōkawa, shown sitting in the dock directly behind General Tōjō, all of a sudden hits the latter in the head with a rolled-up sheet of paper. It was this behavior that led to a psychiatric examination, which revealed syphilitic dementia.

³³ See, for example, Ōkawa Shūmei's preface to his *Nihon seishin kenkyū* (Tōkyō: Meiji Shobō, 1939), 8; also Takeuchi Yoshimi, "Ōkawa Shūmei no Ajia kenkyū," in *Ōkawa Shūmei shū*, 403.

ous Kokuryūkai (Amur River Society), which remained active as a pan-Asian organization well into the 1930s.³⁴

All pan-Asianists had to confront the obvious linguistic, cultural, and political diversity of Asia that belied the purported unity of that vast continent. Most Japanese pan-Asianists evaded this contradiction by focusing only on East Asia and neglecting the rest.³⁵ Ōkawa's Asia, however, covered an area greater than the geographic Asia, including Egypt and even the Muslim-inhabited parts of the Balkan Peninsula.³⁶ Ōkawa was of course well aware of the tremendous linguistic, cultural, and political diversity of Asia, but did not think that it contradicted his vision of Asian unity. He believed that all Asian nations shared certain underlying characteristics that the West lacked. These traits were spiritual or moral in character, and they, rather than any linguistic, cultural or political features, defined the "Asianness" of Asia. "Asia," Ōkawa wrote, "is where the soul of mankind resides ... Asian history has been in essence spiritual."³⁷ For Ōkawa, the spirituality of Asia made it timeless and immutable, intuitive, and introspective. This spirituality, above all, accounted for the Asian attachment to culture and tradition, an attachment, which, he stressed, was no mere romantic nostalgia for the past. It provided Asians, he believed, with penetrating insights into the nature of things. By dint of some intuitive process, which Ōkawa never fully explained, "Asia" was capable of "distinguishing the eternal elements from the transitory ephemeral fluff in all kinds of cultural phenomena, whether in religion, customs, or morality."³⁸

If this concept of Asian spirituality appears vague, it is because Ōkawa's Asia cannot be grasped properly without understanding his position on the West. The West, for Ōkawa, was the Other, in opposition to which Asia (the Self?) acquired its identity and significance as Asia. Asia and the West had distinct (though intertwined) histories. "Asia's history," he insisted, "has been essentially spiritual;" Western history materialis-

³⁴ On the genesis of Japanese pan-Asianism, see, for example, Takeuchi Yoshimi, "Nihon no Ajia-shugi," vol. 3 of *Takeuchi Hyōronshū* (Tōkyō: Chikuma Shobō, 1969), 256–317.

³⁵ For example, Prince Konoe Atsumaro's Tō-A Dōbunkai and Uchida Ryōhei's Kokuryūkai; on Prince Konoe, see Marius Jansen, "Konoe Atsumaro," *The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), 107–23; on Uchida Ryōhei, see Takizawa Makoto, *Hyōden Uchida Ryōhei* (Tōkyō: Yamato Shobō, 1976), esp. 149–78.

³⁶ For example, in *Fukkō Ajia no shomondai*, Ōkawa devoted chapter 9, 223–54, to Egypt and chapter 10, 255–88, to Muslims in Europe.

³⁷ Ōkawa Shūmei, *Shin Ajia shōron* (Tōkyō: Nihon Hyōronsha, 1944), 85.

³⁸ *Nihon oyobi Nihonjin no michi*, 73.

tic.³⁹ "Asia is the training ground of mankind's spirit; Europe is mankind's source of [practical] knowledge."⁴⁰ The separateness of historical experience, Ōkawa believed, meant that Western ideas and methods could not be applied mechanically to solve Asian problems. The French revolution, for example, may have been appropriate in France, but it would be wrong to imitate it in Asia.⁴¹ Reform in Asia, Ōkawa insisted, must accord with the principles of its underlying nature. It must be first and foremost spiritual, not materialistic as in the West.⁴²

Ōkawa's philosophy of history was closely related to his pan-Asianism and his concept of Asia. Ōkawa regarded war as a positive historical factor: the dynamic creative force behind civilization and progress. "Everything in nature always struggles ... Since the days of ancient Homer until the present day, ... world history has been a history of war."⁴³ This quasi-Mussolini emphasis on the "creative aspect" of war foreshadowed the infamous October 1934 army pamphlet "Cardinal Principles of National Defense and Proposals for Their Strengthening" (*Kokubō no hongi to sono kyōka no teishō*) which opened with the words "War is the father of creation, the mother of culture."⁴⁴ The central theme in world history, Ōkawa believed, was the incessant conflict between Asia and the West (Europe). "Of all wars in world history, the most heroic in scope, the most profound in significance is the recurrent war between East and West, Asia and Europe."⁴⁵

But Ōkawa did not reject Western civilization. Far from it. In his outline of world history, he insisted that Asia and Europe complemented each other. Through a kind of synthesis, the East-West conflict enriched both European and Asian civilizations and elevated them to a higher historical stage. In short, war generated progress and civilization. If this view of history smacks of Hegel, it is not by coincidence. Ōkawa's philosophy of history bears Hegel's signature all over it. And like Hegel's, Ōkawa's philosophy of history was teleological. That is, Ōkawa maintained, progress

³⁹ *Ajia, Yoroppa, Nihon*, vol. 2 of OSZ, 870.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Nojima, *Ōkawa Shūmei*, 97.

⁴² The reforms proposed by Ōkawa included: "The construction of 'a restoration Japan,' the establishment of national ideals; the realization of freedom in spiritual life; the realization of equality in political life; the realization of fraternity (*yūiai*) in economic life." After the realization of these "reforms," "the moral unification of the world," Ōkawa hoped, would follow presumably automatically. See the 1925 platform of the Gyōchisha, drafted by Ōkawa cited in Takeuchi, "Profile," 377.

⁴³ *Ajia, Yoroppa, Nihon*, 841.

⁴⁴ Quoted in Eguchi Keiichi, *Jūgonen sensō no kaimaku*, vol. 4 of *Shōwa no rekishi* (Tōkyō: Shōgakukan, 1989), 311.

⁴⁵ *Ajia, Yoroppa, Nihon*, 841.

produced by the dialectical clash of Europe and Asia inexorably led toward history's ultimate goal—the unification of the world by one state. This unification, he foretold in 1925, would come about in the near future as a result of another great war. Various symptoms, according to Ōkawa, heralded the approach of this final stage of world history. They included the decline of Western civilization in the aftermath of the First World War and the stirrings of nationalism throughout Asia.⁴⁶ In the approaching war, Ōkawa prophesied, Japan, “the strongest nation of Asia” would “make its first positive contribution to world history” by defeating America, the strongest nation of the West.⁴⁷ From this perspective, Japan's “2600-year-long” history had been simply a process of preparation for this dramatic duel. By achieving this ultimate victory, Japan would “oust darkness from the world and light it up with a radiant sun.”⁴⁸ After the end of the war, Ōkawa predicted in a Hegelian fashion, Japan would unify the world, thus no doubt bringing history to an end.

Naturally, this final war would also liberate Asia from the “enslavement” of Western colonialism. Japan would “become a Lincoln for the 900 million of Asian slaves.”⁴⁹ Japan, Ōkawa insisted, was uniquely qualified to carry out this mission, because it embodied Asian virtues better than any other Asian nation. After all, Japan alone in Asia managed to preserve complete independence due to its superior morality. This was in stark contrast to China, a pale shadow of its former self, where, Ōkawa noted, “the half-educated literary elite, [who] lead the half-educated masses ... in circles, will certainly never save China from its present turmoil.”⁵⁰ Given such an immoral mess, Ōkawa concluded, Japan had a duty to help Asians save themselves. But, Ōkawa noted, it would be a thankless task. Asians were “peoples without their own states” who “must not be regard-

⁴⁶ *Ajia, Yoroppa, Nihon*, 865, on the decline of Western civilization; *ibid.*, 866, on the stirrings of Asian nationalism; on the latter see Ōkawa, *Fukkō Ajia no shomondai*, *passim*.

⁴⁷ *Ajia, Yoroppa, Nihon*, 873. There is a striking similarity between these and the ideas of Ishiwara Kanji. But it seems that Ōkawa arrived at his views independently of Ishiwara. Ōkawa's work had already been published before Ishiwara's return in October 1925 from Germany where he had developed his ideas under the influence of the Nichiren form of Buddhism. A more likely, if unacknowledged, source for Ōkawa was his erstwhile associate, Kita Ikki, who like Ishiwara was an earnest follower of Nichiren. On Ishiwara, see Mark Peattie, *Ishiwara Kanji and Japan's Confrontation with the West* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), 49. On Kita Ikki's views, see, for example, Wilson, *Kita Ikki*.

⁴⁸ *Ajia, Yoroppa, Nihon*, 873.

⁴⁹ Ōkawa Shūmei and Mitsukawa Kametarō, “Sengen,” *Otakebi* 1, no. 3. (October 1920): 1.

⁵⁰ Ōkawa Shūmei, “Arasou koto o yamete manabe,” *Tōa* 2, no. 5, (May 1929): 1.

ed as equal to the Japanese." They had lost their national independence precisely because of their moral inferiority. Likewise, they were bound to misunderstand Japan's efforts to help them.⁵¹ In short, from this perspective, Asians, especially Chinese, seemed like children who resented having to go to school, though education was to benefit them. Just as individuals on reaching maturity appreciated the value of their education, Ōkawa reasoned, so would Asians eventually learn to appreciate Japan's continental mission.

Concerned as he was about Asian ingratitude towards Japan, Ōkawa was far more worried about the obstacles to Japan's pan-Asian mission within Japan. He may have thought Japan superior to other Asian nations, but he realized it was far from perfect. "No true Japanese," Ōkawa lamented, "can be satisfied with the Japan of today." Japan, in his opinion, no longer deserved to have a national flag adorned with a divine "red sun," because "Japan is not any more an objective realization of national morality."⁵²

The decline of Japan as a state, Ōkawa pointed out, had started as early as the Russo-Japanese War,⁵³ but it assumed alarming proportions only as a result of the First World War. There were several factors that contributed to this regrettable phenomenon. First, there was "moral corruption," whose symptoms were materialism and selfishness. Second, there was factionalism and lack of public spirit among the ruling elites that, in turn, resulted in "the oppression of the common man" and "the decline of loyalty and patriotism." Third, the great war prosperity brought about class hostility as a result of rising prices, shortages, and the appearance of the so-called war *narikin*. Fourth, there was an "unhealthy and abstract" debate about "the concept of the state" between the pro-democracy scholars who "sold their souls to the West" and the "ultra-conservatives" who "protected the national polity" with "divine wind arguments."⁵⁴ To make things even worse, the geopolitical situation was also clearly to Japan's disadvantage. Poring over the map of the world, Ōkawa noted with great grief how "small" the territory of the Japanese Empire was in comparison with the "vast expanse" of the British possessions.⁵⁵ The powerful "Anglo-Saxons," having defeated Germany, were now free to carry out their expansion in Asia, or at least maintain the status quo at the expense of Japan.

⁵¹ Ōkawa *nikki*, entry for 4 August 1937, 142.

⁵² *Nihon oyobi Nihonjin no michi*, 6.

⁵³ Hashikawa, *Chōkokkashugi*, 358.

⁵⁴ "Dai-ni ishin no hatsujōki," *Nihon bunmeishi*, vol. 4 of OSZ, 427, (hereafter "Dai-ni ishin").

⁵⁵ Ōkawa *nikki*, January 1937, 138.

In short, Ōkawa had no doubt that the great war had ushered in a “dark night” for Japan. Not only Japan’s mission, but also its survival was apparently at stake. Without undergoing a series of fundamental reforms, to be more specific, without a Taishō restoration, Ōkawa despaired, “Japan will share the fate of Germany.”⁵⁶

The Taishō restoration⁵⁷ espoused by Ōkawa opposed “all ideas that deny the state, which at present surround us like dark clouds.”⁵⁸ Thus it was anti-party-political, anti-democratic, anti-individualist, anti-hedonistic, and anti-socialist.⁵⁹ It was also anti-capitalist and anti-finance. Ōkawa stressed that the “Taishō restoration” necessitated “destruction of money rule” just as the Meiji restoration had necessitated the “abolition of the feudal structure of the shogunate.”⁶⁰ Nevertheless, he explicitly opposed the concept of class struggle, which in his view did not apply to Japan. His restoration, instead of erecting class barriers, would “fuse the ruler and the people into one whole”.⁶¹ Only this totalitarian fusion of sacred and secular, of the civil and political state, of the private and the public domain could lead to “the realization of the true foundational spirit” and enable Japan to become “the true savior of the world.” The Japanese state, in his view, was “capable of no evil.”⁶²

Only a reformed spiritual Asia led by a reformed spiritual Japan, Ōkawa believed, had the potential to stand up to the West with its own authentic Asian values. As a precedent, Ōkawa cited the early Islamic state, which, by fusing state and church, had successfully challenged the West with its uniquely Asian values.⁶³ Islam, however, failed in the end because it had succumbed to corruption and decadence. A reformed Japan would be immune to such decay and complete the task of unifying the world on behalf of Asia, which Islam had begun centuries before.

Even after the defeat of Japan, Ōkawa did not give up his hope for an ultimate victory of Asia over the Occident. True, on 15 August 1945, after listening to the Emperor’s surrender speech, he feared that 40 years of work “toward the revival of Asia has vanished like a soap bubble,”⁶⁴ but he

⁵⁶ “Dai-ni ishin,” 427–30.

⁵⁷ After Hirohito succeeded his father as emperor of Japan in December 1926, the Taishō restoration became naturally the Shōwa restoration, but without any perceptible change in its content.

⁵⁸ *Nihon oyobi Nihonjin no michi*, vol. 1 of OSZ, 4.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ “Dai-ni ishin,” 427.

⁶² Takeuchi, “Profile,” 377.

⁶³ On Ōkawa’s views on Islam, see his *Kaikyō gairon* (Tōkyō: Keiō Shobō, 1942).

⁶⁴ *Ōkawa nikki*, 15 August 1945, 391.

quickly got over his initial worries. In 1949, after the defeat of Chang Kai-shek, for example, Ōkawa perceived a “close resemblance” between “today’s devotees of communism and the early Muslims” and wished for “a second battle of Tours-Poitiers,” which this time would no doubt end in victory for Asia.⁶⁵

These, in short, are the pan-Asianist views of Ōkawa Shūmei. Throughout his whole career, Ōkawa put the greatest stress on the liberation of Asia, which, he believed, was Japan’s sacred duty. His liberation of Asia was, of course, contingent on Japan’s victorious war to unify the world. This war was predetermined by a Hegelian process of historical development. In order to prevail, Japan had to reform domestically, i.e., it had to become increasingly statist and totalitarian. Small wonder that the senior army officers found his views congenial. After all, he expressed in eloquent words their innermost thoughts.

In spite of this emphasis upon pan-Asianism, it is striking how little concrete Asia there is in Ōkawa’s writings. He travelled to Southeast Asia and China several times, but his diary affords little insight into his sentiments toward Asia or Asians. On a down-to-earth level, the man who made a life-long career of condemning British colonialism, could, on his visit to the British colony of Hong Kong, write the following: “Buildings are solid, roads perfect, goods plentiful, people numerous, ... a wealthy city indeed. [By comparison,] Japan’s cities are just like large villages. Prices are low, surprisingly so compared with Tōkyō ... [Procurers] come to the ship to sell women; in department stores pictures of nude women are on sale, and after dark white streetwalkers hang out in public parks. Cannot detect any hypocritical restrictions. I would like to stay in Hong Kong for two or three weeks with plenty of money and have some fun.”⁶⁶ One cannot detect moral indignation at the outrages of British imperialism in this passage or, for that matter, elsewhere in the diary.

For all his emphasis on Asian authenticity, Ōkawa derived his inspiration as much from Western as from native Japanese or Asian sources. He made no secret of his intellectual debt to Plato⁶⁷ (elitism and idealism); Hegel (his philosophy of history); neo-Hegelian Russian philosopher

⁶⁵ Takeuchi, “Profile,” 374. Ōkawa’s views were by no means isolated. Takeuchi Yoshimi, one of the foremost Japanese Sinologists, regarded the above statement of Ōkawa’s as “a profoundly interesting prophecy.” According to Takeuchi, “in the long run of history, we cannot say that the day of this prophecy will not come. We cannot conclude that some day ... the believers in the civilization which judged Ōkawa will not themselves be judged by him.” Ibid.

⁶⁶ *Ōkawa nikki*, entry for 15 October 1921, 98–99.

⁶⁷ For a reference to Plato, see, for example, *Nihon oyobi Nihonjin no michi*, 4.

Soloviev⁶⁸ (the significance of war in history and situational ethics); the now obscure French mystic, Paul Richard,⁶⁹ who confirmed his view of Japan's moral superiority; Lothrop Stoddard and Oswald Spengler, the pessimists, who proclaimed the decline of the West, etc.

Like these Western sources of his inspiration, Ōkawa was essentially a conservative thinker, even if he occasionally sounded and behaved like a radical. Certainly, Ōkawa's much-vaunted pan-Asianism is hardly a radical doctrine, but merely appears to be a disguised anti-Westernism. His Asia, after all, is not an independent entity; it acquires an identity only as a reaction to the West. While the West is the Other, Asia is just an imperfect extension of Japan, to be molded by Japan in its own image.

Much more palpable than Ōkawa's vision of Asia is his reaction to the domestic change in Japan, which closely parallels his vision of Asia. Just as Asia failed to live up to his ideal of "Asianness," so the Japanese masses failed to live up to his ideal of "true Japan." In his emphasis on the strengthening of the state and the Japanese spirit by "moral reform," Ōkawa echoed the conservative lament over the declining morals, social upheavals, and thought confusion to which allegedly the Japanese succumbed in the aftermath of the First World War. At the root of this degeneration and chaos lay pernicious Western influences. To fend off the perceived Western threat, he recommended a variety of more or less radical measures, which taken together did not detract in any way from the essentially conservative character of his thought.

Certainly Ōkawa, unlike his erstwhile collaborator Kita Ikki, never proposed any radical changes to the imperial institution or the Meiji political system as a whole. Unlike the radical (some even would say fascist)⁷⁰ Kita, Ōkawa was also pusillanimous as regards economics and labor relations. Take, for example, his proposal for "the realization of fraternity (yūai) in economic life" included in his program for the Gyōchisha in 1925. This proposal is a mere reiteration of traditional paternalism. In fact, the whole of the Ōkawa-drafted Gyōchisha program, which also advocated, for example, "the realization of freedom in spiritual life" and of "equality in po-

⁶⁸ Ōkawa translated sections of Soloviev pertaining to war as "Sorobiefu no sensō ron", in vol. 4 of OSZ, 543–60 (originally published in *Gekkan Nihon*, June 1928). In his postwar autobiography Ōkawa wrote: "Soloviev ... has been my intellectual sustenance for many years ...," *Anraku no mon*, 736; see also *Ōkawa Shūmei shū*, 248.

⁶⁹ See Ōkawa's introduction to Richard's *Eien no chie*, vol. 4 of OSZ, 866–67.

⁷⁰ In an article, which rejects the applicability of the concept of fascism to Japanese history, Duus and Okimoto specifically identify Kita Ikki as a fascist. See Peter Duus and Daniel I. Okimoto, "Fascism and the History of Pre-War Japan: The Failure of a Concept," *Journal of Asian Studies* 39 (November 1979): 65–76; esp. 67.

litical life," contained nothing to which a conservative politician or bureaucrat would object.

If we consider Ōkawa as a conservative (rather than a radical) thinker, some of the apparent contradictions in his thought disappear. His admiration for Lenin and the Bolsheviks, for example, is not necessarily evidence of the radicalism of his views or even sympathy for communism as an ideology. Rather, it is a consequence of his anti-Westernism and is an expression of hope that communism as an Asian ideology [*sic!*] would destroy Western civilization and the menacing liberal values it represents. By classifying Ōkawa as a conservative, it is also easier to understand his cordial relations with various senior government officials. There was really no contradiction between those friendships and Ōkawa's involvement in various conspiracies and putsches. After all, none of Ōkawa's friends in high places came to any harm. Nor does his indirect involvement in the assassination of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi, a party politician *par excellence*, necessarily prove the radicalism of his views, at least on the spectrum of Japanese politics. Like many other Japanese conservatives, Ōkawa hated the established political parties, regarding them as a radical menace to his ideal of Japan and the help he gave the murderers of Inukai stemmed from his hatred of parliamentarism, rather than from the radical nature of his views.

The conservative nature of Ōkawa's pan-Asianism does not diminish in any way his responsibility for his contribution to bringing Japan closer to war, for, after all, it was the, now largely forgotten, conservative reaction of the 1920s that paved the way for the tragic events of the 1930s and 1940s. From this perspective, the neglect of Ōkawa and his dream of one Asia is symptomatic of a broader issue, namely, Japan's unwillingness to come to terms with its own past.

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE TÖYÖ KYŌKAI AND THE NAN'YŌ KYŌKAI

Hyung Gu LYNN

INTRODUCTION

While a vast storehouse of academic research has been accumulated on Japan's prewar political history and its relations with the rest of Asia, the majority of the research has coagulated around well-known individuals and well-recognized institutions of the modern nation-state, such as political parties, governments, and individual ministries. There have been several works which have studied economic relations through private sector institutions such as individual zaibatsu, industry associations, and chambers of commerce, while a growing number of studies on international conferences or Japanese overseas communities have been produced of late. However, analysis of other avenues of interaction, such as voluntary and non-governmental associations, has been comparatively neglected.

In fact, the pages of archives and history books are littered with an assortment of names belonging to geographically specific foundations, associations, and organizations—Tōyō Kyōkai, Nan'yō Kyōkai, Chūō Chōsen Kyōkai, Kokuryūkai, Tōhō Kyōkai, Nichi-Doku Bunka Kyōkai, Nichi-Man Jitsugyō Kyōkai, Nichi-Ro Kyōkai, Nikka Jitsugyō Kyōkai, Nihon-Biruma Kyōkai, Nichi-In Kyōkai, Nichi-Ran Kyōkai, Fuirippin Kyōkai, Nichi-Gō Kyōkai, among many others. In addition to the seeming proliferation of such associations, several of them had long organizational life spans. The Tōyō Kyōkai existed from 1898–1945 (forty-seven years) while the Nan'yō Kyōkai lasted from 1915–45 (thirty years). This longevity is comparable to more familiar organizational entities such as the Sei-

¹ See for example, Namikata Shōichi, ed., *Kindai Ajia no Nihonjin keizai dantai* (Tōkyō: Dōbunkan, 1997), especially Hashiya Hiroshi, "Tōnan Ajia ni okeru Nihonjinkai to Nihonjin shōgyō kaigisho," 215–36; also Yoshikawa Yōko, "Senzen Filipin ni okeru hōjin no 'kanmin sekkin' no kōzō," in *Tōnan Ajia to Nihon*, ed. Yano Tōru (Tōkyō: Kōbundō, 1991), 129–46; and Mizuno Naoki, "1920 nendai Nihon-Chōsen-Chūgoku ni okeru Ajia ninshiki no ichidanmen-Ajia minzoku kaigi o meguru sankoku no ronchō," in *Kindai Nihon no Ajia ninshiki*, ed. Furuya Tetsuya (Tōkyō: Ryokuin Shobō, 1996), 509–48.

yūkai ([Jiyūtō 1881] 1900–1940); Rikken Dōshikai (1913–40), Kyōchōkai (1919–46), or the Women’s Suffrage League (1925–40).

Despite the proliferation and the longevity of these legally incorporated voluntary associations, few academic works have focused on the role of these organizations in prewar Japanese domestic and foreign affairs. The aim of this paper is to analyze the roles of two geographically specific associations, the Tōyō Kyōkai and the Nan’yō Kyōkai, and establish their significance in domestic Japanese politics and in interactions with Asia in the prewar period.

Tōyō Kyōkai (East Asia Association) and Nan’yō Kyōkai (South Seas Association) were active in political, economic, educational, and cultural projects. In terms of foreign affairs, due in large part to their networks and resources, both associations were able to engage in data collection and research, publication, and educational activities regarding other countries in Asia. In domestic politics, personal networks allowed for effective lobbying in cases related to Japan-Asia interactions, while having positions with such lobbying organizations kept the names of some of the executives in political prominence.

Most importantly, Tōyō Kyōkai and Nan’yō Kyōkai were concrete embodiments of the cross-institutional political interlocks and coalitions undergirding the surface politics of Nagata-chō. Previous scholarship has contributed greatly to a clearer understanding of workings in official and private sector institutions by analyzing one institution, or by establishing detailed taxonomies of factions and subdivisions within a given ministry, party, or military body. Distinguishing the leanings of one bureau in the Home Affairs Ministry from another, or one faction in the army from another is important for establishing the dynamics and channels of power within the political system. However, official institutions can be julienned only so far. While cliques and divisions within government institutions and political parties were important, these were not the only avenues for forming interest coalitions. The constituents of the Tōyō Kyōkai and the Nan’yō Kyōkai were bureaucrats, scholars, politicians, military officials, and industrialists, cutting across formal departmental lines and organizational hierarchies. I do not argue against the importance of official affilia-

² Previous works which have focused on Tōyō Kyōkai or Nan’yō Kyōkai are Akashi Yōji, “Nan’yō Kyōkai, 1915–45,” *Shakai Kagaku Tōkyū* 40, no. 2 (December 1994): 1–29 (502–30); Go Kōmei, “Kindai Nihon no Taiwan ninshiki: ‘Taiwan Kyōkai Kaihō’ to ‘Tōyō Jihō’ o chūshin ni,” in *Kindai Nihon no Ajia ninshiki*, ed. Furuya, 211–42. Akashi’s article is a solid description of the association’s activities, while Go’s article deals with the contents of the journal published by Tōyō Kyōkai rather than the organization itself.

tions, but rather examine dimensions of foreign relations and policy-making not adequately captured through analyses of official institutions.

In Japanese, the term that most accurately captures associations such as Tōyō Kyōkai and the Nan'yō Kyōkai is *hanmin hankan dantai* (semi-private, semi-public organizations). To avoid the rather awkward translation, I use the term "voluntary associations" in this paper. The term "voluntary association" is commonly used in anthropology and sociology. While the definitions for the concept are still being debated among organizational theorists, one point that is agreed upon is that these are not merely synonyms for "volunteer organizations." The basic point is that in a voluntary organization, the majority of its members are not paid, and that it is not the primary place of work for the majority of its members. The antonym for voluntary associations are not "selfish" organizations, but governments, corporations, ascriptive organizations and social divisions, such as tribes, classes, ethnic groups, and families. My definitions of the term for the purposes of the paper is as follows:

Voluntary associations are formally organized ... groups, most of whose participants do not derive their livelihoods from the organizations' activities, although a few positions may receive pay as staff or leaders. A substantial proportion of associations consist of organizations or persons with economic interests, such as trade associations, professional societies, and labor unions, while many others promote the non-economic concerns of their members. Association boundaries are often fuzzy and porous, since many involve episodic supporters and passively interested constituents who can be mobilized under exceptional circumstances to provide financial or political sustenance.

³ There seems to be much confusion over terms such as "voluntary associations," "NGOs," or even "organizations." To clarify the terminology used in this paper, I should state that NGOs are not, as is often construed in Japan, volunteer organizations concerned with promoting international harmony overseas (in Japan, for some reason, domestic social welfare associations are not included among NGOs), nor must they be environmentally concerned groups such as Greenpeace or the Audobon Society. "Non-governmental organization" means not officially part of the government. "Voluntary association" and "*hanmin hankan dantai*" are not legal terms, but sociological ones. The legal definitions for voluntary organizations vary according to country. For example, in France, non-profit organizations are called "*association*," while those which are profit-oriented are labeled "*société*," whereas in Japan, foundations are divided into various types of "juridical persons" (*hōjin*), such as *zaidan hōjin*, *shadan hōjin*, *gakkō hōjin*, etc.

⁴ Adapted from David Knoke and David Prenskey, "What Relevance Do Organizational Theories Have for Voluntary Organizations," *Social Science Quarterly* 30, no. 3 (March 1984): 3-4.

There are various types of organizations that fit the definition, for example chambers of commerce, industry associations, political campaigns, academic associations, labor unions, religious organizations, and grassroots neighborhood organizations among others. The members of such associations can include average citizens and heads of states, depending on the objectives and boundaries of the group.

Part I of the paper details the structures and resources of each organization and their activities in gathering and disseminating information on other parts of Asia. Part I, section two, profiles the educational activities which served as an important conduit for information and images about Asia. Part II, section one, outlines specific lobbying activities undertaken by Tōyō Kyōkai and Nan'yō Kyōkai, while section two analyzes the role of personal networks in lobbying. Part III addresses the impact of generational change among the core leadership of the organizations, and the resultant organizational decline in the 1930s.

PART I: RESOURCES AND INFORMATIONAL ACTIVITIES

Information Dissemination and Organizational Profiles

This section outlines organizational birth, boundaries, formal goals, legal status, and resources of Tōyō Kyōkai and Nan'yō Kyōkai. Financial resources, scale, legal environment, and other empirical factors defined the extent to which each organization could conduct research, hold lectures throughout Japan, publish periodicals and booklets, and sponsor conferences and exhibitions. With enough resources for regular publications and connections to sponsor and attract forums and lecture tours, both Tōyō Kyōkai and Nan'yō Kyōkai served as key non-official channels for shaping images of Asia in prewar Japan.

Tōyō Kyōkai

Tōyō Kyōkai originated from the Taiwankai, an informal group for those who had either worked in or traveled to Taiwan. At its second meeting in Tōkyō, the motion to turn the Taiwankai into a formal organization was accepted, and the Taiwan Kyōkai was established in April 1898 to support the development of Taiwan. The first president of the association was Katsura Tarō, and the treasurer Ōkura Kihachirō. The executive included

⁵ Katsura's (1848–1913) interest in Taiwan stemmed from his brief days as the governor-general of Taiwan, 2 June–14 October 1896. Katsura spent a grand total of nine days in Taiwan (June 12–20) during his term.

Taiwan Government-General officials, such as Mizuno Jun (first Taiwan Government-General Civil Affairs Department Head), Izawa Shūji (first Taiwan Government-General Education Department Head), Maki Bokushin (first Taiwan Government-General Internal Affairs Department Head), and business figures, such as Ōtani Kahei and Inoue Kakugorō. Political figures, such as Sakatani Yoshirō, Sone Arasuke, Kaneko Kantarō, and Taguchi Ukichi, also numbered among the directors.

Taking its cue from its European counterparts, the Taiwan Kyōkai had no explicit and specific statements regarding political policies and platforms in its charter. Its mission was to promote economic interest and provide information for the grand new colonial project in Taiwan. Other stated objectives of the organization included sending researchers to Taiwan; gathering Taiwanese goods; expediting travel between Taiwan and Japan; assisting Japanese conducting business in Taiwan; creating opportunities to learn and practice Taiwanese language; establishing the Taiwan Kaikan for Taiwanese visiting Japan; developing the association; holding lecture series on Taiwan; and supervising and caring for Taiwanese students in Japan.

Reflecting the expansion of Japanese interests in Korea and Manchuria, Taiwan Kyōkai changed its name to Tōyō Kyōkai in February 1907, and the organizational charter was revised to include Korea and Manchuria.⁶ The dissemination of information regarding Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria, conducting research on the socioeconomic conditions of the three areas, training of personnel to work in private and public sectors in the three areas, publishing its organ paper, holding lectures, and collecting research materials were some of the goals in the revised charter. The expanded roster of directors included business figures connected to the Mitsubishi zaibatsu, (e.g., Iwasaki Yanosuke, Toyokawa Ryōhei) and the Mitsui zaibatsu (e.g., Hayakawa Senkichirō, Fujiwara Ginjirō, Ariga Nagafumi), while younger bureaucrats and politicians, such as Gotō Shinpei, Machida Chūji, and Sekiya Teizaburō, also joined the association.

In terms of its boundaries and scale, Tōyō Kyōkai had five branches by 1907. It established branches in Taipei (January 1899), and Ōsaka (April 1899), while the Seoul and Manchurian branches were both started in

⁶ Katsura's speech on the occasion of the name change is reproduced in full in Tokutomi Sohō (Iichirō), ed., *Kōshaku Katsura Tarō den*, 2 (konkan) (Tōkyō: Kō Katsura Kōshaku Kinen Jigyōkai, 1917), 916–22.

⁷ The Ōsaka branch was started up in 1899, but was dissolved due to lack of interest. It was revived again under Gotō Shinpei, with long-time Ōsaka city mayor, Ikegami Shirō, as the branch head. See *Tōyō Kyōkai-Ōsaka shibu kiyaku narabi meibo* (Tōkyō: Tōyō Kyōkai, 1924); and "Tōyō Kyōkai shohōkoku," *Tōyō* 28, no. 9 (September 1925): 2.

May 1907.⁸ In membership numbers, at its inception in 1898, the association had around 80 members, but this expanded to over 1,700 by the end of 1899. By September of 1923, its membership had grown to 2,994. However, the numbers began to decline after 1929, so that in 1936, the organization had 1,904 members, and by 1944, 1,840 members. General membership fees for the Tōyō Kyōkai were ¥50 per month, while one became a special member by donating more than ¥100 or ¥1,000 at a time. Honorary members did not have to pay fees, but had to be recommended by the association president. Commonly, several members of a branch in the start-up phase made large contributions in their own name, or in their company name. These funds constituted the initial branch endowment.

For regular operations and special projects, these membership fees constituted only a small percentage of the association funding source. Initial endowment at establishment in 1898 was solicited from individual executives of the top zaibatsu, as well as from individual politicians and bureaucrats. In legal terms, Tōyō Kyōkai was initially a *zaidan hōjin* (a juridical foundation) but changed to a *shadan hōjin* (a corporate juridical association)¹⁰ in July 1914. This change in status made it possible to sell advertisement space in its journals, invest in stocks, and generate revenues from the activities of its individual members. Tōyō Kyōkai owned stocks and real estate, and held long-term savings accounts in several banks. For its research division, the association received subsidies from the Taiwan Government-General on specific projects, while special exhibitions and the like garnered endowments from the Government-General of Korea, Taiwan, South Manchurian Railway, and Karafuto Office.

Nevertheless, the funding situation was not always stable, especially after Katsura's death in 1913, and the resulting decline in political pull during second president Komatsubara Eitarō's tenure (1913–19). By the post-First World War slump, there were even suggestions at the executive meetings that the monthly periodical, *Tōyō*, should be discontinued as it

⁸ *Takushoku Daigaku 60 nenshi* (Tōkyō: Takushoku Daigaku, 1955), 105.

⁹ Membership numbers are listed in the annual reports in *Tōyō jihō* and *Tōyō*.

¹⁰ The difference between a *zaidan hōjin* (*Stiftungsperson*) and a *shadan hōjin* (*Körperschaftsperson*), in principle, is that a *zaidan hōjin* operates on an endowment, whereas a *shadan hōjin* operates from the assets of its members and can generate profits through activities of its members. These distinctions were generally derived from German civil law. The basic articles relevant to *zaidan* and *shadan hōjin* are articles 37–39 of the Japanese Civil Law Codes, established in 1896. For further details, see, for example, Hayashi Toshiji, *Zaidan-Zaidan hōjin no kenkyū* (Tōkyō: Shōnandō, 1983).

¹¹ *Takushoku Daigaku 80 nenshi* (Tōkyō: Takushoku Daigaku, 1980), 181.

¹² See for example, the “Tōyō katsudō shashinkan shūshi kessan,” section of “Tōyō Kyōkai shohōkoku,” *Tōyō* 26, no. 9 (September 1923): 21–22.

was a financial drain despite the sales of subscriptions and advertisement space. Generally, however, the association was able to keep out of the red in its annual accounts.

Tōyō Kyōkai's main publication was a monthly journal which was intended to provide information on events in Taiwan and the rest of East Asia. *Taiwan Kyōkai kaihō* was published from 1898 to January 1907 for volumes 1–10. The name was changed to *Tōyō Jihō* (1907–21) for volumes 11–24, then to *Tōyō* (1921–July 1944) from volume 24 for a total of 47 volumes. A typical issue of *Tōyō* covered Taiwan, Korea, Russia, China, and occasionally Brazil or Central Asia, and some fiction. Most of the articles dealt with economic issues, but there were occasional articles on art history, travelogues, the role of cows in human history, and political opinion pieces. Despite the fact that Taiwan was no longer the novelty colonial project that it was at the time of the Tōyō Kyōkai's birth, the monthly featured regular contributions from and on Taiwan. Tōyō Kyōkai also published a weekly newspaper, the *Tōyō Weekly*, the academic journal *Tōyō Gakuhō*, a forum for disseminating research findings concerning East Asia, and over fifty separate research booklets on a variety of topics.

Tōyō Kyōkai-sponsored events were one of few non-governmental forums for disseminating information about Asia within Japan. For example, in February 1923, the association sponsored a China Customs Exhibitions Hall in Tōkyō in which clothing, transportation, foods, wedding ceremonies, school uniforms, shoes, and other items and scenes of China were presented in dioramic displays for a month. In the same year, a nationwide lecture tour on overseas events drew average audiences of around one thousand for each lecture. Annual tours of Taiwan and South China, and occasional tours of Korea and Manchuria, with complete itineraries—including visits to the office of the Governor-General of Taiwan—were also run by the association. At ¥550 per person, and a ceiling of forty people, these tours were not intended to generate profits through mass-marketing tourism to Taiwan, but they were intended to make Taiwan more accessible to those with money to invest or political power to wield.

¹³ "Tōyō Kyōkai shohōkoku," *Tōyō* 28, no. 9 (September 1925): 2–3.

¹⁴ See, for example, the balance sheets for 1936 or 1944. "Kaimu hōkoku," *Tōyō* 32, no. 12 (December 1936): 180; and "Kaimu hōkoku," *Tōyō* 46, no. 3 (March 1943): 53.

¹⁵ Go Kōmei mistakenly states that *Tōyō* was published until December 1942. Go, "Kindai Nihon no Taiwan ninshiki," 212.

¹⁶ For a listing of the research booklet titles to 1943, see the back of *Shina seiboku rū-to gaiken* 51 (Tōkyō: Tōyō Kyōkai, 1943).

The success of Tōyō Kyōkai, a non-profit association, in maintaining publishing activities for some forty-six years was in large part due to its membership. With executives representing a wide range of business and political interests, Tōyō Kyōkai was able to attract funds from various governmental and private sources.

Nan'yō Kyōkai

The genealogy of the Nan'yō Kyōkai can be traced back to the Nan'yō Kondankai, established in 1912 by president of the Nan-A Kōshi, Inoue Masaji,¹⁷ head of the Taiwan Government-General Civil Affairs Department, Uchida Kakichi,¹⁸ president of Malay Gomu Kōshi, Hoshino Shakuo,¹⁹ and a number of Japanese entrepreneurs operating in Southeast Asia and officials of the Taiwan Government-General.²⁰ In late December 1913, the members of this group established the Nan'yō Kyōkai to further facilitate contacts between Taiwan Government-General officials and Japanese businessmen operating in Southeast Asia. This first incarnation of

¹⁷ Born in 1877, Inoue graduated from Waseda, then went to the University of Berlin, where he studied colonial administration and economics. As a member of the Tōa Dōbunkai, he was sent to Korea to be financial advisor to the Korean government, and later secretary to the Ministry of the Imperial Household of Korea in 1905. In 1911, after consulting with a number of people, among them Makino Nobuaki, Den Kenjirō, Akashi Motojirō, Yamagata Aritomo, and Ōkuma Shigenobu, he established Nan-A Kōshi with financial help from Morimura Ichizaemon. Nagami Shichirō, *Kōa ichiro Inoue Masaji* (Tōkyō: Tōkō Shoin, 1941), 514–15, 527–28.

¹⁸ Uchida was born in 1866 and graduated from the Imperial University of Tōkyō. After serving in the Ministry of Telecommunications, he became the director of Civilian Administrator in the Taiwan Government-General under Governor-Generals Sakuma and Andō. He was in the post from 22 August 1910 to 19 October 1915 and was appointed vice minister of telecommunications in 1917 under Den Kenjirō. Uchida was appointed to succeed Den as governor-general of Taiwan and served in the post from 6 September 1923 to 1 September 1924. He became the first president of Japan Telegraphic and Wireless, Co., in 1925. Other directors of the firm included Shibusawa Eiichi, Nakajima Kumakichi, Wada Toyoji, Gō Seinosuke, and Hara Tomitarō. Uchida died in January 1933. See *Kokusai denki tsūshin kabushiki kaishashi* (Tōkyō: Kokusai denki tsūshin kabushiki kaisha, 1949), 9–10; and Uchida Makoto, *Chichi* (Tōkyō: Sōgabō, 1935).

¹⁹ Hoshino was born in 1853 and is best known for promoting small and medium enterprises. Among various posts, he was president of Manshū Nichi Nichi Shinbun, director of Nihon Seitō, and was vice president of the Tōkyō Chamber of Commerce from 1907–17. He was president of the Nihon Jitsugyō Kumiai Rengōkai, from 1908, and also active in various other organizations. Hoshino Shakuo Ō Kanshakai, *Hoshino Shakuo ō den* (Tōkyō: Hoshino Shakuo Ō Kan-shakai, 1935).

²⁰ Nagami, *Inoue Masaji*, 611–12; and Nishioka Kaori, *Shingapōru no Nihonjin shakashi* (Tōkyō: Fuyō Shobō, 1997), 49.

the Nan'yō Kyōkai was dissolved due to lack of interests and funds. Inoue himself was busy managing Nan-A Kōshi in its initial stages of operation, and could not devote much time to the organization.

The second and more lasting incarnation of the Nan'yō Kyōkai was formed in January 1915 by the same combination of Inoue Masaji and Uchida Kakichi. Due to the explosion in exports to Nan'yō and Southeast Asia in 1914–16, Inoue and Uchida were able to accumulate support for a new association devoted to conducting research on Southeast Asia and disseminating the results. Eighteen prominent figures from politics and business, including Den Kenjirō, Ogawa Heikichi, Yamamoto Teijirō, Shibusawa Eiichi, Ōtani Kahei, Wada Toyoji, Hayakawa Senkichirō (Mitsui Bank), Fukui Kikusaburō (Mitsui Trading), and Kondō Yasuhei (NYK), gave their endorsements to the new organization. Financial support was provided by the Taiwan Government-General, the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the Commerce and Agriculture Ministry. The executive of the Nan'yō Kyōkai consisted of one president, two vice presidents, one executive director, one general manager, one treasurer, and an unspecified number of directors.

At its inaugural general assembly, Uchida stated in his opening remarks that the Nan'yō Kyōkai “harbors no political ambitions, and consequently will not have connections to any political party or political faction. Furthermore, our association will not directly manage any enterprises.”²¹ Describing the Tōyō Kyōkai as being primarily concerned with Sinic cultures, the Nan'yō Kyōkai specified that the territory that fit under the rubric of “Nan'yō”²² (South Seas) included Southeast Asia, as well as the South Seas Islands. Among its other various missions, the association was to conduct research on Nan'yō and promote mutual understanding between Japan and the area; research-specific industries, systems, societies of Nan'yō; introduce the research results to Japanese; disseminate information about Japan in Nan'yō; train personnel for in-

²¹ *Nan'yō Kyōkai 10 nenshi* (Tōkyō: Nan'yō Kyōkai, 1925), 4.

²² *Nan'yō Kyōkai 10 nenshi*, 2, 6. My use of the term for this paper will also cover both areas. The terms Inner and Outer Nan'yō were used to differentiate between the Japanese mandate islands in Micronesia, and also Southeast Asia in general. My use of the term Nan'yō includes all of Southeast Asia and the South Seas. In 1940, after “Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere” became part of the official lingo, “Nanpō” became the primary term for the area. For a more detailed discussion of the definitions of the term, see, for example, Yano Tōru, “*Nanshin*” no keifu (Tōkyō: Chūō Kōronsha, 1975), 6–8; Yano Tōru, *Nihon no Nan'yō shikan* (Tōkyō: Chūō Kōronsha, 1979), 112, 123–24; and Shimizu Hajime, “Senkanki Nihon-keizaiteki “Nanshin” no shisōteki haikai,” in *Senkanki Tōnan Ajia no keizai masatsu*, ed. Sugiyama Shin'ya and Ian Brown (Tōkyō: Dōbunkan, 1990), 13–44.

dustries operating in the area; sponsor lectures about the area; and set up a Nan'yō museum and library.

The first president was Yoshikawa Akimasa,²⁴ while Uchida Kakichi was elected to one of the two vice presidencies. The treasurer was Hayakawa Senkichirō, and directors included Den Kenjirō, Fukui Kikusaburō, Gō Seinosuke, Hoshino Shakuo, Inoue Masaji, Nitobe Inazō, Ogawa Heikichi, Tokonami Takejirō, Shibusawa Eiichi, and Wada Toyoji. When Yoshikawa Akimasa, whose interest in Southeast Asia was not particularly ardent, became ill, Den Kenjirō was elected in his place in May 1919. Hayakawa took over as vice president after Yoshikawa's death, and when Hayakawa died, the post was filled by Wada (1923), then Fujiyama Raita (1924). In 1920, Inoue Masaji was appointed as executive director, while another core member, Iizumi Ryōzō, became general manager of the association in 1921.

At its conception in January 1915, the organization had 79 members. By December 1915 it had grown to 360 members, including members of the Taiwan branch. By 1923, Nan'yō Kyōkai had grown to 1,450 members, and by 1929, it had 1,386 members. Nan'yō Kyōkai started out with three major centers of operation in Tōkyō, Taiwan, and Singapore. The Tōkyō headquarters was first temporarily located in the Taiwan Government-General's Tōkyō office, then it was moved to a building in Yaesu. By the end of 1944, the association had branches in Tōkyō, Taipei (est. 1916), Singapore (1916), Java (Batavia, 1921), Kansai (Ōsaka, 1923), Micronesian islands (Palau, 1923), Manila (1924), Tōkai (Nagoya, 1924), Davao (1929), Sumatra (Medan, 1929), Kanagawa Prefecture (Yokohama, 1941), Hiroshima (1942), Yamaguchi Prefecture (1944), Thailand (Bangkok), and an office in Saigon for its members in French Indochina. The branches in Japan received donations and subsidies from prefectural and city governments²⁵ and generally had similar operating budgets of around ¥10,000 per year.

While the branches received subsidies from local governments, the head branch in Tōkyō was fueled by large donations from the Taiwan Government-General. Membership fees were ¥6 per year but required the introduction of at least two members. A supporting member had to do-

²³ *Nan'yō Kyōkai 10 nenshi*, 7–8. For a slightly different translation, see Akashi, "Nan'yō Kyōkai," 4.

²⁴ Yoshikawa Akimasa (1841–1920) was a politician who, after a tenure as Tōkyō governor, served as minister of education, home affairs, justice, and communications during the period between 1890 and 1903.

²⁵ Annual numbers and detailed breakdowns by branch can be found in the annual summary reports presented by the association vice presidents in *Nan'yō Kyōkai 10 nenshi*, and annual reports in issues of *Nan'yō* and *Nan'yō Kyōkai Zasshi*.

²⁶ See for example account sheets for the Kanagawa and Hiroshima branches, *Nan'yō* 28, no. 2 (February 1942): 155, and *Nan'yō* 28, no. 10 (October 1942): 140.

nate ¥50 at one time, while an honorary member had to be recommended by directors and approved by the president of the association.²⁷ By 1944, the fees had changed to ¥12 year, or a ¥200 donation in lump sum, or a ¥500 donation in lump sum. Unlike the Tōyō Kyōkai, Nan'yō Kyōkai started as a *shadan hōjin*, then became a *zaidan hōjin* in January 1939. This change made the association even more dependent on funds from the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the Colonial Ministry.

Nan'yō Kyōkai also operated commercial museums in Singapore (est. 1918) and Surabaya (est. 1924). The Singapore museum was started at the behest of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, (which provided five-eighths of its operating budget). According to the association's statistics, in its first year of operation, the museum in Singapore drew an average of 170 people per day.²⁸ A student center, which also served as a hotel for Japanese businessmen traveling through Singapore, was housed in the same building as the museum. The Nan'yō library in the organizational charter had collected 930 volumes by 1920.

The association also supported temporary exhibitions, lecture series, and conferences. Members of Nan'yō Kyōkai lectured in various places within Japan, and a lecture series was held on a weekly basis at numerous lecture halls in Tōkyō. In 1920, Nan'yō Products Exhibition, organized by the association with the help of the Dutch East Indies Government-General and the Java Bank, toured the major cities of Japan, displaying customs and products of Nan'yō. A conference on exchange rates was sponsored jointly with the Nichi-In Kyōkai and two other organizations. Another conference Nan'yō Kyōkai organized was the Conference on Nan'yō Economic Affairs, held from 14–22 September 1939 in Tōkyō and Ōsaka.³⁰ Similar to Tōyō Kyōkai, Nan'yō Kyōkai organized regular tours of the Nan'yō area. In 1926, Nan'yō Kyōkai and Tōyō Kyōkai jointly sponsored an inspection tour of Nan'yō industries.

Unlike Tōyō Kyōkai, much of the research activity of Nan'yō Kyōkai was left to the branch offices. The Taiwan branch was especially active in all areas, including language training, publishing, and conducting research on Taiwan and surrounding areas. Each branch surveyed natural resources in its area and reported back to the Tōkyō head branch. In Oc-

²⁷ *Nan'yō Kyōkai 10 nenshi*, 7.

²⁸ *Nan'yō Kyōkai 10 nenshi*, 50.

²⁹ For details on the Surabaya museum, see *Nan'yō Kyōkai 10 nenshi*, 206–10. For budgetary details see 94–97. Branch museums were established in Medan and Batavia.

³⁰ *Nan'yō Kyōkai, Nan'yō keizai kondankai hōkokusho* (Tōkyō: Nan'yō Kyōkai, 1940). Vice President Hayashi Kyūjirō and Executive Director Iizumi Ryōzō were particularly active in organizing the event.

tober 1942, Nan'yō Kyōkai set up the Institute for Living Conditions in the Nanpō (Nanpō Seikatsu Kenkyūjo) ³¹ in Java to conduct research on health and health economics in the region. This institute published a monthly journal, *Nanpō Seikatsu*, in addition to conducting its research on medical science relevant to the tropics. Specific research projects on emigration possibilities in North Borneo, ³² Cameron Highlands, Siam, and other places were also undertaken. Even as late as 1943, much of the rhetoric surrounding Nan'yō clung with amazing tenacity to the perennial dream of the undiscovered tropical emigration ³³paradise of endless natural resources and low population density.

The publication activities of the association were as prolific, if not more so, than those of the Tōyō Kyōkai. Nan'yō Kyōkai's monthly was first called the *Nan'yō Kyōkai Kaihō*, then changed to *Nan'yō Kyōkai Zasshi*, and lastly to *Nan'yō*. The periodical was published monthly from January 1915 to October 1944 for a total of thirty volumes. Detailed statistical information on various industries and travelogues were featured in the monthly. From 1919–25, the Singapore branch published a separate monthly entitled *Nan'yō Keizai Jihō*, which was eventually incorporated into the main publication, while the Java branch published the *Ranryō Indo Jihō*. As with the Tōyō Kyōkai, the Nan'yō Kyōkai published a continuing series of research booklets which totaled over fifty. Most detailed the conditions of a specific industry in one area, such as agriculture in the Philippines, or commercial laws pertaining to the Dutch East Indies.

Educational Activities

One of the most important methods of information collection and dissemination was the training of personnel to work abroad in China, the colonies, and the Southeast Asia-South Seas. Mark Peattie's statement that Japanese colonialism had "no specialized colonial service or colonial school, like those in Britain ³⁴and France, to provide particular training in colonial administration," is accurate in the sense that there were no institutions devoted solely to the production of a colonial bureaucracy. However, his remarks give the misleading impression that there were no

³¹ "Hon kyōkai ni Nanpō seikatsu kenkyūjo o setchi," *Nan'yō* 28, no. 12 (December 1942): 140; Iizumi Ryōzō, "Nanpō seikatsu kagaku kenkyūkai no kaisetsu," *Nan'yō* 28, no. 10 (October 1942): 1.

³² For details, see Hara Fujio, *Eiryō Maraya no Nihonjin* (Tōkyō: Ajia Keizai Kenkyūjo, 1986), 66–115.

³³ See for example, Iizuma Ryōzō, *Nan'yō* 29, no. 5 (May 1943): 2.

³⁴ Mark Peattie, *Nan'yō: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885–1945* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988), 71.

private institutions of higher education which explicitly focused on overseas Japanese and Western colonies in Asia.³⁵ Although both associations trained significant numbers of students in area-specific knowledge and language, Tōyō Kyōkai's educational projects had more impact in that they trained a greater number of students and operated their educational facilities longer than did those of Nan'yō Kyōkai.

Tōyō Kyōkai

If one takes the Marunouchi subway line from Tōkyō to Myōgadani station, in addition to the better-known Ochanomizu Women's University, one can find the legacy of Tōyō Kyōkai's educational project, originally started in 1900. Takushoku University³⁶ was intended to train people to work in the public and private sectors in the colonies and overseas. As Mizuno Jun put it, British bureaucrats in India spent two years learning "Indian," then spent two years³⁷ in India for further training before stepping into their permanent posts. The objective was to train people to work in Taiwan, either as public officials or in the private sector.

Katsura was one of the strongest advocates of developing Taiwan as a gateway for expansion of trade in Southeast Asia and South China. To administer Taiwan and conduct business in the area, Japanese with Taiwanese language ability would expedite development. The second president of Tōyō Kyōkai and the school, Komatsubara Eitarō, in a speech to the incoming class of April 1917, emphasized Taiwan and its links to Nan'yō,

³⁵ The best-known of the area-specific training schools was the Tōa Dōbun Shoin in Shanghai, founded by the Tōa Dōbunkai, which trained China specialists. For details, see, for example, Daigakushi Hensan Iinkai, *Tōa Dōbun Shoin Daigakushi* (Tōkyō: Kōyūkai, 1982); and Kurita Hisaya, *Shanghai Tōa Dōbun Shoin* (Tōkyō: Shin Jinbutsu ũraisha, 1993). Another school, Daitō Bunka Daigaku, was founded in 1923 by the Daitō Bunka Kyōkai, an association of peers and Diet members. The president was Count Ōki Enkichi, and the vice president, Ogawa Heikichi. Another example was the Nichi-Ro Kyōkai's higher commercial school operating out of its Harbin Commercial Museum, established in 1918 to further trade with Russia. See for example, Nagami, *Inoue Masaji*, 618; Gotō Shinpei, "Tairiku hatten no tame ni," *Tōyō* 28, no. 6 (June 1925): 2-3; "Tōyō Kyōkai kinji," *Tōyō* 28, no. 7 (July 1925): 178; and *Daitō bunka daigaku 50 nenshi* (Tōkyō: Daitō Bunka Gakuen, 1973). There were other Japanese higher schools in foreign cities that were not related to area training, such as the medical school founded in Shanghai by the Dōjinkai.

³⁶ The school went through numerous name changes. It was first named Taiwan Kyōkai Gakkō, then Taiwan Kyōkai Senmon Gakkō. When the Taiwan Kyōkai became the Tōyō Kyōkai, the school name was changed to Tōyō Kyōkai Senmon Gakkō, then to Tōyō Kyōkai Shokumin Senmon Gakkō, then to Takushoku Daigaku. There was yet another change to Tōyō Kyōkai Daigaku in 1922, then back to Takushoku Daigaku in 1926.

³⁷ *Taiwan Kyōkai Kaihō* 1, no. 8 (20 May 1899): 3.

Korea, and its gateway position to Manchuria and Siberia. Noting the high enrollments in the school for Chinese, Komatsubara noted that Taiwanese and Korean were the school's areas of competitive advantage and encouraged students to take up the latter two languages.³⁸ Aside from the aforementioned languages, English, Russian, economics, statistics, commercial, colonial, and constitutional law, classical Japanese, writing, Asian history, and mathematics were some of the other subjects in the school curriculum. During its first thirty years, some notable names taught as faculty at the school, among them Ariyoshi Chūichi, Baba Eiichi, Izumi Tetsu, Nitobe Inazō, and Ōkawa Shūmei.

Of the first graduating class of 1903, 21 out of 45 went into the Taiwan Government-General. But by the third class, the geographic distribution of graduates had become more varied. By 1919, of the total 1,075 graduates of the school, 85 were in Taiwan, 336 in Korea, 146 in Manchuria, 75 in Central China, 8 in Southern China, 8 in Siberia, 17 in Nan'yō, and 353 in Japan.³⁹ According to its survey in 1929, 908 of its alumni were in Japan, 75 in Taiwan, 288 in Korea, 197 in Manchuria, 89 in China, 17 in Nan'yō, and 27 in other foreign countries. Of these 1,128 were in the private sector, while 168 were public officials employed by one of the ministries or in a colonial administration.⁴⁰ The notable decline in graduates who entered official colonial administration was primarily due to the systematization of staffing procedures for the colonial governments, where bureaucrats from the various ministries, especially the Home Ministry, came to be rotated in and out of the colonies.

In April 1919, succeeding Katsura and Komatsubara, Gotō Shinpei became the third president of the university and Tōyō Kyōkai. He held both positions until his death in April 1929. In 1922, the school received approval from the Ministry of Education in its change from a technical college (*senmon gakkō*) to a university. According to Ministry of Education regulations, a new university had to possess a ¥500,000 endowment to be given university accreditation. The subsidies from Taiwan Government-General to the school had stopped during Komatsubara's term, and Tōyō Kyōkai could⁴¹ only afford to give the school ¥200,000 in real estate and liquid assets. In this pinch, Gotō called upon his connections to persuade a number of sugar manufacturing companies operating in Taiwan to donate the ¥500,000 in 1921.⁴²

³⁸ *Takushoku Daigaku 80 nenshi*, 196.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 211, 272.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 270–73.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 311.

⁴² *Takushoku Daigaku 60 nenshi*, 253. For details on Gotō's policies on sugar during his days in Taiwan, see for example, Tsurumi Yūsuke, *Gotō Shinpei 2* (Tōkyō:

Nagata⁴³ Hidejirō, who had followed on Gotō's heels as the mayor of Tōkyō, also succeeded Gotō as the president of the university in April 1929 after Gotō's death. Unlike his predecessor, Nagata was not concurrently president of Tōyō Kyōkai, but its vice president under the fourth president Mizuno Rentarō. Mizuno had not been associated with the university previously, whereas Nagata had served as a director. In 1932, to cope with the increasing number of students, the school moved to a new campus, the location of the present-day campus in Myōgadani. In 1940, another campus was opened in Kodaira (Hanakoganei) for university preparatory students.

The Tōyō Kyōkai provided limited number of scholarships to students of Takushoku University. For example, starting in 1936, three students recommended by the school were given scholarships of ¥ 35 per month, while another six recommendees were sent on all-expenses-paid research trips, two each to Manchuria and China, and one each to Taiwan and Korea⁴⁵, to study customs, traditions, and educational systems of each area. In September 1943, the French Indochina Academy (Futsu-In Gakuin) was established on the Takushoku University campus. The academy conducted instruction in Vietnamese (Annamese) and French for fifty students⁴⁶.

After Nagata's death in September 1943, Ōkura Kinmochi⁴⁷, who was the university dean, took over as president on a temporary basis. In March 1944, Ugaki Kazushige was appointed by the board of directors as the new university president. Although the school had 3,367 students enrolled for the 1943 academic year, with many of the senior students mobilized into labor teams in farms and coal mines, the president⁴⁸ and the school board of trustees had few educational issues to address.

Tōyō Kyōkai also operated other educational and research institutes. In 1907, it established a branch campus of the college in Keijō (Seoul). The Keijō branch became independent of the parent school in 1918 and was taken over by the Government-General and renamed Keijō Higher Com-

Keisō Shobō, 1937–38, reprint 1965); and Nonaka Fumio, *Nan'yō to Matsue Shunji* (Tōkyō: Jidaisha, 1941), 105–10.

⁴³ Gotō was mayor from 17 December 1920–28 May 1923, while Nagata was mayor from 29 May 1923–7 October 1924.

⁴⁴ *Takushoku Daigaku 80 nenshi*, 320–21.

⁴⁵ "Kaimu hōkoku," *Tōyō* 39, no. 8 (August 1936): 177.

⁴⁶ "Kaimu hōkoku," *Tōyō* 46, no. 7 (July 1943): 107.

⁴⁷ Ōkura Kinmochi (1882–1968) is better known as a director of South Manchurian Railway from 1906 to 1931, or for his role in formation of the aborted Ugaki cabinet, or as the executive director of the National Policy Research Group (Kokusaku Kenkyūkai).

⁴⁸ The 1944 board of trustees consisted of Ugaki, Ōkura, Akaike Atsushi, and Mizuno Rentarō.

mercial School in 1920.⁴⁹ This school was one of the few avenues of upward social mobility for Koreans under colonial rule, as the top graduating students from each class were virtually guaranteed jobs in the private sector.⁵⁰ In Taihoku (Taipei), the association operated the Taiwan Higher Commercial School, established in 1919. As with its counterpart in Korea, almost two-thirds of the students were Japanese,⁵¹ but the Taiwanese who graduated from the school had⁵² considerably better employment prospects than those of other schools. In September 1910, Tōyō Kyōkai established the Dairen Commercial School with 379 entering students, with a women's education section that was eventually spun off into a separate school. Also in 1910, the Tōyō Kyōkai Ryojun (Port Arthur) Language School was opened with 255 incoming students,⁵³ while the Shinkyō (Shinjian) Language Research Center was started up in Manchuria in 1932. Additionally, the association provided housing for a limited number of Taiwanese students in Japan in the Taiwan Kaikan, and kept track of the number of Taiwanese and Korean students in middle school and higher educational institutions in Japan.

Nan'yō Kyōkai

The Nan'yō Kyōkai's educational undertakings were conducted on a far smaller scale and in a more sporadic fashion than those of the Tōyō Kyōkai. The association began several language courses soon after its establishment, but did not start an official school of higher learning until 1942. Through its fragmented but numerous educational programs, Nan'yō Kyōkai promoted the image of Nan'yō as a land of opportunity, with infinite resources for those who wanted a tropical adventure. In addition to providing information, it was later able to provide capital assistance for would-be entrepreneurs, further reinforcing the images of tropical paradises and limitless natural resources.

⁴⁹ Government-General of Korea, "Revised Educational Regulations for Chosen" (1922), 3.

⁵⁰ The top five of a graduating class from the Keijō Higher Commercial School generally entered one of the major banks, while the next ten or so entered trading companies. Usually, 600 or so Koreans applied for 60 slots for each year. Japanese students constituted the other 120 for each year. Interview with Choe Dae-suk, class of 1938, Seoul, 13 July 1996.

⁵¹ For example, in 1925, 229 out of the total 547 students were Japanese, while in 1936, 238 out of 573 were Japanese.

⁵² See George H. Kerr, *Formosa: Licensed Revolution and the Home Rule Movement, 1895–1945* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1974), 178; Yanaihara Tadao, *Teikokushugika no Taiwan* (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 1929, reprint 1988) 154–59.

⁵³ *Takushoku Daigaku 60 nenshi*, 113.

Recognizing the need for foreign languages in conducting business, Nan'yō Kyōkai conducted Dutch and Malay language courses from 1917 to 1941 at its Tōkyō branch,⁵⁴ with a hiatus between 1931 and 1936 due to a shortage of funds and a gradual drop in enrollments. The association's Taiwan branch held Dutch, English, and Malay language courses from 1916 to 1931. Regularly scheduled lectures on Nan'yō provided another informal forum for learning about the natural resources and cultural customs of the Nan'yō area.

Inoue and Nan'yō Kyōkai started a training program to supply businesses operating in Southeast Asia with personnel equipped with area knowledge. The Taiwan Government-General gave ¥15,000 for the project, while Foreign Affairs Minister Ishii Kikujirō donated ¥3,000, and Agriculture and Commerce Minister Kōno Hironaka gave ¥2,000. Mitsui, Kuhara, Mitsubishi,⁵⁵ Furukawa, NYK, and other large firms contributed another ¥140,000. The one-year training took place in the Singapore Commercial Museum with the first class starting in September 1918. The program, called the Commercial Practical Training System, which included training in Dutch, Malay, and English, was discontinued after the second class graduated (1st class 20 students, 2nd class 11) in 1920, due to a shortage of operating funds and lack of corporate interest. Some of the problems in managing the program are reflected in Nan'yō Kyōkai executive director Ishikawa's annual report to the general assembly in 1919, in which he directed criticism at the Ministry of Education for its lack of interest in promoting education related to Nan'yō in Japanese schools, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce for its overemphasis on technical and vocational training.⁵⁶

In 1929, a similar program, the Nanpō Practical Commercial Training Program (Nanpō Shōgyō Jisshūsei Seido) was started up on a larger scale in response to demands voiced by business. With financing from the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the program was free of charge for those accepted, and moreover, provided help with capital for those who completed the course and remained in Nan'yō and opened their own business. This program proved to be more successful. By 1943, Nan'yō Kyōkai⁵⁷ had trained some 798 people, of whom 669 remained in Nan'yō.

In 1942, the association launched its first official school, the Nan'yō Gakuin Technical School in Saigon. Under the supervision of the Foreign

⁵⁴ Malay was started in 1922.

⁵⁵ Nagami, *Inoue Masaji*, 616–17. Kondō Renpei was the head of the fund-raising drive.

⁵⁶ *Nan'yō Kyōkai 10 nenshi*, 64–65.

⁵⁷ Akashi, "Nan'yō Kyōkai," 16.

Affairs Ministry, and funded by the ministry to the tune of ¥278,752, its day-to-day management was subcontracted to the Nan'yō Kyōkai. According to one alumnus of the Nan'yō Gakuin, the school was⁵⁸ placed in Saigon to fortify relations with the Vichy Government-General. It is also likely that as the area was not under direct Japanese control, it was not feasible to simply send Japanese teachers to local schools. This was possible in areas such as Singapore, where the 25th Army recruited local Japanese schoolteachers to train local schoolteachers in Japanese language education.⁵⁹

Several army and navy officials from the General Staff Office were present at the opening ceremonies for the Nan'yō Gakuin, symbolizing the strong interest of military in school. All military officials present stressed the importance of Nanpō for its oceans of oil, rubber, and minerals that found no equal in Manchuria or China.⁶⁰ The school provided housing, books, food, and everything else for the price of donations of ¥360 twice a year by the parents of the students who were accepted.⁶¹

In its three years of its existence, Nan'yō Gakuin trained 112 students. Only the first class completed the three-year course. The third class was to arrive in May 1944, but due to attacks on transport ships by the American naval fleet, the students did not arrive until mid-July.⁶² The third class, as most were still under eighteen, did not serve in the army in 1944–45, but the first and second classes were all drafted into the army as were many of the teachers. Thus, though most of the first graduating class found jobs with well-known firms, their actual time of employment was minimal to nil, due to onset of the war.⁶³ Although the contribution of the school to Japanese commercial ventures was negligible in the prewar period, the school did provide the army with a number of Japanese who could speak some French and Vietnamese.

The association also operated the Kōa Japanese Language School in Jakarta, which operated Japanese classes attached to Kōa Cultural Center. The center, established at the behest of the 16th Army in Java, also taught Bahasa Indonesia for resident Japanese. Some of the special exchange students from Southeast Asia who came to Japan in 1944 stayed at a dormi-

⁵⁸ Kameyama Tetsuzō, *Nan'yō Gakuin* (Tōkyō: Fuyō Shobō, 1996), 18–19.

⁵⁹ The teacher training school was called the Shōnan Nihon Gakuen. Nishioka, *Shingapōru no Nihonjin*, 226; see also Akashi Yōji, "Nihon gunseika no Maraya, Shingapōru ni okeru bunkyō shisaku, 1941–1945," in *Tōnan Ajiaishi no naka no Nihon senryō*, ed. Kurasawa Aiko (Tōkyō: Waseda Daigaku, 1997), 293–332.

⁶⁰ Kameyama, *Nan'yō Gakuin*, 33–34.

⁶¹ Kameyama, *Nan'yō Gakuin*, 308–9. Not 110, as stated by Akashi, "Nan'yō Kyōkai," 21.

⁶² Kameyama, *Nan'yō Gakuin*, 108.

⁶³ For details, see Kameyama, *Nan'yō Gakuin*, 115–93.

tory managed by Nan'yō Kyōkai for a limited time,⁶⁴ but generally, the Nan'yō Kyōkai had less contact with foreign students in Japan than the Tōyō Kyōkai.

PART II: LOBBYING AND NETWORKS

Lobby Cases

In addition to training people, gathering and disseminating information, and expanding its boundaries, Tōyō Kyōkai and Nan'yō Kyōkai conducted lobbying activities using its resources and networks. Although the two voluntary associations did not succeed in obtaining all policy goals, they were generally able to bring issues to the attention of various ministers and ministries. This was especially the case in the 1920s, when the presidents of the associations, Tōyō Kyōkai's Gotō Shinpei and Nan'yō Kyōkai's Den Kenjirō, were two of the most prominent political figures of the day.

Both associations concerned themselves with a variety of issues over their organizational lifespans. For the Tōyō Kyōkai, Taiwan and its potential trade connections to Nan'yō constituted its lobby domain until the focus moved toward continental policy prior to the Russo-Japanese War. Generally, Tōyō Kyōkai concentrated on China, Russia, the formal colonies, and occasionally Nan'yō, while Nan'yō Kyōkai's province was Taiwan, the Micronesian islands, Thailand and the colonies of the Western powers. The territories of the two associations overlapped considerably over Taiwan, but there were no disputes over territory.

Nan'yō Kyōkai

Nan'yō Kyōkai was most active in lobbying cabinets to negotiate with the governments of colonies in Nan'yō, and obtaining financial aid for investments in Western colonies. Executive director Inoue Masaji persuaded Kuhara Fusanosuke to purchase a rubber plantation in 1916 in North Borneo for settling Japanese emigrants.⁶⁵ The venture itself turned out to be an emigration failure as the land yielded poor harvests, but it did continue to function as a rubber plantation. The failure of the project to attract emigrants had absolutely no effect in dampening Inoue's dreams of emigration. In 1917, the British introduced an ordinance prohibiting foreigners

⁶⁴ For more details, see, for example, Kurasawa Aiko, *Nanpō tokubetsu ryūgakusei ga mita senjika no Nihonjin* (Tōkyō: Sōshisha, 1997).

⁶⁵ Nagami, *Inoue Masaji*, 566; Hara, *Eiryō Maraya*, 155.

from owning more than 50 acres of land in Malaya. Nan'yō Kyōkai, as well as Kuhara, submitted several petitions to the Foreign Affairs Ministry, and sent Inoue and association vice president Uchida Kakichi to meet with Foreign Affairs Minister Motono Ichirō to urge that the government address the issue.⁶⁶ The ministry negotiated with the British but to no avail.

Also in 1917, when the British seized and ceased all telegraph services in the Dutch East Indies in June, Japanese businesses reported to Nan'yō Kyōkai that they could not conduct trade and shipping without communications. The association president Yoshikawa and vice president Uchida Kakichi met with Foreign Affairs Minister Motono, Agriculture and Commerce Minister Nakakōji Ren, and Nan'yō Kyōkai director and Communications Minister Den Kenjirō, to urge action on the issue. The ministers successfully petitioned with the British and managed to re-open telecommunication channels between Nan'yō and Japan in November of the same year.

Starting in July 1919, Nan'yō Kyōkai president Den Kenjirō urged successive prime ministers, foreign affairs ministers, and agriculture and commerce ministers to negotiate with the French in order to remove trade barriers to doing business in French Indochina. Since Japan had no commercial treaty with France, the highest tariff rates were applied to Japanese goods. In one of the petitions, Den stated that the French applied the lowest possible customs rates to European and American goods, and applied discriminatory high customs rates to Japanese goods. There was a Taiwan to French Indochina steamer service, run by Yamashita Steamships,⁶⁸ but due to the high tariff rates, no cotton and textile goods could be exported on the steamers. Possibly as a result of years of constant Japanese protests spurred by Nan'yō Kyōkai, the French Governor-General Martial Merlin visited Japan in 1924 to improve relations between the two countries.

⁶⁶ *Nan'yō Kyōkai 10 nenshi*, 115–16. Kuhara was seen by the British as the most significant lobbyist against the ordinance. See Yun Choi-ren, "Maraya ni okeru Nihon no gomu, tekkō tōshi," in *Senkanki Tōnan Ajia*, ed. Sugiyama and Brown, 50, 54–55.

⁶⁷ *Nan'yō Kyōkai 10 nenshi*, 27, 116. While the reasons for the British actions are not clear, it might have stemmed from concerns with the neutral Netherlands and its Netherlands Overseas Trust Company trading in contraband with Germany. See Erik Hansen, "Between Reform and Revolution: Social Democracy and Dutch Society, 1917–1921," in *Neutral Europe between War and Revolution, 1917–1923*, ed. Hans A. Schmitt (Charlottesville, V. A.: University Press of Virginia, 1988), 183.

⁶⁸ For details, see Katayama Kunio, *Kindai Nihon no kaiun to Ajia* (Tōkyō: Ochanomizu Shobō, 1996), 221–50, 278–99.

⁶⁹ As Den had injured his foot, he could not meet with Merlin at the scheduled time. *Nan'yō Kyōkai 10 nenshi*, 93–94, 118–20. An actual commercial treaty for Japan-French Indochina trade was not signed until May 1932.

The 12 February 1934 Dutch East Indies Import Ordinance put severe import quotas on Japanese goods entering the Dutch East Indies. Nan'yō Kyōkai, along with the Tōkyō Chamber of Commerce and other industry associations, submitted petitions in support of government negotiations. On 10 March and 23 April 1934, Nan'yō Kyōkai appealed directly to the Dutch governor-general, the president and vice president of the Volksraad, and the minister of colonial affairs, urging them to rescind the ordinance. Inoue and general manager Iizumi Ryōzō, along with two other members of Nan'yō Kyōkai, Ishihara Hiroichirō and Matsue Shunji, were invited by the Foreign Affairs Ministry to participate in the Japan-Netherlands Trade Conference of June-December 1934.

Tōyō Kyōkai

While Tōyō Kyōkai was more active than Nan'yō Kyōkai in educational projects, in lobbying, especially during second president Komatsubara Eitarō's tenure, 1913–19, the organization generally was not particularly active. Komatsubara chose to concentrate on managing the school, but during Gotō Shinpei term as president, 1919–29, Gotō's policy views were reflected in the pages of its publications.

In debates over the fundamental principles of colonial governance, between self-rule and assimilation, most members of Tōyō Kyōkai were vocal advocates of assimilation. During the 1920s and 1930s, the editorials in *Tōyō* were filled with numerous opinion pieces and editorials against the Taiwanese self-rule movement and the post-First World War Taiwan legislature establishment issue. However, not all members were avowed assimilationists. Tōgō Minoru, who contributed regularly to the

⁷⁰ Akashi, "Nan'yō Kyōkai," 12–13.

⁷¹ For details on the negotiations, see Murayama Yoshitada, "Dai ichiji Nichi-Ran kaishō-Nihon no yūwateki keizai shinshutsu no tenkanten," in *Ryōtaisenkanki Nihon-Tōnan Ajia kankei no shosō*, ed. Shimizu Hajime (Tōkyō: Ajia Keizai Kenkyūjo, 1986), 99–118; Adachi Hiroaki, "Kaisenzen no keizai kōshō-tai Ranin, Futsuin kōshō," in "*Nanpō kyōeiken*"-senji *Nihon no Tōnan Ajia keizai shihai*, ed. Hikita Yasuyuki (Tōkyō: Taga Shuppan, 1997), 101–34; and Kokaze Hidemasa, "Nichi-Ran kaiun masatsu no Nichi-Ran kaishō," in *Senkanki Tōnan Ajia*, ed. Sugiyama and Brown, 109–40.

⁷² Komatsubara (1852–1919) was a bureaucrat of the Yamagata Aritomo clique. He served as governor of Saitama, Shizuoka, Nagasaki prefectures, vice minister of justice, home affairs, and was the education minister and agriculture and commerce minister during Katsura Tarō's second cabinet in 1908. Aside from his political career, he devoted his energies to education administration, serving as Kokugakuin University's president in addition to his post in Tōyō Kyōkai.

⁷³ See, for example, the editorial in *Tōyō* 26, no. 5 (May 1923): 138.

periodical, was among a minority of Tōyō Kyōkai opposed to assimilation.

There were also some members who expressed support for anti-imperialists who were seeking refuge in Japan. Pan-Asianist tones vivified feature articles on Subhas Chandra Bose and Artemio Ricarte, while anger oscillated through commentaries against British and American racism and arrogance.

There were also constant calls by some association members in Taiwan for more cargo freight trains cars and fewer luxury sleeping cars in Taiwan in order to improve the distribution of goods on the island from the ports, more convenient transportation linkages to the home islands and French Indochina, more freedom of the press, more education related to Taiwan in Japan, and other issues related to the administration of Taiwan. Whether as a direct result or not, the number of freight train cars increased from around 5,000 to around 10,000 in Taiwan from 1920 to 1930.

Especially for the period between the Gotō-Joffe talks in the spring of 1923 to the normalization of relations in 1925, Russia-related articles were frequently featured. Such constant urgings for greater Russo-Japanese trade and cooperation were consistent with president Gotō Shinpei's foreign policy views regarding Russia. Throughout the 1920s, the pages of *Tōyō* were filled with articles outlining the natural resources of the Russian Far East, and the potential economic benefits of normalization with post-revolution Russia.

⁷⁴ See, for example, Tōgō Minoru, "Shokuminchi seido no konpon hōshin," *Tōyō* 28, no. 11 (November 1925): 2–12.

⁷⁵ The features on Bose were unabashed and biting in its criticisms of Ishii Kikujirō and subdued but hardly ambivalent in its praise of Tōyama Mitsuru, Uchida Ryōhei, and Kōno Hironaka. See Nakayama Kei, "Indo no shishi, Bōsu shi," *Tōyō* 28, no. 1 (January 1925), 61–85; *ibid.* 28, no. 2 (February 1925): 51–66; *ibid.* 28, no. 3 (March 1925): 124–140; also Rasai Gakujin, "Dōjingo," *Tōyō* 28, no. 1 (January 1925): 92–97.

⁷⁶ See for example regular contributions from Taiwan by S. S. Sei, "Taiwan jihō—saikin no mondai," in most issues of *Tōyō* in the 1920s and 1930s in which these and many other issues are raised.

⁷⁷ Takahashi Yasutaka, *Nihon shokuminchi tetsudōshi ron* (Tōkyō: Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha, 1995), 30.

⁷⁸ For details, see, for example, Sakurai Ryōju, *Taishō seijishi no shuatsu-Riken dōshikai no seiritsu to sono shūhen* (Tōkyō: Yamakawa, 1997), especially 186–88; and Aizawa Kiyoshi, "Nihon kaigun no senryaku to sankoku dōmei mondai," in *Nihon no kiro to Matsuoka gaikō*, ed. Miwa Kimitada and Tobe Ryōichi (Tōkyō: Nansōsha, 1993), 41–45.

⁷⁹ See for example, Matsumoto Kunihira, "Sekai ni okeru Nihon gaikō no tachiba o ronji—Nichi-Ro-Shi sankoku dōmei ni tsuite," *Tōyō* 28, no. 4 (April 1925): 2–13; Gotō Shinpei, "Nichi-Ro kōkanfuku ni tsuite," *Tōyō* 28, no. 3 (March 1925): 1–14; Gotō Shinpei, "Tairiku hatten no tame ni," *Tōyō* 28, no. 6 (June 1925): 2–12; and Moriya Sakao, "Kakumei go no Roshia," *Tōyō* 28, no. 11 (November 1925): 2–18.

Networks and Effectiveness

Effectiveness in lobbying has been linked to organizational interlocks and personal connections. As noted in the previous sections, the executives of both associations were generally well-known bureaucrats and businessmen, a fact which facilitated their lobbying activities. Interlocking directorates and connections link organizations and their leaders to segments of the political and economic environment, usually with those of similar socio-political standing, or similar levels of "clout and grace."⁸⁰ Factors such as age, position in politics, educational background, length of time in an organization, and personal values also lead groups and individuals into different coalitions, depending on the issue.

One type of interlock was with prominent political positions, such as cabinet posts. Proximity of organization executives to major public office facilitated policy access. From the latter half of the 1910s through the 1920s, Gotō Shinpei and Den Kenjirō were two of the most powerful cabinet ministers not to have become prime minister. Not coincidentally, of the numerous voluntary associations engaged in lobbying, Tōyō Kyōkai and Nan'yō Kyōkai were two of the most powerful during the 1910s and 1920s.

During the Terauchi Masatake cabinet (October 1916–September 1918), Gotō was known as the de facto power in the cabinet as he held successive posts as home affairs and foreign affairs minister. Den was appointed communications minister in the cabinet. In April 1918, Privy Councilor Itō Miyoji told Den Kenjirō that either Den or Gotō would most likely be appointed as the prime minister to succeed the Terauchi cabinet.⁸²

In the Yamamoto Gonnohyōe cabinet (September 1923–January 1924), Gotō and Den were again placed in cabinet posts to balance power. Gotō was appointed home minister, while Den was assigned the agriculture and commerce post. Genrō Saionji Kinmochi feared that with Gotō as home minister, anti-Seiyūkai tendencies would become strongly reflected in the cabinet; thus, he hoped Yamamoto would favor Den more as Den was close to the Seiyūkai. Saionji even assembled a pro-Den, anti-Gotō group during the Yamamoto cabinet to block Gotō's policy initiatives. In

⁸⁰ See Joseph Galaskiewicz et al., "The Influence of Corporate Power, Social Status, and Market Position on Corporate Interlocks in a Regional Network," *Social Forces* 64 (December 1985): 423; and also Mayer Zald, *Organizational Change: The Political Economy of the YMCA* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

⁸¹ Jeffrey Pfeffer, *Power in Organizations* (Marshfield, Mass.: Pitman, 1981), 37.

⁸² Den Kenjirō Denki Hensankai, *Den Kenjirō Denki* (Tōkyō: Den Kenjirō Denki Hensankai, 1932), 345–47.

⁸³ Matsumoto Gōkichi, *Taishō demokurashii ki no seiji* (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 1959), 256, 274–75.

1926, Den, along with Hiranuma Kiichirō and Uehara Yūsaku, was a top candidate⁸⁴ to form a new cabinet, but the task eventually fell to Wakatsuki Reijirō.

Having powerful figures as association presidents helped membership and fund-raising drives, attracted audiences for association sponsored lectures, and moreover, expedited lobbying. For example, in the aforementioned 1917 case of the British seizing telecommunications between Dutch East Indies and Japan, Den was at the time, a director of the association (Yoshikawa was the president, Uchida vice president) and concurrently, the communications minister in the Terauchi cabinet. Uchida Kakichi's appointment as governor-general of Taiwan in 1924 was also facilitated through his ties to Den. When Yamamoto Gonnohyōe offered Den the communications minister post while Den was back visiting Tōkyō from Taiwan, Den insisted on assurances that someone with previous experience in Taiwan would succeed him as Taiwan governor-general. Once Uchida Kakichi's appointment became official, Den drove out⁸⁵ to Ōmori, where Uchida lived, to congratulate him on the appointment. Although Uchida's connection to Den through the Nan'yō Kyōkai was presumably not the sole reason why he was appointed, his lobbying activities as vice president of the association had kept him in contact with various prominent bureaucrats and politicians, and had kept Uchida's name on the political stage.

Even if the lobbying had no direct connection with the official posts held by association executives, the fact that the representatives of the association held major posts helped lobbying through simple cachet. For example, in the case of Gotō, while he was president of Tōyō Kyōkai (1919–29) he was also Tōkyō mayor (1920–23), and home affairs minister (1923–24), but he did not hold an official post related to foreign affairs (he was foreign affairs minister in 1918). Nevertheless, the association could take up the Russo-Japanese normalization issue with some effect due to Gotō's personal interests in the issue and his political influence. Gotō had obtained⁸⁶ approval from Prime Minister Katō Tomosaburō to negotiate with Joffe, but met with unofficial resistance from other quarters. Ogawa Heikichi gave Kita Ikki money⁸⁷ to criticize Gotō, and openly criticized the talks with Joffe in the Diet. Tōyō Kyōkai served as a counter to such crit-

⁸⁴ Matsumoto, *Taishō demokurashii ki no seiji*, 301.

⁸⁵ Den Kenjirō denki, 528, 533.

⁸⁶ Tsurumi, *Gotō Shinpei*, 4, 385.

⁸⁷ Itō Takashi, *Daiichiji sekai taisen to seitō naikaku* (Tōkyō: Yamakawa Shuppan, 1997), 225–26.

icisms, with various prominent figures expressing their support for Gotō's foreign policy initiative in print.

The associations provided one more base, in addition to political parties, on which bureaucrats and other candidates for official posts could maintain and develop links to political and business leaders. If not occupying a formal post, the presidency or directorship of a major voluntary association allowed bureaucrats and politicians to keep their names reasonably prominent, obtain information on issues of interest, and lobby under the name of the association.

These ties and cross-institutional networks were maintained through various methods. The first and most obvious strategy was to have individuals become members of the association. Another method was to form alliances with other similar organizations. Tōyō Kyōkai and Nan'yō Kyōkai had several interlocking directorates and memberships during its overlapping years of existence, 1915–45. Often, business figures and retired politicians held memberships to numerous associations, facilitating to informational exchanges and joint projects between the two organizations.

Another form of network maintenance and information exchange was hosting dinners and lectures with officials in key positions. For example, both Tōyō Kyōkai and Nan'yō Kyōkai regularly scheduled dinners with colonial bureaucrats, usually at the bureau chief or vice governor-general levels. For example, Tōyō Kyōkai invited vice governor-generals of Korea to dinners whenever they were back in Tōkyō.

Educational projects also provided opportunities for expanding networks. Prominent officials were frequently asked to give speeches at graduation ceremonies and school year opening ceremonies.⁸⁸ In 1938, Takushoku University adopted an advisory system. Rather than advisors renowned for their expertise in higher education, names such as Ugaki Kazushige, Hirota Kōki, Nagai Ryūtarō, Nakajima Chikuhei, Matsuoka Yōsuke, Yasukawa Yūnosuke, Shimomura Hiroshi, Kodama Kenji, Fukai Eigō,⁸⁹ Mizuno Rentarō, Fujiyama Raita, and Yūki Toyotarō filled the roster.

⁸⁸ Hayakawa Senkichirō, Ishizuka Eizō, Kondō Renpei, Ōhashi Shintarō, Ōtani Kahei, Magoshi Kyōhei, Masuda Masuzō, Ikeda Kenzō, Kamata Eikichi, Masuda Giichi, Wada Toyoji, Inoue Masaji, and Den Kenjirō were some of the overlapping directors and members of Nan'yō Kyōkai and Tōyō Kyōkai.

⁸⁹ See, for example, *Tōyō* 26, no. 5 (May 1923): 139; and *ibid.* 39, no. 7 (July 1936): 14–27, 146; also *Nan'yō Kyōkai zasshi* 15, no. 1 (January 1929): 108; and *Nan'yō* 25, no. 3 (March 1939): 76.

⁹⁰ *Takushoku Daigaku 60 nenshi*, 289.

Questions as to whether these associations represent collusion of politicians with big business or whether they represent the voice of private interests against governmental bureaucratic controls over the economy deflect attention from the fact that personal networks were the engines which drove these groups. It should be noted that not all *genrō*, politicians, and bureaucrats thought alike simply because they were Japanese, as is implied in the “uniquely Japanese cooperation between state and enterprise” clichéd construction invariably invoked from some quarters. Of course, despite the relatively large membership numbers, neither of the two associations were ever mistaken for populist or grass-roots movements.

These were elite coalitions and cliques which manifested themselves in voluntary associations. These networks created access and attracted funds. The divisions were along personal and policy lines, not along private-public, or inter-ministerial distinctions. It should be noted that the “government” was not composed of individuals who were always in power, but individuals who rotated in and out of cabinet posts, and vied for cabinet positions. A tool in this jockeying and lobbying process was a position within a well-known, well-connected organization, such as Nan'yō Kyōkai or Tōyō Kyōkai.

PART III: ORGANIZATIONAL DECLINE

Despite the paucity of research directly on voluntary organizations, there have been some views put forth regarding their impact and changing roles in prewar Japanese history in the context of the southward advance (*nan-shin*). Most explain the decline in influence of these organizations during the 1930s in terms of changes in the external environment. However, I would argue that the internal changes within the associations have been overlooked in the existing literature. By focusing on generational change and the consequent deterioration of personal networks, the impact of internal dynamics on the decline of these organizations can be highlighted.

Of the environmental approaches, one of the more popular ones has been the “advance guard” view, which stresses the military significance of voluntary associations before the outbreak of the Pacific War. The Nan'yō Kyōkai is portrayed as an intelligence arm for later military expansion. Especially after 1936, the association did undertake several intelligence reports for the army and navy. From the beginning to the end,

⁹¹ See Eric Robertson, *The Japanese File: Pre-War Japanese Penetration into Southeast Asia* (Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia, 1979).

Nan'yō Kyōkai received substantial subsidies from the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the Taiwan Government-General, and had many bureaucrats in its executive and membership. In terms of spy cases, there were cases involving employees of firms which were members of the Nan'yō Kyōkai, such as the one in December 1934, where Ishihara Sangyō Singapore branch head, Nishimura Yoshio,⁹³ died in a British prison after having been arrested on spying charges.

Another view stresses the impact of the "Fundamental Principles of the National Policy" statement of August 1935 which explicitly outlined the importance of expansion into Nan'yō. During the tenures of successive governors from Den to Nakagawa, the Taiwan Government-General's southward advance activities had been limited to economic research, but now a renewed age of southward expansion began in 1935. The Taiwan Government-General, the Tōkyō government, Colonial Ministry, Foreign Affairs Ministry, and the navy sought to obtain control over the southward advance policy. The navy successfully landed admiral Kobayashi Seizō in the Taiwan governorship (1936–1940). Kobayashi implemented new policies to promote industrialization, assimilation, and military preparedness. Reflecting this interest, Navy General Staff members began attending meetings of the Nan'yō Kyōkai beginning in July 1935.

Another argument emphasizes the economic environment in explaining the role of voluntary associations. Due to the proliferation of trade barriers against Japanese goods in the 1930s, voluntary associations became progressively closer to the Foreign Affairs Ministry as trade barriers necessitated increasing negotiations with foreign governments. In order to expedite their lobbying, the larger trading firms in particular used voluntary organizations to cooperate with the Foreign Ministry. For example, Nan'yō Kyōkai also counted Foreign Affairs Ministry officials such as Tōgō Shigenori and Shigemitsu Mamoru among its directors even prior to 1935. Hashiya Hiroshi argues that in 1938, when Nan'yō Kyōkai became a *zaidan hōjin*, it was in compliance with a move by the Foreign Affairs

⁹² From 1939 to 1941, the Taiwan Government-General gave ¥12,000 each year to Nan'yō Kyōkai, and another ¥6,000, ¥10,000 and ¥6,000 to the Taiwan branch. Kondō Masami, *Sōryokusen to Taiwan-Nihon shokuminchi hōkai no kenkyū* (Tōkyō: Tōsui Shobō, 1996), 110–11.

⁹³ Supposedly, he committed suicide by drinking poison. Nishioka, *Singapōru no Nihonjin*, 150.

⁹⁴ Gotō Ken'ichi, "Taiwan to Nan'yō-Nanshin mondai tonō kanrendo," in *Kindai Nihon to shokuminchi*, ed. Ōe Shinobu et al., vol. 2 (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 1992), 147, 150, 153–54; also Hatano Sumio, "Kokubō kōsō to Nanshinron," in *Tōnan Ajia to Nihon*, ed. Yano, 147–65; and Hatano Sumio, "Nihon kaigun to 'Nanshin,'" in *Ryōtaisenkanki Nihon-Tōnan Ajia*, ed. Shimizu, 207–36.

Ministry to put the various⁹⁵ semi-private and private organizations under its unified supervision.

An explanation slightly different from the above three is one that can be labeled a resource dependence view. Hara Fujio surmises that Nan'yō Kyōkai overextended itself in acquiring land in the Cameron Highlands for an emigration project in 1937. Twenty families moved in, but all but three left prior to December 1941. The jungle hillside conditions, poor harvests, and British and Chinese hostility all discouraged the emigrants from staying. As a consequence of the considerable financial strain, the only way for Nan'yō Kyōkai to realize the long-held dreams of successful emigration to Nan'yō and to continue other association operations was for the association to cooperate closely⁹⁶ with the military or whoever controlled the government purse strings.

All of the above views point out important factors in driving the decline of Nan'yō Kyōkai. Hara's assessment of the impact of financial dependency on the government funds points to one of the basic weaknesses common to most voluntary associations. Especially with Nan'yō Kyōkai and Tōyō Kyōkai, executives had used personal connections to solicit donations and endowments and had relatively little in the way of independent sources of funds. The 1935 declaration, economic barriers, and wartime intelligence also clearly had major impacts on independence and directions of the Nan'yō Kyōkai.

While acknowledging the environmental forces and limitations in resources, I would argue that the fundamental reason for the decline was due to generational changes in leadership within Nan'yō Kyōkai and Tōyō Kyōkai. Both associations had already undergone changes in platform and power by 1935, when the environmental changes peaked.

Organizations are not established in vacuums; therefore, vestiges of history influence structure and original power distributions. All organizations face problems of retention and diffusion of knowledge, skills, information, and political power. During the 1920s, Den and Gotō had been two of the most significant political figures, always being mentioned as possible prime ministers. By the 1930s, the de facto leaders of both organizations were not comparable in terms of political power, and perhaps more importantly, commitment to the associations.

The importance of leadership succession in the associations can be seen clearly in the case of Tōyō Kyōkai. After it was started by Katsura, the organization experienced a slight lull under Komatsubara. When Gotō inherited the presidency, he managed to revive it quickly with his personal

⁹⁵ Hashiya Hiroshi, "Tōnan Ajia," 213–36; also Yoshikawa, "Senzen Fuirippin," 129–46.

⁹⁶ Hara, *Eiryō Maraya*, 61–76.

networks and tireless lecture tours. During his term, Gotō used his personal networks to obtain funds from the sugar manufacturers association for the university, and also used his status as a former civil governor of the Taiwan Government-General to obtain funds from the Taiwan Government-General for specific research projects.

When Gotō became president of the association after Komatsubara's death, he asked his close friend Mizuno Rentarō⁹⁷ to become the vice president. Mizuno replied that he would⁹⁸ on the condition that Nagata Hidejirō be appointed executive director. When Gotō died in 1929, Mizuno was elected new president. However, Mizuno in the 1930s did not wield the same kind of power Gotō had in the 1920s. Mizuno had failed to impress Saionji during the collapse of the Kiyoura Keigo cabinet in June 1924. As Saionji put it, "... especially when Yamamoto (Gonnohyōe), Tokonami (Takejirō), and Mizuno come to visit, there is no point in talking to them." Furthermore, due to the scandal in 1928 when Mizuno first resigned, then rejoined the Tanaka Giichi cabinet as minister of education when Kuhara Fusanosuke was appointed as communications minister,¹⁰⁰ Mizuno himself was not as powerful a figure as he had been.¹⁰¹

Unlike Mizuno, the new vice president, Nagata Hidejirō,¹⁰² held cabinet positions in the 1930s, as colonial minister in the Hirota Kōki cabinet (March 1936–February 1937), and railways minister (November 1939–Jan-

⁹⁷ Mizuno (1868–1949) was vice home affairs minister under Gotō in the Terauchi cabinet, then became home minister when Gotō switched to foreign affairs. He was appointed vice governor-general of Korea in 1919, then served as home affairs minister in the Katō Tomosaburō and Kiyoura Keigo cabinets. He was appointed education minister in the Tanaka Giichi cabinet in 1928, but resigned to protest the appointment of Kuhara Fusanosuke as communications minister. Mizuno was the central Seiyūkai figure within the home ministry. In 1935, he left the party after he served on a deliberative council in 1935 for the Okada cabinet. From 1936, he was the head of the Kyōchōkai, and served as advisor to the Sanpō Hōkokukai and other wartime organizations.

⁹⁸ Mizuno Rentarō, "Nagata Hidejirō kun o omou," *Tōyō* 46, no. 12 (December 1943): 7.

⁹⁹ Matsumoto, *Taishō demokurashiiki no seiji*, 301.

¹⁰⁰ For more details on the incident, see, for example, Awaya Kentarō, *15 nen sen-sōki no seiji to shakai* (Tōkyō: Ōtsuki Shoten, 1995), 22–24.

¹⁰¹ Mizuno's decline in influence can be seen in the fact that in 1940 he had to struggle mightily to keep the Kyōchōkai (of which he was president) intact under government-mandated reorganizations of labor-related bodies. Takahashi Hikohiro, "Shinkanryō, kakushin kanryō to shakaiha kanryō-Kyōchōkai bunseki no ichishiten toshite," *Shakai Rōdō Kenkyū* 43, nos. 1–2 (1996): 52.

¹⁰² Nagata (1876–1943) was Home Ministry police bureaucrat who was promoted by Mizuno and Gotō. He had two terms as Tōkyō mayor, in 1923–24, and in 1930–31.

uary 1940) in the Abe Nobuyuki cabinet, but had neither the stature, pull, nor clout that Katsura and Gotō had wielded.

The Nan'yō Kyōkai's top executive also changed drastically around the same time. Den died in 1930, and Uchida in 1933. Several other founding members, such as Nitobe Inazō, Inoue Junnosuke, and Ōtani Kahei, also died in 1932. Executive director Inoue Masaji enlisted Konoe Fumimaro to be the new association head, but Konoe's personal interest in the economic and emigration possibilities for Nan'yō were not strong. Starting in 1930, a new generation of Nan'yō businessmen, such as Ishihara Hiroichirō and Matsue Shunji entered the organization. Ishihara had close ties to right-wing figures, Ōkawa Shūmei in particular.¹⁰³ The spy cases in Southeast Asia involved Ishihara Sangyō employees as well as Nan'yō Kyōkai researchers, but all of these occurred after the deaths of Den and Uchida, and the decline in influence of Inoue Masaji, who had turned his attention in emigration projects in South America around 1932. In 1938, Inoue and Fujiyama Raita both retired as vice presidents. Inoue retained connections to Nan'yō Kyōkai as an advisor, while Kodama Hideo and Hayashi Kyūjirō became the new vice presidents.

This is not to assert that had Mizuno not reached his political peak in the 1920s alongside Gotō, Tōyō Kyōkai members would have become anti-war activists, or that had Den and Uchida lived longer, Nan'yō Kyōkai would not have engaged in intelligence operations or have rebelled against Taiwan Government-General and Foreign Affairs Ministry controls. However, the decline in independence arose not only from the pressure of external forces, but also from succession and generational change occurring in the key positions within the associations and also in elite ranks in general. Generational change among the elites also meant that the leaders of Tōyō Kyōkai and Nan'yō Kyōkai had fewer connections to active cabinet ministers, and the number industrialists who had been sources of non-governmental funds declined rapidly as such individuals as Magoshi Kyōhei, Shibusawa Eiichi, Asano Soichirō, and others died in the late 1920s and early 1930s.

As personal networks were based on ties between various individuals, these links could not be institutionalized and transferred very successfully. The internal changes in Tōyō Kyōkai and Nan'yō Kyōkai combined with generational change and environmental changes to produce the decline in independence and lobbying activities.

¹⁰³ On Ishihara, Ōkawa, the Meirinkai, and Jinmukai, see Akasawa Shirō and Awaya Kentarō, eds., *Ishihara Hiroichirō kankei bunsho*, vol. 1 (Tōkyō: Ritsumeikan Hyakunenshi Henshūshitsu, Kashiwa Shobō, 1994), 302–7.

CONCLUSION

The Tōyō Kyōkai and the Nan'yō Kyōkai conducted a wide-range of activities. Research on specific regions, information dissemination, education, lobbying, and other activities informed governments and private companies of specific conditions in other areas of Asia. In terms of interactions with Asia, the two associations gathered data and distributed information and images through lectures, schools, exhibitions, tourism, and publications. In terms of domestic politics, they lobbied on specific issues as well as served as a base of power for Gotō Shinpei, Den Kenjiro, and other political figures. The two organizations also displayed institutional isomorphism—similar organizational forms, internal demography, organizational scale, financial dependency, and other characteristics.

Although existing views stress the environmental changes to explain the roles of voluntary organizations, in the case of Tōyō Kyōkai and Nan'yō Kyōkai, leadership changes by the first half of the 1930s had considerably more impact in decreasing their lobbying power than changes in economic conditions, or even the national policy. When the role of personal networks operating within and without each voluntary association are emphasized, rather than the political and social system itself, the internal changes and the effects they engendered on organizational survival become more obvious.¹⁰⁴

Such organizations as Tōyō Kyōkai and Nan'yō Kyōkai were formalizations and manifestations of cross-institutional linkages that were at the core of most political bargaining and transaction in Japan. This is not to deny the importance of formal affiliations and hierarchies, but rather to point out that through these organizations, interest networks were formed and fortified, and these significantly affected interactions with other countries, while providing candidates for cabinet positions with an organizational base to draw on.

The analysis of elite cross-institutional networks and coalitions have been subsumed by the tide of nation-centered narratives which focus primarily on official structures and institutions of the nation-state. Although more work needs to be done on these types of elite associations and the personal networks, the examination of the role of Tōyō Kyōkai and Nan'yō Kyōkai in domestic politics and foreign interactions shows the importance of personal networks in shaping Japanese history.

¹⁰⁴ See Chester I. Barnard, *The Function of the Executive* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938); and Howard Aldrich, *Organizations and Environments* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1979), 281.

TECHNOCRATIC VISIONS OF EMPIRE: TECHNOLOGY BUREAUCRATS AND THE “NEW ORDER FOR SCIENCE-TECHNOLOGY”

Janis MIMURA

Today Japan ranks as one of the world's technological superpowers. This achievement is remarkable in three respects: Japan was a late developer, it lacks natural resources, and it developed its technology without the scientific tradition of the West. Faced with such constraints, Japan chose to pursue a path of technological development that differed from that of the advanced Western countries. The nature of this distinctive model of technological development forms the subject of recent research on contemporary Japanese technology policy. One scholar has suggested the existence of a “technonational ideology,” highlighting the role of strategy and ideology in Japanese technology policy.¹ Others have suggested the formation of a “regional production alliance” or “vertical *keiretsu* network” in Asia that will ensure Japan's technological hegemony in the region.² These studies point to long-term strategic thinking about technology among Japanese policymakers.

During the Second World War, a group of technology-minded bureaucrats devoted considerable effort to formulating a long-term strategy for technological development for Japan and its empire. These “technology bureaucrats” sought to devise a technology policy for Japan that would overcome the country's backwardness, lack of sufficient raw materials, and weak scientific base. They hoped to achieve this through the establishment of a “New Order for Science-Technology” (*Kagaku gijutsu shintai-sei*) between 1940 and 1942.³ As part of Konoe Fumimaro's “New Order,” the New Order for Science-Technology represented one attempt by the government to mobilize the nation along totalitarian lines to prosecute

¹ Richard J. Samuels, *“Rich Nation, Strong Army”: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).

² Walter Hatch and Kozo Yamamura, *Asia in Japan's Embrace: Building a Regional Production Alliance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

³ For a discussion of the New Order for Science-Technology see the following works: Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *The Technological Transformation of Japan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Sawai Minoru, “Policies for the Promotion of Science and Technology in Wartime Japan,” *Keizaigaku Ronshū* 35, no. 1 (1995) and “Nitchū sensōki no kagaku gijutsu seisaku” *Nenpō Kindai Nihon*

the war in China. More than just a plan to mobilize science and technology for war, the New Order for Science-Technology formed a cornerstone in the bureaucratic vision of a postwar Japanese empire in East Asia. The technology bureaucrats looked beyond the military's immediate concerns of fighting a war and imagined an autarkic empire that would represent the outward projection of a united, industrialized, and technologically advanced Japan. A central objective of this movement was an attempt to devise a Japanese type of "science-technology" (*kagaku gijutsu*). Japanese planners believed that building a "new order" in Japan was the prerequisite for constructing a "new order" in East Asia – that placing Japan upon a scientific basis was the necessary first step to building a technologically based empire.

This essays seeks to illuminate wartime bureaucratic thinking about technology and technocratic control by examining the ideas underlying the movement for a New Order for Science-Technology. The focus here is on patterns of thought and implicit ideas about technology and its perceived role in Japan and East Asia. In this essay, I analyze the writings of two of the ideologues of the movement, Miyamoto Takenosuke and Mōri Hideoto. Miyamoto was an engineer in the Home Ministry and head of the Japan Engineering Association (*Nihon Gijutsu Kyōkai*).⁴ Mōri was a renovationist bureaucrat from the Finance Ministry who helped design Manchuria's planned economy.⁵ Both Miyamoto and Mōri believed that they represented a new breed of bureaucrats emerging after the First World War known as "technology bureaucrats" (*gijutsu kanryō*), equipped with both specialized technical knowledge and broad administrative experience.⁶ Both joined the Asia Development Board (*Kōain*) in 1938 and the Cabinet Planning Board in 1941, where they designed a sci-

Kenkyū 13 (Tōkyō: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1991): 44–65; Kawahara Hiroshi, *Shōwa seiji shisō kenkyū* (Tōkyō: Waseda Daigaku Shuppanbu, 1979); Hiroshige Tetsu, *Kagaku no shakai shi: Kindai nihon no kagaku taisei* (Tōkyō: Chūō Kōronsha, 1973); *Nihon kagaku shi gakkai, Nihon kagaku gijutsu shi taikēi*, vol. 4 (Tōkyō: Dai-ichi Hōki Shuppan, 1966).

⁴ For a study on Miyamoto Takenosuke, see Ōyodo Shōichi, *Miyamoto Takenosuke to kagaku gijutsu gyōsei* (Tōkyō: Tokai Daigaku Shuppankai, 1989) and Furukawa Takahisa, *Shōwa senchūki no sōgō Kokusaku kikan* (Tōkyō: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1992).

⁵ For studies on Mōri Hideoto, see Itō Takashi, "Mōri Hideoto ron oboegaki" in his *Shōwaki no seiji* (zoku) (Tōkyō: Yamakawa Shuppankai, 1993).

⁶ For a recent study on the technology bureaucrats, see Ōyodo Shōichi, *Gijutsu kanryō no seiji sankaku: Nihon no kagaku gijutsu gyōsei no maku hiraki* (Tōkyō: Chūkō Shinsha, 1997). In contrast to Ōyodo, I adopt a broader definition of technology bureaucrats, which includes not only bureaucrats with an engineering background but also bureaucrats who closely identified themselves with the latest technological trends.

ence and technology policy for Japan and its empire. They promoted their ideas by means of an ideological campaign launched in engineering and right-wing journals, through speeches and interviews, and finally in the drafting of the New Order for Science-Technology.

STATE EFFORTS TO MOBILIZE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

In many respects, wartime policies to mobilize science and technology during the war represented no more than an intensification of existing policies that sought to raise the technological standard of Japan.⁷ One can point to an impressive history going back to the Meiji period of government attempts to import and adapt advanced Western technology and promote private and public technical research through financial grants and the establishment of public research institutes, technical colleges, and universities. The semi-governmental Institute for Physical and Chemical Research (Rikagaku Kenkyūjo, or Riken), founded in 1917, perhaps best represents the state's early commitment to enhance Japan's industrial and military capability through science and technology.

State efforts to mobilize science and technology for war can be traced back to the First World War. For the military, the First World War indicated that future wars would be "total wars" (*sōryokusen*), requiring the mobilization of not only the country's military forces, but all aspects of civilian life—including science and technology.⁸ At the center of total war mobilization was the attempt to make Japan self-sufficient in resources. This would require the development of heavy industry and the promotion of scientific and technical research to create not only sophisticated weapons for war, but synthetic substitutes for resources that the country lacked. The military's promotion of science and technology for total war included the establishment of research centers during the First World War, the navy's efforts to develop synthetic petroleum from 1919, and the establishment of the Resource Bureau (Shigen Kyoku) in 1927, which marked the first of a series of technocratic organs composed of military officers and civilian bureaucrats.

After the outbreak of the China war in 1937, the state began to assume a more interventionist role in promoting science and technology for war. Especially after the Nomonhan Incident, which demonstrated the superiority of Soviet military technology, and Germany's invasion of Poland in 1939,

⁷ Morris-Suzuki makes this point in *The Technological Transformation of Japan*.

⁸ For a discussion of total war mobilization, see Michael Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War* (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1987).

calls by the military for Japan to mobilize science and technology reached a peak.⁹ In April of 1938, the Konoe cabinet established the Science Council (Kagaku Shingikai) for the purpose of resolving the nation's resource problems through science. Headed by Prime Minister Konoe and supervised by the Cabinet Planning Board, the Science Council brought together ministry officials, professors, and military officers to devise measures to promote scientific and technical research, especially in the area of machine tool production. A year later within the Cabinet Planning Board, the Science Division (later renamed the 7th Division) was created to promote science and technology for total war mobilization. Within the Ministry of Education, active promotion of science began after the assumption of the former army minister Araki Sadao to the post of Minister of Education in 1938. Through its Science Promotion Investigative Council (Kagaku Shinkō Chōsa Kai), the ministry aimed to increase funding for science research, promote technical education, and encourage the application of science in daily life.¹⁰ Likewise, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, which had been at the forefront of technological innovation since the early 1930s, created a series of laws to expand production in strategic areas, such as machine tools, automobiles, and aircraft to mobilize for war. Among these laws were the Artificial Petroleum Law and Steel Industry Law of 1937, and the Machine Tool Industry Law and Aircraft Manufacturing Law of 1938.

LAYING THE IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR A TECHNOLOGY-BASED EMPIRE

The movement for the New Order for Science-Technology is commonly interpreted as simply one more attempt by the state to mobilize science and technology for war. However, this study suggests that the New Order for Science-Technology was qualitatively different. The movement gained momentum in December 1938, with the establishment of the Asia Development Board, a supraministerial agency created to oversee the government's policies in occupied China. The appointment of Mōri to the economic section and Miyamoto to the technology section marked the beginning of an alliance between the renovationist bureaucrats and engineers.¹¹ In contrast to the ministries and the cabinet, which viewed Japan's deficiencies in sci-

⁹ In the so-called "Nomonhan Incident," Japanese troops suffered heavy losses when they clashed with Soviet forces along the Manchurian—Mongolian border between May and September of 1939. The incident was pivotal in alarming Japanese planners of the backwardness of Japan's military technology.

¹⁰ Sawai, "Policies for the Promotion of Science and Technology in Wartime Japan," 49.

ence and technology mobilization as a problem of material and human resources, Miyamoto and Mōri believed that the problem went even deeper and lay in the minds of the Japanese. In their writings, both took pains to distinguish their efforts from those of the ministries and cabinet. Miyamoto warned: "It is a great mistake to view the promotion and mobilization of science as necessary for a state under a wartime system and only necessary to achieve the specific goal of handling the China Incident."¹² He described the establishment of the Science Deliberation Council and Science Mobilization Council in the cabinet as merely attempts to mobilize "weak Japanese science."¹³ Mōri saw the problem as one in which technology continued to be understood as simply a human resource issue—an increased demand for skilled labor and engineers corresponding to the new demands of the wartime economy. Mōri explained: "The problem of technology in our country's wartime economy today—while it is becoming an important problem—still means no more than the unprecedented increase in importance of laborers and engineers within the economy."¹⁴ As for the task that lay ahead, he suggested that "[t]echnology's transition from a materialistic existence within the economy to a life existence directly tied to the spiritual power of the race or nation is the essential problem of politics from now on."¹⁵

For the technology bureaucrats, the challenges of mobilizing science and technology were not only material but ideological and conceptual in nature. These bureaucrats keenly perceived that science and technology were crucial to transform Japan into an industrial and military power. Yet science and technology were viewed as foreign—as products of the West, developed within a Western liberal tradition, and based upon natural resources available to the West. Moreover, science was looked upon warily by the ruling class as subversive of Japan's emperor system. The historian Kawahara Hiroshi suggests that the tendency to "slight technology and view science as dangerous" (*gijutsu o keishi shi, kagaku o kiken shi suru*) formed one part of *tenno sei* ideology.¹⁶ At a time of increasingly restricted access to Western technology, disillusionment with Western liberalism, and heightened calls to mobilize the nation under the imperial symbol,

¹¹ For a description of the Asia Development Board see Imura Tetsuō, *Kōain kankō tosho zasshi mokuroku* (Tōkyō: Fuji Shuppansha, 1994).

¹² Miyamoto Takenosuke, "Kagaku kokusaku ron," in *Kagaku no dōin* (Tōkyō: Kai-zōsha, 1941), 6.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 8–9.

¹⁴ Mōri Hideoto, "Gijutsu no kaihō to seiji: gijutsu seishin no kakushin," *Kaibō Jidai* (September 1939): 4.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹⁶ Kawahara, *Shōwa seiji shisō kenkyū*, 200.

these bureaucrats recognized the need for Japan to develop a technology policy that was independent of the West and compatible with Japanese thought. They also perceived the need for a new type of bureaucrat to lead Japan, not mandarin bureaucrats trained in law, but “technology bureaucrats” equipped with technical expertise and a broad vision of empire.

Miyamoto Takenosuke

Miyamoto's appointment as head of the technology section in the newly created Asia Development Board represented the culmination of efforts by Miyamoto and members of the Japan Engineering Association to promote technology and raise the status of engineers within the government. Founded as the Japan Artisan Club (Nihon Kōjin Kurabu) in 1920, this association made “democracy and trade unionism” its guiding spirit and sought to mobilize engineers and enlighten society about technology.¹⁷ The organization proposed such measures as the promotion of technological research, advancement of technical education, job search assistance, and the dissolution of academic cliques in the engineering field. From the beginning it adopted a critical stance toward capitalism, taking pains to separate technology from capitalism: engineers were “creators” (sōzōsha), while technology was described as a “cultural creation that fused together natural science and technique.”¹⁸ In 1935 the Japan Artisan Club changed its name to the Japan Technology Association and adopted the slogan of “guiding public opinion based on technology” and “technological patriotism.”¹⁹ The title of their journal would also change from *Kōjin* (Artisan) to *Gijutsu Nihon* (Technology Japan), and later to *Gijutsu Hyōron* (Technology Review).

From 1939, Miyamoto began to design the blueprint for Japan's technology-based empire. In a speech he gave shortly after joining the Asia Development Board, Miyamoto delineated the requirements for the construction of a new East Asia: a long period of time—between thirteen and thirty years, and a large amount of funds, raw materials, and human resources.²⁰ Such conditions were possible only in times of peace. Quoting an American scholar, Miyamoto indirectly called for an immediate end to

¹⁷ Miyamoto Takenosuke, “Gijutsuka no shakaiteki danketsu,” *Gijutsu Hyōron* (June 1937): 2.

¹⁸ Kaneko Gen'ichirō, “Miyamoto kun o omou,” *Gijutsu Hyōron* (February 1942) quoted in Kawahara, *Shōwa seiji shisō kenkyū*, 65.

¹⁹ Miyamoto Takenosuke, “Gijutsuka danketsu no shidō genri,” *Gijutsu Hyōron* (July 1937): 1.

²⁰ Miyamoto Takenosuke, “Kōa gijutsu no konpon genri,” from *Gijutsu taikai kōen* (1 March 1939), reprinted in Miyamoto Takenosuke, *Tairiku no keizai kensetsu* (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 1941), 145.

hostilities with China: "Perpetual peace must be established between China and Japan in order to develop China. Japan and China are of the same race and script, and theoretically it is natural that they should cooperate for their mutual benefit."²¹

In a key essay that he wrote the following year entitled "Kōa gijutsu no mitsu no seikaku" (The three characteristics of Asian development technology), Miyamoto developed the concept of "Asia development technology" (*kōa gijutsu*).²² The unique features of Asia development technology would be its "rapid advance" (*yakushinsei*), comprehensiveness (*sōgōsei*), and "regional potential"—or ability to tap the sources of its surroundings (*ritchisei*). "Rapid advance" was defined in relative terms, as he explained: "for the purpose of the perpetual maintenance of the cooperative economy between the two countries and the fruits of joint prosperity, it is absolutely crucial that Japanese technology always maintains its superiority over Chinese technology."²³ Miyamoto suggested: "If Chinese technology advances by one, then Japanese technology must advance by two. Even if from now on the half-century handicap between the technology of both countries becomes increasingly pulled apart, rather than reducing it, limitless advance must be continued. For this reason Japanese technology must be more advanced."²⁴ To ensure that Japanese technology stayed ahead, its comprehensiveness and "regional potential" were essential. By comprehensive character Miyamoto referred to a unified and coordinated technology policy; by "regional potential" he meant that "Japan must have its own original technology which has been developed to suit the conditions—natural, social, economic conditions—of Japan."²⁵

"Asia development technology" would be developed within a so-called East Asian Economic Community (*Tōa keizai kyōdōtai*) (*kyōdōtai* being a translation of the German word *gemeinschaft*). Miyamoto contrasted the notion of "community" to the idea of an "economic bloc." He defined "economic bloc" as "simply a joint phenomenon of both parties, a union through a bloc economy such as that formed between the colony and mainland, and held together by means of an economy of mercantilist exploitation."²⁶ In contrast, he suggested that the term economic community "makes as a condition reciprocity and equality, and common existence

²¹ Ibid., 139.

²² Miyamoto Takenosuke, "Kōa gijutsu no mitsu no seikaku," *Tenshin Kyoku Zasshi* (March 1940), reprinted in *Tairiku no keizai kensetsu*, 177–183.

²³ Ibid., 179.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid., 181.

²⁶ Miyamoto Takenosuke, "Tōa keizai kyōdōtai ron," *Gijutsu Hyōron* (December 1940), reprinted in *Tairiku no keizai kensetsu*, 58.

and common prosperity. It does not allow an exploitative economy of capitalistic selfishness within it."²⁷ Essentially, Miyamoto's conception of an East Asian Economic Community was based on the implicit ideas of hierarchy and mutual dependence. Mutual dependence in a superior-inferior relationship was to form the basis for Japan's relationship to China. Hence, it was necessary that Japanese technology maintains its "rapid advance" and maximizes its effectiveness through "comprehensive" development and through its regional character. "If Manchurian and Chinese—especially Chinese—technology rapidly develops in the future without the aid of Japan and that country's rich resources can be developed, then mutual sharing of technology between Japan and China will cease to exist, and will bring about none other than the internal collapse of the East Asian Economic Community."²⁸ In other words, Asia development technology would enable Japan to catch up with the West through the resources of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere at a time when access to foreign technology and raw materials was becoming increasingly restricted. Moreover, it would represent Japan's "contribution" to East Asia, and thereby provide the justification for Japanese hegemony in the region.

Mōri Hideoto

Among the renovationist bureaucrats, Mōri had the most developed and philosophically grounded vision of empire that he developed in monthly essays in the renovationist journal *Kaibō Jidai* (Era of Analysis) under the pen name Kamakura Ichirō. Together with the renovationist bureaucrats Minobe Yōji and Sakomizu Hisatsune, Mōri was known as one of the "three ravens" (*sanba karasu*) of the Cabinet Planning Board and the ideologue of the group. According to Minobe, Mōri would provide the ideas, Sakomizu would systematize them, and Minobe would be responsible for their implementation.²⁹ As a member of the Asia Development Board and Cabinet Planning Board during the key years between 1939 and 1941, Mōri participated in drafting policies for the New Order for Science-Technology. Particularly through his essays in *Kaibō Jidai* and contributions to technology journals, such as *Gijutsu Hyōron* and *Kagakushugi Kōgyō*, Mōri undertook the task of making science and technology a part of Japanese culture. His attempts to take technology and science out of the abstract, universal, individual-based liberal capitalism and place it within a national community (*kokumin kyōdōtai*) based on the "volk" (*minzoku*) and "con-

²⁷ Ibid., 59.

²⁸ Ibid., 63.

²⁹ Minobe Yōji, *Yōyō kano – Minobe Yōji tsuitōroku* (Tōkyō: Nihon Hyōronsha, 1954), 129.

crete" national activity were remarkably similar to efforts by so-called reactionary modernist engineers and intellectuals in Weimar and Nazi Germany.³⁰

In an essay which he wrote shortly after joining the Asia Development Board entitled "Tōa kyōdōtai to gijutsu no kakumei" (The East Asian Community and the revolution of technology), Mōri attempted to develop a new theoretical basis for technological development within a Japan-Manchuria-China sphere.³¹ Within this regional sphere, technology would be developed upon the new economic basis of the "national economy" (*kokumin keizai*) instead of upon the basis of Western liberalism. Mōri contrasted this national economy with the liberal economy. The liberal economy was founded upon the principle of the individual and the "universal principles of mankind," while "liberal economics" explained economic phenomena in terms of the "surface relationship" between the national and world economy. In the pursuit of commercial profit, the national economy had previously "expanded its area of participation in the world economy through the mechanism of free trade."³² The liberal system subordinated a nation's economic activity to the world economy, where the value of a country's natural resources and the extent of their development were dictated by the world market. However, as he explained, "the significance of today's economic activity is national economic activity, not for an abstract individual or mankind; it is activity as concrete national activity."³³ The national economy would be independent of the world economy, and economic activity, especially the development of natural resources, would be based upon the needs of the national economy rather than upon some abstract notion of free trade.

Like Miyamoto, Mōri believed that the key to a self-sufficient national economy was the development of synthetic raw materials, which he believed represented a "new industrial revolution." As Mōri explained in "Gijutsu no kaihō to seiji: gijutsu seishin no kakushin" (Government and the liberation of technology: the reform of the spirit of technology): "When raw material resources do not directly exist within the state's territory, the state maintains relationships abroad. In this way, both domes-

³⁰ See Jeffrey Herf, *Reactionary Modernism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1984). It is not clear to what degree German engineers and intellectuals influenced Japanese technology bureaucrats. However, one active participant in the debates on the New Order for Science-Technology, Aikawa Haruki, was familiar with of their writings. See Aikawa Haruki, *Sangyō gijutsu* (Tōkyō: Hakuyōsha, 1942).

³¹ Mōri Hideoto, "Tōa kyōdōtai to gijutsu no kakumei" *Kaibō Jidai* (March 1939): 4–12.

³² *Ibid.*, 5–6.

³³ *Ibid.*, 5.

tically and internationally, a country's government is dependent upon and subjected to an economy that is built upon the control of natural raw materials."³⁴ If technology could solve Japan's resource problem, then developing technology would no longer be a problem of mobilizing materials, but would become a problem of mobilizing the creative powers of the people—in other words, "a problem tied to the national community and to its spirit and people." The new technology "came to possess spiritual and cultural significance because its progress was the gauge to measure the freedom of creativity of the people." In terms of this creativity—"immense creativity is not of one human being but is rigidly and deeply tied to the people's communal life."³⁵ Mōri summed up the characteristics of the new technology as follows: technology is neither simply a means of production nor specialized individual technology resulting from random discoveries as in the West, but is a technology of the national community based upon synthetic raw materials and "supported by the lively creative character within the community." Moreover, "it is comprehensive, uniform, and possesses a greater planning character due to its being unified into something ethnic and its uniform character makes technology's actions spiritual."³⁶

A prominent theme in the writings of Mōri and Miyamoto was the call for a new type of bureaucrat to administer such a technology-based society. A technology-based society meant not only a society based upon synthetic resources and heavy industry, but one built upon superior organization. According to Miyamoto: "The guiding principle of so-called renovationist national policy is ... rationalization of every section of society, of the economy, and of government. The utmost efficiency of structure should take priority; the minimum use of labor to achieve maximum efficiency is the principle of the economy."³⁷ Mōri envisioned a functionalist society organized by occupation. In such a society, conflict between labor and capital will be eliminated, and "workers and entrepreneurs will acquire the status of organizers."³⁸ He suggested that, "[f]or the nation, possession of industrial raw materials and supplies necessary for life and all other things becomes not a problem of importing money and capital, but a problem of organization".³⁹ Mōri suggested that, as for the new type

³⁴ Mōri Hideoto, "Gijutsu no kaihō to seiji: gijutsu seishin no kakushin," *Kaibō Jidai* (September 1939): 4–8, reprinted in *Gijutsu Hyōron* (September 1939): 12–15.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 7.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 8.

³⁷ Miyamoto Takenosuke, "Kakushinteki kokusaku juritsu no yōken," *Gijutsu Hyōron* (August 1937): 3.

³⁸ Mōri Hideoto, "Nihon kokumin keizai no keisei to seiji," *Kaibō Jidai* (April 1939): 30.

of bureaucrat, “naturally, they must change from legislative bureaucrats to so-called “creative bureaucrats” (*sōzōteki/kurie-chibu na kanryō*). This is a strange word; however, in the area of technology it is also the same. We were “conservative engineers” (*hoshuteki gijutsusha*) who drafted, applied, and interpreted laws; from now on we will be “creative engineers” (*sōzōteki gijutsusha*).”⁴⁰

While Mōri advocated the need for “creative engineers” in the bureaucracy, Miyamoto called for the need for “administrative engineers” in the technical field:

The concept of integrated technology is the latest concept, even abroad. As in Germany, the term “administrative engineer (*Verwaltungssingenieur*) is being used. In contrast to the specialized engineer who is entrenched in his own field, [the administrative engineer] maintains contact with all fields including government, economics, and culture, and displays the synthesized results ... I think that this is the new direction of technology and at the same time its true mission.”⁴¹

Here, the vision of technocratic control put forth by Mōri and Miyamoto was that of a society run by technology bureaucrats who perceived the challenge of government as ultimately that of organization.

DESIGNING THE NEW ORDER FOR SCIENCE-TECHNOLOGY

The movement for the New Order for Science-Technology was officially launched on 12 April 1940 as part of Prime Minister Konoe’s New Order movement. Upon the request of the chief of the political section of the Asia Development Board Suzuki Teiichi in May of 1940, Miyamoto began producing the first drafts for the Technology Board. These drafts were then presented to the Cabinet Planning Board director Hoshino Naoki. The models which the technology bureaucrats turned to were not the liberal models of the advanced Western countries, America and Britain, but the statist models of the late developers “Manchukuo,” Soviet Russia, and Nazi Germany.

Organizing the New Order for Science-Technology

One organizational model for the future Technology Board could be found in the Continental Science Board (*Tairiku Kagakuin*) in Manchuria.⁴² As

³⁹ Ibid., 30.

⁴⁰ “Zadankai: Kakushin kanryō,” *Jitsugyō no Nihon* (1 January 1941).

⁴¹ Miyamoto, “Kōa gijutsu no konpon genri,” 152.

with many of Japan's wartime planning agencies and control laws, Manchuria served as an important experimental ground to try out new policies and methods for Japan and its empire. Plans for a central agency for scientific research were initiated by the renovationist bureaucrat Hoshino Naoki, under whose leadership at the Cabinet Planning Board the science-technology new order would be launched. A Finance Ministry official in the early 1930s, Hoshino rose to the prime ministership in Japanese-controlled Manchukuo and was known as one of the *ni-ki-san-suke*.⁴³ Upon the invitation of Hoshino in 1934, the founder of Riken, Ōkochi Masatoshi, established the research center with the assistance of engineers and scientists such as Fujisawa Takeo of the Cabinet Resources Bureau and Suzuki Umetarō of the research bureau of the South Manchurian Railways (Mantetsu).

As the central agency for scientific research in Manchuria, the Continental Science Board sought to develop the resources of Manchuria, train researchers, and promote scientific knowledge. All science and technology-related research was to be assumed by the agency, including the science research functions of Mantetsu. Hoshino justified the assumption of Mantetsu's scientific research center in Dairen by the need to geographically centralize research practices in the capital of Shinkyō (now Changchun). Politically, this move symbolized the takeover of science and technology planning by the renovationist bureaucrats after their arrival in Manchuria.

The original inspiration for the Continental Science Board was Germany's Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, which served as a model for a centralized, semi-governmental research institute.⁴⁴ The organization of its various research sections was modeled on Riken. However, Riken's growth into a sprawling conglomerate also served as a lesson in what to avoid. Suzuki Umetarō lamented: "there are over 680 research laboratories and institutes both private and public. These various institutes cover different jurisdictions resulting in sectionalism, inflexibility, and overlapping of research. From the standpoint of cost, it is extremely inefficient. We seek to avoid these problems in Manchuria and make it as close to the ideal as possible."⁴⁵ For this reason, the Soviet model became the principle organizational model for the Continental Science Board.

⁴² Kawahara, *Shōwa seiji shisō kenkyū*, 84–92.

⁴³ The *ni-ki-san-suke* referred to the last syllable of the leaders of the Manchukuo government: Tōjō Hideki and Hoshino Naoki, and Kishi Nobusuke, Ayukawa Giisuke, and Matsuoka Yōsuke.

⁴⁴ On the founding of the Continental Science Board see Hoshino Naoki, *Mihatenu yume* (Tōkyō: Diamondosha, 1963), esp. 170–75.

⁴⁵ Suzuki Umetarō, "Tairiku no hatten to kagaku" (1938), in *Nihon kagaku gijutsu shi taikei*, vol. 4, 324.

The attractive features of the Soviet model were that science research was centralized and placed under the state, and scientists participated directly in policy-making and enjoyed high status within the government. Suzuki described Soviet science policy in the following way:

As you all know, after the Russian revolution, religion, and superstition were disaffirmed, and the basis for government became the stability of the people's lives – in other words, planning for the strengthening of national defense and providing for the necessities of life. Only through the power of science-technology can this be achieved. As a result, a large amount of energy is devoted to promoting science. More than ten large research organs were constructed in Moscow, prominent scholars and researchers gathered and organized an academy which was made into the central research agency for science-technology. [Furthermore,] its head participates in the highest levels of planning within the government. As for important national policies, the academy is consulted via this representative, and concrete plans are drafted based on research studies carried out in the various research institutes. These become the working plans for such things as the Five-Year Plan.⁴⁶

Similar principles were applied in the design of the Continental Science Board. It was placed directly under the Prime Minister (*kokumin sōridai-jin*), the head of the institute was given the rank of minister by being “specially appointed” (*tokunin kan*), and researchers became “research bureaucrats,” a rank higher than that of clerk (*jimu bunkan*), and were provided a salary equivalent to that of a high-level civil servant (*tokkyū bunkan*). In terms of its research policy, the Continental Science Board would be a comprehensive research organ dealing with all aspects of the natural sciences. Its research agenda aimed to further national policy and was to be set by a Science Deliberation Committee composed of the Prime Minister, Chief of General Affairs (*sōmuchō kan*), bureau chiefs, and the director of the Continental Science Board.⁴⁷

In the late 1930s and early 1940s, the founders of the Continental Science Board would apply their experiences in Manchuria at the Cabinet Planning Board in Japan. Under Konoë's second cabinet, Hoshino Naoki would direct the New Order as president of the Cabinet Planning Board and Fujisawa Takeo would become head of the Cabinet Planning Board's

⁴⁶ Suzuki Umetarō, “Manmō shigen no kaihatsu to kagaku,” *Gijutsu Hyōron* (October 1941): 33.

⁴⁷ Manshūkokuishi Hensan Kankōkai, ed., *Manshūkokuishi: Sōron* (Tōkyō: Manmō Dōhō Engokai, 1965), 1127.

Seventh Division. Suzuki Umetarō, as head of the Continental Science Board, would continue to preach the virtues of Soviet science policy, and the Cabinet Planning Board's resident Soviet specialist, Nakamura Masao, would regularly contribute articles to Miyamoto's *Technology Review* about Soviet technology policy. However, as the technology bureaucrats would discover, developing science and technology policy in Japan posed a much more formidable challenge. Unlike in Manchuria, where technology bureaucrats were given a free hand to create science and technology policies from scratch, planners in Japan had to confront a firmly entrenched political culture that looked warily upon science.

Mobilizing the Scientific Spirit of the Nation.

If the Soviet model of science mobilization provided an important organizational inspiration for the New Order for Science-Technology, it was the "scientific" and "spiritual power" of Nazi Germany that set the standard for the ideological mobilization of science and technology in wartime Japan. The head of the science division of the Cabinet Planning Board and admirer of German technology policy, Morikawa Kakuzō, even published a study entitled *Nachi seiji to waga kagaku gijutsu* (The Nazi Government and Our Science-Technology).⁴⁸ In this book, Morikawa set about analyzing the national character of Germans and the role of science and technology in German society in order to grasp the secret of Germany's technological success. He admired the national character of the Germans, which he described with the words *Sachlichkeit*, *Zweckmäßigkeit*, and *Rationalismus* (objectivity, practicality, and rationality). In comparing Japan and Germany, he suggested that in contrast to Germany, "Japan lacked the communal spirit, and has not undergone training in obedience, as evidenced by the recent spate of *gekokujō* (juniors overpowering seniors)."⁴⁹ Moreover, "in contrast to the Japanese, the spirit of science permeates the everyday lives of Germans."⁵⁰ Morikawa was particularly impressed by the Deutsches Museum in Munich, which he believed demonstrated the high level of common awareness of science and technology in German society.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Morikawa Kakuzō, *Nachi seiji to waga kagakugijutsu* (Tōkyō: Okakura Shobō, 1942).

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 129.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 131.

⁵¹ Morikawa Kakuzō, "Doitsu no gijutsu sha to Nihon no gijutsu sha" *Gijutsu Hyōron*, January 1941, contained in *Minobe Yōji bunsho* (Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Toshokan hen, 1988).

Miyamoto also looked to Germany as the model for technology mobilization in Japan. What attracted Miyamoto to Nazi Germany was its national spirit: "Nazi Germany says 'we will not grieve over our lack of resources. It is sufficient to overcome our intellectual poverty. Now we will either acquire or manufacture what we need.' The Japanese as well must overcome material difficulties through spirit and effort like the Germans."⁵² Miyamoto was deeply influenced by the German "blitzkrieg," which he believed was made possible by two factors: "scientific power"—represented by superior weapons produced through science and machines—and "spiritual power." Miyamoto believed that the two were not conflicting, but were mutually dependent and represented a "harmonious fusion."⁵³ He believed that technology was the foundation for national defense, industry, and life, and that science made technology possible. The German blitzkrieg highlighted the important relationship between state and science, which he classified into three areas: national defense and science, industry and science, and daily life and science. In terms of the relationship between national defense and science, he suggested that "present and future wars are based on extremely advanced science and machines."⁵⁴ Industry and science had also become intimately related. Not only was "the application of science in the manufacturing production process indispensable," but science had become a substitute for raw materials. Through science, low-grade ore can be substituted for high-grade ore, while wood fiber can be used to make raw cotton, coal to make oil, and coal and lime to make rubber.⁵⁵ Finally, as for the relationship between daily life and science, he offered the following: "a country's national power is determined by the sum of material and human resources. If they are appropriately combined, the functional form it takes is national defense power and industrial power. Deficiencies in human resources can be supplemented by science."⁵⁶

Miyamoto believed that the real obstacles in developing science and technology lay in Japanese and "oriental" culture, as he explained:

In the ancient Orient, material things were looked down upon and spiritual things were revered. Our tradition was one in which materialism was rejected and idealism embraced. It is wrong to reject scientific civilization as materialist culture. Science is not material, and

⁵² Miyamoto, "Kōa gijutsu no konpon genri," 147.

⁵³ Miyamoto Takenosuke, "Kokka to kagaku," *Risō* (December 1940); reprinted in *Kagaku no dōin*, 19.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 13.

scientists are not materialists. Science is the study that makes clear ancient truths, and conforms to the law of mathematical principles, or the law of experience. "The 'clarification of the *kokutai*' (*kokutai meichō ron*) looks coldly upon science as if it were a heretic. It automatically assumes that it is absent from the Japanese character because it is a foreign culture. It is mistakenly linked with historical materialist thought, and looked down upon as a material thing, while [in contrast,] the Japanese value the spirit—hence it is viewed as combining charcoal and ice."⁵⁷

Miyamoto tried to dispel two myths that he believed were associated with science in Japan: that science was associated with historical materialism, or Marxism, and hence incompatible with Japan's notion of *kokutai*; and that science's "materialist" orientation made it incompatible with the non-materialism, or "idealism" of oriental culture. By doing so, he hoped to make science more widely accepted among the people. As he suggested: "science is not only necessary for scientists, but crucial for nurturing the scientific way of thinking and perception among the general populace."⁵⁸ Only by incorporating science and the "scientific way of thinking" could Japan compete with the West.

Miyamoto's solution was to advocate a new type of Japanese "science-technology," in which he drew a distinction between "pure science" and "applied science" (i.e., technology) with an emphasis on the latter. Japanese science-technology recognized the intimate relationship between pure science and technology: technology was possible only through basic scientific research. However, science could possess a unique Japanese character only if it was directed toward the development of technology based upon the resources of Asia and furthered Japan's goals of military and industrial "catch-up." As he explained: "What I reject is pure science having a universal character. I affirm applied science having a regional, state, and racial character." Miyamoto believed that science and technology are rigorously tied together, and that the development of technology without scientific research is like "flowers blooming without grass" (*kusa nashi ga hana o hiraki*).

Mōri saw the need for a new ideology for Japanese science-technology "for the purpose of truly fusing science and technology into the life of the Japanese race"⁵⁹ Developing such an ideology involved several steps. In the same way in which Mōri had taken technology out of liberal capital-

⁵⁷ Miyamoto, "Kokka to kagaku," 22.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁵⁹ Mōri Hideoto, "Seiji ishiki to kagaku gijutsu suijun," *Gijutsu Hyōron* (January 1941).

ism and placed it within the national community, he would now take science out of the “mechanistic materialistic worldview” and place it within his so-called “new worldview of quantum theory.” In a dialogue with the Japanese philosopher Miki Kiyoshi in April of 1941, Mōri described the new stage of science.⁶⁰ According to Mōri, “Japanese science-technology remained no more than a struggle with the economy from the moment it awakened as modern science-technology.”⁶¹ Like technology, science research in Japan had been driven by economic development, and as a result, science-technology was subordinated to the economy and could only have a “materialistic existence.” Like Miyamoto, Mōri believed that science had been associated with Marxism within Japanese ideology and was seen as the “source of the historical materialist world view.”⁶²

Mōri justified the mobilization of science by arguing that science was now moving toward a “higher stage” and was now compatible with Japanese culture:

Modern science, which is pushing toward the completion of the study of atomic energy, is itself revising its view of the former historical, materialistic, mechanistic world picture and moving toward embracing oriental philosophy. Can't Japanese philosophy and today's new science become completely fused together? In other words, I sense that the development of science today is now able to be fused for the first time with our philosophy and science, and the reason why our ideology opposed science is because science was still in a primitive stage.⁶³

The new stage of quantum theory, according to Mōri, represented “the fusion of mechanistic and metaphysical elements.” This fusion heralded the fusion of the previous material, mechanistic science of the West, and the non-material, spiritual philosophy of the Orient. According to Mōri: “The reason why I am interested in science-technology is because, after all, the scientific view of the quantum theory and so-called ‘metaphysical cognition’ have become unified and [Japanese science-technology] no longer contradicts the Japanese totalitarian world view.”⁶⁴

Having created a new ideological basis for both technology and science, the last step for Mōri was to unite them into a Japanese type of “science-technology.” He saw this as ultimately a problem of government. In an es-

⁶⁰ Mōri Hideoto and Miki Kiyoshi, “Ashita no kagaku Nihon no sōzō,” *Kagaku Gijutsu Kōgyō* (April 1941).

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 187.

⁶² Mōri, “Seiji ishiki to kagaku gijutsu suiun,” 25.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 24.

⁶⁴ Mōri and Miki, “Ashita no kagaku Nihon no sōzō,” 196.

say in the January 1941 issue of *Technology Review*, Mōri suggests: "There must exist greater sensitivity toward the mutually influencing character of science and technology in order to create a superior technology." A science-technology based upon a commercial economy "tends to sever science and technology, and a government founded upon a commercial economy, naturally from this standpoint, has a short-term perspective which is poor in the power of imagination about the future character of the ethnic people." Hence, for Mōri, "political consciousness must be created before technology and science are mechanically tied together." This was the duty of scientists and engineers to teach politicians and the people about the new stage of science and technology. "We must raise the people's political awareness of science in order to develop Japan's science-technology."⁶⁵

IMPLEMENTING THE NEW ORDER FOR SCIENCE-TECHNOLOGY

The "Outline Plan for the Establishment of a New Order for Science-Technology" (Kagaku Gijutsu Shintaisei Kakuritsu Yōkō) was approved by the cabinet on April 1941. In the opening statement of policy, the government anticipated "the completion of a Japanese character of science-technology based upon the resources of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere." This goal was to be achieved through "the establishment of a total war state system of science-technology," "the rapid development of technology," "the epoch-making advancement of science," and "the promotion of the scientific spirit of the nation."⁶⁶ The "Japanese character of science-technology" was based upon Miyamoto's "Asia development technology."

The Outline proposed policies that were grouped into three areas: policies to promote scientific research, policies to promote technology, and policies to "cultivate the scientific spirit." The centerpiece of the New Order for Science-Technology was the establishment of the Technology Board (Gijutsuin).⁶⁷ Like the Continental Science Board, the Technology Board was to serve as a comprehensive research agency for science and conduct research on basic science, applied science, and industrialization. As in the case of the Continental Science Board, the technology bureau-

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Kikakuin Kenkyūkai, *Kokubō kokka no yōkō* (Tōkyō: Shinkigensha, 1941), 173.

⁶⁷ For a detailed study of the establishment of the Technology Board, see Sawai Minoru, "Kagaku gijutsu shintaisei kōsō no tenkai to gijutsuin no tanjō," *Ōsaka Daigaku Keizai-gaku* (December 1991): 367–95.

crats sought to avoid the overlapping and redundancy of science and technology research in Japan. Through the supra-ministerial Technology Board, they hoped to bring together representatives of the various ministries to draft national policies and plans such as a Five-Year Plan for the rapid development of technology.⁶⁸ However, due to strong opposition by the various ministries, especially by the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, who viewed such plans as infringing upon their area of authority, the drafters were forced to withdraw their plan and resort to trying to coordinate research among over 1,000 research institutes in Japan. In addition to the Technology Board, a Science-Technology Deliberation Council (Kagaku Gijutsu Shingikai) was to be established to unite the various science-technology inquiry boards such as the Ministry of Education's Science Promotion Investigative Council.⁶⁹ The establishment of both the Technology Board and the Science-Technology Deliberation Council was delayed until 1942. However, by this time, given the severe conditions of the Pacific War and demands of the military, science and technology mobilization was geared toward the short-term goal of fighting the war.

CONCLUSION

The New Order for Science-Technology represented an attempt by Japan's technology bureaucrats to develop a science and technology policy for Japan and its empire in East Asia. These bureaucrats sought to achieve this by developing a Japanese type of science-technology inspired by the models of scientific and technological development of Soviet Russia, Nazi Germany, and their own experimental ground of Manchuria. In launching the movement for the New Order for Science-Technology, renovationist bureaucrats and sympathetic engineers joined together to launch an ideological campaign to make science and technology compatible with Japanese culture. These bureaucrats also sought to convince the Japanese public that they as "technology bureaucrats" were uniquely qualified to run Japan's empire in East Asia.

Through the New Order for Science-Technology technology bureaucrats such as Miyamoto and Mōri articulated a vision of a postwar Japanese empire. They imagined this empire to be built upon the idea of a

⁶⁸ Ibid., 193.

⁶⁹ For a study on the Science-Technology Deliberation Council see Sawai Minoru, "Taihei'yō sensōki kagaku gijutsu seisaku no hitokusari" *Ōsaka Daigaku Keizai-gaku* (October 1994): 1–23.

“community” characterized by mutual dependence, or a symbiotic relationship in which members would provide for the others’ needs. For the “community” to be sustainable, each member would adhere to a defined role, with Japan assuming the position as technological leader in the region.

After the war the ideological foundations of this New Order were no longer tenable as Japan was now firmly entrenched in the democratic world order and its emperor system was disavowed. Within the postwar order, Japan has achieved tremendous economic growth and now ranks among the most technologically advanced countries in the world. However, with Japan’s growing economic presence in Asia, concerns have been raised about whether Japan is building a “regional production alliance” or a peacetime “yen bloc” in Asia.⁷⁰ With the rapid economic development of Asia and Japan’s increasing economic and technological influence in the region, has become all the more imperative to come to terms with Japan’s recent past in Asia. The New Order for Science-Technology provides a window into wartime bureaucratic thinking about technology and technocratic control and in doing so, provides an important historical perspective to current discussions of Japanese technology policy and its role in Asia.

⁷⁰ See for instance, Hatch and Yamamura, *Asia in Japan’s Embrace*, and Paul Maidment, “The Yen Bloc: A New Balance in Asia?” *Economist* (15 July 1989).

III.
IMPERIALISM AT WORK:
THE JAPANESE EMPIRE IN ASIA

CONSUMPTION AS RESISTANCE: THE NATIONAL PRODUCTS MOVEMENT AND ANTI-JAPANESE BOYCOTTS IN MODERN CHINA

Karl G. GERTH

Always remember and never forget May Ninth [1915].

A 1915 poster written in its author's blood

Commercial Warfare can defeat Military Warfare.

By remembering May Ninth and May Thirtieth [1925], [Chinese-made] Sanjiao Brand towels will bring down [Japanese-made] Tienmiao Brand towels.

Advertisement in a Shanghai newspaper in June, 1925

Boycotts figure prominently in the history of Sino-Japanese relations in the first third of the twentieth century, and with good reason. During this period, such boycotts precipitated or accompanied major turning points in relations between the two countries—with significant boycotts directed against the Japanese in 1908, 1909, 1915, 1919, 1925, 1928, and then nearly continuously into the second Sino-Japanese War (1937–45). Indeed, a recent book on the origins of the war asserts that the policies underpinning Chinese boycotts provoked the war with Japan.¹

Despite the frequency and centrality of boycotts, studies usually focus on individual incidents, ignoring any continuity with previous ones.² Even the few books that cover multiple boycotts fail to adequately problematize the continuity between them.³ As such, the historiography of boycotts interprets these events as isolated manifestations of a cycle that

¹ Donald A. Jordan, *Chinese Boycotts versus Japanese Bombs: The Failure of China's "Revolutionary Diplomacy," 1931–32* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).

² Two examples of studies that examine individual boycotts include: Jordan, *Chinese Boycotts* and Joseph T. Chen, *The May Fourth Movement in Shanghai: The Making of a Social Movement in Modern China* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971). Among several recent studies on the Anti-American boycott of 1905, Wong Sin-kiong is helpful in suggesting how this boycott develops protest tropes. See Wong, "The Genesis of Popular Movements in Modern China," Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1995.

³ The most important studies covering multiple boycotts are: Charles F. Remer, *A Study of Chinese Boycotts: With Special Reference to Their Economic Effectiveness* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1933) and Kikuchi Takaharu,

intensified over time. The sequence of events within each cycle can be summarized as follows: A foreign “humiliation” prompts a popular response in the form of a boycott, and the Japanese respond by pressuring the Chinese government to suppress it. The Chinese government then attempts to suppress the boycott with varying degrees of intensity until gradually the boycott dissolves as government suppression from above, inertia from below, and the profit motive among merchants undermine the commitment of participants. A few years later, another round begins.⁴

My concern here is the inactivity that is assumed to exist between these “cycles.” In the first part of the paper, I introduce a Shanghai-based commercial and industrial organization with ties throughout the region, and examine how it tried to mediate the economic impact of political and social changes on its businesses and industries. I argue that this organization continually promoted an ethic of nationalistic consumption as part of its strategy to compete against foreign companies in Chinese markets. Combining elements of anti-imperialism, nationalism, and Chinese identity, this ethic made the consumption of “national products” (*guohuo*) patriotic and the use of foreign products akin to treason. The ethic increasingly came to shape aspects of Chinese life by legitimizing government policies, sanctioning social activity, influencing clothing fashions, and more. Throughout this paper, I refer to the growing number of diverse organizations, activities and agendas supporting this ethic of nationalistic consumption as the “National Products Movement” (*Guohuo yundong*, or NPM).

In the second half of this paper, I examine the relationship between the National Products Movement and the boycotts by looking at the 1915 boycott. I focus on the agenda and activities of a single organization that embodied a particular ethic of nationalistic consumption to see how this ethic spread and influenced the interpretation of objects and events beyond its original scope. At the heart of this paper is a reinterpretation of boy-

⁴ *Chūgoku minzoku undō no kihon kōzō: Taigai boikotto no kenkyū* (Tōkyō: Daian, 1966 [expanded and revised edition, 1974]). While periodically mentioning some of the long-term effects of boycotts, such as the replacement of Japanese products with new Chinese ones, Remer’s focus is “economic effectiveness” from the perspective of trade statistics, not institutions, activities, or symbols. Kikuchi does a superior job of connecting boycotts by analyzing them alongside the growth of domestic Chinese industry. He also acknowledges the appearance of the National Products Movement (NPM) organizations, but only examines them within the narrow context of individual boycotts and does not trace their activities across boycotts. In other cases, multiple boycotts are subsumed under other subjects.

⁴ This interpretation of boycotts is reinforced by the common practice of numbering boycotts in contemporary coverage, especially Japanese. See, for instance, *Shina ni okeru hainichi undō* (Ōsaka: Ōsaka Shōgyō Kaigisho, 1928), 1–6.

cotts, specifically the anti-Japanese boycott of 1915, through their re-contextualization. I propose that the NPM links and redefines these events, shifting the interpretative paradigm away from boycotts as sporadic and usually temporarily successful events to boycotts as a highly visible manifestation of growing commitment to and extension of an ethic of nationalistic consumption.⁵ Examining events such as boycotts from the perspective of a movement that promoted a refusal to buy foreign products in general, and increasingly Japanese products in particular, will reveal that popular resistance to Japanese and other foreign activity in China is underestimated and misunderstood.⁶ Indeed, the misinterpretation of these events as isolated incidents leads to a devaluing of important dimensions of Chinese nationalism and forms of anti-imperialism that Japanese encountered throughout China.⁷

DOMESTICATING CONSUMPTION PRIOR TO 1915

This section examines the development of an ethic of nationalistic consumption through the early history of a key organization in the National Products Movement, the National Products Preservation Association (Zhonghua Guohuo Weichi Hui, which I hereafter refer to as the NPPA).⁸ The section illuminates the development of the NPM as a coherent move-

⁵ The groundbreaking work of Shanghai economic historian Pan Junxiang includes boycotts as a manifestation of the NPM but does not explore the links between the two. See Pan, "Guohuo yundong pingjia de ruogan wenti," in Pan Junxiang, ed., *Zhongguo jindai guohuo yundong* (Beijing: Zhongguo Wenshi Chubanshe, 1996), 577–78.

⁶ In contrast with these studies that concentrate on the economic dimension of the Sino-foreign rivalries, I focus on the broader context of organizations, activities, and symbols that shape these rivalries. The growth of Chinese domestic industry and its implications for Sino-Japanese economic rivalry are surveyed in Marie-Claire Bergère, *The Golden Age of the Chinese Bourgeoisie, 1911–1937* (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 63–98; Kikuchi, *Chūgoku minzoku undō*, and many other places. Specific rivalries between Chinese and foreign businesses are examined in industry studies, such as Sherman Cochran *Big Business in China: Sino-Foreign Rivalry in the Cigarette Industry, 1890–1930* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980) and Takamura Naosuke, *Kindai Nihon mengyō to Chūgoku* (Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1982), especially 140–156.

⁷ The Japanese also encountered these forms of nationalism within boycotts and the NPM in overseas Chinese communities, especially in Southeast Asia. See, for example, Akashi Yoji, "The Boycott and Anti-Japanese National Salvation Movement of the Nanyang Chinese, 1908–1941." Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 1963.

⁸ Translating the Chinese name for the NPPA poses problems. I chose the middle course between two extremes—one stressing the purpose of the organization and

ment with the means to shape and promote this ethic. It demonstrates that the movement as a whole was indeed a sustained effort, rather than a series of unconnected or loosely connected events subordinated to boycotts. Neither the movement nor the NPPA was, as one scholar stated and many others implied, merely “camouflage for boycotts.”⁹ In fact, this paper argues that the reverse may be the case. The second half of the paper uses the anti-Japanese boycott of 1915 and its legacy to show how the NPM, through such organizations as the NPPA, came to define the social, ideological, and economic bases of boycotts.

Advocating Nationalistic Consumption

The formation of an ethic of nationalistic consumption was closely linked to other changes in China. The political revolution of 1911 that led to the downfall of China’s last dynasty further destabilized, or completely overturned, state-sponsored symbols, institutions, and ideologies. Moreover, there was more than one contender to make replacements, as mounting internal problems caused the Qing dynasty to collapse at least as much as it was overthrown by strong revolutionary forces in control of competing weapons, soldiers, and ideologies. The contenders were anxious to consolidate power, and at the local level these struggles were often expressed in battles over symbols, such as anti-foot binding campaigns, the cutting of queues, the modification of clothing, the reorganization of time through holidays and the introduction of the solar calendar, among others.¹⁰ When examined, these conflicts over rival state-building agendas are usually seen as battlegrounds for political, military, and intellectual elites at one

the other one a more literal translation. I elected to translate *weichi* as “preservation” to contrast it with its implied antonym, which often appeared in the phrase, “national annihilation” (*wangguo*). “Preservation” implies not only preserving the industries involved in the NPPA, but also the Chinese nation through the “preservation” of its industries. A NPPA document from 1925 translates its name as “China Products Improvement Association” (Suzhou Municipal Archives Suzhou zong shanghui quanzong 2.1 [all materials come from this collection referred to hereafter as SZMA]: File 397). Although improving Chinese products was an explicit and central part of the agendas of NPM groups, such as NPPA, the term does not adequately invoke the foreign threat that promoting Chinese products implied. Other translations for NPPA are “Chinese Product Protection Society” and “Society to Encourage Use of National Goods.” Linda Pomerantz-Zhang, *Wu Tingfang (1842–1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1992), 235.

⁹ See for example, Matsumoto Shigeharu, *The Historical Development of Chinese Boycott, Book 1, 1834–1925* (Tōkyō: Japanese Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1933).

¹⁰ Li Shaobing, *Minguo shiqi de xishi fengsu wenhua* (Beijing: Beijing Shifan Daxue Chubanshe, 1994).

end of the social hierarchy and students, secret societies, and other mass movements of resistance at the other end.¹¹ However, powerful economic interests also mobilized resources to redefine the new symbols of state to reinforce and extend competing narratives of the nation, its people, and its route to “national salvation” (*jiuguo*).¹²

The NPPA had pressing reasons for linking consumption with burgeoning Chinese nationalism. In the conflict over how the Chinese should look, the new republican government made relentless efforts to eradicate queues and introduce Western-style dress for men. Because of the close association between queues and Chinese-style clothing, the NPPA had a legitimate concern that the domestic silk industry was in grave danger. The immediate goal of the NPPA, then, was to prevent political leaders throughout China from sanctioning the clothing changes that were accompanying queue cutting. Moreover, they were successful in lobbying to mandate that Chinese clothing be made of domestically produced materials, especially silk. In the process, the organization managed to sever the old link between hair and clothes, and to attach distinct meanings to each. For instance, the NPPA helped redefine the Chinese-style long gown (*changpao*) as a patriotic style. Such reinterpretations helped ensure the survival of Chinese clothing, but also had a more subtle long-term significance in building an ethic of nationalistic consumption that would define other products as national interests.¹³

To defend itself against this immediate threat posed by clothing change, the powerful interests represented in the NPPA quickly built a sophisticated organization. This organization immediately sought to take advantage of many opportunities created by the fall of dynastic rule, which allowed economic interests to form new, even more specific interest groups than the chambers of commerce that only recently had been allowed to form. Indeed, organizations of Chinese sojourning in Shanghai,

¹¹ Prasenjit Duara makes important contributions to scholarship at both ends of the spectrum, analyzing the resistance to state-building agendas both among national elites and within local movements. See Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995).

¹² Indeed, I would argue that this ethic of nationalistic consumption was very competitive, contributing largely to the emerging dominant narrative of history, rather than to “alternative” ones. For a lucid discussion of the concepts of nationalism and narrative as they relate to modern Chinese history, see Duara, *Rescuing History*, Part 1.

¹³ My discussion throughout the first half of this paper of the role of the NPPA and the NPM in the battles over defining a new orthodox appearance draws on “Empires of Appearance and Disappearance: The Politics of Hair and Wear in Modern China, 1880–1930,” a paper written for the Annual Association for Asian Studies Conference, Washington, D.C., 27 March 1998.

or native-place associations, that eventually formed the NPPA began organizational activities shortly after the outbreak of the revolution. After two months of organizational meetings, the association was formally established in Shanghai on December 12, 1911, at the main hall of the Hangzhou Qianjiang native-place association.¹⁴

Although the NPPA became a large organization with hundreds of members representing native-place associations, industries, students, and many other groups, it was inaugurated by a small and narrow group of only four representatives from each of eight native-place associations, a total of thirty-two.¹⁵ Moreover, these associations represented only three industries—silk/satin, hat, and pawn shops—all in the Jiangsu and Zhejiang area. The initial agenda of the NPPA not only reflected the immediate concern over the survival of Chinese-style hats and clothing, but it also articulated widely held notions that quickly attracted new members, branch organizations, and similar groups throughout China and in overseas Chinese communities.

¹⁴ For more information on the preparatory meetings, see Zhonghua Guohuo Weichi Hui, *Zhonghua guohuo weichi hui ershi zhounian jinian kan* (Shanghai, 1932) [hereafter, NPPA, *Jinian kan*], Huiyi jilu section.

The NPPA is regularly labeled the oldest NPM organization. See, for instance, Pan Junxiang, "Guohuo yundong zhong de shanghai minzu zichanjieji," in *Dang'an yu lishi* (1989), 55; and Xin Ping et al., *Minguo shehui dagang* (Fuzhou: Fuzhou Renmin Chubanshe, 1991), 348. However, a reporter attending the inaugural meeting of the NPPA informed the gathered that there were already three other smaller organizations in Shanghai. See Li Zhuoyun's short speech in Zhonghua Guohuo Weichi Hui, *Zhonghua Guohuo Weichi hui zhangcheng wendu huilu* (Shanghai, 1912) [hereafter NPPA, *Zhangcheng wendu huilu*], 9a. Because I discuss native-place associations only in Shanghai and Jiangnan, I follow Goodman and use "native-place association" to denote both *huiguan* (meeting hall) and *gongsuo* (public office), the institutions established by sojourning merchants. Bryna Goodman, *Native Place, City, and Nation: Regional Networks and Identity in Shanghai, 1853–1937* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 39.

¹⁵ There is much confusion in the secondary, and indeed, primary, literature concerning the establishment of the NPPA. The above scholars (as does the NPPA, *Jinian kan*: Huishi section, 1) all incorrectly list the founding number of native-place associations as ten, with an initial representation of forty members. In actuality, thirty-two persons, or four representatives from each of eight native-place associations, made up the founding group. See NPPA, *Zhangcheng wendu huilu*, 4b–5a. Others get the founding date wrong. For example, Zheng Qing [Chen Zhengqing], "Shanghai Zhongguo Guohuo gongsi zai zhanshi de houfang," *Dang'an yu lishi* 1987.3, 64–71, lists the founding of the NPPA as 1915, and Pomerantz-Zhang, *Wu Tingfang*, 235, seems to say that Wu organized the group in 1914.

Hierarchies of Dissemination

From the start, the NPPA faced three major obstacles in gaining support for its agenda. First, it had to win over Chinese military and political leaders, many of whom were already endorsing policies the NPPA opposed, such as clothing reform. Naturally, it focused on cultivating support in and around the Shanghai base of operations, where its influence was strongest. Second, it had to disseminate its agenda and build support outside of Shanghai. Lastly, it had to make its agenda appealing beyond a narrow group of political and economic elites. With the collapse of imperial power and the growth of regional power centers, members understood that they would not be able to rely exclusively on state and elite patronage.

Cultivating Patronage. The NPPA prized powerful patronage, and worked hard to gain early support from influential politicians. At its inaugural meeting, the NPPA developed these contacts by inviting and giving prominent roles to Shanghai leaders, county and provincial officials, and representatives of other groups as well as individuals from the military, political, commercial, and academic circles. In the months following the inaugural meeting, the NPPA continued to lobby these political and military elites by writing letters, sending telegrams, and encouraging their attendance at other organization functions. These efforts yielded public letters of support from such prominent Chinese as Sun Yatsen, Shanghai military governor Chen Qimei, and noted diplomat Wu Tingfang. Shortly after its establishment, the NPPA received a letter from Wu Tingfang endorsing its formation and inquiring about membership. The NPPA immediately asked him to join and in less than a year elected him president.¹⁶ Support such as this helped establish the legitimacy and prominence of the NPPA.

Building a National Network. From its inception, the NPPA hoped to provide an organizational template to facilitate the establishment of similar groups throughout China. It immediately began cultivating ties to chambers of commerce and local governments in other provinces by “sending

¹⁶ Sun Yatsen's letter to the NPPA was published in Nanjing's *Lanshi zhengfu gongbao* 7 (4 February 1912); for Chen Qimei's assurances to the NPPA that clothing would be regulated, see his letter to the NPPA reprinted in the newspaper *Shen bao*, 20 December 1911, and republished in the collection Shanghai Shehui Kexue Yuan, ed., *Xinhai geming zai Shanghai shiliao xuanji* (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1981), 423–24. On Wu Tingfang, see NPPA, *Jinian kan*, Huiwu jilu section, 3; I deal extensively with Wu's involvement in the NPPA in “Empires of Appearance and Disappearance.” The NPPA also received early letters of support from lower ranking officials, including one from the Shanghai Shangwu Chairman Wang, see NPPA, *Zhangcheng wendu huilu*, 2.

telegrams to far places and writing letters to nearby ones.¹⁷ The correspondence aimed not only to secure support for the NPPA agenda, but to urge other cities and towns to set up similar groups, propagate common economic goals locally, and lobby local, regional, and national authorities. To assist in the formation of sister organizations, it circulated materials on all aspects of its organization. The earliest and most comprehensive of these was a 1912 booklet that detailed all aspects of the organization, including its initial membership, bylaws, and copies of speeches from its inaugural meeting. It also provided form letters, and it urged other groups to use them as a basis for lobbying local, regional, and national authorities. These NPPA templates became the basis for letters from other groups and the model for the establishment of similar organizations.¹⁸

The NPPA's appeal found immediate success in provinces and cities across China, including Tianjin, Fuzhou, Changsha, Tonghai, Anqing, Beijing, Nanjing, Jiaxing, Zhenjiang, Hankou, Jinan, and many more.¹⁹ The Shanghai-based NPPA had varying degrees of contact with these other organizations. It was directly involved in setting up some organizations, while with others it only exchanged correspondence and passed along copies of its literature. Its relationship with Suzhou was particularly close. In July of 1912, Suzhou became among the earliest cities to follow the NPPA lead in establishing an organization to promote the NPM agenda. With a third of its population working in the silk industry, Suzhou had a lot to lose if the silk industry continued its downward slide.²⁰ Already, an influential Suzhou silk native-place association, the Yunjin Gongsuo, was involved in the establishment of the NPPA in Shanghai. Now, this native-

¹⁷ Nearly every speaker addresses the importance of helping to establish similar organizations in other cities. See, for instance, the speech by Li Zhuoyun, NPPA, *Zhangcheng wendu huilu*, 9a. There was a large pool of potential contacts as, by the end of 1911, there were nearly 800 local-, county-, and provincial-level chambers of commerce in China. Bergère, *The Golden Age*, 57.

¹⁸ Indeed, it became common practice for later NPM organizations to send each other copies of bylaws and other organizational literature. The NPM organizations active in the spring of 1925 are surveyed and categorized in Jiang Weiguo, "Jindai Zhongguo guohuo tuanti chuxi," in *Min'guo dang'an* 1995.1, 75–83, who classifies the NPPA as a "producer/marketer" NPM organization, 76–77.

¹⁹ Conveniently summarized in Huang Yiping and Yu Baotang, eds., *Beiyang zhengfu shiqi jingji* (Shanghai: Shanghai Shehui Kexue Yuan Chubanshe, 1995), 182. The NPPA, *Jinian kan* log lists the establishment of these branches as well as contact with others. Pan, *Guohuo yundong*, 19–20, compiles a list to demonstrate the breadth of the NPPA correspondence with other NPM organizations throughout China and with overseas Chinese.

²⁰ The establishment of the Suzhou NPPA branch in the context of the local silk industry is covered in Wang Xiang, "Jindai sichou shengchan fazhan yu Jiangnan shehui bianqian," *Jindaishi yanjiu* (1992.4), 1–20.

place association, working through the Suzhou General Chamber of Commerce, oversaw the establishment of a local branch.²¹

Popularizing the National Products Movement Agenda. From its beginnings, the NPPA used diverse channels to disseminate its agenda, including formal (letters and petitions) and informal (word of mouth within native-place associations), new (telegraph, newspapers, periodicals) and old (meetings at teahouses, restaurants, and native-place association halls). To provide an idea of this range, the following paragraphs introduce some of these initial channels that formed the basis of boycotts and the backbone of the NPM.²²

From its inception, the NPPA was concerned with conveying its message to as many Chinese as possible. For instance, it printed a synopsis of what might be termed its “mission statement” in colloquial Chinese (*baihua*), and included it with the initial booklet of informational templates.²³ It also used other forms of dissemination intended to broaden its reach. Each year, the NPPA printed and distributed handbills, leaflets, newspaper advertisements nationally and overseas as well as other materials designed to boost membership, advertise NPPA activities, increase awareness of the NPM, promote specific national products, and so on. Print runs varied by subject and year, ranging from several thousand to several tens of thousands. And the total for all categories of propaganda literature ranged from the tens of thousands to the hundreds of thousands of pieces each year.²⁴ By the early 1930s, the NPPA would claim that these efforts to publicize “national products” (*guohuo*) were so widely successful that even “all women and children knew” about the importance of buying Chinese products.²⁵

Locally, the NPPA also organized lectures and other forums to disseminate its message more widely. At the inaugural meeting in December, 1911, members decided to hold a “Promote National Products Dissemi-

²¹ SZMA 2.1: File 840, 8–12, 27. In writing to the office of the Jiangsu governor and city authorities, eight members of the new Suzhou branch of the NPPA association explained their purpose and requested official recognition of the group in a petition with lines drawn from the 1912 NPPA template.

²² The NPPA also continually developed new channels, including parades, expositions, periodicals, and others. For a brief introduction to the channels not discussed here, see Pan, “Guohuo yundong zhong,” 55–59.

²³ NPPA, *Zhangcheng wendu huilu*, 24a–25b.

²⁴ NPPA, *Jinian kan*, Huishi section, 16–18. The NPPA, *Jinian kan*, Huiwu jilu section records hundreds of instances of printing handbills, circulars, special-product catalogs (*yangben*) on silk and other products, and so on. For instance, in its first year (12 December 1911 to 12 December 1912) the NPPA circulated over 5,000 copies of a handbill encouraging the use of nationally produced silk.

²⁵ NPPA, *Jinian kan*, Huishi section, 2.

nation Rally," which drew over 3,800 people. Following the success of this event, NPPA members agreed to organize regular Saturday evening lectures to teach Chinese that it was their responsibility to buy national products. The meetings started out slowly; only four persons attended the first of these rallies. Gradually, organizers learned to be more flexible, varying time and inviting social figures to make speeches as well. The number of onlookers grew into the thousands.²⁶ Eventually, these rallies culminated with the inauguration of annual "National Products Salvation Rallies."

The NPPA actively sought to publicize its agenda through the media, which it considered an effective tool for quickly getting messages out and shaping public opinion. They attempted to enlist the newspapers in reversing earlier trends and encouraging Chinese to consider the economic consequences for "the nation" of their individual purchasing decisions. Beginning with its inaugural meeting, during which several reporters even gave speeches supporting the formation of the organization, the NPPA invited reporters to attend its meetings. Moreover, NPPA members were urged to write newspaper articles and place ads in periodicals.²⁷

As the National Products Movement developed, the NPPA used many other tactics. They created a certification process for goods claiming to be national products, established stores that sold only these products, assisted area manufacturers in marketing products in other places, participated in organizing national expositions for Chinese products, and much more. Some of these other tactics will be examined below within the context of the 1915 boycott. As the above suggests and the second part will demonstrate, prior to the 1915 boycott an entrenched organizational network was in place to quickly interpret and expand such events as boycotts.

Elements of an Ethic

These numerous channels of dissemination left a significant document trail, enabling the reconstruction of the NPPA's ethic of nationalistic consumption, which brought together many ideological trends that mutually

²⁶ NPPA, *Jinian kan*, Kaihui section, 13: Meetings were held at both the Qianjiang Huiguan and Ningbo native-place association. From 1912 to 1924, the NPPA held fifty-nine such meetings. The first rally was held in July of 1912, and the second two months later in September, when three were held. From then until January of 1914, rallies were held nearly every week; the NPPA kept a log of these talks, which includes speaker and a brief summary. The influential Shanghai-based paper *Shen bao*, for instance, gives a good overview of one such rally, 4 November 1912.

²⁷ NPPA, *Zhangcheng wendu huilu*, 15a–16b.

reinforced its central message. Above all, the early documents of the NPPA and the group's early activities demonstrate how the NPPA sought to separate the issue of abolishing the queue from the issue of reforming Chinese dress, supporting the elimination of the queue while arguing for the preservation of Chinese-style dress. The NPPA aimed to save the silk industry by establishing a link between silk interests and those of the entire country. To do this, they sought to persuade people that clothing was an issue of national survival, not merely the health of a few industries. To strengthen this link, the NPPA advanced arguments that blended economic, political, symbolic, and nationalistic reasoning, arguments that would appeal to a broad spectrum of Chinese. Collectively these strands formed an ethic of consumption that quickly came to apply to other products, inform discussions on economic relations, shape interpretations of events that would lead to boycotts, and so on.

The Economy and the Ethic. Linking the health of the economy and the well-being of the nation was fundamental to the discourse animating this new ethic of nationalistic consumption. The economic consequences of changing clothing, for example, were more important than "appearing modern to foreigners" by wearing Western-style clothing, the number one consideration of many politicians, intellectuals, and other Chinese.²⁸ This was most clearly evident in the economic rationale offered for opposing clothing change. As documents and speakers frequently warned, switching to wool suits from cotton and silk gowns would have a devastating effect on the Chinese economy. Silk played a central role in Chinese economy; the process of switching to wool would destroy a key industry without creating one in its place because China produced almost no wool products. As a result, these materials would have to be imported, at least until China could develop a wool industry. In the meantime, NPPA literature warned, the displacement of the silk industry would throw millions out of work, effecting the entire economy.

The economic rationale also included an immediate and practical consideration, namely a financial argument against dress conversion. If men were forced to change clothing, Chinese would be forced to spend a fortune. Such concern seems ludicrous, but as the rise of a Republican interpretation of appearance suggests, and indeed Sun Yatsen's own initial preference for suits indicates, the possibility of shift, at least among the upper classes, must have seemed quite real.

²⁸ Chinese diplomat Wu Tingfang, an early advocate of removing queues, was the most famous proponent of this position. His collected writings contain numerous discussions of the subject. See, for example, *Wu Tingfang ji*, ed. Ding Lanjun and Yu Zuofeng (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1993), 358–360.

Commercial Warfare. NPPA literature also frequently argued that international trade was even more serious than a zero-sum game because buying foreign products not only hurt the Chinese, but also helped its enemies. To reinforce this claim, the organization regularly invoked the concept of “commercial war” (*shangzhan*).²⁹ One popularizer of this concept in the late nineteenth century was the comprador-scholar Zheng Guanying (1842–1921), who in *Warnings to a Prosperous Age* (c. 1893) (*Shengshi weiyan*), argued that international commercial relations represented even more of a threat to China than the territorial ambitions of imperialist powers. To survive this war, China needed to “stimulate commerce” (*zhenxing shiye*). As with Zheng several decades earlier, invoking this phrase during the NPM enhanced the social position of economic elites and pressured governments to adopt mercantilist policies. Now there were newer, more democratic implications as well. Whereas Zheng aimed his recommendations at Chinese elites, modern mass communication brought the message to others, encouraging them to enlist in the “war” by not buying what would increasingly come to be known as “enemy products” (*chouhuo*) after 1915.

The spread of the notion of “commercial war” accompanied a growing obsession with China’s balance of payments. By the beginning of the twentieth century, this concern over trade imbalances crystallized into what economic historian Chi-ming Hou described as the widely popular notion of a “drain effect”: Any profits made by foreigners in China came at the expense of the Chinese.³⁰ During this time, Chinese trade statistics became enshrined as the single most important measure of how the “war” was going. And during the NPM, they were frequently published and republished in tables, charts, graphs, and essays.³¹ This preoccupation with the “loss of economic control to foreigners” and the “leakage of profits” (*liquan waiyi* and *louzhi*), as “commercial warfare” was commonly described, is typified in the inaugural meeting speech of a key figure

²⁹ Guo Xianglin et al., *Zhongguo jindai zhenxing jingji zhi dao de bijiao* (Shanghai: Caijing Daxue Chubanshe, 1995), 65–83.

³⁰ In 1877, China began running a trade deficit that quickly ballooned, see Hazama Naoki et al., *Deeta de miru Chūgoku kindai shi* (Tōkyō: Yūhikaku, 1996), 21. Chi-ming Hou, *Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China, 1840–1937* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), 93–94. Historian Paul Cohen summarizes late-nineteenth century economic nationalism in his biography of a well-known proponent of “commercial warfare,” Wang Tao (b. 1828); Paul A. Cohen, *Between Tradition and Modernity: Wang T’ao and Reform in Late Ch’ing China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), 185–208.

³¹ A typical example of trade statistics as scorecard for the NPM is Guangdong Jianshe Ting, *Guohuo diaocha baogao* (Guangzhou: Guangdong Jianshe Ting, 1930).

throughout the history of the NPPA, Wang Jian. A member from a Suzhou native-place association with a long history of representing the interests of the silk industry, he took early responsibility for communicating with outside groups and raising public awareness of issues the NPPA supported. Wang's speech is worth quoting:

Today we convene this organization to preserve national products (*guohuo*). As China is an expansive land, rich in natural resources, with more than enough to meet its own needs, why, then, is commerce and the economy in dire straits? It's all due to the fact that China doesn't understand the "Way of Commercial Warfare" (*shangzhan zhi dao*). Foreigners say that "military warfare makes [a state] powerful and commercial warfare makes [a state] wealthy" (*bingzhan qiang shangzhan fu*). But, China doesn't understand commercial warfare. It continually exports raw materials and reimports finished products, thus allowing the profits to flow into foreign hands ... When profits are drained in this way, China is losing in commercial warfare. Consequently, the economy faces hard times. Compatriots should research how to improve semi-finished products and sell finished ones. Everyone should make preserving national products a main objective, and not simply blithely follow fashion trends. In this way preservation of national products will be great ... Although the scope of this group is small now, it is my hope that it reaches all provinces and gets them to preserve national products.³²

Formulating and disseminating an ethic of nationalistic consumption was a creative response to imperialism. NPPA leaders such as Wang Jian also understood that the key to success lay in making Chinese industry more competitive; and NPPA members made frequent mention of the need to make improvements.³³ In the interim, however, members, in a proto-import substitution argument, sought to prevent imports from destroying their industries. Because the "unequal treaties" denied China tariff autonomy until the very end of the 1920s and because these treaties set tariffs at a paltry 5–7.5% ad valorem, Chinese leaders could not wield the traditional tool of protective tariffs.³⁴ Moreover, the lack of a strong, stable govern-

³² Wang Jian's speech in NPPA, *Zhangcheng wendu huilu*, 8b.

³³ Outlining the importance of finding new uses for silk, the first NPPA president Zhang Ziyin went so far as to say that finding uses for Chinese silk materials should be considered akin to cherishing the "essence of the Chinese nation" (*huangzu guocui*)! NPPA, *Zhangcheng wendu huilu*, 7b.

³⁴ On China's protracted negotiations to recover tariff autonomy, see Stanley F. Wright, *China's Struggle for Tariff Autonomy: 1843–1938* (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, Ltd., 1938).

ment with the financial means to support economic development left a vacuum. The result was that Chinese commercial and industrial interests such as those in the NPPA sought to erect non-tariff barriers to trade, such as mandating clothing styles that made use of nationally produced fabrics.

Peace and Political Stability. The NPPA also warned that widespread economic destruction would accompany any clothing switch and would have immediate political reverberations. According to this line of reasoning, a chain reaction begun by massive dislocations in the silk industry would destabilize China as millions went hungry and began to wander the country in search of food. Moreover, allowing foreigners to benefit at the expense of the Chinese economy would delegitimize the government. It warned the new government that in reestablishing political order after the Revolution of 1911 it ought not allow the masses to navigate on their own such cultural changes as those in appearance.

One Ethnic, One Ethic. Through the ethic of nationalistic consumption, such NPM organizations as the NPPA also sought to create a bounded Chinese ethnic market in which membership was predicated on consumption of the products of one's compatriots (*tongbao*). From the first NPPA president onward, leaders of NPM organizations stressed continually that "all 400 million Chinese have this responsibility" to promote the NPPA agenda.³⁵ In addition to the economic well-being of the nation, Chinese independence was at stake because switching to wool clothing not only benefited foreign economies, it also encouraged foreign imperial powers to sink their teeth deeper into China. As the second half of this paper will demonstrate, this theme would grow in importance after the Japanese presented the notorious Twenty-One Demands in early 1915.

"NATIONAL HUMILIATION" AND CONSUMPTION IN 1915

Humiliating experiences at the hands of foreigners are so common in Chinese modern history that enumerating them could, and indeed has, filled thick encyclopedias. They include every imaginable variety, such as "unequal treaties," foreign wars fought on Chinese lands, and countless acts of violence against individual Chinese. Reviewing the sheer number is a sobering experience; and the next half of this paper in no way attempts to deny their numbers and the very real harm they caused. Nevertheless, similar to other historical events, their meanings are neither immediately self-evident nor fixed for all time. They, too, are sites of contention, often

³⁵ NPPA, *Zhangcheng wendu huilu*, 5b.

defined by those with the power to get a definition to stick. This half of my paper examines how one set of humiliations fed the growing NPM.

The Politics of Defining Events

Opportunism, ultimatums, demands, threats—by any reckoning 1915 contained an abundance of Sino-Japanese friction, generating the raw materials for the creation of powerful anti-Japanese symbols. Keeping in mind the activities of the NPPA and the ethic of nationalistic consumption within the NPM, the events of 1915 take on new, more powerful significance. The boycotts of that year do not appear simply as ephemeral events, “five minutes of enthusiasm,” as foreigners and many Chinese often derided such events, but overt manifestations of and fuel for a growing movement. Long after the boycotts dissipated, the student organizations disbanded, and more regular Sino-Japanese economic intercourse resumed, the NPPA and a growing number of similar organizations within the NPM went about disseminating interpretations of 1915 that linked consumption of Chinese products with anti-imperialism.

Although the politics behind the imposition and acceptance of the Twenty-One Demands are complex, the basic elements are simple. On January 18, 1915, Japan secretly presented Chinese President Yuan Shikai with a list of demands, divided into five groups. The first four groups included: the formal recognition of the transfer of German rights in Shandong province to Japan, the extension of leases and rights which Japan had won from Russia in 1905, the joint control over the Hanyeping Iron Works, and a Chinese commitment not to cede any territory to a third country. The final group of demands immediately triggered the most Chinese opposition, because it required the virtual transfer of Chinese sovereignty by placing Japanese advisors in all branches of government, joint policing of troublesome areas, contracting the Japanese to build railways, and establishing special economic rights in Fujian province. Negotiations dragged out for the next five months. Under pressure, Japan withdrew this fifth set of demands and presented the remaining ones as an ultimatum on May Seventh, which the Chinese were forced to accept on May Ninth.

May Seventh and May Ninth quickly became days of “national humiliation” (*guochi*), worthy of yearly commemoration.³⁶ Organizations and individuals across China quickly spread this definition, denouncing Ja-

³⁶ Symptomatic of the fragmented political state of China, this humiliation was commemorated on two different days. May Seventh was the focus of commemoration in North China, and May Ninth was the commemoration day in the

pan's "latest, most serious humiliation." In a manifesto sent to chambers of commerce and newspapers across China, the Beijing Chamber of Commerce voiced a popular Chinese response to the events that the NPPA helped disseminate in the Shanghai area:

Japan is taking advantage of war in Europe to have its way in East Asia. The ultimatum of May Seventh is the best manifestation of this opportunism. If Chinese wish to live as human beings, we must never forget the humiliation of May Seventh ... The memory should be passed on to our children and grandchildren, from one generation to the next, for all eternity. From this May Seventh onward, we 400 million Chinese must struggle wholeheartedly to help our country. Although our bodies may perish, our will cannot die, and we must forever remember this humiliation.³⁷

In addition to fixing these days as "humiliations," public statements such as this one also came to implicitly or explicitly signify how to remember and redress the outrage.

From Humiliation to Resistance

Sustaining such outrage and channeling it into the NPM was a complex process. The lengthy negotiations over the Demands gave Chinese plenty of time to grow impatient; it also gave them time to organize opposition and create new, and appropriate old, ways of expressing dissent. They expressed dissent through activities ranging from violent boycotts to avoiding popular Japanese hairstyles. Although these forms of protest expressed varying levels of commitment to the ethic of nationalist consumption, they all contributed to the NPM. This section begins to trace how these events, once defined, become signals to not consume Japanese products.

South. Sun Fanjun et al., eds., *Minguo shi da cidian* (Beijing: Zhongguo Guangbo Dianshi Chubanshe, 1991), 57. The difference in days provides a way of evaluating the types of sources and focus of readings. In his useful survey of the politics surrounding the Twenty-One Demands, Jansen, for example, only mentions the commemoration of May Seventh. Marius B. Jansen, *Japan and China: From War to Peace, 1894–1972* (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Co., 1975), 209–23.

³⁷ Reprinted in Zhichi Hui [Society to Inform of the Humiliation], ed., *Guochi*, June 1915, 2 vols., no pagination. Similar sentiments were expressed in a widely distributed Beijing Education Ministry telegram, reprinted in *Shen bao*, 14 June 1915. On the NPPA role in spreading the former, see *Shen bao*, 20 May 1915; the same issue says that the Jiangsu Provincial Education Association vowed to hold yearly commemoration days to remind students and staff at all schools of the meaning of this "humiliation."

Local political environments shaped forms of dissent, with much of it feeding into the NPM. The massively unpopular Twenty-One Demands put these governments in a difficult position. On the one hand, local and provincial leaders received a constant stream of pressure and orders from the top to keep a lid on demonstrations and agitation that might further provoke Japan or further delegitimize the Beijing central government. On the other hand, local governments were often sympathetic to the outpouring of anti-Japanese sentiment and were reluctant to try to suppress all manifestations of dissent; others merely wanted to further erode the dwindling credibility of Yuan Shikai because of his unwillingness to confront Japan. The national government was well aware of growing resentment, and officials continually tried to reassure an anxious populace with pronouncements that the negotiations were proceeding successfully.³⁸

Local governments negotiated the tension between maintaining order and yielding to popular pressure by cracking down on primarily overt manifestations of dissent. They prohibited and disbanded public gatherings, confiscated inflammatory circulars, prevented the removal of Japanese product ads, and heightened police visibility near Japanese businesses.³⁹ Meanwhile, more subtle forms of dissent flourished.

Japanese targets certainly got the message. In March of 1915, a Japanese shopkeeper in Shanghai frustrated over Chinese boycotts posted the following verse poster outside his shop:

We are among the strongest of nations.
 Why should we fear you bastards?
 The current boycott of Japanese goods
 Is just empty talk.
 If you continue to protest in this way
 We will order your President to suppress it.
 Qingdao, Taiwan, and Korea.
 No, we are not jesting.
 Soon you will be an extinct nation.
 And assuredly you will become slaves.⁴⁰

³⁸ For a summary of the role of domestic politics in negotiations over the Twenty-One Demands, see Ernest P. Young, *The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai: Liberalism and Dictatorship in Early Republican China* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), 186–92. On the eve of the settlement, these reassurances become more frequent and insistent. See, for instance, *Xinwen bao*, 1915.5.7. Meanwhile, these same papers printed editorials denouncing leaked versions of what they derided as a sham “peace” settlement. See especially *Shen bao*.

³⁹ *Xinwen bao*, 27, 29, 31 March 1915 and 1 April 1915.

⁴⁰ *Shi bao*, 29 March 1915.

The poster expressed a lot more than the anger and bravado of a Japanese shopkeeper. It unintentionally articulated the frustration of a growing number of Chinese. Reprinted in a Chinese newspaper, it cleverly used a Japanese text to disseminate growing Chinese suspicions about Japan and its intentions in China. Here, the poster affirmed, was proof positive that Japan, flush with its startling success over Russia a decade earlier, now considered itself a first-rate world power with the arrogance necessary to push its own agenda in Asia; it was merely looking for an excuse to further humiliate China. The references to three recent acquisitions of an expanding Japanese empire was an unambiguous statement of China's fate, "national extinction" (*wangguo*).⁴¹ Moreover, the poster emphasized the powerlessness of the Chinese, whose boycotts and politicians were considered mere short-term obstacles to the inevitable.

By reprinting the inflammatory poster, the Chinese paper also implied an appropriate response, a challenge to redouble resistance to Japanese imperialism, and prove the Japanese wrong. It was a call to action. The events of May confirmed that the Chinese could not depend on their politicians to preserve China's immediate interests, much less the integrity of the nation. Despite growing government pressure, organizations such as the NPPA found ways to signal this threat as well as relate it to a desired Chinese response in the form of an ethic of nationalistic consumption.

"A Certain Empire:" Invoking Japan to Signify Nationalistic Consumption

Under increasing pressure, organizations and individuals created subtle signs that signified "Japan" without specifying it. Even after the formal boycotts and government pressure subsided, these signs continued to exist. The NPM's invocation of Japan reminded the Chinese of Japanese "humiliations" and the need for the rejection of Japanese products and services. The dates of these and later humiliations were vivid and common symbols. For instance, the numbers "5-9" unambiguously represented May Ninth. On one level, then, simply writing "5-9" signified "humiliation at the hands of the Japanese." These numbers were widely used as symbols in posters, illustrations, and handbills throughout China. Naturally, they often signified more than one message. Within the NPM, for example, "5-9" also came to signify a response to humiliation: Do not buy

⁴¹ Chinese intellectuals immediately added acceptance of the Twenty-One Demands to a rapidly expanding narrative of "humiliations" (*guochi*) climaxing with "national extinction." By June, one group, which included Liang Qichao, had already compiled a set of essays on "extinct nations," such as Poland and India, and detailed how China was headed for the same fate: Yan Ruli, ed., *Wangguo jian fu guochi lu* (Shanghai: Taidong Tushuju, 1915 [1919 reprint]).

Japanese products. Often, such signs were explicitly linked, especially in advertisements and product names. Within months after the May humiliations of 1915, companies co-opted the “5–9” symbol into product names, including cigarettes and silk products.⁴²

With Japanese pressure on the Chinese government to crack down on boycotts, there were many other less explicit, but equally comprehensible, ways of disseminating boycott messages. Because of the official pressure on explicit attacks on Japan, Japan was often referred to in not-so-subtle ways. A common way to refer to Japan at this time was “a certain empire” (*mou diguo*). For example, in Guangzhou, Chinese papers regularly received letters from readers offering money to support armed resistance to “unwarranted aggression of a certain empire.”⁴³

Occasionally, references to this “certain empire” were simply reminders of the humiliations perpetrated by Japan. Increasingly, however, these references signified an appropriate response, instructions on forms of resistance. For instance, one well-written but simple-to-read pamphlet was open to several interpretations. In the most straight-forward reading, the pamphlet discussed problems caused by the Japanese in China. Under closer scrutiny, it conveyed a more emotional statement: “Our country is becoming a second Korea!” The most inflammatory and central message of all required reading from right to left, rather than from top to bottom, as was ordinary: “Citizens, don’t buy Japanese goods.”⁴⁴ These signs of protest also took the form of poems, written in flowery prose, but delivering a stern message. As one poem put it: “Japan indeed oppresses us, and selfish are its claims. Yes, boycott all things Japanese—a duty evermore.”⁴⁵

The NPM “Camouflages” Boycotts, or Vice Versa?

As rumors spread and tensions mounted, Shanghai police became more aggressive, often searching the houses of returned students, especially those coming back from Japan, and other known activists.⁴⁶ In response, more strident groups and individuals advocating aggressive anti-Japanese activ-

⁴² See, for instance, the ad for “5–9 Brand Cigarettes” in *Guohuo diaocha lu*, ed. Wang Hanqiang, 3 ed. (Shanghai: The National Products Preservation Association, 1915), 64.

⁴³ *North-China Herald* (Shanghai weekly [hereafter *NCH*]), 27 March 1915, 895–96.

⁴⁴ *NCH*, 10 April 1915, 84.

⁴⁵ *Xinwen bao*, 1 April 1915; *NCH*, 24 April 1915, 241.

⁴⁶ *Xinwen bao*, 2, 3 April 1915. One case of police confiscating handbills from students returned from Japan received a lot of attention at the time. See *Xinwen bao*, 10, 19, 29 April 1915.

ities began expressing dissent by adopting the organizational forms, slogans, and techniques of the NPM. This has led contemporary observers and historians to misinterpret the NPM as a whole as simply an extension of the boycott, led by students and opportunistic businessmen. Matsumoto Shigeharu's interpretation of NPM activities during 1915 is typical:

The movement for the "Encouragement of the Use of Native Products," which was still no more than a camouflaged boycott movement, came into existence first in Shanghai, where by March 16th an Association for the Encouragement of the Use of Native Products was formed under the auspices of the Chinese students who returned from Japan. Later in Hanyang, Hankow, Changsha, and in many other cities similar organizations were established. These associations carried on the boycott, carefully evading the law and authority.⁴⁷

Clearly, the founding of the NPPA in 1911 and the subsequent development of the NPM demonstrate that the movement was much more than "camouflage" for a boycott. At the same time, Matsumoto and others are certainly correct about two things. First, the patriotic rhetoric and non-confrontational techniques of the NPM insulated it from official censure. Second, the movement grew rapidly as a consequence of popular response to the Twenty-One Demands.

Organizing National Survival

Threats of government retaliation pushed public displays of anti-imperialist sentiments into activities, organizations, and vocabularies of the NPM.⁴⁸ At the same time, Chinese businessmen, students, intellectuals, and many others worked from below to form organizations to facilitate this transfer of sentiment and develop it within the context of the NPM. For instance, contributing to a National Salvation Fund (*Jiuguo chujin*) was a popular and less risky way of expressing the sentiments underlying the boycott. In April of 1915, the Awareness of the Humiliation Association (Zhichi Hui) set up a fund in Shanghai to solicit \$50 million yuan to ensure national survival through the twin patriotic objectives of supporting the construction of arsenals, the raising of an army and the building of a navy, as well as financing the development of domestic industries. As the threat of immediate war

⁴⁷ Matsumoto, *The Historical Development of Chinese Boycott*, 40.

⁴⁸ President Yuan Shikai repeatedly ordered provincial authorities to end boycotts, prohibit discussions of the negotiations, disband organizations, and censor telegrams. Madeleine Chi, *China Diplomacy, 1914–1918* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 60.

with Japan receded, the economic elites in charge of the Fund gradually shifted the emphasis to the NPM objective of economic development.⁴⁹

The Fund quickly became a socially and legally acceptable way to express what one observer called “practical nationalism.” In only a few weeks in April, the fund campaign raised and deposited \$250,000 in the Bank of China. As money poured in from all over China and overseas, the management of the Fund became more sophisticated, even organizing special committees to explain it to depositors. In allowing only Chinese to contribute and setting no limits on subscriptions, the Fund’s regulations reflected the larger goals of the NPM. The appeal found broad support, as a large number of poor Chinese participated. It provided such a seemingly innocuous way to express nationalism that even government officials, civil servants, members of armed forces, and policemen all agreed to contribute one month’s salary, which was expected to raise over \$10 million.⁵⁰ Naturally, the Japanese understood the deeper meaning of these deposits, claiming donations to such funds by Chinese officials revealed these officials actually supported boycotts and their cover, the NPM.⁵¹ Although initiated in Shanghai, by May there were 70 branches established throughout China.⁵² Within a few months, Shanghai alone collected \$640,000 and had promises for another \$700,000; Beijing raised \$1,940,000 and other provincial cities gathered \$2,100,000. By June, \$20 million of the \$50 million target had been raised.⁵³

This popular technique had the participation and support of many of the most powerful economic and political magnates who came to be openly associated with the Fund. Under the direction of such elites in Shanghai, deposits quickly expanded, as did new ways of finding participants. Moreover, the success of the Fund spawned more ambitious plans and organizations. A group of Shanghai businessmen, including NPPA leader Wu Tingfang, established a group modeled after the National Salvation Fund. The new group had a sharper focus, knowing that even with \$50 million China could not build an army, a navy, and industry. Instead, the new group, the League of China, placed development of domestic industry at the top of its agenda.⁵⁴

⁴⁹ Zhichi Hui, *Guochi*, vol. 1. This volume also contains the bylaws of the group set up to administer the fund. See also, *NCH*, 24 April 1915, 255.

⁵⁰ *Xinwen bao*, 10 May 1915; *NCH*, 19 June 1915, 825–26.

⁵¹ *NCH*, 26 June 1915, 944.

⁵² For a partial list of these locations, see Kikuchi, *Chūgoku minzoku undō*, 164–65.

⁵³ *Xinwen bao*, 15 April 1915, 28.

⁵⁴ *NCH*, 19 June 1915, 825–26. The frequent coverage of these funds also underscores their popularity and innocuous appearance. See, for instance, the run of articles in the *Xinwen bao*, 7, 8, 10 April 1915.

NPM organizations also took more overtly pro-boycott positions. In March of 1915, for example, some one hundred representatives from twenty major native-place associations met in the International Settlement of Shanghai to form the Association to Encourage the Use of National Products (Zhuanong Guohuo Hui). This group resolved not to accept consignments of Japanese goods or use Japanese ships to transport goods. It also resolved to cut off relations with Japanese merchants. Despite a Beijing government ban on the group, within a few months, the groups appeared in seventy cities and towns and counted politicians among its ranks, including China's future Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Zhengting.⁵⁵ Even a Japanese paper that called for the Japanese government to force China to end its boycott concluded that because of a lack of organizations explicitly calling for and organizing the boycott, there was not much more the Chinese government could do.⁵⁶

The NPPA through 1915

The events of 1915 fueled tremendous growth within the NPPA, expanding the frequency and scope of its activities. Chinese resistance was increasingly pushed into NPM forms of expression because Japan could not be confronted directly by military and economic means.

Boycotts acted as a sort of membership drive. From slightly over a hundred members during its first year, the NPPA grew steadily during its first few years. During 1915, however, membership soared to 688, a 26 percent increase over the previous year, its highest single year increase.⁵⁷ Moreover, the structure of the membership changed, as the group continued soliciting women to join. By 1919, the only year for which there is a complete membership list, 41 of the 749 members were women.⁵⁸ However, this growth in membership largely accounted for by new types of members. The initial bylaws (*huizhang*) of the Association made joining difficult in that other potential native-place associations "with common interests" had to receive approval from representatives of all other asso-

⁵⁵ Kikuchi, *Chūgoku minzoku undō*, 164; Cochran, *Big Business in China*, 68. NPPA also sent one of its leading members, Wang Wendian, to help establish the group and write its bylaws. Shanhai Nippon Shōgyō Kaigisho, *Hainikka nitsu to Nikka haiseki no eikyō* (June 1915): Vol. 1, 65; *Shen bao*, 17 May 1915 and 31 May.

⁵⁶ *Ōsaka Mainichi Shinbun* quoted in NCH, 10 July 1915, 87–88.

⁵⁷ NPPA, *Jinian kan*: Huishi section, 12.

⁵⁸ SZMA 2.1: File 454, 20–21. I address the role of women in the NPM extensively in other places; see especially, "Engendering Nationalistic Consumption: 'Women's National Products Year' in China, 1934," a paper written for the 43rd Annual International Conference of Eastern Studies, Tokyo, 23 May 1998.

ciations.⁵⁹ During 1915, however, membership types expanded to include three types. In addition to native-place associations and individual members, enterprises (*gongshang chang*) also began sending representatives—49 in 1915, with more joining every year.

As indicated earlier, in its first three years of activities, the NPPA published and distributed over 100,000 pieces of literature per year, including membership information, circulars on and promotions of national products, verification of the status of products, group advertisements, and so on. During 1915, however, the total number of publications expanded to over 300,000. The reach of these publications is incalculable, as the NPPA instructed recipients to further disseminate them.

The new activities of the NPPA also reflected the interests of its expanded ranks. As local, regional, and national Chinese government officials began to advocate policies that promoted national goods, investigating and certifying the status of goods became an increasingly important function of organizations such as the NPPA. These “certifications” became especially important during boycotts, when such classifications could make or break a company. Before commercial or industrial enterprises could join the NPPA, it sent a team to investigate the applicant’s products. There were many types of investigations including comprehensive examinations, trademark investigations, capital origins, material origins, nationality of employees, and a miscellaneous category. In its first year, 1912, NPPA conducted only eleven such investigations. As with its other activities, however, things took off in 1915, when it conducted 383 such investigations, a total only equaled or exceeded in two other years with widespread boycotts, 383 in 1925 and a high of 464 in 1928.⁶⁰

The NPPA published the results of these investigations along with other propaganda in an increasing array of publications. Two of the more innovative were the *Records of National Products Investigations* (*Guohuo diaocha lu*) and a monthly magazine, *The National Products Monthly* (*Guohuo yuebao*). The purpose of the *Records* was to disseminate an approved list of domestically manufactured products, thereby giving domestic manufacturers a place to promote their wares and merchants a means of finding replacements for imported products.⁶¹ As each new national product was added to the list, the concept of a national product defined implicitly in these books against those products, presumably “non-Chinese, unpatri-

⁵⁹ NPPA, *Zhangcheng wendou huilu*, 3b.

⁶⁰ NPPA, *Jinian kan*: Huishi section, 14–16.

⁶¹ Wu Tingfang’s forward to Wang Hanqiang, *Guohuo diaocha lu*. These *Records* were widely circulated. See the reprint in Nippon Shōgyō Kaigisho, *Hainikka nitsu to Nikka*, 77–127.

otic products," the benefits to domestic producers of attaching a national products label to their product became more compelling. Advertisements also made the distinction between the national and foreign products more apparent.

CONTINUITY WITHIN BOYCOTTS AND THE NPM

It is understandable that observers and historians have usually concluded that the National Products Movement and boycotts were the same thing. By late 1915, the political confrontation between Japan and China slipped from the front pages of Chinese and foreign newspapers, widespread anti-Japanese boycotts dissolved, and some of the more strident activism within the NPM disappeared. According to trade statistics, Sino-Japanese economic relations returned to their pre-1915 position.⁶² From this perspective, the nationalistic sentiment and activity underlying the boycott was, perhaps, merely "five minutes of excitement" or a "cycle." However, by examining the history of the NPPA in this period, this paper has proposed an alternative interpretation of boycotts that places them in the context of a growing ethic of nationalistic consumption within the organizations, activities, and vocabularies of the NPM. To be sure, the events of 1915 provided fuel to the movement, but it was neither the first nor the last source. The NPPA continued to expand its hierarchies of dissemination, for example, helping to establish leading organizations during the turmoil of 1919 and 1923, and other years.⁶³ It also sought to amplify its ethic of nationalistic consumption, especially on the importance of having women and children consume goods with the nation in mind. While some measurable forms of NPM activism may have dropped from 1916 to 1918, the NPPA case suggests that forms of resistance through consumption persisted and spread—ready to generate, define, and absorb new expressions of nationalism.

⁶² Or, in Remer's words: "the trade statistics show that the effect of the boycott was temporary disturbance of the trade rather than any falling off." *A Study of Chinese Boycotts*, 53.

⁶³ These organizations include: Industrial and Commercial Study Society of China to Preserve International Peace (Zhonghua Gongshang Baocun Guoji Heping Yanjiu Hui), formed in early 1919, and the Shanghai Citizens Association on Sino-Japanese Relations (Shanghai Duiji Waijiao Shimin Dahui), established in 1923.

ECONOMIC EXPANSIONISM AND THE MILITARY: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE JAPANESE COMMUNITY IN SHANGHAI IN 1931

Harumi GOTO-SHIBATA

The period between the Washington Conference of 1921–22 and the Manchurian Incident of 1931 was the time when economic expansionism flourished in Japan.¹ Japan in the period put aside the ambitions it showed during the First World War and, instead, endeavored to further its economic interests. Shidehara Kijūrō, Japan's foreign minister from 1924 to April 1927 and from July 1929 to the end of 1931, believed that Japan had no other option but to industrialize and to make profits by exports. He regarded China as the most suitable market for Japanese industries because of its proximity. He was of the opinion that Japan should start from China, and then move on to Southeast Asia.²

Many Japanese actually went to China in order to do business and gain profits there. Among all treaty ports in China, the International Settlement of Shanghai was the center of foreign trade and investment.³ With its strategic location at the estuary of the Yangzi River and its protected harbor, Shanghai was ranked as the fourth largest port in the world in the 1920s. As far as business and trade were concerned, it was more important than the northeastern part of China, even for the Japanese. The typical Japanese in Shanghai was a businessman or a banker, while the typical Japanese in the Northeast was an official or an employee of the South Manchurian Railway.

In September 1931, however, Japan started to invade the Northeast and in January 1932 bombarded the Chinese area of Shanghai. This paper is a case study of the failure of economic expansionism and of the beginning of a more violent phase of Japanese imperial expansion. It mainly deals

¹ Akira Iriye, "The Failure of Economic Expansionism: 1918–1931," in *Japan in Crisis*, ed. Bernard S. Silberman and Harry D. Harootunian (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1974).

² *Shidehara Kijūrō* (Tōkyō: Shidehara Heiwa Zaidan, 1955), 331–32.

³ The history of foreign settlements in Shanghai can be traced back to the Treaty of Nanjing. In 1863, the American and British settlements became incorporated into the International Settlement, which adopted the administrative machinery of the British settlement, namely the elected Municipal Council.

with the men-on-the-spot,⁴ namely Japanese businessmen and the Japanese navy in Shanghai. It considers why the Japanese businessmen whose interest was predominantly economic came to rely on naval power in the summer of 1931.⁵

THE GROWTH OF THE JAPANESE COMMUNITY IN SHANGHAI

A considerable number of the Japanese came to and settled in Shanghai after the Sino-Japanese Friendship Treaty of 1871. Before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, however, the Japanese population in the foreign settlements was only a few hundred. Among those, about fifteen were working for Mitsui Bussan, a trading company, and seven or eight for the consulate, while the majority of the male population consisted of small merchants who dealt in porcelain or fancy and sundry goods. The Japanese by no means belonged to the establishment of the Shanghai foreign settlements. Although Mitsui Bussan had its branch in the flourishing area of the International Settlement, even that was a small business by Shanghai standards. Yamamoto Jōtarō, who worked for Mitsui Bussan, wrote to a friend that he had influence only over other Japanese living in Shanghai.⁶

Its victory in the Sino-Japanese War enabled Japan to join the group of treaty powers and acquire most-favored-nation status. The Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed in 1895, permitted foreigners to establish factories in the treaty ports so that the economy of the treaty ports subsequently entered a new, industrial, phase.

⁴ What was happening in the period seems to be more easily placed in the explanation of D.C.M. Platt or J.S. Galbraith than the framework of a transition from an informal empire to a formal empire. In analyzing British imperialism in the mid-nineteenth century, they stated that “turbulence” on the frontier made the men-on-the-spot take action. See, for example, D.C.M. Platt, “The Imperialism of Free Trade: Some Reservations,” *Economic History Review* XXI (1968); J.S. Galbraith, “The ‘Turbulent Frontier’ as a Factor in British Expansion,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* II (1960).

⁵ Since the 1980s, several historians have researched the Japanese community in Shanghai, and the period after 18 September 1931 has been well studied. See, for example, Murai Sachie, “Shanghai jihen to Nihonjin shōkō gyōsha,” in *Nenpō kindai Nihon kenkyū* 6: *Seitō naikaku no seiritsu to hōkai* (Tōkyō: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1984); Yamamura Mutsuo, “Manshū jihen ki ni okeru Shanghai zairyū Nihon shihon to hai Nichi undō,” *Wakō keizai*, nos. 20–22, 20–23 (1988); Horimoto Naohiko, “Shanghai no kō Nichi undō to Nihonjin kyoryū min,” *Shindaishigaku*, no. 14 (1989).

⁶ Shanghai Kyoryūmin Dan, *Shanghai kyoryūmin dan sanjūgo shūnen kinenshi* (Shanghai, 1942), 42; Hara Yasusaburō, *Yamamoto Jōtarō* (Tōkyō: Jiji Tsūshinsha, 1965), 51–52.

The Boxer Uprising in 1900 and Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 afforded a further opportunity for Japan to consolidate its position as one of the treaty powers in China. Sino-Japanese trade started to develop and many Japanese settlers moved into China, seeking business opportunities. Shanghai became the center of Japanese investment in the cotton industry in China. In 1902 the Shanghai branch of Mitsui Bussan purchased a cotton mill which had been established by Chinese capital. The first Japanese cotton mill in China, Naigai Men mill, was established in Shanghai in 1911.⁷

In 1905, there were 12,000 foreigners in the foreign settlements of Shanghai, 30 percent of whom were Japanese. In order to offer a venue for social contact and the exchange of information, the Japanese Club was organized in 1906. Although there was already in existence the Shanghai Club, where leaders of the British community lunched and socialized, no Japanese, except the consul-general, could join it. This was partly because of the problem of language and partly because of the difference in the standards of living between the Japanese and the British who enjoyed pre-dominant status in China.⁸

The number of Japanese increased even further by the outbreak of the First World War. Indeed, by 1915 the Japanese formed the largest national group, second only to the Chinese. Because of their numbers, the Japanese came to be represented by one councilor on the Municipal Council in 1916, when the Japanese division of the Municipal Police was established.⁹ Japan also gained an enormous economic advantage during the war because exports of the Western powers decreased and because Japan reached the stage where its industries, especially the cotton industry, were producing a substantial volume of exports. Japanese cotton manufacturing in China grew dramatically, partly as a result of higher tariff rates for cotton imports coming into China after 1918.¹⁰ By 1931, the Jap-

⁷ Takamura Naosuke, *Kindai Nihon mengyō to Chūgoku* (Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1982), 116; Charles Frederick Remer, *Foreign Investments in China* (New York: Macmillan, 1933), 97, 419, 426–27, 495.

⁸ Shanhai Nihon Shōgyō Kaigisho, *Go sanjū jiken chōsasho* (Shanghai, 1925), 599; Mark R. Peattie, "Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1895–1937," in *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937*, ed. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), 192–94.

⁹ Shanhai Nihon Shōgyō Kaigisho, *Go sanjū jiken*, 422, 446; Shanhai kyoryūmin dan, *Shanhai jihenshi* (Shanghai, 1933), 503.

¹⁰ Takamura, *Kindai Nihon mengyō*, 114–16; Richard C. Bush, *The Politics of Cotton Textiles in Kuomintang China 1927–1937* (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1982), 23; Peter Duus, "Zaikabō: Japanese Cotton Mills in China, 1895–1937," in *The Japanese Informal Empire*, 81–83, and Peattie, "Japanese Treaty Port Settlements," 184.

anese increased even more, reaching about 20,000, and came to constitute 70 percent of the foreign population.¹¹

The division among the Japanese in Shanghai became noticeable in the early 1920s. One group was called the “Native Faction” and included numerous poor Japanese residents who had migrated to Shanghai dreaming of better lives and had come to possess their sole social and economic stake in Shanghai. About 60 percent were from western Japan, and among them more than half were from Kyūshū because of its proximity. Their occupations were various, including shopkeepers, gardeners, and doctors. Most of them lived in renovated Chinese houses and often turned the front parts into small shops. Their standard of living was the same as that of the Chinese populace.¹² A Japanese employee of a shop in Hongkou could possibly earn only C\$50 or C\$60 per month, while the monthly stipend of a member of the Shanghai Municipal Police was C\$80.¹³

The other group of Japanese consisted of the people who worked for the branches of big trading companies, banks, and cotton mills, so that it was called the “Company Faction.” The heads of the group were well educated and usually spent only a few years in Shanghai. Some of them had already had experience in the West. The group’s business was generally more stable than that of the “Native Faction.”¹⁴

The “Native Faction” was dissatisfied with the existing situation of the International Settlement. It resented both the predominant status of the British, and the stratification within the Japanese community. The franchise system of the International Settlement had been adopted to secure the retention of municipal control in the hands of those foreigners whose land-owning and business interests were paramount. It was based on property not on people, and thus most Japanese in the “Native Faction” were not eligible for voting in the International Settlement. Besides, since the official language of the Municipal Council was English, the councilors had to communicate in English, so that Japanese candidates were not selected from this faction. The “Native Faction” was aware that it was slighted.¹⁵

¹¹ Shanhai Nihon Shōgyō Kaigisho, *Shanhai Nihon shōgyō kaigisho nenpō*, no. 8 (Shanghai, 1925), 7; *Ōsaka shōkō kaigisho geppō*, no. 219, August 1925.

¹² Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives (hereafter, JFMA), Chōsho, Tsū 205, Tsū 255 and Tsū 262; NHK Shuzai Han, ed., *Dokuyumento Shōwa 2: Shanhai kyōdō sokai* (Tōkyō: Kadokawa Shoten, 1986), 35–51; Takatsuna Hirofumi, “Shanhai jihen to Nihonjin kyōryūmin” in *Nitchū sensō*, ed. Chūō Daigaku Jinbun Kagaku Kenkyūjo (Tōkyō: Chūō Daigaku Shuppanbu, 1993), 26–56.

¹³ “More Japanese Police,” *North-China Herald* (hereafter, NCH), 10 April 1926.

¹⁴ Ishii Itarō, *Gaikōkan no isshō* (Tōkyō: Chūō Kōronsha, 1986), 228, 235.

¹⁵ JFMA, 5.3.2.155–1, 20 May 1925, Yada to Shidehara, no. 385; Ishii, *Gaikōkan*, 246.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE JAPANESE IN SHANGHAI AND THE CHINESE

Most Japanese went to Shanghai seeking business opportunities. Although their intention was not violent, once in China they had to cope with hostile atmosphere. Japan's policy toward China had made Chinese anti-imperialist nationalism grow, and the Japanese residents thus found themselves on the front line in the confrontation between Japanese imperialism and Chinese nationalism.

Let us consider the situation within Shanghai first. Not only Japan but also China gained from the temporary retreat of the Westerners during the First World War when Shanghai capitalists expanded into manufacturing and modern banking.¹⁶ The competition worried Japanese manufacturers and became one of the reasons they started establishing cotton mills in Shanghai.¹⁷ By 1924, however, the "golden age" for the Chinese industrialists ended with a full return of foreign competition. The resulting economic crisis made them acutely aware and resentful of foreign economic encroachments.¹⁸ The greatest rival for China's growing economy was Japan's economic power rather than that of Western countries, including Britain, because industrialization of China and Japan started in the same fields, such as the cotton industry. Besides, the end of the war did not bring back the golden days of British industry and trade.

The relations of the Japanese with Chinese workers were not cordial either. Labor disputes in Japanese-owned cotton mills were rampant since the end of 1924. The first and most important cause of the troubles was deteriorating living conditions of Chinese workers. They demanded wage increases, because living expenses in Shanghai, especially food and housing prices, had surged sharply since the outbreak of the First World War. Second, between 1924 and 1927, Shanghai became a significant center for Chinese communism and the trade-union movement, and workers were influenced by communist cadres. Third, presented with this growth of communism, the foreign mill owners strengthened control.¹⁹

Another reason for the troubles was that the Chinese workers were strongly critical of the ill treatment they received from Japanese mill owners, although it is not clear whether the conditions in Japanese mills were actually worse than those in Chinese-owned mills. Many Chinese workers, who had migrated to Shanghai from the countryside, were new to the

¹⁶ Takamura, *Kindai Nihon mengyō*, 104–5.

¹⁷ Duus, "Zaikabō," in *The Japanese Informal Empire*, 81.

¹⁸ Parks M. Coble, *The Shanghai Capitalists and the Nationalist Government* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), 26.

¹⁹ NHK Shuzai Han, *Dokumento Shōwa*, 78.

experience and difficulties of an industrial society, as well as to the confrontation between management and labor. In the Chinese-owned mills, the conflicts were understood simply as those between the workers and owners, or as those between the pre-industrial life style and the industrial one, while in foreign-owned mills these facts were kept in the background, and the difference in race, nation and culture were emphasized.²⁰

Nevertheless, it is impossible to deny that the relations between the Chinese workers and the Japanese staff were hostile. This is underlined by the reminiscences of the Japanese who worked for the mills in Shanghai. They were actually frightened of the Chinese and tried hard not to show the white feather. According to them, it was “scary” to commute from the company accommodation to the mills; it was as if they were strong as long as they were in the mills but helpless once they went out of them; and it was “extremely unpleasant” to patrol the mills at night.²¹ Had relations been cordial, these worries of the Japanese would have been unnecessary.

Unfriendly relations and labor disputes resulted in the outbreak of the May Thirtieth Incident. In February 1925, the Naigai Men mill dismissed several workers, which led other workers to a protest strike. On 15 February, strikers made an attack on Toyoda mill, and one Japanese was beaten to death. Although these strikes were settled before the end of February, more troubles occurred. On 15 May, a collision between the Chinese workers, who were protesting against the discharge of yet another two workers, and the Japanese with the support of two Sikh policemen resulted in the death of a Chinese worker. On 30 May, the Chinese organized a memorial service for him, demanding compensation for his death and the start of an anti-Japanese boycott. Chinese demonstrators gathered on the Nanjing Road and approached the police station. The Shanghai Municipal Police under the command of a British inspector opened fire on the demonstrators. The Chinese community was enraged by the bloodshed, and it was decided to go on general strike as of 1 June.

Although the trouble originated in Japanese-owned mills, the target of the strike and boycott turned out to be the British.²² However, the leaders of the Japanese cotton industry were not pleased with the development. The unique characteristic of the Japanese cotton industry in China was that it developed without the assistance of the Japanese government. The mill owners were proud of their independence and did not expect much protection of Japanese government, while they believed the protection of

²⁰ Takamura, *Kindai Nihon mengyō*, 140.

²¹ NHK Shuzai Han, *Dokumento Shōwa*, 66–71.

²² For details, see Harumi Goto-Shibata, *Japan and Britain in Shanghai 1925–31* (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), chap. 2.

the Municipal Council and British administrative power was indispensable. As they feared, the protection seems to have reduced after the May Thirtieth Incident. In September 1926, at a conference held at the Ōsaka Chamber of Commerce on the problems concerning China, one participant mentioned the change in the stance of the Municipal Police. According to him, the police used to prevent the occurrence of troubles, but since the incident, they would only intervene after something happened.²³

Let us now turn to the situation surrounding Shanghai. The greatest problem for the Japanese community in Shanghai was that their fortunes were seriously affected by Japanese policies toward Shandong and the Northeast. Despite their peripheral existence in the Japanese imperial power structure, the Japanese residents could not claim that they were good Japanese, totally irrelevant to the violent policies pursued by somebody else in Japan. As a result, they were presented with anti-Japanese boycotts several times. Especially after the reunification of China, the effects of the boycotts were considered to have become more serious than before.

In May 1928, an anti-Japanese boycott was started in Shanghai as a protest against the Sino-Japanese military clash at Jinan.²⁴ An Anti-Japanese Association was organized to halt transactions in Japanese goods. It advised Chinese merchants to cancel contracts with the Japanese and demanded that merchants should register goods already kept in stock by 31 May. If merchants made donations to a national salvation fund, the association would issue certificates allowing them to sell the Japanese goods. Trade in Japanese goods was still possible, but it became markedly more difficult and expensive. The rate of contribution to the fund differed according to the commodities involved, and basic necessities that could not be substituted by Chinese products were exempted.²⁵

²³ Ōsaka shōgyō kaigisho geppō, no. 233, October 1926, 3–10.

²⁴ On the anti-Japanese boycotts, see Kikuchi Takaharu, *Chūgoku minzoku undō no kihon kōzō* (Tōkyō: Daian, 1966); Charles Frederick Remer, *A Study of Chinese Boycotts* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1933); Banno Junji, "Japanese Industrialists and Merchants and the Anti-Japanese Boycotts in China, 1919–1928," in *The Japanese Informal Empire*; Donald A. Jordan, *Chinese Boycotts versus Japanese Bombs* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991); Harumi Goto-Shibata, "Japanese and British Perceptions of Chinese Boycotts in Shanghai," in *The Growth of the Asian International Economy, 1850–1949*, ed. Kaoru Sugihara (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

²⁵ "Japanese Boycott Revival," NCH, 4 August 1928; "The Anti-Japanese Boycott" and "Boycott Seizures to be Returned," NCH, 11 August 1928; Nihon Shōkō Kaigisho, *Shina nan'yō ni okeru saikin Nikka haiseki no keika narabini eikyō* (Tōkyō: Nihon Shōkō Kaigisho, 1929), 20–25.

The anti-Japanese boycott continued for more than a year, and its aim and character changed over time. The Chinese tried to further Chinese industries by stimulating the production of certain articles which had been imported from Japan by using the national salvation fund. Their intention was not only to boycott Japanese products, but also to protect and develop national industries.²⁶ Japan's economic power had come to be regarded as the greatest obstacle to China's economic independence, and a boycott served the same purpose as protective tariffs against imports from Japan.²⁷ Furthermore, the boycott was the only effective measure against the products of Japanese cotton mills flourishing in Shanghai.

The methods of the boycott also developed and became more rigorous. On 15 January 1929, the Anti-Japanese Association stopped issuing certificates acknowledging contributions to the national salvation fund. Instead, it decided that Japanese goods should be confiscated and sold at public auctions. Transactions involving Japanese goods became almost impossible in Shanghai. The profits from the auction were paid into the national salvation fund.²⁸

The Japanese in Shanghai began to feel as if they were victims. In June 1928, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Shanghai organized a series of meetings for Japanese business representatives in Shanghai. As the meetings were to be held on Fridays the organization was named *Kin'yōkai* (Friday Club). Members of the consulate, the commercial attaché, and the resident naval and military officers were also expected to attend these sessions. At the first and second meetings, on 26 June and 6 July 1928, many representatives insisted that Japan should take a strong stand against the Chinese, while a consul, Shimizu Tōru, argued that it was impossible to protest against the anti-Japanese boycott because the Chinese had liberty of choice in making purchases.²⁹ At the meeting on 13 July, however, Shimizu mentioned the possibility of using naval power, an idea to which the naval attaché was well disposed.

It is not recorded what kind of naval power Shimizu contemplated using, and probably his idea was limited to patrols by the navy. The Japanese merchants became very keen on the idea of relying on naval power

²⁶ League of Nations, *The Report of the Commission of Enquiry of the League of Nations into the Sino-Japanese Dispute* (Geneva, 1932), 117; Kikuchi, *Chūgoku minzoku undō*, 326; Kubo Tōru, "Kokumin seifu ni yoru kanzei jishuken no kaifuku katei," *Tōyō Bunka Kenkyūjo Kiyō*, no. 98 (1985): 350–57.

²⁷ Remer, *Chinese Boycotts*, 153, 240; Kubo, "Kokumin seifu," 376.

²⁸ League of Nations, *The Report*, 117; "Japanese Boycott Measures," NCH, 27 October 1928; Nihon Shōkō Kaigisho, *Shina nan'yō*, 82.

²⁹ Tōkyō Shōkō Kaigisho Shōkō Toshokan, *Kin'yōkai hōkoku* (hereafter, *Kin'yōkai*), nos. 1 and 2.

and repeatedly mentioned it, so that Shimizu, who suggested it first, now attempted to instil them with caution.³⁰ As the boycott continued, however, naval power ceased to be mentioned, probably because no positive response from the navy was forthcoming.

On 31 July 1929 the Guomindang banned the anti-Japanese movement. Although the boycott was not resumed in Shanghai until the summer of 1931, the Japanese in Shanghai could not be confident about the future prospects of their businesses. As most of the world was hard hit by the Great Depression in this period, with the exception of the Japanese cotton industry in China, business was bad. Besides, the Japanese in Shanghai gained the impression that the Nanjing government was making considerable efforts to promote China's economic independence. For example, Nanjing raised tariffs to provide revenue to stabilize government finances, but a protective effect was inevitable. Nanjing also held conferences and formulated various policies in order to protect and develop national industries.³¹ The situation seemed especially bleak for small-scale Japanese merchants in Shanghai.

RELYING ON THE NAVAL LANDING PARTY

The Anti-Japanese Boycott in the Summer of 1931

The Wanbaoshan Incident and the Korean Incident led to the revival of agitation against Japanese goods in Shanghai. At Wanbaoshan near Changchun in the northeastern part of China, a conflict had continued since April 1931 between migrated Korean peasants and Chinese peasants over disputed irrigation ditches. On 2 July, the armed Chinese clashed with the Korean peasants, and this escalated into an exchange of gunfire between the Chinese and the Japanese police. The Wanbaoshan Incident caused anti-Chinese riots in Korea from 4 to 7 July, in which, as revenge, 119 Chinese were murdered and more than 200 injured.

Since Korea was Japan's colony, it was reported in Shanghai that Japan suggested that the Koreans should persecute the Chinese,³² and the two incidents resulted in the revival of the anti-Japanese boycott in Shanghai. On 13 July, various Chinese industrial and commercial organizations, the

³⁰ *Kin'yōkai*, nos. 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8, respectively 13 July, 20 July, 3 August, 10 August, and 16 August 1928.

³¹ Arthur C. Young, *China's Nation Building Effort* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), 49, 307; *Kin'yōkai, Shanhai hai Nikka jitsujō*, no. 50, 10 January 1931.

³² See for example, *Shen bao*, 7 July 1931, 4, 13.

Shanghai Guomindang, and the Chinese in Shanghai held a meeting where the Shanghai Municipal Anti-Japanese and Protect Overseas Chinese Association (AJPOC) was organized. This declared a boycott of Japanese goods and the permanent severance of economic relations with Japan. On 16 July, it ordered newspaper companies not to carry advertisements for Japanese commodities. On 19 July, the actual boycott started, although the scale was small.³³ As usual, transactions in Japanese goods increased first, because some Chinese merchants tried to gain profits before another full-scale anti-Japanese boycott made dealings difficult.³⁴ On the afternoon of 23 July, the registration of Japanese goods started. One point that differed from the former boycotts was that the confiscation of goods at the checkpoints overseen by the AJPOC pickets was adopted as the main method from the beginning.³⁵

At this time, there were several different opinions among the Guomindang members and merchants.³⁶ Nanjing kept its distance from the boycott, stressing that the agitation was a private initiative directed from Shanghai. Jiang Jieshi wished to avoid another source of conflict. Furthermore, the financial situation did not allow the Nanjing government to be too favorable to the anti-Japanese boycott, because both trade with Japan and Japanese manufacturing within China were rich sources of revenue. As a result, both Murai Kuramatsu, the consul-general in Shanghai, and Captain Kitaoka Haruo, the naval attaché, reported that the Chinese were not very keen on boycotting Japanese goods. The Japanese authorities hoped that, lacking encouragement from the Nanjing government, the anti-Japanese agitation would remain ineffective and soon die out. On 22 July, Shigemitsu Mamoru, who became the minister to China on 6 August 1931, urged the Chinese foreign minister to halt the boycott. Accordingly, a letter by Jiang which urged caution upon the nation was published on the next day.³⁷ In total contrast to the stance of Nanjing, the Shanghai

³³ *Shen bao*, 14 July 1931, 13, and 17 July 1931, 13; *Nihon gaikō monjo*, Shōwa ki I dai 1 bu dai 5 kan (hereafter, NGM), no. 676, Murai to Shidehara, 14 July 1931; JFMA, A.1.1.0.20–2 (hereafter, JFMA, A), vol. 1, Murai to Shidehara, no. 328, 17 July 1931, and military attaché to Army Vice-Minister, no. 750, 20 July 1931.

³⁴ *Shen bao*, 20 July 1931; *ibid.*, 26 July 1931, 13.

³⁵ "The Boycott Demand," NCH, 21 July 1931; *Shanghai Nichi Nichi Shinbun* (hereafter, SNNS), 21 July 1931, evening 2.

³⁶ NGM, no. 688, Shigemitsu to Shidehara, 27 July 1931; JFMA, A, Murai to Shidehara, 4 August 1931, no. 386.

³⁷ NGM, no. 675, Murai to Shidehara, 13 July 1931; NGM, no. 681, Shidehara to Shigemitsu, 21 July 1931; NGM, no. 683, Shigemitsu to Shidehara, 23 July 1931; JFMA, A, Murai to Shidehara, 15 July 1931, no. 321–1; JFMA, A, vol. 1, military attaché to General Staff, 21 July 1931, no. 7; JFMA, A, vol. 1, military attaché to General Staff, no. 772 (1,2), 22 July 1931.

Guomindang decided that it should participate in the AJPOC and lead the movement, although it should do so through individual members taking active roles, not as a leadership unit.³⁸

Chinese business interests in Shanghai naturally thought that they should make the most of this opportunity in order to compete effectively with Japanese producers, to promote their own business, and to expand the movement which would advocate the usage of national products. Yet, there were divisions between the old commercial elite in Shanghai and the younger party-oriented and nationalistic merchants.³⁹ The boycott, once enforced, would hurt many Chinese traders who profited from dealings in Japanese industrial and consumer goods. Thus some merchants were dissatisfied with the overly rigorous method of the boycott.⁴⁰

The stance of Yu Qiaqing, the honorary AJPOC chairman, was complicated. He had been participating in various boycotts since 1898 and as recently as the 1928–29 anti-Japanese boycott. His shipping interest was in a position, according to Japanese intelligence, to take advantage of the boycott, so that he was thought to be attacking his competitors, such as the Nisshin Kisen. But he had visited Japan on business, and some Japanese asked him to prevent “economic severance.” Yu did not attend the inaugural meeting of the AJPOC and stated that “only a boycott which was voluntarily instituted by merchants could bring about the desired results.” He preferred the merchants handle the boycott without the intervention of the Shanghai Guomindang. Aside from his advocacy of the manufacture and use of national products, the opinion of Yu as a capitalist was incompatible with the attitudes of the Shanghai Guomindang and radical young merchants.⁴¹

The Stance of the Japanese Navy

Although Chinese opinion was not united, the Japanese in Shanghai felt that their business was in danger. As such commodities as cotton yarn, soap, and glass bottles were confiscated by the AJPOC, the Japanese in Shanghai became extremely agitated.⁴² At the Friday Club meeting on 24

³⁸ *Shen bao*, 16 July 1931, 12.

³⁹ See Kaneko Hajime, “Shōmin kyōkai to Chūgoku Kokumintō (1927–1930),” *Rekishii Gaku Kenkyū*, no. 598 (1989).

⁴⁰ JFMA, A, vol. 1, Shigemitsu to Shidehara, no. 660, 20 July 1931; Jordan, *Chinese Boycotts*, 32–37, 41–42, 56.

⁴¹ *Shen bao*, 18 July 1931, 13; and 26 July 1931, 14; Kikuchi, *Chūgoku minzoku undō*, 384.

⁴² NGM, no. 686, Murai to Shidehara, 25 July 1931; JFMA, A, vol. 1, military attaché to General Staff, no. 772 (1,2), 22 July 1931; SNNS, 25 July 1931, 7; SNNS, 27 July 1931, evening, 1; SNNS, 30 July 1931, 9; SNNS, 31 July 1931, evening, 2.

July 1931, the representative of the Association of Japanese Cotton Piece Goods Merchants in Shanghai observed that the powerful Chinese cotton piece goods merchants had joined the anti-Japanese association and that the effect of the anti-Japanese agitation would be serious. The consulate, however, emphasized that the Nanjing government was not supporting the movement and that even the members of the Shanghai Guomintang were joining in merely on an individual basis.⁴³

Since the founding of the Friday Club in June 1928, the Japanese army and navy officers residing in Shanghai had been expected to attend its meetings. The Japanese First Expeditionary Fleet, whose commander had the authority to decide whether to use force at Shanghai, was more active in this period than during the period of the anti-Japanese boycott of 1928–29. At the Friday Club meeting on 24 July 1931, a resident naval officer, Kuwabara Shigetō, asked the participants to report the situation of the anti-Japanese boycott to the navy as well as to the consulate, because the navy intended to protect the lives and the property of the Japanese in concert with the consulate.⁴⁴

The main reason for this change in the stance of the First Expeditionary Fleet was the personality and attitude of the naval commander, who had been Rear Admiral Shiozawa Kōichi since 1 December 1930. The second possible reason was the change in the Japanese navy. In 1930, the navy had experienced a fierce internal confrontation over the London Naval Conference and the question of disarmament. One group, the so-called “Treaty Faction,” insisted that Japan should accept the proposal of the United States and Britain in order to maintain harmony with those countries. The other, the “Fleet Faction,” insisted that Japan should not accept the disarmament proposal. It was this latter group which gained in strength in the course of the confrontation. It is not known to which faction Shiozawa belonged, but his firm attitude might have been related to the general trend of the Japanese navy.

In the meantime, Shigemitsu was asking Foreign Minister Shidehara whether he was allowed to protest against the anti-Japanese boycott officially. He was of the opinion that boycotts would be harmful if they were to be repeated to put pressure on every Sino-Japanese negotiation. Surely the Guomintang was not supporting the boycott, but, he noted, neither did they make any efforts to control it.⁴⁵

⁴³ JFMA, A, vol. 3, Murai to Shidehara, no. 404, 14 August 1931; *Kin'yōkai*, nos. 113 and 115, respectively 24 July and 5 August 1931.

⁴⁴ *Kin'yōkai*, no. 113, 24 July 1931.

⁴⁵ NGM, no. 688, Shigemitsu to Shidehara, 27 July 1931; NGM, no. 690, Shigemitsu to Shidehara, 4 August 1931.

In grappling with the anti-Japanese boycott in the summer of 1931, the lack of trust and communication between the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the navy was serious. Each organization was working in isolation, pursuing its own objective. At the Friday Club meeting on 31 July, the representative of a shipping company asked Kuwabara whether the navy could patrol the canals or not.⁴⁶ Kuwabara did not give any answers during the meeting, but on 3 August 1931, Shiozawa issued an order concerning the anti-Japanese movement to the units under his command:

When Japanese goods are to be confiscated in Shanghai, ... sailors should be dispatched ... in order to control the disorderly activities. The Timing of the Dispatch.

When the Consulate requested, or when the sufferers requested directly and the units admitted the necessity.⁴⁷

Two days later, the consulate in Shanghai found out that the above order had been issued, and was extremely shocked because it had not been consulted in advance. Murai immediately protested through the naval attaché. The consulate was of the opinion that since the Chinese authorities stated that they would control the situation, it was too early even to let a steam launch with an armed unit patrol the Huangpu.⁴⁸ However, crossing the protest of Murai, an order was issued by the commander of the naval landing force in Shanghai, who was a subordinate of Shiozawa, to prevent the confiscation of the Japanese goods.⁴⁹ At the meeting of the Friday Club on 7 August, Kuwabara reported that the navy had decided to prevent violence.⁵⁰

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs believed that these orders of Shiozawa and the naval landing party in Shanghai were contrary to the Orders for Expeditionary Fleets which had been issued by the Navy Ministry in 1898. Article 23 of the order read as follows:

That the commander should resort to arms, only when the life, freedom and property of imperial subjects are in great danger and the government of the involved country does not fulfill her duties and there is no other way of protection but to use our arms. In this case, the commander should consult our diplomats residing in the country or the consuls in advance. However, when he is faced with a great

⁴⁶ *Kin'yōkai*, no. 114, 31 July 1931.

⁴⁷ NGM, no. 692, Murai to Shidehara, 5 August 1931.

⁴⁸ NGM, no. 692, Murai to Shidehara, 5 August 1931.

⁴⁹ JFMA, A, vol. 3, Murai to Shidehara, no. 950, 6 August 1931.

⁵⁰ *Kin'yōkai*, no. 116, 7 August 1931.

emergency and does not have time to consult our diplomats or consuls, he may be exempted from this requirement.⁵¹

On 8 August, Murai visited Shiozawa on his flagship, *Ataka*, and discussed the matter. Shiozawa told Murai that he did not intend to resort to arms immediately. However, he continued, if Japanese goods were detained near where the Japanese fleet was at anchor, to let the Chinese do whatever they wanted would damage Japan's prestige. In that situation and if it should be found necessary, the navy intended to stop the disorderly deeds.⁵²

Shidehara also found Shiozawa's order distasteful, because it was issued without consulting Shigemitsu or Murai, and also because it declared that the navy could take action only after a direct request from the victims. Shidehara believed that this condition was contrary to the Orders for Expeditionary Fleets and decided to discuss the matter with the Navy Ministry.⁵³

On 14 August 1931, the Navy Ministry cabled Shiozawa that, although it generally agreed with the order, there seemed to have been some misunderstanding between Shiozawa and Murai. Shiozawa should solve this misunderstanding and, from then on, should discuss the situation in Shanghai with the consulate even more thoroughly than before.⁵⁴ Since Shiozawa's order was so obviously contradictory to the Orders for Expeditionary Fleets, the Navy Ministry yielded to the opinion of the Foreign Ministry, but Shiozawa's order itself was not withdrawn.

Shiozawa's order remained in effect and, on 19 October 1931, at the fourth meeting of the First Expeditionary Fleet, it was explained to the captains of ships. The interpretation given at the time was that since the Orders for Expeditionary Fleets decided that, in peacetime, fleets should act in conjunction with the diplomatic authority, the captains should always keep contact with diplomats. However, the First Expeditionary Fleet decided that "keeping contact" and "being ordered" were two different things, and it was determined that the navy would judge the situation and take necessary steps on its own: the Fleet under Shiozawa would not take orders from the diplomats.⁵⁵

⁵¹ JFMA, A, vol. 3, Gunkan gaimu rei.

⁵² NGM, no. 695, Murai to Shidehara, 10 August 1931.

⁵³ NGM, no. 697, Shidehara to Shigemitsu, 13 August 1931.

⁵⁴ JFMA, A, Navy Ministry to the commander of the First Expeditionary Fleet and Kitaoka et al., no. 115, 14 August 1931.

⁵⁵ National Institute for Defense Studies, Japanese Naval Archives (hereafter, JNA), 10/Kōbun bikō/s6-112, 19 October 1931, Dai ichi kengai kantai, no. 31-4.

The Japanese Community's Opinion of the Navy and the Consulate

While the two ministries were negotiating, the naval landing party was called out several times in accordance with the order of Shiozawa, so that the expectation of naval protection grew among the Japanese in Shanghai. On 11 August, the hempen bags of a Japanese trading company were confiscated on the Suzhou Creek in the International Settlement. The members of the consulate negotiated with the Chinese of the AJPOC, and it was decided that the bags would be released. However, before the actual release, three officers and twenty sailors were dispatched from the naval landing party without the knowledge of the consulate, because a Japanese who witnessed the detention directly informed the navy of the trouble. The members of the AJPOC were shocked to see the navy and released the detained goods.⁵⁶

On 12 August, when 171 bags of Japanese cotton yarn were to be shipped off by a ship of Butterfield and Swire moored at Pudong, about thirty Chinese, who belonged to the AJPOC, assaulted a Japanese and tried to detain the bags. A launch of a Japanese shipping company happened to pass by and informed the Ataka of the emergency. Consequently, one officer and fifteen sailors set off on the launch, seized four Chinese and took the commodities back. The AJPOC men were handed over to the consulate.⁵⁷ On 13 August, Shiozawa reported on these two successful missions to the Navy Ministry, which on the next day cabled back that Shiozawa should solve the misunderstanding between himself and the consulate.⁵⁸

On 14 August, a meeting of the AJPOC was held in order to discuss how to carry on the anti-Japanese agitation. At this meeting, the differences of opinion among the Chinese became even clearer. The ideas of the powerful merchants in Shanghai including Yu Qiaqing were not shared by the lower ranks of the Guomindang and students. On 21 August, Yu proposed that he should withdraw from the committee of the AJPOC.⁵⁹

The effect of dispatching sailors was impressive to the Japanese in Shanghai. Although the Foreign Ministry believed that the problem had been settled as it wished, even it came to think that the stance of the navy was understandable, especially because the control of the situation by the Chinese authorities was incomplete.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ NGM, no. 696, Murai to Shidehara, 11 August 1931.

⁵⁷ JFMA, A, vol. 3, Murai to Shidehara, no. 399, 13 August 1931; *Kin'yōkai*, no. 117, 14 August 1931; *Shen bao*, 14 August 1931, 13.

⁵⁸ JNA, 10/Kōbun bikō/ s6-60, Shiozawa to Navy Ministry, no. 106, 13 August 1931.

⁵⁹ *Shen bao*, 22 August 1931, 14, and 28 August 1931, 14; SNNS, 22 August 1931.

⁶⁰ NGM, no. 700, Murai to Shidehara, 17 August 1931; NGM, no. 701, Shidehara to Murai, 24 August 1931.

The Japanese in Shanghai were not informed of this stance of the Foreign Ministry, so that they were extremely dissatisfied with the lackluster response of the consulate. One example is the consulate's reaction on 12 August, when the marine products of a trading company were confiscated by the AJPOC. Although the company reported the confiscation to the consulate, the latter was unwilling to help. On the contrary, the consulate reproached the company for its carelessness. The company was told that it should negotiate for the return of the goods by itself.⁶¹

On 20 August, the *Shanghai Nichi Nichi Shinbun* criticized the "incompetence and shamelessness" of the Japanese diplomatic authorities. It reported that people were dissatisfied with four "so-called strong protests" made by the diplomats, because no commodities had been returned and the protests themselves had not been officially presented by the minister, Shigemitsu. In addition, it continued, the consulate was wrong to criticize the naval protection.⁶²

Firm opinions were expressed by the majority at the 118th meeting of the Friday Club held on 21 August. Members had come to think that merely continuing negotiations with the Chinese would not solve anything. Shidehara's peaceful negotiations and friendship were less attractive to the Japanese in Shanghai than assertive measures by Shiozawa.

Consul-General Murai, who was caught in the middle of this situation, was criticized both by the indignant Chinese⁶³ and the Japanese businessmen in Shanghai. He attended the Friday Club meeting on 28 August and reported that he had seen the mayor of Shanghai, Zhang Qun, on 22 and 27 August. He had requested that Zhang see to the return of captured Japanese goods within the week; if the goods were not returned, the victims might take some countermeasures, but Murai could not take any responsibility for that. Zhang agreed to return the goods. Murai insisted that the dispatch of the sailors had strengthened the anti-Japanese movement, but the remark was far from convincing to the members of the Friday Club.⁶⁴ On the same day, the Chinese decided to return the detained Japanese goods, and this decision was carried out by 29 August.⁶⁵

⁶¹ *Kin'yōkai*, no. 117, 14 August 1931.

⁶² SNNS, 20 August 1931, 1.

⁶³ *Shen bao*, 15 August 1931, 13. According to this report, the mayor of Shanghai, Zhang Qun, protested against the dispatch of sailors.

⁶⁴ *Kin'yōkai*, no. 119, 28 August 1931.

⁶⁵ JFMA, A, vol. 4, Murai to Shidehara, no. 442, 29 August 1931. The dispatch of the sailors was not the only reason why the AJPOC decided to return the detained Japanese goods. The following developments should also be taken into consideration: the withdrawal of the Japanese police from Wanbaoshan on 8 August 1931; floods in central China; and sympathies shown by the government, the Imperial Household, and the people of Japan for the sufferers of the floods.

SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

To the Japanese residents in Shanghai, the situation went from bad to worse after the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident. Naturally enough, the incident drastically strengthened the anti-Japanese feeling of the Chinese, while the Japanese government was preoccupied with the problems in the Northeast. The frustration of the Japanese in Shanghai became total, with the result that they urged naval intervention. It was not the Japanese government which decided to employ naval force. The men-on-the-spot brought about the hostility.

There was one significant difference between the development in Shanghai and that in the Northeast or European imperial expansion in and after 1880s. The Japanese government did not accept the situation created by the men-on-the-spot. First of all, it did not have any strategic reasons to be fully involved in the problems of Shanghai at this stage. Shanghai was not even a buffer zone in the protection of the "special" interests in the Northeast. Second, the international repercussion made the government worry. Third, economic motivation for intervention was not high. Business interests in Shanghai were mostly private and developed without the protection of the government. Although the Japanese Foreign Ministry had made great efforts in keeping China's tariff rate as low as possible, it was not prepared to play a larger role. A cease-fire agreement was reached on 3 March 1932. The Japanese troops were withdrawn in May 1932.

Presented with the rise of anti-imperialist nationalism, the Japanese in Shanghai came to the conclusion that, despite the motto of economic expansionism, the Japanese diplomatic authorities were not interested in assisting their enterprises. Therefore, they decided to rely on the navy which had been assertive since 1930. The sole object of the Japanese in Shanghai was to protect their commercial rights and expand their business. However, the attack upon Chinese nationalism did not achieve their desired goal. Security for trade was not established. Instead, it only resulted in the failure of Japan's economic expansionism. It might be true that Japan occupied a militarily stronger position after the conflict, but the anti-Japanese feeling intensified further, the anti-Japanese boycotts continued, and no Chinese willingly bought commodities from their enemy any longer.

THE TAIWAN GOVERNMENT-GENERAL AND PREWAR JAPANESE ECONOMIC EXPANSION IN SOUTH CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1900– 1936

Adam SCHNEIDER

INTRODUCTION: EXPANSION, DEVELOPMENT, AND TRADE IN THE COLONIAL SETTING

The centrality of economic development in Japanese colonial policy and the relationship of development to imperial expansion have been the objects of historical inquiry for some time.¹ It is thus surprising that the efforts of Japan's oldest colonial administration to promote economic expansion beyond its colonial borders have remained unexamined. Over most of its fifty years, the Taiwan Government-General implemented a range of different policies to increase its influence over South China and Southeast Asia, a region that came to be known collectively as the *nanzō*. These included cultural measures, such as the promotion of schools, hospitals, and newspapers, political meddling, and in at least one case military intervention, although the Amoy Incident² of 1900 ended abortively

¹ The themes of expansion and development are treated in several articles in the series of three volumes edited by Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie: *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), and *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1996). These themes are also addressed in recent series of Japanese works, including Ōe Shinobu et al., eds., *Iwanami kōza—kindai Nihon to shokuminchi*, eight volumes (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 1992–93) and Ōishi Kaichirō, ed., *Nihon teikoku shugi shi*, three volumes (Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1985–94).

² The Amoy Incident involved an attempt by the governor-general of Taiwan, Kodama Gentarō, and his assistant Gotō Shinpei to take advantage of the confusion generated by the Boxer Uprising to occupy Amoy. A fire deliberately set at a Japanese temple in the coastal city in late August was used as a pretext for the occupation, and a small group of Japanese marines was actually sent in, but Tōkyō stopped the plan before the main force assembled in Taiwan departed. Kodama, exasperated, sought unsuccessfully for permission to resign. The incident was one factor contributing to the collapse of the Yamagata cabinet in October, but it also marked the end of the Taiwan Government-General's military adventurism in South China. See Marius B. Jansen, *The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), 99–103.

with Tōkyō reining in the Government-General. The most important and enduring measures adopted by the Government-General, however, were economic.

Until the mid-1930s, Taiwan's economy served mainly as an agricultural appendage whose exports eased the strains of industrialization in Japan. The Government-General's development policy toward Taiwan has been studied, and it has become a truism that the needs of the Japanese metropole determined the economic roles assigned to its colonies.³ The Government-General's economic policy toward the *nanpō*, however, reflected its own sub-imperialist ambition as much as metropolitan needs. Expectations were high for both the development of Taiwan and external economic expansion, but the colonial government's achievements in the *nanpō* were overshadowed by the remarkable growth of the island's domestic economy.

Taiwan's domestic economic development can be viewed as the result of sustained increases in both the factor inputs and productivity of rice and sugar cultivation.⁴ A few comparisons suggest the magnitude of the transformation that occurred between 1900 and the 1930s. Total output of sugar cane rose more than 2,000 percent, from about 500,000 to 12 million

³ Samuel Pao-San Ho, "Colonialism and Development: Korea, Taiwan, and Kwantung," in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945*, ed. Myers and Peattie, 347.

⁴ There is a growing literature on the economic development of colonial Taiwan, but the best single book in English remains Samuel P. S. Ho, *Economic Development of Taiwan, 1860–1970* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), which also contains a useful if now somewhat dated bibliography. There are relevant articles by Ho and others in Myers and Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945*. The reader wishing a general introduction should also consult Tu Zhaoyan's *Nihon teikokukushugika no Taiwan* (Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1975), the most comprehensive monograph in Japanese. Zhang Zonghan's *Guangfu qian Taiwan zhi gongyehua* (Taipei: Lianjing Chuban Shiye, 1980) is another general survey, but it is somewhat slanted.

Highly detailed information about the colonial economy is available in three works compiled for the Ministry of Finance after the war: Ōkurashō Kanri Kyōku, "Nihonjin no kaigai katsudō ni kansuru rekishiteki chōsa tsūkan dai-jūni satsu Taiwan hen dai-ichi bunsatsu dai-ichi bu Taiwan keizai hansei shi gaikan," "Nihonjin no kaigai katsudō ni kansuru rekishiteki chōsa tsūkan dai-jūyon satsu Taiwan hen dai-san bunsatsu dai-go bu Taiwan no keizai (sono ichi)," and "Nihonjin no kaigai katsudō ni kansuru rekishiteki chōsa tsūkan dai-jūgo satsu Taiwan hen dai-san bunsatsu dai-go bu Taiwan no keizai (sono ni)." The Bank of Taiwan in its postwar, Chinese incarnation put out a number of detailed volumes on Taiwan's economic history, although some of them tend to be more descriptive than analytic. References to these are listed in the bibliography of Ho's book. The best collection of statistical series, along with a number of useful essays, is to be found in Mizoguchi Toshiyuki and Umemura Mataji, eds., *Kyū Nihon shokuminchi keizai tōkei* (Tōkyō: Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha, 1988).

metric tons between 1901 and 1939.⁵ This was driven by an increase in cultivated land area of almost 900 percent, from 16,500 to 145,000 hectares, and by efficiency gains in sugar production of almost 500 percent, from 1.8 to 8.8 tons/hectare, between 1902–3 and 1939–40.⁶ Rice agriculture also expanded, if not quite as dramatically as sugar, from about 400,000 to 1.3 million metric tons between 1901 and 1939.⁷ Indigenous rice yields in 1900 were about 6–7 *koku/kō* in 1900 versus 14–15 *koku/kō* for high-yield strains of rice in the 1930s.⁸

Descriptions of economic growth in terms of productivity gains and increases in factor inputs, however, obscure the purposeful and planned human action that was its source. Massive investment in the sugar industry by Japanese industrialists, the efforts of countless Taiwanese, mostly farmers, and, above all, aggressive intervention by the colonial state lay behind this success. Although the first major Japanese sugar firm in Taiwan was set up in 1900, it was not until after the Russo-Japanese War that Japanese industrialists began to invest wholeheartedly in Taiwanese sugar production.⁹ Industry growth, driven by high profits, was rapid but volatile. Three rounds of consolidation—in the late Meiji era, after the First World War, and in the early 1940s—narrowed the field to four large Japanese companies, eliminating Western and Taiwanese competition in the process.¹⁰ Private industrial investment in Taiwan before the mid-1930s remained predominantly in sugar, accounting for about 186 million yen out of 200 million yen of total paid-in capital in industry as late as

⁵ Yhi-Min Ho, *Agricultural Development of Taiwan, 1903–1960* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1966), 141.

⁶ Nōrinshō Nōrin Suisan Gijutsu Kaigi Jimukyoku Nettai Nōgyō Kenkyū Kanri Shitsu, *Senzen senji ni okeru Taiwan nōgyō gijutsu no hattatsu—ine kansho* (1978), 24.

⁷ Yhi-Min Ho, *Agricultural Development*, 135–36.

⁸ Takahashi Kamekichi, *Gendai Taiwan keizai ron* (Tōkyō: Chikura Shobō, 1937), 183. One *kō* is equal to about 0.97 hectares.

⁹ The nationalization of the railroads in Japan was an important factor in the development of the sugar industry in Taiwan because it put a great deal of capital in private hands that was subsequently used to finance sugar companies. See Steven J. Ericson, *The Sound of the Whistle—Railroads and the State in Meiji Japan* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 372–73. On the early history of Taiwan's modern sugar industry, see Mori Hisao, "Taiwan sōtokufu no tōgyō hogo seisaku no tenkai," *Taiwan kingendai shi kenkyū* no. 1 (1978), 41–82.

¹⁰ See chapter four of Tu, *Nihon teikokukushugika no Taiwan*, 271–367. The four largest firms were Dainippon Sugar (Dainippon Seitō), Meiji Sugar (Meiji Seitō), Ensui-kō Sugar (Ensui-kō Seitō), and Taiwan Sugar (Taiwan Seitō). All but the first were based in Taiwan. These four firms were among the largest manufacturing and mining companies in the empire, ranking in the top thirty in 1919 and the top forty in 1940; Nakagawa Keiichirō, Morikawa Hidemasa, and Yui Tsunehiko, eds., *Kindai Nihon keiei shi no kiso chishiki* (Tōkyō: Yūhikaku, 1974), 452, 454.

1935.¹¹ The success of the sugar industry in Taiwan also depended on the Taiwanese, of course. There were a few modern Taiwanese-owned firms, although the last one was bought out in 1941,¹² and Taiwanese worked in Japanese sugar companies, but Taiwanese cane growers made the largest contribution.¹³ By cultivating more acreage of higher-yielding cane varieties, they raised their own standard of living¹⁴ as well as sugar company profits. The development of high-yield *hōrai* rice in the early 1920s also allowed them to produce more rice and, by providing a profitable alternative to cane cultivation, gave them more leverage in negotiating cane prices with the sugar companies.

Both Japanese industrialists and Taiwanese farmers, however, were dependent on the colonial state. The sugar companies initially relied on a variety of direct and indirect subsidies,¹⁵ and they enjoyed monopsony cane purchasing privileges in legally established regions around their plants throughout the colonial period. Not only was their access to raw materials protected, but tariffs shielded their market in Japan from international competition. Taiwanese cane farmers also shared indirectly in these benefits at the expense of the Japanese consumer. Furthermore, these farmers were directly indebted to the state for the combination of better fertilizer, high-yield crop strains, and advanced irrigation facilities that made it possible to increase agricultural output so dramatically.¹⁶ The state also built the basic transport and communication infrastructure that linked supply in Taiwan with demand in Japan for cane and rice.

This linkage fostered the economic complementarity with Japan that came to dominate Taiwan's external trade. Although most of Taiwan's trade in the precolonial period went to China, from about the time of the

¹¹ Taiwan Sōtokufu Kanbō Chōsaka, *Taiwan sōtokufu dai-sanjūkyū tōkei sho* (1937), 451–52, 506–7.

¹² Shinkō Sugar (Shinkō Seitō) was bought out by Taiwan Sugar in October 1941; Tu, *Nihon teikokukushugika no Taiwan*, 334.

¹³ The population of Taiwan in 1935 was approximately 5.3 million. Out of this figure, the farming population was about 2.8 million, while only 64,246 Taiwanese were factory employees, and fewer than 35,000 of these were involved with sugar production. Mizoguchi and Umemura, eds., *Kyū Nihon shokuminchi keizai tōkei*, 256–57; Taiwan Sōtokufu Kanbō Chōsaka, *Taiwan sōtokufu dai-sanjūkyū tōkei sho* (1937), 347, 442–43.

¹⁴ For a survey of agricultural living conditions in Taiwan, see Chang Han-yu, "A Study of the Living Conditions of Farmers in Taiwan 1931–1950," *The Developing Economies* 7, no. 1 (March 1969): 35–62.

¹⁵ A chart summarizing different Government-General support measures for the sugar industry is in Takahashi, *Gendai Taiwan keizai ron*, 230–31.

¹⁶ The state was responsible for several large irrigation projects and the development of high yield rice strains. It also promoted the use of better fertilizer, much of which was imported from other parts of the empire. Takahashi, *Gendai Taiwan keizai ron*, 110–21; Ho, *Economic Development of Taiwan, 1860–1970*, 41–69.

Russo-Japanese War trade with Japan eclipsed its total trade with other countries. This trend accelerated with the agricultural development of Taiwan, until Taiwan's total import and export trade went overwhelmingly to Japan. In the early 1930s, for example, trade with Japan constituted nearly 80 percent of imports and 90 percent of exports.¹⁷ Trade with other parts of the empire was insignificant, and trade with foreign countries, while not negligible, was small compared to trade with Japan. Even during the boom years of the First World War, export growth was mediated through Japan.

On the one hand, what is clear, even from such an abbreviated narrative of the economic development of Taiwan, is that both growth and an increasingly close trade relationship with Japan, based on the exchange of agricultural raw materials for capital and manufactured goods, were sought and achieved in large part through the economic policy of the colonial state. The external expansion that was also promoted by the state, on the other hand, was inherently a more elusive goal than the development of the island itself. Correspondingly, the policies used to pursue it were more varied and the degree of success achieved more difficult to measure. The general objective of economic policy toward the *nanpō* was to control the region by integrating it with Taiwan, but this meant different things at different times and to different administrations in Taihoku (Taipei). Stronger trade ties, influence over the financial environment in the *nanpō*, and control over key service enterprises, like shipping, warehousing, and banking, were all intermediate goals. Policy tools included subsidies and official and semi-official corporations. These were used in different combinations, although one can distinguish two main periods in external economic policy divided around the First World War.

In taking up the Government-General's economic program for the *nanpō*, the temptation is to compare it unfavorably to the very successful domestic economic policy. The more important question, however, has to do with the relationship between the two, and specifically how the economic complementarity between Japan and Taiwan constrained the Government-General's efforts to control and integrate the *nanpō*. Understanding this relationship also throws light on the subsequent period between the mid-1930s and the outbreak of the Pacific War, during which the Government-General adopted a new program of industrialization for the Taiwanese economy and, at the same time, moved more aggressively than ever before to carve out its own sub-imperial sphere.

¹⁷ Calculated from Mizoguchi and Umemura, eds., *Kyū Nihon shokuminchi keizai tōkei*, 246–47, 251.

EARLY GOVERNMENT-GENERAL ECONOMIC MEASURES

The failed plot that resulted in the Amoy Incident of 1900 led the Government-General, under the leadership of Kodama Gentarō (1898–1906) and his civil affairs chief Gotō Shinpei (1898–1906), to abandon direct military action as a strategy for South China. Gotō, to whom Kodama delegated much responsibility, was an aggressive imperialist, but he was also a pragmatist. He continued to simultaneously try to free Taiwan from its traditional economic subordination to the continent and to extend Japanese influence into South China, but with corporate instruments rather than force.¹⁸ These corporate proxies were largely extensions of the Government-General itself, involving individuals with close ties to the administration and frequently public funds as well. While this was a viable strategy in some sectors, it was not feasible in others, particularly those that required large amounts of capital. Gotō and subsequent leaders in the Government-General therefore adopted other approaches that allowed them to draw on capital resources in Japan. As Mark Peattie has noted, Japanese imperialism was characterized by a shortage rather than a surplus of capital.¹⁹ In practice, these Government-General approaches could mean simply persuading an existing Japanese shipping company to establish routes connecting Taiwan with other regions, or more formally setting up an institution like the Bank of Taiwan (Taiwan Ginkō; BOT), which was subsidized by the central government.

One of the earliest firms to emerge as an offshoot of the Government-General was the Sango Company (Sango Kōshi).²⁰ The Sango Company was established as a private corporation in 1902, the thirty-fifth year of Meiji, from which it took the two numerals that made up its name. While posing as a joint Sino-Japanese enterprise, the company was really the brainchild of Gotō and was run by his protégé, Akuzawa Naoya, a Tōkyō Imperial University graduate who worked briefly for Mitsubishi before joining Gotō in the Government-General.²¹ The Sango Company was divided up into three divisions for education, research, and operations, but the education division, which ran a school from 1904 to 1909 and research division were of secondary importance.²² Although little is known about Akuzawa and the company, especially in its later years, in the decade be-

¹⁸ Kitaoka Shin'ichi, *Gotō Shinpei—gaikō to bijon* (Tōkyō: Chūō Kōronsha, 1988), 64–65.

¹⁹ Mark R. Peattie, "Introduction" in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945*, ed. Myers and Peattie, 12.

²⁰ Tsurumi Yūsuke, *Gotō Shinpei dai-nikan* (Tōkyō: Keisō Shobō, 1965), 491.

²¹ Nakamura Takashi, "Taiwan sōtokufu no Kanan tetsudō kōsaku—Chō-Sen tetsudō o megutte," *Nanpō Bunka* 14 (November 1987): 73.

fore the First World War the operations division had several major projects in South China and was an important instrument of Government-General economic policy.

The company's two largest enterprises were a camphor business in Fujian and the Chaozhou-Shantou railroad. Japanese involvement in the railroad was disguised through the use of Taiwanese and Chinese intermediaries, who funneled Government-General money into the project.²³ The line of about thirty miles was completed in 1906, a little more than two years after construction began, and Akuzawa arranged for the Chinese front company to contract the management of the railroad to his Sango Company. Sango then brought in Japanese and Taiwanese staff from the railway section of the Government-General to actually run the operation. Although it faced competition from water transport in the first few years, the railroad gradually became more successful. There was considerable friction between the railroad and local Chinese, however. The forced sale of land to the company resulted in an attack on the railroad during the construction phase that claimed the lives of several Japanese. Later, the railroad became the target of anti-foreign protests, and in 1909 an incident occurred between the Chinese workers and Japanese management that ultimately led to nominal Japanese withdrawal from the railroad. Akuzawa retained control, however, through a new secret management contract. Thereafter, he cut back on the use of Japanese staff, relying on Taiwanese and Chinese to reduce the potential for future conflict. Another result of this incident was that the Government-General withdrew from the project and stopped its annual subsidies to Sango. Sakuma Samata, a career military man from Chōshū already in his sixties, had replaced Kodama as governor-general in 1906, but he lacked the imagination of his predecessor, had a corrupt civil affairs chief, and preferred to concentrate his efforts on the subjugation of the aborigines in Taiwan.²⁴ Thus after Gotō's departure to head the new South Manchurian Railway Company, there was less support within the Government-General for Sango. The company continued to operate the railway profitably into the 1920s, but was forced to relinquish control in 1922. Management of the railroad deteriorated rapidly after that, and it had to be reorganized in 1929.

The Sango Company's camphor project evolved out of Gotō's desire to strengthen the position of the camphor monopoly in Taiwan by extending

²² Nakamura Takashi, "Taiwan to 'Nan-Shi Nan'yō'" in *Nihon no nanpō kan'yo to Taiwan*, ed. Nakamura Takashi (Tenri: Tenrikyō Dōyūsha, 1988), 10–11.

²³ On the railroad project, see Tsurumi, *Gotō Shinpei*, 493–95, 500–504, and Nakamura, "Taiwan sōtokufu no Kanan tetsudō kōsaku," 73–103.

²⁴ Huang Zhaotang, *Taiwan sōtokufu* (Tōkyō: Kyōikusha, 1981), 89–98.

its business into South China.²⁵ Camphor was traditionally one of Taiwan's major products, along with rice, sugar, and tea, but it declined in importance during the colonial era, particularly after the First World War, when synthetic substitutes became available.²⁶ At the turn of the century there was little hint of this, though, and Akuzawa, acting on the instructions of the Government-General, began negotiating with the Chinese at the local and central level in 1901 and eventually succeeded in obtaining an exclusive camphor concession for Fujian in 1902.²⁷ Sango set up manufacturing and distribution operations based in Fuzhou and Shanghai, with a network of other purchasing outposts. Although the business went well for the first few years, increasing pressure from the Chinese to recover foreign concessions eventually forced the company out in 1909.

While both the railroad and the camphor project were in South China, the Sango Company also began to move into Southeast Asia. For example, as the camphor project began to run into trouble, the Sango Company moved into gum plantations in Malaya; in fact, as the first major Japanese gum venture, it was later referred to as the "founder" (*kaiso*) of the Japanese gum enterprise in Malaya.²⁸ This position allowed it to take full advantage of high prices during the First World War, unlike newcomers who had to wait several years before their gum trees became productive. By the end of the war it was considered the leading Japanese gum firm in Malaya.²⁹ There is little information about the gum enterprise thereafter, but it was still the leading Japanese plantation by area in Malaya in a 1936 survey.³⁰

A second firm that served the Government-General in economic relations with China was the Nankoku Company (Nankoku Kōshi), which brought workers from mainland China to Taiwan.³¹ Precolonial Taiwan attracted seasonal migrant labor from South China, especially to support the tea industry, which boomed during the second half of the nineteenth

²⁵ Camphor became a public monopoly in Taiwan in 1899.

²⁶ During the 1920s and 1930s camphor accounted for only about 2 percent of exports by value, less than either bananas or tea and about the same level as alcohol; Ōkurashō Kanri Kyoku, "Nihonjin no kaigai katsudō ni kansuru rekishiteki chōsa tsūkan dai-jūyon satsu Taiwan hen dai-san bunsatsu dai-go bu Taiwan no keizai (sono ichi)," 10.

²⁷ On the camphor project, see Tsurumi, *Gotō Shinpei*, 492–93, 497–500, and Nakamura, "Taiwan to 'Nan-Shi Nan'yō,'" 11.

²⁸ Taiwan Sōtokufu, "Minami Shina oyobi Nan'yō chōsa dai-jūroku: Nan'yō ni okeru hōjin no kigyō" (1918), 56.

²⁹ Yano Tōru, 'Nanshin' no keifu (Tōkyō: Chūō Kōronsha, 1975), 105.

³⁰ Taiwan Sōtokufu, *Nan'yō kakuchi hōjin kigyō yōran* (Taihoku, 1937), 36.

³¹ (Taihoku: Taiwan Sōtokufu Taihoku Kōtō Shōgyō Gakkō Nan-Shi Nan'yō Keizai Kenkyūkai, 1937), and the documents in Nakamura Takashi, "Nankoku kōshi ni tsuite," *Nanpō Bunka* 7 (December 1980): 159–177.

³¹ On the Nankoku Company, see Matsuo Hiroshi, *Taiwan to Shinajin rōdōsha*

century. Around the time that Taiwan was ceded to Japan, several thousand workers were coming annually, typically arriving in the spring and returning to the mainland in the fall. Concerned with the ongoing guerrilla resistance to Japanese rule, the Government-General initially restricted immigration, but after control had been established, it reversed itself to allow an adequate supply of labor for the major infrastructure projects started at the turn of the century. An 1899 regulation established a licensing system for labor importers, but in 1905 this was replaced with an arrangement whereby one Gotō Mōtarō and his firm (Taika Shokumin Gōshi Kaisha) were granted an exclusive concession to import workers. In 1915, this firm was reorganized into the Nankoku Company.

Nankoku recruited labor through Chinese compradors at offices in Fuzhou, Shantou, and Amoy and used deposits and guarantors to filter out unwelcome elements.³² There was a fairly steady surplus of immigrants over those returning to mainland China, so that between 1905 and 1935 the number of Chinese workers resident in Taiwan grew tenfold from about 4,000 to about 40,000.³³ Nankoku retained its exclusive concession until 1937, when labor imports were stopped because of the China Incident. As in 1899, labor demand eventually won out over security concerns, and in 1940 labor imports were restarted. At this point, however, Nankoku Company saw its operations completely absorbed by the Taiwan Development Company (Taiwan Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha), which was the main instrument of overseas economic expansion from Taiwan after its formation in 1936.

In addition to fostering new companies to serve specific policy objectives, the Government-General also harnessed established Japanese shipping firms to its economic goals. Grants for the operation of regular shipping routes connecting Taiwan to South China and Southeast Asia constituted a major component of total Government-General spending on subsidies and were important in persuading private firms to open and maintain routes. After arranging with Ōsaka Commercial Shipping Company (Ōsaka Shōsen Kaisha; OSK) and the Japan Mail Steamship Company (Nihon Yūsen Kaisha; NYK) to operate Ōsaka–Jilong and Kobe–Jilong services, the Government-General next commissioned the OSK to operate a Danshui–Hong Kong route in 1899. This was followed over the next few years by an Anping–Hong Kong line and four other routes connecting Chinese coastal cities. By 1911, Taiwan was linked by the OSK to Canton, Shanghai, and Shantou, as well.³⁴ One explanation that has been offered

³² Matsuo, *Taiwan*, 33–35.

³³ Matsuo, *Taiwan*, 43. The traditional tea workers also gave way to carpenters and odd-jobbers (*zatsuekifu*) during the late 1920s and 1930s.

for why the Government-General chose the OSK for all but one of the routes is that the NYK was more closely tied to the central government and therefore potentially less amenable to the Government-General's demands than the OSK.³⁵ The Government-General sought first to push the British steamship firm of Douglas out of Taiwan and then to challenge it in South China. The OSK received 3.5 million yen in subsidies from the Government-General, including grants for the Ōsaka-Jilong line, over the decade 1896–1905 to help it achieve this.³⁶

The Government-General's larger aspiration was to use the inroads it made in South China shipping to extend OSK lines into Southeast Asia. It sponsored a number of investigative missions with the OSK prior to the First World War to determine if a Java line would be profitable. The Government-General hoped to use the OSK to get a share of the trade between Southeast Asia and South China, such as sugar from the Dutch East Indies, rice from Saigon, and Chinese passengers going to work overseas.³⁷ What the investigative reports revealed, however, was that Chinese and British interests were too strongly entrenched for the OSK to challenge. The OSK and NYK in fact chose not to cooperate with the Communications Ministry when it set up a subsidized Japan-Java route in 1912 because the subsidies offered were insufficient, allowing the route to go to a new company, South Seas Mail Steamship (Nan'yō Yūsen). By 1916, facing a huge surge in shipping demand and with the Western powers distracted by war, the OSK was ready when the Government-General offered a generous subsidy of 100,000 yen annually to run from Jilong to Java with stops along the China coast and in Singapore.³⁸ The OSK was able to establish a position in the Java trade thanks to the financial support of the Government-General.

Although the Sango Company, Nankoku Company, and the OSK each contributed to the Government-General's overseas economic program, during the period before the 1930s the colonial government's most important instrument was the Bank of Taiwan, which opened its doors in 1899. Claims by some scholars that Taiwan lacked a true national policy company before the 1930s notwithstanding,³⁹ the BOT, in addition to serving

³⁴ Katayama Kunio, *Kindai Nihon kaiun to Ajia* (Tōkyō: Ochanomizu Shobō, 1996), 223.

³⁵ Katayama, *Kindai Nihon*, 218.

³⁶ Katayama, *Kindai Nihon*, 222.

³⁷ Katayama, *Kindai Nihon*, 265; Katayama Kunio, "The Expansion of Japanese Shipping into Southeast Asia before World War I: The Case of the O.S.K.," *The Great Circle* 8, no. 1 (April 1986): 5.

³⁸ Katayama, *Kindai Nihon*, 290.

³⁹ See Kubo Fumikatsu, "Taiwan Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha to 'nanpō shinshutsu' (I)," *Chūō Daigaku Kigyō Kenkyūjo Nenpō* 13 (1992): 77–106, and "Taiwan Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha to 'nanpō shinshutsu' (II)," *Chūō Daigaku Kigyō Kenkyūjo Nenpō* 14 (1994): 145–182.

as a colonial central bank, was set up explicitly to pursue national policy goals in Southeast Asia and South China.⁴⁰ To be sure, the BOT focused on Taiwan during its first decade, using its capital to finance the nascent sugar industry and public development projects, as well as the Government-General, but during this period it was also active in China, where it supported Government-General goals in a number of ways.

The most basic method the bank used to promote the Government-General's economic program was by providing exchange and trade financing to business through a network of offices in South China and Southeast Asia. BOT branches sprang up in Amoy (1900), Hong Kong (1903), Fuzhou (1905), Shantou (1907), Canton (1910), Shanghai (1911), Hankou (1915), and dozens of other places in China, mostly in the south, while it was eventually represented in over thirty locations in Southeast Asia, starting with Singapore (1912). A sense of rivalry with Japan's main foreign exchange bank, the Yokohama Specie Bank (Yokohama Shōkin Ginkō),⁴¹ and aggressive leadership by Yagyū Kazuyoshi,⁴² president from 1901 to 1916, contributed to this expansion, but the lending practices driving the BOT's rapid growth later proved disastrous.

The BOT's activities in South China also included lending to the Chinese, although these loans proved equally imprudent. As early as 1900, it had already begun negotiations, and it concluded eleven loans before the fall of the Qing in 1911.⁴³ In addition to these individual loans, the BOT also participated in various Japanese bank syndicates that used loans to try to exert influence in China during the chaotic 1910s and 1920s. The BOT tried other ways of extending economic influence into South China, too. Its branches issued their own drafts (*shiharai tegata*), for example, and the Ministry of Finance was also persuaded to let it circulate silver yen in South China. The approximately 10 million yen it pumped into circulation had little effect in such a broad region, however.⁴⁴ There was also a

⁴⁰ Taiwan Ginkō Shi Hensan Shitsu, *Taiwan Ginkō shi* (Tōkyō, 1964), 8.

⁴¹ Taiwan Ginkō Shi Hensan Shitsu, *Taiwan Ginkō shi*, 384, 395–96, 405–6; Namikata Shōichi, *Nihon shokuminchi kin'yū seisaku shi no kenkyū* (Tōkyō: Waseda Daigaku Shuppanbu, 1985), 312; Katayama Kunio, "Tokutei kenkyū 'bunka masatsu' C. Nihon no nanpō kan'yo: Intabyū kiroku—kyū Taiwan Ginkō no tokushitsu" (1979), 14.

⁴² Katayama, "Intabyū kiroku," 23.

⁴³ In addition to the eleven loans by the BOT, several other negotiations were begun but never concluded. Sunaga Noritake, "Taiwan Ginkō no Chūgoku shihon yushutsu katsudō—jiko shikin tandoku shakkan o chūshin to shite," *Tochi Seido Shigaku* 35, no. 2 (Winter 1993): 26. A comprehensive list of BOT loans to China during the Taishō and early Shōwa eras is in Taiwan Ginkō Shi Hensan Shitsu, *Taiwan Ginkō shi*, 358–63.

⁴⁴ Taiwan Ginkō Shi Hensan Shitsu, *Taiwan Ginkō shi*, 399–400.

proposal in 1912 to transform and expand the BOT from a regional bank for Taiwan based in Taihoku into an overseas bank for China.⁴⁵ This ultimately came to nought, as did the loans to China when the Chinese defaulted. The circulation of silver yen also dwindled as a result of the anti-Japanese sentiment provoked by the Twenty-One Demands and the occupation of the Shandong peninsula.⁴⁶

ECONOMIC MEASURES AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR

The First World War brought rapid growth to Taiwan as well as Japan. The sugar industry enjoyed unprecedented profits, symbolized by the 100 percent dividend issued to stockholders in 1920 by Taiwan Sugar, one of the leading sugar firms in the Japanese empire.⁴⁷ Rice riots in Japan created more demand for Taiwanese rice, ultimately leading to the development of the high yield *hōrai* strain that transformed agriculture in the 1920s. These trends bound Taiwan's economy more closely to Japan, even as they expanded Japanese trade with Southeast Asia.

Leadership in the Government-General also evolved. Sakuma's decade-long reign came to an end in 1915, and he was succeeded by a series of more activist governor-generals, Andō Sadayoshi (1915–18), Akashi Motojirō (1918–19), and Den Kenjirō (1919–23). While this represented an increase in turnover, the fact that one civil affairs chief, Shimomura Hiroshi (1915–21), served all three provided continuity. More importantly, Shimomura, a colorful figure who went on to pursue a career as a journalist and later politician, returned to the expansionist approach of Gotō Shinpei. Although Andō was preoccupied with both quelling a major armed uprising and containing peaceful Formosan demands for greater political participation stimulated by the visit to Taiwan of veteran parliamentarian Itagaki Taisuke, his administration did begin to focus attention back on external affairs. Government-General representatives were posted to Japanese consuls in South China, various cultural initiatives were stepped up, and budgetary allocations for subsidies, discussed in detail below, also began to increase.⁴⁸ It was the pair of Shimomura and Akashi, however, that, like Gotō and Kodama before them, provided the most aggressive leadership. Under Shimomura, both the methods and regional

⁴⁵ Namikata, *Nihon shokuminchi kin'yū*, 313–14.

⁴⁶ Taiwan Ginkō Shi Hensan Shitsu, *Taiwan Ginkō shi*, 401.

⁴⁷ Kubo Fumikatsu, *Shokuminchi kigyō keiei shi ron* (Tōkyō: Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha, 1997), 182.

⁴⁸ Ide Kiwata, *Taiwan chiseki shi* (Taihoku: Taiwan Nichi Nichi Shinpōsha, 1937), 590–91.

focus of the Government-General's overseas economic programs changed. The wartime trade boom solidified a shift in the focus of policy from South China to Southeast Asia that had begun earlier, and new firms were created to supplement the Government-General's existing corporate proxies. Another development was the increased use of subsidies to strictly private firms, a shift from the earlier reliance on corporations with more direct ties to the colonial government. Although there were subsequent changes in the 1920s and early 1930s, these institutions and approaches constituted the basic direction of overseas economic policy.

These new tools did not mean that all of the Government-General's existing ones were jettisoned. While the Sango Company was reducing its commitment to China and establishing a leading position in the gum business, the other major instrument of Government-General policy, the BOT, expanded so rapidly during the war that the bulk of its financing activities shifted from Taiwan to Japan and overseas. The BOT provided loans to many Japanese firms, including exporters, gum plantations, and so forth, both during the boom and after.⁴⁹ Perhaps the most famous of these was Ishihara Hiroichirō's mining company, which was started in 1920 with BOT loans,⁵⁰ and which was later one of the largest suppliers of Japanese iron ore imports. The BOT deviated from its mission in Taiwan and Southeast Asia and South China, however, to pursue profits in Japan proper during the war, so that in the early 1920s around half of its deposits and loans were concentrated there.⁵¹ While Ishihara's enterprise flourished, the BOT went down in 1927 with its main loan customer, Suzuki Trading (Suzuki Shōten). Although the BOT had managed to keep Suzuki afloat for awhile, when its deposits in Japan fell drastically, the bank could no longer finance the failing Suzuki and was so overextended that it temporarily closed as well. The bank was reorganized after its collapse, but it limped along in the 1930s and did not recover a prominent role until the Pacific War.

The collapse of prices for tropical products, anti-Japanese boycotts by Chinese at home and overseas, and the return of Western competition to Southeast Asian markets in the postwar hurt Japanese business and by extension Japanese shipping. While the OSK was able to hold on to its position in Southeast Asia during the 1920s, the 1930s brought intense competition from other Japanese companies and the Dutch. Ishihara, who had

⁴⁹ Taiwan Ginkō Shi Hensan Shitsu, *Taiwan Ginkō shi*, 411–17.

⁵⁰ Yasukichi Yasuba, "Hiroichirō Ishihara and the Stable Supply of Iron Ore," in *The Japanese in Colonial Southeast Asia*, ed. Saya Shiraishi and Takashi Shiraishi (Ithaca, N.Y.: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1993), 143–44.

⁵¹ Katō Toshihiko, *Honpō ginkō shi ron* (Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1957), 225; Watanabe Sahei and Kitahara Michitsura, eds., *Gendai Nihon sangyō hattatsu shi dai-26 kan—ginkō* (Tōkyō: Kōjunsha, 1966), 325.

begun to vertically integrate his mining operations by shipping his own ore from Malaya, triggered a shipping war in 1931 when he moved into the Java shipping trade.⁵² This had two major ramifications. First, the Japanese government arranged a merger that created a single new firm from the Java routes of several Japanese shipping companies. Then, after repeated negotiations with the Dutch, the Japanese finally reached an agreement in 1936 that allocated the shipping trade between this new Japanese firm and the Dutch. The Government-General continued to subsidize the OSK through the Pacific War, but it stopped relying on that firm for overseas routes and turned to other shipping companies.⁵³

In addition to the continued use of these existing institutions, the Government-General sponsored the formation of two new service enterprises for the *nanpō*, the Kanan Bank (Kanan ginkō) and the Southern Godown Company (Nan'yō Sōko). They were conceived as a pair that would complement the shipping provided by subsidized OSK lines, but unlike the OSK these institutions sought to harness the resources of overseas Chinese to the Government-General's expansionist aims.⁵⁴ In this respect, the participation of prominent Taiwanese was initially crucial to both companies for attracting Chinese support, and it made them distinctly colonial institutions.

Although the Kanan Bank was a postwar creation, the idea for it originated some years earlier, before the wartime boom. In 1913, a successful Taiwanese tea exporter based in Java, Guo Chunyang, proposed to set up a joint Sino-Japanese bank that would bring together the capital of overseas Chinese with Japanese capital in Taiwan to finance business in Southeast Asia.⁵⁵ In contrast to the BOT and Yokohama Specie Bank, this institution was to focus on long-term development financing. Under Akashi and Shimomura, this idea was realized. An organizational conference attended by BOT leaders, representatives from the central government ministries, and Shimomura was held in Tōkyō in 1918.⁵⁶ Guo himself went to Japan and met with Prime Minister Hara Kei the following year to pitch the proposal.⁵⁷ Having persuaded the central government, the promoters

⁵² On this economic confrontation, see Hiroshi Shimizu, "Dutch-Japanese Competition in the Shipping Trade on the Java-Japan Route in the Inter-war Period," *Tōnan Ajia kenkyū* 26, no. 1 (June 1988): 3–23.

⁵³ Katayama, *Kindai Nihon*, 239. Government-General subsidies did include money for a stopover in Jilong on the OSK's Bangkok line.

⁵⁴ For example, the initial provisional name for what became the Southern Godown Company was the Kanan Warehouse Company (Kanan Sōko); Nitta Risuke, *Nan'yō Sōko Kabushiki Kaisha jūgo nen shi* (Kobe: Nan'yō Sōko Kabushiki Kaisha, 1936), 87.

⁵⁵ Taiwan Ginkō Shi Hensan Shitsu, *Taiwan Ginkō shi*, 424. On Guo, see Yoshida Seidō, *Taiwan kokon zaikaijin no yokogao* (Taihoku: Keizai Shunjūsha, 1932), 227–32.

⁵⁶ Kanan Ginkō, "Kanan Ginkō" (1918), 4.

then recruited Lin Xiongzheng, a member of the Banqiao Lins, an old and extremely wealthy Taiwanese family with real estate and trading interests. The Lins had previously used their influence in Amoy to help the BOT set up its first overseas branch there, receiving in exchange Government-General patronage when they later moved into the sugar business in Taiwan.⁵⁸ Lin Xiongzheng and a group of BOT men toured the major cities of South China and Southeast Asia during the summer of 1918 to drum up interest in the stock offering for the new bank among prominent Chinese businessmen.⁵⁹

The Kanan Bank was launched in Taihoku early in 1919, with a capitalization of ten million yen. Lin served as its president, and ten of the twenty-two directors were Chinese. In addition to the head office in Taiwan, it eventually opened overseas branches in Burma, French Indochina, Java, Singapore, and Canton. Although the bank managed profits in the first few years, the postwar recession and anti-Japanese sentiment among overseas Chinese weakened it severely. A major reorganization that halved the bank's capitalization was implemented in 1924, but the financial crises of 1927 found it still struggling. A second reorganization, which included a 3-million-yen government bailout, the elimination of three overseas offices, and another reduction in capital, followed in 1928.⁶⁰

One consequence of this string of problems was that Chinese stock ownership and the number of Chinese directors declined.⁶¹ The departure of Chinese investors and depositors meant that the bank became increasingly dependent on Japanese and Taiwanese sources for its capital. Lending also gravitated toward Taiwan and Japan. In 1930, for example, 81 percent of the bank's available funds and 55 percent of dis-

⁵⁷ Mukōyama Hiroo, *Nihon tōchika ni okeru Taiwan minzoku undō shi* (Tōkyō: Chūō Keizai Kenkyūjo, 1987), 342.

⁵⁸ Thomas B. Gold, "Colonial Origins of Taiwanese Capitalism," in *Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan*, ed. Edwin A. Winckler and Susan Greenhalgh (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988), 110.

⁵⁹ Kanan Ginkō, "Kanan Ginkō," 5–6.

⁶⁰ Kanan Ginkō, "Kanan Ginkō," 9–10.

⁶¹ The number of Chinese directors fell from ten in 1919 to five in 1930. Interestingly, the number of Taiwanese directors and the Taiwanese proportion of stock ownership both increased.

Kanan Bank Share Ownership (%)

	Chinese	Japanese	Taiwanese	Total
1919	48,800 (49)	23,190 (23)	28,010 (28)	100,000 (100)
1930	12,503 (25)	14,825 (30)	22,672 (45)	50,000 (100)

Source: Kanan Ginkō, "Kanan Ginkō," 16.

counting and loan activity was within Japan and Taiwan.⁶² The bank did not abandon its mission to finance business in Southeast Asia, however. On the one hand, starting in 1929, it became the centerpiece of the Government-General's new strategy for supporting these overseas businesses through loan subsidies, and its activities as a source of inexpensive capital for such firms are discussed below. On the other hand, it did dispense with the idea of mobilizing the capital of overseas Chinese. In the 1930s, the bank shifted toward greater reliance on Taiwanese capital, and during the Pacific War the BOT transferred three of its branches in Taiwan to the Kanan Bank to help it in this area.⁶³ Thus the bank continued to pump money into the Government-General's interests in the *nanpō*, but relied on Taiwanese as opposed to Chinese capital.

Like the Kanan Bank, the Southern Godown Company was part of the Government-General's plan to promote and direct economic expansion southward. In 1916, the Taiwan Warehouse Company (Taiwan Sōko) was formed through the cooperation of the Government-General, the BOT, and major sugar producers, like Taiwan Sugar Company. Southern Godown, established in 1920 with a capitalization of 5 million yen, was in one sense an extension of Taiwan Warehouse, with the latter transferring its Canton facility to the new company.⁶⁴ In addition to the head office in Taiwan and the Canton office, Southern Godown also had storage facilities in Singapore, Haiphong, Saigon, Batavia (Jakarta), and several other locations around the Dutch East Indies. As with the Kanan Bank, a prominent Taiwanese, Lin Xiantang, was brought in to front for the organization and give it the appearance of a joint Sino-Japanese venture.⁶⁵ Although unrelated to Lin Xiongzhen, Lin Xiantang was also from an old and wealthy family. Lin had various commercial interests, but was most famous as a moderate Taiwanese leader, a pragmatist who sought to promote home rule in Taiwan through cooperation with the Japanese.

Southern Godown ran into the same initial problems as the Kanan Bank when the business environment turned sour in the 1920s. It was more fortunate in that it was able to find business with Ishihara when overseas Chinese failed to patronize the new firm.⁶⁶ Nevertheless, it still faced difficulties serious enough to require the company to reorganize. Ishihara Hiroichirō has written that BOT president Nakagawa Kojūrō, who had earlier provided Ishihara with the loans to get his own company started,

⁶² Kanan Ginkō, "Kanan Ginkō," 14–15.

⁶³ Taiwan Ginkō Shi Hensan Shitsu, *Taiwan Ginkō shi*, 425.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 427.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ Taiwan Ginkō Shi Hensan Shitsu, *Taiwan Ginkō shi*, 428.

approached him to help Southern Godown.⁶⁷ Ishihara agreed, and at a special meeting of stockholders in 1930 the company's capitalization was reduced, and a bunch of new directors representing Ishihara's interests were brought in.⁶⁸ Ishihara himself took a controlling interest in the company and the post of company advisor, but Lin remained as a figurehead president. The BOT also negotiated lower interest rates for the company's outstanding debts because Ishihara guaranteed them.⁶⁹ Southern Godown ceased receiving financial support from the Government-General that year, and in 1932 it moved its headquarters to Kobe, near Ishihara's base in Ōsaka. The company was successful in the 1930s, thanks to the resurgence of Japanese exports to Southeast Asia following the devaluation of the yen, and of course to Ishihara's continuing patronage. Southern Godown thus fulfilled its intended role as a service enterprise in Southeast Asia, although perhaps more as a tool of Ishihara than of the Government-General.

In addition to setting up new semi-official companies, the Government-General also developed new methods for supporting private businesses overseas more directly. From about 1900 the Government-General had provided subsidies to further its cultural and economic programs in South China. These funds went under various names and included transfers to schools and for trade promotion. The sums involved before 1914 were small, never more than 90,000 yen. Starting in that year, however, the opaque title "South China and South Seas Facilities Expenditures" (*Minami Shina oyobi Nan'yō shisetsuhi*) was introduced for this budget item. The name stuck for the next three decades, and more importantly the level of funding grew rapidly from the end of the First World War (Table 1). Tracing the flow of financial support from the Government-General to private corporations in general is difficult, and a complete picture will probably remain out of reach. It is known, for example, that initial capital for the Sango Company was taken from funds allocated to disaster relief,⁷⁰ and subsidies that went to some of the national policy and semi-official companies almost certainly found their way into private hands. A list of distributions between 1915 and 1934 does exist, however.⁷¹ This document ac-

⁶⁷ Ishihara's original connection to Nakagawa was through Ritsumeikan University, where Ishihara had studied and Nakagawa had been president; Ishihara Sangyō Kabushiki Kaisha Shashi Hensan Iinkai, *Sōgyō sanjūgo nen o kaiko shite* (Ōsaka, 1956), 71.

⁶⁸ Taiwan Ginkō Shi Hensan Shitsu, *Taiwan Ginkō shi*, 428.

⁶⁹ Taiwan Ginkō Shi Hensan Shitsu, *Taiwan Ginkō shi*, 429.

⁷⁰ Nakamura, "Taiwan sōtokufu no Kanan tetsudō kōsaku," 77.

⁷¹ Taiwan Sōtokufu, "Nettai sangyō chōsasho: Nanshi Nan'yō ni okeru hōjin kigyō no jōsei" (1935).

	(yen)		(yen)		(yen)
1900	10,000	1912	70,000	1924	900,000
1901	10,000	1913	70,000	1925	765,000
1902	10,000	1914	70,000	1926	765,000
1903	10,000	1915	120,000	1927	765,000
1904	10,000	1916	120,000	1928	765,000
1905	20,000	1917	300,000	1929	765,000
1906	90,000	1918	600,000	1930	688,500
1907	90,000	1919	750,000	1931	585,225
1908	90,000	1920	900,000	1932	550,112
1909	70,000	1921	900,000	1933	582,682
1910	70,000	1922	900,000	1934	582,682
1911	70,000	1923	900,000	1935	582,862

Table 1: Taiwan Government-General “South China and South Seas Facilities Expenditures”
(Minami Shina oyobi Nan’yō shisetsuhi)

Sources: Kondō Masami, *Sōryokusen to Taiwan* (Tōkyō: Tōsui shobō, 1996), 70. Ōkurashō Kanri Kyoku, “Nihonjin no kaigai katsudō ni kansuru rekishiteki chōsa Taiwan hen dai-roku bunsatsu no yon—furoku Taiwan tōchi gaiyō,” 551–52, and the appendix to Taiwan Sōtokufu, “Nettai sangyō chōsasho: Nanshi Nan’yō ni okeru hōjin kigyō no josei” (1935), give slightly different numbers.

Note: Before 1914 this budget item had several different names.

counts for only a portion of the total funds dispensed under the budget expenditure item; the rest of the money went to support the Government-General’s cultural and other programs in South China and Southeast Asia.

The information on grants to companies shows a number of interesting trends in the location and types of firms supported, as well as their size and number. All of these characteristics changed around 1929, and the subsidy program after the First World War can therefore be understood as divided into two periods around that date. Relatively few Japanese firms in the *nanpō* benefitted from subsidies before 1928. Just twelve received money between 1915 and 1928, although most of these obtained grants for several years. When the Government-General changed its approach in 1929 and began to subsidize companies by paying a portion of the interest on loans extended by the Kanan Bank, the number of firms involved in-

creased substantially. From about four per year between 1915 and 1928, the average number jumped to more than thirty firms annually between 1929 and 1934. The average subsidy decreased from around 15,000 to 6,000 yen as a result, despite an increase in the total value of grants handed out. The Government-General did not cease direct subsidies altogether, but most of the companies were helped through loan supports. One possible reason for the shift was that loan subsidies, which required firms to pay part of the interest and all of the principal, created more discipline than direct handouts. In any case, the colonial administration handed out literally hundreds of grants.

A variety of projects, including agriculture, general trading, lumbering, fishing, printing, and even hat making were supported across the *nanpō* in both periods, but the Government-General concentrated on certain regions and activities in each period. Excluding subsidies to the Kanan Bank and Southern Godown Company, most of the support before 1929, measured by both the number and value of grants, went to firms in the Dutch East Indies and British Borneo. These firms tended to be engaged in general agriculture and copra cultivation. In contrast, after 1928 the Government-General concentrated on the Philippines and Malaya, where the chief products were Manila hemp and gum. In the second period, ordinary trading companies and not just agricultural firms also benefitted. Another change occurred in the relative importance of the Kanan Bank and Southern Godown grants between the two periods. Before 1928, almost half of the total subsidies, more than 400,000 yen, went to Southern Godown, but as mentioned this firm received no subsidies thereafter. No grants to the Kanan Bank are listed for the first period, and a relatively small amount of money was distributed to it during the second period for research and information gathering. Thus, overall Government-General support moved away from these semi-official enterprises.

An increase in the total level of support and number of firms, a shift from semi-official to private companies, and a change in approach from indirect support through service enterprises to direct support of companies producing raw materials characterized the evolution of the Government-General subsidy program across the two periods. These patterns reflected political and economic changes in Taiwan. After Den and Shimomura, political leadership became fragmented, with five different governor-generals and four different civil administrators between 1923 and 1931. At the same time, major government funded projects, such as the enormous Kanan irrigation works and a large hydroelectric plant for the newly established Taiwan Electric Power Company (Taiwan Denryoku), ran into financial difficulties. Coupled with the BOT debacle in 1927, such factors may have contributed to the shift in emphasis away from

large, direct grants to semi-official firms and toward small grants in loan form to private firms. More generally, these difficulties raised questions within the Government-General about whether developing Taiwan itself or pushing economic expansion abroad should be given priority, but there seems to have been no attempt to resolve this problem before the 1930s.⁷²

CONCLUSION

Across several decades and using various methods and institutions, the Government-General pursued the economic integration of Taiwan and the *nanpō*. The intensity with which different administrations pursued expansion also varied; Gotō and Shimomura provided more vigorous and aggressive leadership than Sakuma and the governor-generals of the 1920s. The Government-General's corporate proxies likewise faced different obstacles and followed different trajectories. The Sango Company and Southern Godown succeeded in establishing positions in Southeast Asia, while at the same time moving away from their original patron, the Government-General. The OSK and the colonial government cooperated to drive foreign shipping out of Taiwan and challenge it in coastal China and Southeast Asia. This mutually beneficial relationship lasted until the 1930s, when competition with other shipping firms in Japan and the Dutch cut into the OSK's business. The Government-General's financial institutions, the BOT and Kanan Bank, both suffered from serious problems as a result of the postwar retrenchment in the Japanese economy and in Southeast Asian trade. While the BOT was not a factor again in Government-General expansionism until the late 1930s, the Kanan Bank overcame this obstacle, with generous official support to be sure, and became a source of financing for numerous firms in Southeast Asia.

If the methods and institutions of the Government-General varied, they still manifested several long-term trends. First, there was the general shift from South China toward Southeast Asia. This reflected the influence of

⁷² Indications can be found of Government-General support for both positions. One the one hand, Tanaka Saikichi published an article in the official magazine of the Government-General advocating the development of Taiwan. On the other hand, the Government-General's representative to a trade conference sponsored in Tōkyō by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1926 appealed to the central government to support Taiwan's economic expansion into the *nanpō*. Tanaka Saikichi, "Taiwan shokusan ginkō setsuritsu no kyūmu," *Taiwan Jihō* 87 (February 1927): 36–39; Nagaoka Shinjirō, "Kanan shisaku to Taiwan sōtokufu," in *Nihon no nanpō kan'yo to Taiwan*, ed. Nakamura, 237–38.

different forces, from the rise of Chinese nationalism to Japan's increasing demand for tropical raw materials. At bottom, Southeast Asia offered greater scope for the ambitions of the Government-General. A second theme was the move from official to private institutions. With the exception of the shipping subsidies, Meiji and Taishō era intervention was mediated through official and semi-official companies, which provided indirect support as service enterprises. During the 1920s, the limits of this strategy were exposed, and the Government-General tried to reach private enterprise directly, subsidizing producers rather than the banks and warehouses that provided them with services.

The achievements of the companies involved in the Government-General's economic program were constrained by larger economic forces. Naturally, among these were the general economic problems that afflicted the whole Japanese empire in the aftermath of the First World War and again in the late 1920s. More specifically, however, the colonial government's domestic and overseas economic programs were in a fundamental sense at odds with each other. The success of the Government-General's domestic economic policy created a trade pattern that increasingly bound Taiwan to Japan. This was just the typical complementarity of colonial trade, with raw materials flowing to Japan and finished goods to Taiwan. In attempting to move in the opposite direction away from Japan, the Government-General's overseas program tried to integrate Taiwan with a region consisting mostly of other colonies producing some of the same raw materials.

There was little complementarity and therefore little trade. If Taiwan had been the lowest cost producer of rice and sugar it might have been able to export these products to the *nanpō*, but it could not compete with rice from Indochina, for example, and the very existence of the Taiwanese sugar industry depended on tariff walls protecting it from Javanese sugar. While total trade between Taiwan and China between 1900 and 1913 was a little less than half the size of trade with Japan, that fraction dropped to about one-sixth for the period 1914 to 1935.⁷³ Of course these figures reflect Taiwan's total China trade and thus are an overestimate of trade with South China. The trade with Southeast Asia was just 4 percent of the level of trade with Japan between 1900 and 1913, falling to 3 percent between 1914 and 1935. The absolute value of Taiwan's Southeast Asia trade did increase, peaking at 17 million yen for combined exports and imports in 1920, but this must be measured against trade with Japan on the order of 300 million yen. One consequence of this lack of complementarity was that the Government-General's efforts frequently resulted in stronger ties

⁷³ Trade figures calculated from data in Taiwan sheng xingzheng zhangguan gongshu tongji shih, ed., *Taiwan sheng wushiyi nian lai tongji tiyao* (1946), 962–63, 966–67.

between the *nanpō* and Japan rather than the *nanpō* and Taiwan. The gravitation of Southern Godown toward Ishihara and the tendency of the subsidized smaller private firms in Southeast Asia to send their output to Japan rather than Taiwan for processing can be understood in this context.

This fundamental constraint on Taiwan's economic relationship to the *nanpō* only began to change in the mid-1930s. At that point, the Government-General adopted a policy of industrialization for the island that emphasized the processing of raw materials from China and Southeast Asia in Taiwan, powered by newly constructed hydroelectric capacity at Sun-Moon Lake. The goal was to transform Taiwan from its position as the colonial periphery of the Japanese metropole into its own industrial metropole drawing raw materials from the *nanpō*. Two events in 1936 marked the inauguration of this strategy. The Japan Aluminum Company (Nihon Aruminiumu) began manufacturing aluminum with bauxite from the Dutch East Indies in Takao at the end of year. More importantly, 1936 saw the formation of the Taiwan Development Company. As a national policy company, it attempted, among other things, to secure the overseas resources necessary for industrialization in Taiwan. Both companies enlarged their operations through the Pacific War, and the Taiwan Development Company in particular grew to become the defining economic institution of the final decade of colonialism in Taiwan, with projects stretching from Indochina to the Philippines, and from South China to Java. While Japanese military priorities closed down the possibility of the kind of sub-imperial sphere sought by the Government-General, recent trends in Taiwanese economic ties with South China and President Lee Teng-hui's "'Go South'"⁷⁴ initiative for investment in Southeast Asia suggest that the relationship of these regions to Taiwan's development has not lost any of its relevance.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ This policy was originally referred to as the "southern advance policy" (*nanjin zhengce*) and used the same characters as the prewar Japanese term (*nanshin seisaku*), but it was later changed to "southern policy" (*nanfang zhengce*) to avoid any association with Japanese imperialism. See Tu Zhaoyan, *Taiwan kara Ajia no subete ga mieru* (Tōkyō: Jiji Tsūshinsha, 1995), 144.

⁷⁵ On Taiwanese investment in Southeast Asia, see Xiangming Chen, "Taiwan Investments in China and Southeast Asia," *Asian Survey* 36, no. 5 (May 1996): 447–67.

IV.
THE POSTWAR LEGACY
OF THE JAPANESE EMPIRE

RESURRECTING THE EMPIRE? JAPANESE TECHNICIANS IN POSTWAR CHINA, 1945–49¹

Daqing YANG

“Trust is needed when you make use of the Japanese ... When they are trusted, the Japanese people work with devotion, even at the risk of their lives. This is their character.”² These words were not taken from a book on Japanese culture, but were addressed to the Chinese Nationalist government in late 1945 by Nishikawa Akitsugu, Toyoda’s general manager in China. These were truly remarkable words when one considers the fact that such a call for trust was made shortly after the long and bloody war that cost tens of millions of Chinese lives as a result of the Japanese invasion. It would be premature, however, to dismiss these words as simply wishful thinking on the part of one Japanese businessman. Nishikawa was but one of the tens of thousands of Japanese who actually spent their early postwar years in China to provide technical assistance.

This study hopes to shed light on the activities of Japanese technicians in postwar China in the context of both international politics and economic development. While keeping the picture of entire China, I shall focus on those Japanese civilians belonging to the Toyoda textile enterprise in Shanghai in order to highlight the prospects and limits of the proposed technical cooperation. In doing so, this study seeks to fill a gap in the history of Japan’s relations with Asia in the postwar period, which, in most standard accounts, begins with the Peace Treaty negotiations or the communist victory in mainland China.³ A reader is given the impression that the several millions Japanese soldiers and civilians in the Asia Pacific region simply all packed up and went home without a trace. That many Jap-

¹ The author gratefully acknowledges the generous support from the Yokohama Association for Overseas Exchange and the Japan International Cultural Exchange Foundation. Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at the Ikei (Masaru) Seminar at Keiō University, fall 1994, and at the 40th International Conference of Eastern Studies held in Tōkyō, May 1995.

² Untitled memo by Nishikawa Akitsugu (November 1945), China Textile Machine Makers Co. Papers, Q192–23, The Shanghai Municipal Archives, China. (Hereafter CTMM Papers.)

³ For example, Tanaka Akihiko, *Nitchū kankei, 1945–1990* (Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1991), and Soeya Yoshihide, *Nihon gaikō to Chūgoku, 1945–1972* (Tōkyō: Keiō Tsūshin, 1995).

anese remained in the former imperial outskirts (*gaichi*) after the collapse⁴ of the empire is not only little known, but its impact also hardly assessed. The only English-language study on the subject of Japanese staying on in China, described the involvement of Japanese military personnel in the Chinese Civil War in detail, but dismissed any significant role of the civilians. The Chinese Nationalists failed to make “anything even approaching adequate use of Japanese civilians in China,” we are told, because they were “completely dominated by narrow-minded professional soldiers” and its foremost civilian leader, T.V. Soong⁵ often considered anti-Japanese, “declined to make use of the Japanese.” As this study hopes to demonstrate, although the actual cooperation probably failed to accomplish its political objectives, the influence of these Japanese technicians should be regarded as an important, if unintended, legacy of the Japanese empire.

POLITICS

Japanese Initiatives

Within days after the announcement of Japan’s surrender in August 1945, General Okamura Yasuji, commander-in-chief of the Japanese army in China and a leading China expert in the army, began formulating Japan’s postwar policy toward China. Although he had vehemently objected to surrendering the “one million and fifty thousand unbeaten Imperial Army,” he finally came to accept the reality of Japan’s defeat. After consulting with Ogura Masatsune, a well-known businessman from the Sumitomo concern then serving as the supreme economic advisor to the Nanjing regime, Okamura took the unusual step to draft by himself what became known as the “Outline of Postwar Settlement with China.” Recognizing

⁴ A search on the Diet Library CD-ROM under the subject of “repatriation” (*hikiage*) turned up over 200 Japanese books acquired by the library since 1948. For a general study written by a historian of migration, see Wakatsuki Yasuo, *Sengo hikiage no kiroku* (Tōkyō: Jiji Tsūshinsha, 1991).

⁵ Donald G. Gillin and Charles Etter, “Staying On: Japanese Soldiers and Civilians in China, 1945–1949,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 42, no. 3 (1983): 497–518. See also unpublished papers by E. Bruce Reynolds, “A Thwarted Strategy: The United States and Japan’s Plans for Postwar China” (seminar paper, University of Hawaii-Manoa, n.d.), and David Reuther, “Repatriation of Japanese Troops and Civilians From China, 1945–1946,” (seminar paper, The George Washington University, 1996). The latter two studies focused on Japanese intentions and American response, relying mostly on declassified U.S. government sources, including the important MAGIC documents—intercepted Japanese diplomatic correspondence.

that China would become the sole remaining power of East Asia, Okamura concluded that "Japan should contribute to the future restoration of the empire and the reconstruction of East Asia by clearing up the misunderstanding between itself and China and by helping strengthen China wherever possible."⁶ Adopted at the military and political affairs liaison conference in Nanjing, the Outline was sent to all Japanese consulates in China by the embassy on 21 August and forwarded to Tokyo.

Improvement of relations with China was by no means a new theme in Japan's Asian policy. As the war turned against Japan in the Pacific, Asian solidarity found new endorsement among Japanese leaders. Not surprisingly, this latest call following Japan's surrender was echoed in Tokyo. In a dispatch to Nanjing, Shigemitsu Mamoru, the new foreign minister of Japan and a long-time advocate of Sino-Japanese cooperation, agreed that Japan "will henceforth strive to foster the basis for a Japanese-Chinese coalition." "Before we can even hope to achieve this end," he further elaborated in the telegram, "we shall have to carefully lay the groundwork by using every possible approach open to us."⁸ Sino-Japanese cooperation apparently became one of Japan's objectives immediately after the war.

As a method to forge a cooperative relationship between Japan and postwar China, Okamura's Outline recommended that "we shall dispatch Japanese technical experts to China on a large scale; and, in particular, we will develop widely in China those branches of industry (prohibited) in Japan as well as mining and agricultural techniques."⁹ In Okamura's view, now that Japan was defeated in war, the "only way it could provide assistance was through technology and experience."¹⁰ To government leaders of Japan, therefore, technical assistance to postwar China was to

⁶ "Wahei chokugo no tai-Shi shori yōkō" (18 August 1945), reprinted in *Senryō shiroku 2: Teisen to gaikōken teishi*, ed. Etō Jun (Tōkyō: Kōdansha, 1989), 148–51. See also Okamura's diary on 16 August, in *Okamura Yasuji taishō shiryō 1* (Tōkyō: Hara Shobō, 1970), 34. Now that China had replaced Japan to accomplish the "liberation of East Asia," Okamura wrote, "Japan must assist China to become strong and prosperous."

⁷ In addition to Akira Iriye's seminal works in English, *Power and Culture* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), the latest research in Japanese can be found in Hatano Sumio, *Taiheiyō sensō to Ajia gaikō* (Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1996).

⁸ "Sino-Japanese Relations: Japan's China Policy" (Publication of Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section, Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, 2 October 1945), 19–20, Record Group 457, SRH-093, U.S. National Archives. This was largely based on English translations of ULTRA intercepts of Japanese diplomatic correspondence.

⁹ "Wahei chokugo," 150; "Sino-Japanese Relations," 7–8.

¹⁰ When Nishikawa visited Okamura in Shanghai in April 1948, as the latter recorded in his diary, they agreed completely on policies toward postwar China. *Okamura Yasuji taishō shiryō*, 21, 177.

take on political significance. Namely, it would become a means to maintain and to strengthen Japan's influence in that country after Japan had failed in its military endeavor. Technical assistance to postwar China was also seen as an economic incentive for Japan. Given the dire socioeconomic condition in Japan, some argued, employment of Japanese technicians to China would help alleviate unemployment pressure at home. As one Foreign Ministry official noted in an internal memo, due to the removal of many industrial facilities for reparation as well as the large-scale repatriation of Japanese from overseas, considerable unemployment among Japanese technicians would be expected. Therefore, he concluded, "Japan should consider how to make use of them [technicians], especially in places long under Japanese administration, such as Taiwan and Kwantung provinces [i.e. southern Manchuria]."¹¹

In the fall of 1945, Nishikawa Akitsugu of Toyoda submitted a long letter to T.V. Soong, premier of the Chinese Nationalist government. The letter is worth quoting in some length, as it spelt out the vision of technology as the medium of Sino-Japanese cooperation:

It is unfortunate that China and Japan had resorted to war, but since the war has ended this way, we are now friendly neighbors. However, Japan has benefited much from the elder [*senpai*] China, and has developed by learning much in fields of culture, Buddhism, moral teachings, and business. From now on, since the war has ended, we must consider ways of repaying the debt of gratitude. What we are capable of doing is to serve China and its people through the textile technology, namely, to teach the Chinese people the technology of automatic looms invented by our late (founder) Toyoda Sakichi ... This is because I believe that, by transplanting Toyoda's textile technology to a revitalized China, we can start friendly relations between the two peoples and open the path to coexistence and coprosperity."¹²

Nishikawa Akitsugu first came to Shanghai in 1919, accompanying inventor and founder of the company, Toyoda Sakichi, to assess the China market and to acquire the land for new Toyoda mills. By the end of the Second World War, Nishikawa had been Toyoda's top manager for its China operations for nearly three decades, almost his entire adult years. Likewise, many other senior management or technical personnel had been in China

¹¹ "Nik-Ka kankei seijōka ni kanrenseru shomondai oyobi kokkō shūfuku ni itaru katoki ni okeru enjō yōsei jikō" (April 1946), 23, A 0122 6-2, Postwar Records, The Diplomatic Record Office, Japan. (Hereafter Postwar Records.)

¹² Nishikawa Tatsuo, ed., *Nishikawa Akitsugu no omoide* (Nagoya: n.p., 1964), 61-62.

over twenty years. Like many Japanese long involved with China, Nishikawa viewed the eight-year war between the two countries only as an aberration to a longer history of peaceful Sino-Japanese exchanges. His confidence in the superiority of Toyoda technology was certainly not affected by Japan's defeat in the war. In another letter, he reminded the Chinese that, having been in Shanghai throughout the war, the Toyoda technicians would be an invaluable¹³ asset to the Nationalists returning from inland China after eight years.

Although there was no evidence that Nishikawa was acting under the orders of the Japanese government, it was noteworthy that Horiuchi Tateki, Japan's minister in China since 1942, played the role of a facilitator. In fact, Nishikawa later recalled that he first learned about the possibility of remaining in China from Horiuchi, who in turn had been instructed to remain¹⁴ in China "to deal with the necessary affairs under the new situation." Almost certainly a participant of the liaison meeting in Nanjing in August that approved the Outline, it is therefore more than just a coincidence that Horiuchi's views closely resembled the aforementioned Outline.¹⁵ A career diplomat with thirty years of service in China, Horiuchi himself had been a proponent of Sino-Japanese cooperation. As Horiuchi saw it, the future industrial recovery of Japan depended on both a steady supply of raw material and foodstuff as well as a huge market. Since China possessed both, assistance to China in the form of Japanese equipment and skills was an indirect form of contribution to Japan's own recovery.¹⁶ Together with Nishikawa's letter, Horiuchi wrote on his own to the Chinese government to recommend Toyoda's technology.

Nishikawa's faith in Japanese technology was shared by Takasaki Tatsunosuke, former president of the Manchurian Heavy Industry Co., who was to be in charge of all remaining Japanese in entire northeast China. In appealing to his fellow Japanese, however, Takasaki downplayed the role of politics:

We are neither politicians nor military men. We came to Manchuria as businessmen and developed industries here. However, as a result of the war most of the facilities were taken away by the Soviet troops. It feels just like our own child being taken away from us. How can we abandon these enterprises in Manchuria and go home? Why don't we

¹³ Untitled memo by Nishikawa (November 1945), CTMM Papers.

¹⁴ Ambassador (Tani) to Foreign Minister (Shigemitsu) (26 August 1945), in *Senryō shiroku*, 165–67.

¹⁵ Horiuchi allegedly in turn read it in the newspaper. See his speech at a dinner in honor of Japanese technicians (4 May 1947), CTMM Papers.

¹⁶ Horiuchi Tateki, *Chūgoku no arashi no naka de* (Tōkyō: Kangensha, 1950), 96–97.

help restore these half-damaged enterprises and then leave? This is the duty of us technicians.

Chinese Policies

Toyoda's offer of technical assistance was welcomed by the Chinese leaders. In the early spring of 1946, T.V. Soong met with Nishikawa in Shanghai, with Horiuchi Tateki present. Expressing interest in Nishikawa's suggestions, Soong urged him to make a detailed proposal as soon as possible.

Despite his alleged anti-Japanese stance, Soong's attitude came as no surprise. During the meeting just mentioned, Soong was said to have confided in Horiuchi about his disappointment with both the Soviet Union and the United States, which had concluded the Yalta Agreement behind China's back.¹⁷ At the time of Japan's surrender, the Nationalist Government in Chongqing was already considering "drafting Japanese POWs in China so as to expedite recovery of the industry, mining, and transportation in the occupied areas."¹⁸ These areas, including Manchuria, Peiping-Tianjin area and lower Yangtze area, and Taiwan, boasted the bulk of China's modern economy. As soon as the Nationalists returned, the government confiscated all Japanese-owned enterprises. Although some of them were later auctioned off to private Chinese businesses, operation of many industrial enterprises remained a government responsibility. One official reported from Nanjing that those sent from Chongqing to take over Japanese facilities "know nothing about the political and economic situations in the occupied area and do not know how to proceed."²⁰ Convinced that it desperately needed Japanese expertise in China's postwar reconstruction, the government promulgated "Temporary Regulations Concerning the Use of Japanese Personnel in China" in late 1945. According to it, Japanese with expertise which China currently lacked, or whose departure would interrupt regular work or transfer operations, might be retained by the Chinese government. All retained Japanese must sign pledges that they would obey Chinese laws as well as their Chinese superiors. Before

¹⁷ Takasaki Tatsunosuke, *Manshū no shūen* (Tōkyō: Jitsugyō no Nihonsha, 1953), 305.

¹⁸ Okada Akira, *Hong Kong* (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shinshō, 1985), 51–52. The author was Horiuchi's interpreter.

¹⁹ "Chuli Riben wenti jianshu" (Discussed at the Supreme National Defense Committee on 12 August 1945), *Zhonghua Minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian: Dui-Ri kangzhan shiqi* Series 7, Vol. 4 (Taipei: Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Dangshi Weiyuanhui, 1981), 639.

²⁰ Shao Yuling to Chiang Kai-shek (22 September 1945), *Zhonghua Minguo*, 31–32.

conclusion of a peace treaty²¹ with Japan, these retained Japanese would be paid only living expenses.

Soong's interest in Nishikawa's suggestion also reflected the fact that the recovery of the textile industry, was arguably the most important industry for China, was high on the government agenda. The numerous Japanese textile mills confiscated by the Chinese government became the single largest conglomerate of China's postwar textile industry—The China Textile Reconstruction Corporation (CTRC). The Toyoda mill, long regarded as a "model mill" because of its cutting-edge technology, was the first among all Japanese mills to resume production after the war.²² As an important component, textile machinery manufacturing in China was now considered a "national policy." The China Textile Machinery Maker (CTMM), capitalized at 6 billion yuan, was set up to repair and manufacture the much-needed machinery. Private businesses supplied 60 percent of the capital, while the remaining 40 percent came from the government in the form of the Toyota Auto Factory and another Japanese-owned textile machinery factory.

Not all Chinese were in favor of retaining Japanese technicians, to be sure. To some it was a humiliation having to rely on technicians from a defeated country; others also suspected that those Japanese who chose to remain in China harbored designs of economic aggression. Indeed, the Nationalist government had to walk a fine line and to avoid being too close to the Japanese. Though preoccupied with economic and military matters, they were not entirely oblivious to the political implication of Japanese technical assistance for postwar Sino-Japanese relations. Perhaps as a tactic of persuasion, the Chinese director told Japanese technicians in the northeast China that:

We will not treat retained (technicians) as belonging to a defeated country. We do not create inequality between Japanese and Chinese. You are chosen to carry out Sino-Japanese cooperation which is currently receiving worldwide attention ... No amount of diplomatic pleasantries can come close to such cooperation. By taking a firm first step, we can²⁴ settle the past and build the foundation of Sino-Japanese relations.

²¹ "Zhongguo jinnei Riji yuangong zhanxin zhengyong tongze," in *Ziyuan weiyuanhui dang'an shiliao huibian*—*Guangfu chuqi Taiwan jinji jianshe*, comp. Xue Yueshun, vol. 1 (Xingdian, Taiwan: Guoshiguan, 1993), 14.

²² Chen Shouzhi, "Zhongfang gongsi jieguan de Rizi mianfangchang ziliao," *Zhongguo jindai fangzhi shi yanjiu ziliao huibian* 9 (September 1990): 46.

²³ Incidentally, Soong himself also had invested heavily in the textile industry. *Rongjia qiye shiliao* (Shanghai: Shanghai Shehuikexueyuan Chubanshe, 1983) II.

²⁴ Hirajima Toshio, *Rakudo kara naraku e* (Tōkyō: Kōdansha, 1972), 244.

American Responses

It did not take long for American policymakers to establish a linkage between the Japanese remaining in China and a potential resurgence of Japanese influence in its former empire. Continued monitoring and interception of Japanese diplomatic communication provided a steady flow of damaging evidence. In beginning of October, the Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section of Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations issued a confidential study titled "Sino-Japanese Relations: Japan's China Policy," in which the above-mentioned Outline and other secret Japanese correspondence were extensively quoted.²⁵ Although the Americans accepted the right of theater commanders to retain Japanese soldiers at their discretion, they soon became concerned that not only soldiers but also large numbers of civilian technicians were retained in China. In late 1945, the Far Eastern subcommittee of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) proposed that the U.S. reiterate support for including Japanese civilians in the repatriation. It warned that

it must be realized that any Japanese civilians remaining in China will be secretly striving for a resurgence of Japanese power and influence in the Pacific area to the exclusion of Western powers and will therefore directly jeopardize American interests in China. The danger is already apparent in the acquiescence by the Chinese Government to the retention of Japanese "technicians" in positions which they held during the war.

The SWNCC paper went on to cite reports of 400 such "technicians" working in the Chinese government agencies and thousands more employed in government bureaus, railroad transportation,²⁶ factories, and communication companies in the Shanghai area alone. Such suspicion was corroborated by reports from Americans in China. "We have reasons to believe, and evidence to show," pointed out a ranking American officer in China in early 1946, "that the Japanese have begun a long-range program in China designed to pit Orientals against Occidentals. Their new idea is to grow fraternal with the Chinese and turn our Allies against us."²⁷

²⁵ "Sino-Japanese Relations".

²⁶ Appendix "B" of SWNCC 258 (1 February 1946) "Repatriation of Civilian Japanese from China," in Congressional Information Service, *Occupation of Japan* (microfilm published by the Congressional Information Service and Maruzen Co., 1989).

²⁷ Quoted in Gillin and Etter, "Staying On," 508.

Such American concern was not only real, but served as the basis for U.S. policy for timely repatriation of *all* Japanese from China. During his visit to China, General Wedemyer told General Ho Yingting at their meeting in Nanjing in October 1945 that all Japanese in China should be repatriated by June 1946, with the exception of Taiwan, where some Japanese technicians were allowed to stay till January 1947. This policy, however, encountered resistance from the Chinese Nationalist government.

Opposition to the complete repatriation of Japanese technicians from Chinese government was understandable, especially from the standpoint of those responsible for industrial recovery programs. A report from Taiwan in March 1946 stated that the allocated quota of 1,000 Japanese technicians was far from sufficient for the various industries, and at least another 5,000 would be needed for at least five months. The report described the consequence of drastically reducing Japanese technicians in alarming terms: most manufacturing would stop and equipment would be stolen. "With reduced production," the report went on, "unemployment would increase and security deteriorate, perhaps even leading to riots."²⁸ As a result, the Nanjing government decided to allow temporary retention of 7,000 technicians and 28,000 thousand dependents in Taiwan alone.²⁹ As the National Resource Commission reiterated to General Ho Yingting a month later, retained Japanese technicians were indispensable to ensure continued operation of many factories and mining facilities. As if to ward off American concerns, it testified that over the months these Japanese "have been able to obey orders and work strenuously," and it was still necessary to utilize Japanese technology in this period of postwar reconstruction, as long as it did not harm the [China's] national interest.³⁰

Although America's position softened somewhat on the issue of remaining Japanese technicians in China, accepting the usefulness of Japanese technical expertise to China's postwar reconstruction, it nonetheless urged the Chinese government to retain only those Japanese whose presence was required on grounds of professional or technical abilities. At the same time, they had to demonstrate by their past records that they did not represent any threat to the peace and security of China and were not likely

²⁸ Ministry of Economy to National Resource Commission, quoting a report by Special Representative Bao Yonghe in March 1946, reproduced in *Ziyuan weiyuanhui*, 2.

²⁹ Minutes of the second meeting on retained Japanese (21 March 1946), in *Zhengfu jieshou Taiwan shiliao huibian* (Xindian, Taiwan: Guoshiguan, 1990), 609–10.

³⁰ National Resource Commission to Commander Ho (April 1946), 2(1)/8837, The Executive Yuan Papers, The Second Historical Archives, China. (Hereafter as Executive Yuan Papers).

to serve as an entering wedge for the resurgence of Japanese influence on the Continent.³¹

Given the persistent pressure from the United States, the Chinese government made further concessions. In June 1946 the Chinese notified the American government that it would retain some 12,000 Japanese in China proper, excluding Taiwan and Manchuria. On 21 October 1946, an inter-ministerial meeting was held at the Department of Defense to address the matter of Japanese technicians in China. As various ministries that employed Japanese technicians voiced the desire to continue such employment, the Foreign Ministry reminded them that due to prior agreement with the American government, the total number of Japanese technicians should be kept at no more than 12,000 and only on a temporary basis. The meeting did not produce new policies, but concluded that employment of Japanese technicians should be made on a voluntary basis and their reimbursement should be brought to the same level as the Chinese.³²

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Technicians

The total number of Japanese technicians and skilled workers in China immediately after the war is difficult to ascertain. American records show that at the end of 1946, after nearly three million Japanese had been repatriated from China, slightly over 90,000 Japanese still remained in the country (including Taiwan and Manchuria). Needless to say, not all of them were technicians or skilled workers, since many were dependents. There were also a significant number of military personnel. A nationwide survey by the Nationalist government around the same time put the number of Japanese technicians at slightly over 14,000.³³ This survey was by no means inclusive, however, since many local authorities either failed to report or gave the smaller figure. Moreover,³⁴ it did not include those Japanese in areas under communist control. (See Appendix. Japanese Technicians in Postwar China [December 1946])

³¹ Enclosure in SWNCC 258/5 (revised 25 June 1946) in *Occupation of Japan* microfilm.

³² "Guofangbu zhaokai zhengyong Riji jishu ren yuan taolunhui jilu" (21 October 1946), 2(1)/8838; see also Minister of Defense Bai to Premier Song (12 November 1946), 2(1)/8837, Executive Yuan Papers.

³³ See Appendix in Reuther, "Reparation of Japanese," 2.

³⁴ Despite their rhetoric condemning the collusion between the Nationalists and Japanese militarists, the Chinese communists regarded the capture of some 100 Japanese technicians when the communist troops took the Anshan coal mine as

In terms of geographical distribution, the largest concentration of Japanese technicians were found in northeastern China, which was on its way to become a major industrial base during the fourteen years under Japanese control. Over 10,000 Japanese technical personnel, together with some 33,000 dependents,³⁵ remained in that region after the first wave of repatriation in 1946. Nearly 1,000 Japanese worked on the railway alone. All of the Japanese technicians were organized under a special office (*Riji lianluo chu*), set up in May 1946 by the Chinese Nationalists within the overall liaison office. Headed by Hirayama Fukujirō, a high official from the South Manchurian Railway Company (SMR), it had branch offices in several cities.³⁶ A large number of Japanese were also retained in Taiwan, which had been ruled by Japan as a colony for over half a century. Within China proper, Shanghai saw the highest number of Japanese technicians because of its status as the largest commercial city, followed by other major cities like Peiping and Hankow, as well as such industrial centers like Datong and railway nexus like Xuzhou.³⁷

Those who did stay behind had different reasons. Many had lived in China for decades and were optimistic for its future. Some considered their service as a form of reparation for Japan's invasion of China. Especially during the early period, many Japanese were not particularly eager to return to their devastated homeland and preferred the relatively good pay as promised by the Chinese government. A significant portion of these Japanese perhaps stayed in China against their will, although the actual use of force on the Chinese part was rare. Many simply resigned to the reality that Japan had to pay for its defeat, and some accepted to stay so that hundreds of thousands of other Japanese could be swiftly repatriated. No doubt, efforts of persuasion by the Chinese as well as by Japa-

"a cause for celebration." See Hirajima, *Rakudo kara*, 170. For experiences of Japanese technicians retained by the Chinese communists, some of whom remained till 1954, see also Marusawa Tsuneya, *Shin Chūgoku kensetsu to Mantetsu Chūō Shikenjo* (Tōkyō: Nigatsusha, 1979); Hirota Kōzō, *Mantetsu no shūen to sono go* (Tōkyō: Seigensha, 1990). Official histories include *Man-Mō shūsenshi*, 708–22; Kan Hiroshi et al., "Chūkyō chiku no kinkyō," (September 1949), in *Zoku-Hikiage engo no kiroku*, comp. Kōseishō Hikiage Engokyoku (Tōkyō: n.p., 1955), 55–58; Kaneko Hakase, "Darian chiku kara no hikiage ni kasuru mondai ni tsuite," and "Manshū chiku sanryūsha no ippan jōkyō." See also Wakatsuki, *Sengo hikiage*, 194–95.

³⁵ Wakatsuki, *Sengo hikiage*, 193.

³⁶ Hirajima, *Rakudo kara*, 225.

³⁷ "Quanguo ge diqu jieguan gongchang zhengyong Riji jishu ren yuan renshu ji jishu zhongrei tongjibiao" (December 1946), 2(2)/2868, Executive Yuan Papers.

nese like Horiuchi and Takazaki changed many minds among those who had wanted to leave.³⁸

What is relatively clear is that the tens of thousands of Japanese were employed in China in a wide range of fields, ranging from manufacturing, railway, mining, to hospitals, schools, and even government agencies. In other words, what is generally grouped together as technicians—*jishu rennyuan* in Chinese, *gijutsusha* in Japanese—in fact consisted of different professions. While nearly a quarter of all Japanese technicians in early postwar China worked in factories, many were administrators or economists. Their functions also varied considerably. Many Japanese stayed on to manage the transition from Japanese to Chinese (in Manchuria and for a brief period, Soviet) control. Some were retained simply because there was a lack of skilled persons in such fields as medicine. Although small in total number, Japanese medical personnel was most widely distributed and found in all parts of China. Some Japanese worked in liaison offices that coordinated activities of the remaining Japanese with the Chinese authorities, others taught in schools, as not a few Japanese families had children of school age. Finally, a number of Japanese stayed on to conduct research, to teach and pass on their knowledge to the Chinese.

Anatomy of Assistance

To better understand the activities of retained Japanese technicians, it is helpful to go beyond generalizations and examine Toyoda's engineers headed by Nishikawa Akitsugu in Shanghai.³⁹ Between April and June of 1946, Nishikawa, who had been selected to head the Association of Japanese Technicians in Shanghai, held a series of frequent meetings—over sixty in all—with the new Chinese president of the CTMM. After some initial discussion, Nishikawa and seventeen other Japanese technicians from Toyoda agreed to stay on to work for the newly founded CTMM. In August 1946, CTMM was formally granted permission from the Chinese Defense Ministry to employ these Japanese technicians.⁴⁰

³⁸ Hirota, *Mantetsu no shūen*, 182–84; Wakatsuki, *Sengo hikiage*, 193; Hirajima, *Rakudo kara*, 225–26; Horiuchi, *Chūgoku no arashi*, 205–6; Marusawa, *Shin Chūgoku*, 55–56. A number of publications in Japan used the term “forced” (*kyōsei*) to describe some circumstances, but in general, they tend to make a clear distinction between those taken to Siberia by the Soviet Union and those who stayed in China. Mantetsukai, *Mantetsu shain shūsen roku* (Tōkyō: Mantetsukai, 1997), 660.

³⁹ For a more detailed discussion, see Daqing Yang, “Technical Cooperation and Postwar Sino-Japanese Cooperation: Toyoda in China, 1945–1949,” *Transactions of the International Conference on Eastern Studies* No. XL (1995): 132–41.

One of the major problems facing CTMM was the fact that textile machinery in Chinese mills came from different countries and makers, thus following different standards. The lack of a common standard posed difficulty in repairs and maintenance. The CTMM would therefore begin with repairs and changes of the huge variety of spindles in Chinese mills, which were to be based on Toyoda's High Draft Alfa, or the so-called Japan Standard type. Then it would manufacture automatic looms as well as automatic parts. CTMM's ultimate goal was to produce an entire set of textile machinery including spinning equipment.

The production of Toyoda automatic looms in China had already been planned when the Toyoda machinery factory was set up in Shanghai in 1942. The looms were abandoned, however, in favor of hand grenades and other light ammunition due to the pressing demand of the war.⁴⁰ Although CTMM was to use the designs and equipment from former Japanese factories in Shanghai and employ the remaining technicians, for Nishikawa, cooperation from Toyoda in Japan was essential to the production of Toyoda automatic looms in China. Nishikawa's plan was to request Toyoda in Japan to make key parts of the looms and send machine tools as well as some 100 technicians to Shanghai. As a veteran manager and lieutenant of the venerable Sakichi, Nishikawa had a certain amount of confidence in securing the deal. In mid-1946, Lu Chen, a Chinese engineer with many years of experience in the textile machinery industry, was dispatched to Japan ostensibly to work on reparations matters in the Chinese Delegation in Tokyo. In fact, he was to deal with Toyoda directly on issues relating to textile machinery production in China.

The cooperation between Toyoda and the Chinese envisioned by Nishikawa was soon encountering several obstacles. First, there were considerable differences between Nishikawa and his colleagues in Shanghai on the one hand and Toyoda's leadership in Japan on the other, a fact that was only exacerbated by the difficulty in communication between the two groups throughout the period.⁴² The Toyoda patent was one central issue under contention. From the very beginning, Nishikawa had indicated "Toyoda's willingness to contribute its high draft patent," which was "based on the hope that it will be immediately put to use in China." Since it is patented in Japan, he pointed out, its production in China will bring much profit to

⁴⁰ Minister of Defense (Bai) to CTMM (24 August 1946), CTMM Papers. Altogether, twenty-two Japanese employees requested monthly stipends for their families or relatives in Japan, ranging from 500 to 3,000 yen.

⁴¹ Toyoda Jidō Shokki Seisakusho Shashi Henshū Iinkai, *Toyoda Jidō Shokki Seisakusho Yonjūnenshi* (Nagoya: n.p., 1967), 278.

⁴² The correspondences, it appears, had all gone through Chinese eyes before they reached the other party, if at all.

keep CTMM in operation.⁴³ Upon hearing of similar attempts by other factories in China to make Toyoda high draft spindles, Nishikawa and his Japanese colleagues proposed “resorting to legal measures to ensure CTMM’s monopoly in using the Toyoda patent”.⁴⁴ He told the Chinese that “J-Alfa [spindle] is patented in Japan, and nobody is allowed to copy it. Our company received the patent and changed it to C.S.(Chinese Standard).” Although he was concerned that other domestic and foreign makers would also rush to follow suit, and consequently give Toyoda headquarters headaches, Nishikawa⁴⁵ nonetheless considered CTMM as the legitimate recipient of patent rights. On the other hand, the Toyoda leadership in Japan viewed the matter quite differently. Due to the changing conditions inside Japan, the company was undergoing reorganization and was to resume production soon under SCAP orders in 1946. Production of the best-selling automatic looms in China, let alone unconditioned use of its patented technology, was clearly not in the company’s interest.

In addition to the resistance from Toyoda in Japan, CTMM also faced a number of problems at home. Some were economic: spiraling inflation and a shortage of funds were causing production to be postponed several times. Low efficiency made things worse. In the meantime, this was not cooperation between equal partners. One could not ignore the fact that after the Japanese accepted defeat in China, public sentiment toward Japanese citizens was still largely negative, not without reason. The relationship between Japanese technicians and their Chinese counterparts were not always smooth. But it needs to be pointed out that Chinese leaders as well as top managers of CTMM treated the Japanese technicians with utmost courtesy. Nishikawa, on the other hand, was free to criticize as well as to advise. The relationship was thus far from that of one between the victorious and the defeated. In their discussions, Nishikawa gave opinions on a broad range of issues including the length of working hours, methods of payment (by piece, rather than by time), management-labor relations, workshop design, structure of the company, acceptance of orders, and price calculation.

The assistance by Nishikawa and his fellow Japanese technicians helped produce impressive results. Despite various difficulties and delays, in early 1947, CTMM announced its success in manufacturing automatic spindles—the Alpha High Draft based on the Toyoda model, which was re-designated as the Chinese Standard. A year later, CTMM produced China’s first automatic loom modeled after the famed 44’ G Type Toyoda Automat-

⁴³ Huang-Nishikawa meeting No. 7, CTMM Papers.

⁴⁴ Huang-Nishikawa meeting No. 59, CTMM Papers.

⁴⁵ Huang-Nishikawa meeting No. 57, CTMM Papers.

ic Loom. By the end of 1948, the company was producing 20,000 new spindles and 200 looms.⁴⁶ This was a remarkable achievement for a manufacturer that had been established less than three years before, and Nishikawa and his fellow Toyoda technicians played indispensable roles. Already orders for the looms were pouring in from numerous domestic and foreign mills. By February 1949, already some two months behind schedule,⁴⁷ the company had a standing orders for 1,300 automatic looms.

By early 1949, however, just as the cooperation began to bear results, it was also running into further difficulties. Peng Xuepei, Chairman of CTMM and its chief sponsor in the Nationalist Party's Central Committee, died in a plane accident, soon to be followed by the loss of CTMM president, Huang Bojiao, due to illness. Two of Japanese engineers had also died of illness. Beginning in late 1948, the remaining Japanese technicians returned to Japan one after another. When the People's Liberation Army began advancing toward the Nationalist heartland,⁴⁸ Nishikawa, too, took leave after nearly thirty years in Shanghai.

Closure and Causes

Repatriation of most Japanese technicians from China had already been under way by then. In addition to promises made to the Americans, there were other pressures on the Chinese government. As situations in China continued to deteriorate just as conditions in Japan began to recover, more and more Japanese demanded repatriation. In August 1947, the Government reiterated that unless there was a desperate need, Japanese technicians must be repatriated. Some enterprises were able to find Chinese replacements, thus no longer had to keep the Japanese. In Taiwan, many Japanese technicians were released from duty in early 1947 and one report indicated the number of Japanese greatly reduced.⁴⁹ In northeast China, most of the retained Japanese technicians were released from service by the Nationalist government by the end of 1947, partly because of Chinese replacements, but more likely for fear of leaving them to the advancing Chinese communists. The Japanese liaison office was disbanded in Sep-

⁴⁶ Horiuchi, *Chūgoku no arashi*, 200.

⁴⁷ "Zhiji Jiaohuo Jianbiao" (23 February 1949); Bunge Far East Agencies, Inc. to CTMM (27 September 1948), CTMM Papers.

⁴⁸ CTMM paid \$2,400 and 54,000,000 yuan respectively to their families. After returning to Japan, Nishikawa spent some time recuperating from illness before taking up work in a Toyoda-related trading company.

⁴⁹ Only 25 Japanese remained employed in petroleum, electric power, pulp, and cement production. See "Zai-Tai gedanwei jixu liuyong Riji renyuan mindan," in *Ziyuan weiyuanhui*, 9–13.

tember 1947 and its members were repatriated in the following month.⁵⁰ By early 1948, the total number of Japanese technicians in Nationalist-controlled areas had dwindled to about 1,361 (with 4,092 dependents). The last group of sixty-six Japanese working on the railway or in power plants remained after August 1948, after which the Chinese communists took over.⁵¹ Horiuchi, a strong advocate in Japanese technical assistance to China, left for Japan at the end of 1948.

After the establishment of the People's Republic of China, quite a number of Japanese technicians continued to work in China. Many medical workers even participated the Korean War with the Chinese "Volunteer Army." A number of Japanese scientists from the SMR Central Laboratory supervised the construction of new plants and their initial productions. Almost all of them returned to Japan in 1956 by way of the first exchange of visits between the two countries.

Prolonged presence of large numbers of Japanese in China as envisioned by Japanese leaders immediately after the War did not materialize, largely because it was met with international pressure. The American insistence on removing Japanese influence from China stemmed from the fact that despite their civilian status, Japanese technicians in Asia were considered descendants of the empire. While employing hundreds of thousands of Japanese as forced labor in Siberia, Soviets also pressured the Chinese to release Japanese technicians from Dalian, where some 3,500 Japanese remained after the war. It was partly because America's insistence; partly because the Soviets were keen on replacing them with Soviet technicians.

International factors alone could not explain the remarkable case of Toyoda technicians in Shanghai, where changing domestic situations in both Japan and China were perhaps more crucial. The escalating civil war in China, while involving many Japanese on both sides, hastened the repatriation of the remaining Japanese and hence the early end of Japanese-Chinese technical cooperation. At the same time, the accelerated economic recovery in Japan under American occupation no doubt further attracted Japanese technicians from overseas. It also served as a new justification, as in the case of Toyoda in Japan, against transferring⁵² advanced Japanese technology and equipment to other Asian countries.

⁵⁰ Hirajima, *Rakudo kara*, 248–49, 275–78.

⁵¹ *Man-Mō shūsenshi*, 695–97.

⁵² For a discussion of implications of U.S. policy change, see Nishikawa Hiroshi, "Amerika no tai-Nichi seisaku no tenkan to Chūgoku no dōkō," *Keizai-gaku Kenkyū* 43, no. 4 (1994): 73–92.

SIGNIFICANCE

Although China probably had retained the largest number of Japanese technicians after the war, it was by no means the only country to do so. Japanese technicians were also found in other parts of the former empire in the immediate postwar era. In Pyongyang alone, for example, over 2,000 Japanese technicians and skilled workers were registered in early 1946. To coordinate their activities, a Japanese section was set up within the North Korean Industrial Technology Association (*Kita Chōsen Kōgyō Gijutsu Renmei Nihonjin Bu*). As of mid-1947, over 400 Japanese technicians, many with family members, were still working in mines, factories, hospitals, and schools in the northern half of the Korean peninsula.⁵³

Just as the repatriation of nearly seven million Japanese from overseas following the war was a logical consequence of Japan's collapsed empire, the continued presence of tens of thousand of technicians in various parts of Asia well after its demise must also be seen as one of its multifaceted legacies. What was its historical significance? Was retaining Japanese technicians an admission that the Chinese were not qualified to administer these areas, as George Kerr said about Taiwan?⁵⁴ Does it demonstrate that Japan was now dedicated to assisting its Asian neighbors? Or yet another example of the residual benefits of the Japanese Empire?

Though defeated in the war, Japan still possessed considerable technological strength compared to its Asian neighbors.⁵⁵ The presence of tens of thousands of Japanese technicians in China and Korea was a result of extensive economic and industrial development in the empire and reflected Japanese control of the industries and exploitation of the natural resources in occupied areas and colonies. Therefore, it was often impossible for these enterprises to function with the sudden withdrawal of Japanese technical experts.⁵⁶ In this sense, China continued to be dependent on Japan technologically even after its declared victory. Such technological dependence was obvious to Japanese and Chinese leaders as well as to the

⁵³ Morita Yoshio, *Chōsen shūsen no kiroku* (Tōkyō: Gannandō, 1964), 758–808.

⁵⁴ George H. Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed* (New York: De Capo Press, 1965), 116.

⁵⁵ In fact, the Soviets also demonstrated much interests in the scientific research at the SMR Central Laboratory and a delegation from the Academy of Sciences visited the institute in 1946. See Marusawa, *Shin Chūgoku*, 15–31; Hirota, *Mangetsu no shūen*, 64–66. Similarly, the United States, Britain, as well as the Soviet Union, acquired much German technology during the early postwar period. See John Gimbel, *Science, Technology and Reparation: Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), and John Farquharson, "Governed or Exploited? The British Acquisition of German Technology, 1945–1948," *Journal of Contemporary History* 32, no. 1 (1997): 23–42.

⁵⁶ *Man-Mō shūsen-shi*, 693.

Japanese technicians themselves, although they exploited it for different purposes.

Although the presence of Japanese technicians in postwar China was a short-lived one, two areas seem particularly fertile for future explorations.

Technological Legacies

Technology transfer, as Daniel Headrick has pointed out, was part of Western colonialism in the Third World. The experience of Nishikawa and other Japanese technicians in postwar China shows that the same process was at work after the demise of Japanese imperialism in Asia.⁵⁷

Toyoda's technicians played just such a role. The lasting impact of this short period of technical cooperation could be seen in what has been described as the "astonishingly rapid recovery" of China's textile industry after 1949, despite the fact that imports of Japanese machinery were cut off due to trade restrictions. In fact, in the mid-1950s, the People's Republic of China even began exporting textile machinery to Southeast Asia and Eastern European countries. In 1958, for example, China agreed to help build textile mills in Burma and provide all the necessary equipment. Not surprisingly, it became a matter of concern in Japan.⁵⁸ It is possible to attribute the phenomenon of post-Second World War industrial growth to the existence of the Japanese textile industry in China before the war—the so-called Zaikabō.⁵⁹ Obviously, in the Toyoda episode at least, the early postwar years played an important link that is commonly underacknowledged. By using the Toyoda model as the basis for the new CTMM production, Nishikawa succeeded in bringing postwar Chinese textile machinery on a Japanese track, so to speak. Furthermore, Toyoda's conduits to Chinese textile industry by no means ended with the departure of its technicians. Personal ties formed before and during this period with Chinese textile industrialists who later moved to Hong Kong and Taiwan helped future Toyoda sales to those areas.

⁵⁷ Daniel Headrick, *Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850–1940* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). Recently, the issue of technology transfer in the early postwar transition has also been raised by Japanese scholars. See Imura Tetsuo, "Sorengun no Tōhoku shinkō to sengo Chūgoku Tōhoku no sangyō," unpublished paper.

⁵⁸ Tōa Keizai Kenkyūkai, *Shin Chūgoku no kikai kōgyō* (Tōkyō: Tōa Keizai Kenkyūkai, 1960), 184–185.

⁵⁹ Kiyokawa Yukihiko, "Chūgoku sen'i kikai kōgyō no hatten to Zaikabō no igi," in *Keizai Kenkyū* 43, no. 1 (1983): 22–39.

Although further study of other industries are needed, Toyoda's experience was certainly not unique. For example, Japanese scientists from the South Manchurian Railway's Central Laboratory played important parts in utilizing their research in many chemical, pharmaceutical, mining, and other industrial enterprises in China.⁶⁰

Political Implications

The other area worth further study is the impact of such technical assistance on the overall bilateral relations between Japan and China. To Horiuchi, for instance, the benefits of Toyoda's assistance on Sino-Japanese relations outweighed any possible negative repercussions on the Japan's textile machinery industry.⁶¹ The attempt to use Japanese technicians in postwar China as agents of resurgent Japanese influence in Asia, as envisioned by Okamura, Shigemitsu and other Japanese leaders, did not produce intended results. The short-lived technical cooperation certainly affected both Japanese and Chinese and their attitudes toward each other. In this sense, Japanese like Nishikawa were not only providing technical assistance to China; Nishikawa was also influencing postwar China's perception of Japan through his devotion to work and his belief in a special Sino-Japanese relationship. Although it is difficult to assess the exact impact, the fact that Chinese leaders such as T.V. Soong and other ranking officials were among his direct and indirect contacts is significant. According to Horiuchi, even the Chinese press reversed its earlier skepticism and offered favorable coverage when CTMM succeeded in producing the new looms, even publishing Nishikawa's photograph.⁶²

In terms of its long involvement in China and its closeness to China's government after the war, the Toyoda case was perhaps exceptional. But there is abundant evidence that in northeast China, ranking Chinese officials such as Zhang Gongchuan (Chang Kia-ngau) also regularly consulted Japanese experts on industrial, financial, and agricultural recovery after the departure of Soviet troops.⁶³ T.V. Soong, after touring Taiwan, was reportedly very impressed with the Japanese achievements and asked

⁶⁰ For details, see Hirota, *Mantetsu no shūen*, and Marusawa, *Shin Chūgoku*.

⁶¹ Horiuchi, *Chūgoku no arashi*, 200.

⁶² Horiuchi, *Chūgoku no arashi*, 206–7.

⁶³ See meetings of Zhang Gongchuan (Chang Kia-ngau) with Japanese technical experts, recorded in his diaries dated 25, 27, 28, 30 June; 8, 12, 13 July; 14, 16, 17, 20, 28, 31 August; 2, 26 September; 10, 27 October; 17, 27, 29, 31 January; 13 February. Yao Songlin, comp. *Zhang Gongchuan xianshen nianpu chugao* (Taipei: Zhuanji Wenxue Chubanshe, 1982). For a partial English translation, see *Lost Chance in Manchuria* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1994). Also *Man-Mō shūsenshi*, 693–722.

Horiuchi to organize a group of Japanese technicians to assist economic development of the Hainan Island.⁶⁴ On the other hand, a number of Japanese not only remained interested in Chinese affairs, but put their Chinese connection to use after returning to Japan. Takasaki Tatsunosuke, who oversaw Japanese technical assistance in former Manchuria during the years after the war, was one. After serving as minister of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry, he would later play an important role in setting up what became known as the L-T memorandum trade between Japan and China.⁶⁵ Hagiwara Teiji, a chemist from SMR Central Laboratory who stayed on in China, became actively involved in postwar trade with China soon after his return to Japan in 1954.⁶⁶

Here one should not oversimplify the complex variety of circumstances. There also seemed to be considerable differences as to how such experience affected the Japanese. A Japanese government survey of repatriated Japanese from Manchuria in late 1946 revealed a wide range of views among those returned Japanese technicians. While a few acknowledged the Chinese (and Soviet) support, many complained about their conditions. On the issue of Sino-Japanese cooperation, the opinion was sharply divided. While many supported the idea and were willing to offer Japanese special skills, a few maintained that such cooperation could succeed only when Japanese were in positions of guidance.⁶⁷

Ultimately, then, this study suggests that the period immediately after the war was far from being “years of no significance,” but was instead filled with both opportunities and uncertainties. Though defeated in war, many Japanese—both government leaders as well as ordinary citizens—sought to construct new types of relationship with its Asian neighbors. Even though technical assistance to China was cut short due to a combination of domestic and international factors, Japanese technicians in postwar China were already making the transition to a post-imperialist world in which Japan would excel.

⁶⁴ Horiuchi, *Chūgoku no arashi*, 200–203. During the war, Japan had begun to develop its much-deeded resources, such as rice, rubber, sugar on the island, which, Horiuchi believed, continued to be important to Japan after the war.

⁶⁵ Soeya, *Nihon gaikō*, 162–67.

⁶⁶ See his reminiscence in Marusawa, *Shin Chūgoku*, esp. 188.

⁶⁷ Kanrikyoku Zaigai Hōjin-ka, “Manshū hikiagesha no kansō oyobi kibō ni tsuite no chōsa” (12 December 1947), 1103–14, in K-0001, frames 1103–14. Postwar Records. Undoubtedly, such sentiment had manifested in arrogance on the part of some Japanese technicians, which led to further friction with the Chinese. See an example of this reported in Gillin and Etter, “Staying On,” 509–10.

Appendix

Japanese Technicians in Postwar China

Area	Mining	Factory	Railway	Agriculture	Communi- cation	Health Care	Engineer- ing	Culture	Other	Subtotal
Nanjing	20	4				1				25
Shanghai		200	6	53	2	54	20	90	303	728
Hangzhou						2			7	10
Anqing	2			2						4
Hankou	4	105	12		9	14	11	4	142	301
Xuzhou	26	38	110		68	35		2	73	352
Haizhou		12				13			25	50
Jinan		69	29			41	1		10	150
Qingdao	5	27				16	1	3	12	64
Tianjin		26	10			8	15		31	91
Peiping	9	148	83		19	44		49	184	551
Datong	62	168				11	33		26	300
Baotou		3				5	6		10	25
Zhengzhou						9			7	16
Guangzhou		2				1			16	19
Hainan Island						1			24	25
Taiwan	20	304	60	125		18	27	239	261	1,054
Northeast (Manchuria)	781	2,176	976		480	105	201	715	4,833	10,267
Total	929	3,282	1,287	197	578	378	315	1,102	5,964	14,032

Compiled by the Second Department, ROC Ministry of Defense (14 December 1946)

Note: All figures based on reports by various military, governmental, and other agencies before 14 December 1946.

Source: RG2(2), File 2868, No. 2 Historical Archives, Nanjing, China.

IN THE SHADOW OF THE MONOLITH: YOSHIDA SHIGERU AND JAPAN'S CHINA POLICY DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR YEARS, 1949–54

C. W. BRADDICK

"I do not think it will affect Japan very much."¹

When Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru made this statement before the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee on 22 February 1950, he was of course referring to the freshly minted Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. One could argue that this pact represented only the latest twist in a "regional triangle of tension [which] had pitted Russia, Japan, and China against each other through ... three-quarters of a century of confrontation and conflict."² Certainly, from the signatories' point of view, the Alliance—like its predecessor concluded in 1945—was, at least in part, a legacy of the Japanese Empire in East Asia. The treaty's preamble was explicit: it was directed at preventing "the revival of Japanese imperialism and the resumption of aggression on the part of Japan or any other state that may collaborate in any way with Japan."³ In McCarthyite Washington, however, in the wake of the "loss of China," the alliance was interpreted as a further act of aggression against the United States. Even the State Department, which had earlier pursued a more flexible policy toward China, could only conclude that Mao Zedong had now "attached China to the Soviet chariot."⁴ Thus was the myth of "monolithic communism" born.

It has recently been observed that "when Mao Zedong openly leaned to one side and concluded an alliance with the Soviet Union in February, 1950, the chances that Tōkyō and Beijing would establish anything like strong ties of friendship became very small indeed. Very rarely does the friend of one's enemy become one's friend."⁵ During the last years of the

¹ *Asahi Shinbun*, 23 February 1950.

² Allen S. Whiting, *Siberian Development and East Asia: Threat or Promise?* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), 3.

³ See Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 260.

⁴ Clubb to Kennan, 25 April 1950, cited in Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 188.

⁵ Roger Dingman, "The Dagger and the Gift: The Impact of the Korean War on Japan," *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 2, no. 1 (spring 1993): 36.

Occupation, the Japanese were indeed under enormous pressure to adopt the Cold War perspectives of their American overseers, but as we shall see, most drew a clear distinction between Moscow and Beijing. To them the Chinese were *akadaikon*: like the radish, their "redness" was only skin deep.⁶ Toward "New China," popular sentiment was still dominated by a sense of war guilt, whereas Stalin's opportunism during the last week of the Pacific War had redoubled the traditional hostility felt for Russia. There was nothing feigned about Yoshida's declared indifference to the Sino-Soviet Alliance. As a career diplomat who had seen extensive service in prewar China, he was convinced that a Sino-Soviet rift was inevitable, and believed that the process could be accelerated by building ties to Beijing, as the more vulnerable of the two to seduction by the West. Yoshida persistently sought to persuade the British and Americans of the virtues of this "thesis," but after 1950 his optimism was increasingly dismissed at home and abroad as mere "wishful thinking."

Yoshida is widely credited with having laid the foundations of postwar Japanese foreign policy during his seven-year reign as premier, yet he remains an enigma. His China policy, in particular, continues to arouse intense debate. How, for instance, does one reconcile the view that "Yoshida remained a staunch supporter of the Chinese Nationalist government on Taiwan until his death," with his having "fought a vigorous, rear-guard action against the American peace-treaty negotiator, John Foster Dulles, in order to avoid recognizing the Taipei government instead of the Beijing government." Were Yoshida's motives in promoting his "thesis" strategic, as he claimed, or mercantilist, as those who credit him with being the originator of *seikei bunri* (the separation of economic from political relations) would assert. Is it true that: "Throughout the postwar period he never abandoned his private conviction that at some future time, after the Sino-Soviet alliance had collapsed ... the two great East Asian powers [Ja-

⁶ See Richard Story, "Some Aspects of Social Change in Japan," in *Symposium on Economic and Social Problems of the Far East*, ed. E.F. Szczepanik (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1962), 440.

⁷ Yoshida joined the Foreign Ministry in 1906. He served in Mukden (Shenyang) during 1907–8, was appointed consul in the port of Antung (Andong) in 1912, and the following year became secretary to the governor-general of Korea. From 1922–25 he was consul-general in Tientsin (Tianjin) and then held the same post in Mukden until the beginning of 1928. *Japan, An Illustrated Encyclopedia* (Tōkyō: Kodansha, 1993), 1757.

⁸ Janet Hunter, *Concise Dictionary of Modern Japanese History* (Tōkyō: Kodansha International, 1984), 251, and Chalmers Johnson, "The Patterns of Japanese Relations with China, 1952–82," *Pacific Affairs* 59, no. 3 (fall 1986): 403.

⁹ George Jan, "The Japanese People and Japan's Policy Toward Communist China," *Western Political Quarterly* 22 (summer 1969): 605.

pan and mainland China] could resume their natural historical relationship.”¹⁰ If so, then we are still left to ponder the extent to which the prime minister’s private views motivated official policy, for his biographer still maintains that, “Yoshida never mounted a serious or sustained campaign to promote a more enlightened China policy by the United States.”¹¹

This is a study of diplomatic history without diplomatic relations. Fortunately, recently declassified documents in the diplomatic archives in Tōkyō, Washington, London, and Canberra are throwing new light on the thinking behind the Japanese government’s China policy during the Cold War, but we cannot confine ourselves to the as-yet-incomplete official record. This study will also draw on contemporary published materials and an array of secondary sources in English and Japanese in an attempt to resolve the contradictions outlined above and to answer one fundamental question: to what extent did Japanese policy-makers’ view “New China” through the prism of old China, or alternatively, to what degree were their perceptions shaped by the encroaching Cold War, represented by the Sino-Soviet alliance?

The approximately five-year period from 1 October 1949, when the People’s Republic of China was proclaimed, until 10 December 1954, when Yoshida was forced from office, can be divided into three unequal segments, according to the degree to which he actively pursued the “Yoshida thesis.” The first phase spanned most of Yoshida’s second term as prime minister of Occupied Japan. Initially, the “Yoshida thesis” enjoyed the support of a near consensus of international anti-communist opinion, but it was gradually eclipsed by John Foster Dulles’s “hard wedge” strategy—promoting a rift by increasing Chinese dependency on the Soviets rather than reducing it—at least in the policy councils of Washington. The second phase, a two year hiatus, lasted until May 1954, and the final phase, covering Yoshida’s last eight months in office, saw him make a futile attempt to revive his “thesis.”

BIRTH OF THE “YOSHIDA THESIS”

As early as November 1948, Yoshida Shigeru, recently restored to the premiership, reportedly viewed: “without any anxiety the possibility of a total [seizure] of China by the communists.” This was reportedly because he believed that a communist Chinese regime would soon prove as nationalistic and xenophobic as its predecessors, and thus rather than contrib-

¹⁰ John Welfield, *Empire in Eclipse* (London: The Athlone Press, 1988), 41.

¹¹ John Dower, *Japan in War and Peace* (New York: The New Press, 1993), 233.

uting to Soviet power in Asia, would actually diminish it. He also apparently¹² argued that Sino-Japanese ties could be rebuilt to the benefit of both.

American thinking at this time tended to confirm Yoshida's assessment that "Titoism in China" was a realistic prospect. In March 1949, official United States policy aimed to "augment, through permitting restoration of ordinary economic relations with China, such forces as might operate to bring¹³ about serious rifts between Moscow and a Chinese Communist regime." Somewhat contradictorily, however, Washington now extended export controls to include China—albeit less severe than those imposed on the Soviet Union¹⁴—and GHQ in Tōkyō applied these to Sino-Japanese trade.

Yoshida repeatedly made clear his opposition to all such restrictions, for instance, telling CBS journalist, William Costello, in May 1949:

I don't care whether China is red, white or green, we are willing to do business with her. China is our neighbor. There is a danger that trade between our countries might be permanently cut, but I believe that we shall¹⁵ eventually transcend ideological differences and progress together.

It was noted in Washington "how distinctly assertive, unified, and confident the Japanese appeared on this issue, as compared to the almost cowering remarks on foreign policy that usually emanated from Tōkyō."¹⁶ That summer, while the pro-mainland trade lobby in Japan was busily getting itself organized, the Chinese communists sent a small trade mission to Japan.¹⁷ It bore no fruit, but by year's end, Yoshida's trade minister, Inagaki Heitarō, was confident enough to set a target for China's share

¹² Schaller, *The American Occupation*, 188. Unfortunately, he does not offer any source to support these observations.

¹³ NSC 41, "US Policy Regarding Trade with China," Foreign Relations of the United States [Hereafter FRUS], 1949, IX, 826–34.

¹⁴ Yasuhara Yoko, "Japan, Communist China, and Export Controls in Asia, 1948–52," *Journal of Diplomatic History* 10, no. 1 (winter 1986): 81–82.

¹⁵ William Costello, "Could Japan Go Communist?" *Nation* 168, no. 20 (14 May 1949): 534. See also Schaller, *American Occupation*, 188–89, and Reinhard Drifte, *The Security Factor in Japan's Foreign Policy, 1945–52* (Ripe, E. Sussex: Saltire Press, 1983), 128.

¹⁶ Schaller, *American Occupation*, 189.

¹⁷ The non-partisan Diet Members' League for the Promotion of Sino-Japanese Trade (Nitchū Bōeki Sokushin Giin Renmei) was established that summer with Progressive Party Secretary General Tomabechi Gizō as chairman and an initial membership numbering about ninety. This was soon followed by the Sino-Japanese Trade Promotion Association (Nitchū Bōeki Sokushin Kai) led by Sugi Mi-

of Japan's total foreign trade of between one-quarter and one-third—significantly greater than during the 1930s.¹⁸

The "Yoshida Thesis" in Retreat

Even after the establishment of the PRC on 1 October 1949, Washington in theory remained willing to allow Japan "to maintain normal political and economic relations with the communist bloc and, in the absence of open hostilities, resist complete identification either with the interests of the United States or Soviet Union."¹⁹ Over the next twelve months, however, under the triple impact of the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, the outbreak of the Korean War, and China's subsequent intervention therein, the optimism of the spring²⁰ gradually evaporated, to be replaced by a fear of losing Japan as well.

Yoshida's thinking did not undergo any such transformation. At worst he thought the Sino-Soviet alliance might delay Japan's peace treaty.²¹ He remained convinced that "China would never become a slave to the Kremlin." Yoshida's reasoning seemingly owed more to racial prejudice than rational analysis:

Referring to centuries of Chinese history, the character of the Chinese people, their consistent successes in the past in thwarting efforts at domination or absorption, and their superiority to the Russians in intelligence, cleverness and political astuteness, he declared that he had every confidence in the outcome. The Chinese, he concluded, will be "too much for the Russians."²²

chisuke of the Ōsaka Chamber of Commerce. See Makiko Hamaguchi-Klenner, *China Images of Japanese Conservatives* (Hamburg: Mitteilungen des Instituts für Asienkunde, 1981), 71; Haruhiro Fukui, *Party in Power* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 241; R.K. Jain, *China and Japan, 1949–80* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981), 26.

¹⁸ *New York Times*, 25 November 1949, cited in Schaller, *American Occupation*, 189. The average figures for 1930–39 were 21.6 percent of Japanese exports and 12.4 percent of imports according to Japan's Ministry of Finance. Okita Saburo, "Sino-Japanese Trade and Japan's Economic Growth," in Szczepanik, *Symposium*, 158. The actual figures for 1949 were 0.6 percent of Japanese exports and 2.3 percent of imports. Gaimushō, *Nitchū bōeki no genjō* (Tōkyō: 1969).

¹⁹ Howard Schonberger, *Aftermath of War* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1989), 152.

²⁰ Schaller, *American Occupation*, 190.

²¹ *Asahi Shinbun*, 23 February 1950.

²² Memorandum of Conversation [Hereafter MC], Yoshida and Cloyce Huston, 8 April 1950, FRUS, 1950, VI, 1167.

Such views remained widespread in Japan. Just two days after the alliance was signed, *Asahi Shinbun* claimed that "Communist China is already considering itself the leader of the union of socialist nations in Asia. China thinks that this union should be independent of the Soviet Union and should stand on an equal footing."²³ Yoshida was under increasing pressure to hasten the end of the Occupation and spur stagnating Sino-Japanese trade. A multi-party resolution, adopted by the House of Councillors at the end of April, anticipated Washington's de facto recognition of Beijing and called on the government to "leave aside ideological and political differences and ... exchange economic missions with the new China."²⁴

The Korean War

The outbreak of the Korean War caused the Truman administration not only to defer indefinitely any prospects for a Sino-Soviet rift, but also to downgrade belief in its own ability to influence the process.²⁵ Similarly, the Japanese Foreign Ministry issued a statement which presupposed the existence of a "monolithic communism" by suggesting a link between North Korea's invasion of the south and the earlier signature of the Sino-Soviet alliance.²⁶ Not every Japanese diplomat shared this view. After reports of China's "volunteer army" intervening in the conflict were confirmed in late November, Wajima Eiji, head of the ministry's Control Bureau (Kanrikyoku), privately warned the Americans that "the Japanese ... would be apathetic to an attempted invasion by the Soviets but would resist such an attempt if made by the Chinese communists alone." His explanation for the differentiation was simple, in the former case, "the Japanese would feel that they had better leave such resistance to the Occupation forces," whereas in the latter in-

²³ *Asahi Shinbun*, 16 February 1950. See also Hongō Gaichi, "Soren to Chūkyō no kyokutō seisaku," *Chūō Kōron* 65, no. 3 (March 1950): 81.

²⁴ Ishikawa Tadao, Nakajima Mineo, and Ikei Masaru, eds., *Sengo shiryō: Nitchū kankei* (Tōkyō: Nihon Hyōronsha, 1970), 23, and Gordon Chang, *Friends and Enemies* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 73. Yoshida immediately responded by secretly despatching Finance Minister Ikeda Hayato to Washington in an effort to persuade the United States to end the Occupation as soon as possible. The proposal was discussed in Washington at the highest levels, but no official response was forthcoming. Welfield, *Empire in Eclipse*, 46–47; Michael Yoshitsu, *Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 34; and Schaller, *American Occupation*, 257–58.

²⁵ Chang, *Friends and Enemies*, 80.

²⁶ "Statement issued by the Foreign Ministry for the purpose of clarifying Japan's position in the Korean conflict, 19 August 1950," *Contemporary Japan* 19 (July–September 1950): 463–69.

stance, "the long-standing enmity existing between the Japanese and Chinese would be sufficient to cause them to resist."²⁷ Yoshida, meanwhile, continued to publicly downplay the seriousness of any communist threat to Japan, telling the Diet the following month, "We do not have the slightest expectation that the communist countries will invade Japan."²⁸

The Americans lacked Yoshida's certitude. In December 1950, just nine months after General Headquarters (GHQ) had formally authorized Japanese trade with the PRC, Washington embargoed all exports to China. With no choice but to comply, Japanese trade with the mainland plummeted.²⁹ Yoshida raised the embargo question with Special Ambassador John Foster Dulles at the end of January 1951:

[He] spoke of the long-term necessity of trading with China, and while he realized that in view of [the] present communist domination of that country it would not be possible to expect great results in the near future, nevertheless, he believed that in the long run the Chinese would adopt the attitude that "war is war and trade is trade" and that it would be possible for a reasonable degree of trade to take place between Japan and China.³¹

This was perhaps the first time that Yoshida gave voice to a concept later to be called *seikei bunri*. It is important to note, however, that he was recommending such a policy for China, not Japan. Tōkyō was to use trade for covert, strategic purposes: "Japanese businessmen because of their long acquaintance with and experience in China, will be the best fifth column of democracy against the Chinese communists," Yoshida claimed.³²

²⁷ MC, Wajima and Richard Butrick (Director General Foreign Service), 15 December 1950, 794.00/12-1550, Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington D.C. [Hereafter NA.] Wajima was a senior diplomat with more than twenty years service, including the period from July 1937 to October 1943 in China. *Gaimushō nenkan*, (Tōkyō: Gaimushō, 1961), 567.

²⁸ John Dower, *Empire and Aftermath* (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1979), 391. Following the implementation of the "Red Purge," Yoshida was also able to declare: "As far as the Japanese skies are concerned, the Red star is receding," Yoshida Shigeru, "Japan and the Crisis in Asia," *Foreign Affairs* 29, no. 2 (Jan. 1951): 179.

²⁹ Jain, *China and Japan*, 27.

³⁰ From a postwar high of \$19.6 million in 1950, exports fell to \$5.8 million the following year, and were just \$600,000 in 1952. Imports followed a similar plunging trajectory. Chae-Jin Lee, *Japan Faces China* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 144. See also Howard Schonberger, "John Foster Dulles and the China Question in the Making of the Japanese Peace Treaty," in *The Occupation of Japan: The International Context*, ed. Thomas Burkman (Norfolk, Virginia: MacArthur Memorial, 1984), 234.

³¹ MC, Yoshida, Dulles, and Sebald, 29 January 1951, FRUS, 1951, VI, 827-28.

Such talk, however, simply made the Americans more nervous about a future sovereign Japan, which the CIA had already labelled “opportunistic.”³³ Thus, on 23 April, Dulles extracted an oral pledge from Yoshida not to sign a separate peace treaty with the mainland.³⁴ Even so, right up until his departure for San Francisco, he kept on trying to sell his “thesis” to anyone who would listen.³⁵

San Francisco and the “Yoshida Letter”

When the San Francisco Peace Conference convened in September 1951, Anglo-American differences meant that neither Beijing nor Taipei was represented.³⁶ Yoshida carefully avoided the issue of which regime Tōkyō would recognize. His speech—extensively rewritten by the Americans—claimed that “the role of Chinese trade in [the] Japanese economy ... has often been exaggerated.”³⁷ On his return to Tōkyō, Yoshida initially tried to temporize in the face of harsh Diet questioning concerning a peace treaty with China.³⁸ However, on 29 October, Yoshida indicated a willingness to place relations with Mao and Chiang on an equal footing. Specifically, he expressed an interest in opening an overseas office in Shanghai (like the one about to open in Taipei) and said he would welcome a communist Chinese office in Tōkyō if its sole purpose were to promote trade.³⁹

³² MC, Yoshida, Dulles, and Sebald, 29 January 1951, FRUS, 1951, VI, 827–28. Yoshida subsequently withdrew this formulation. MC, Yoshida, and Sebald, 20 February 1951, FRUS, 1951, VI, 828.

³³ Memorandum by CIA, NIE–19, “Feasibility of Japanese Rearmament in Association with US,” 20 April 1951, FRUS, 1951, VI, 998–99.

³⁴ MC, Yoshida to Dulles, 23 April 1951, FRUS, 1951, VI, Pt.1, 1316.

³⁵ R.G. Casey to Sir Arthur Tange, “Copy Personal Diary Entry of Talk with Yoshida in Japan in [7 August] 1951,” 9 December 1959, A 1838/280–3103/10/10/2, Australian Archives, Canberra [Hereafter AA], and Murphy, AmEmbTok, to Dept. of State [Hereafter DOS], “The China Policy of an Independent Japan”, 13 May 1952, 693.94/5–1352, NA.

³⁶ Britain’s Labour government had extended recognition to the PRC in January 1950. For a recent study, see Qiang Zhai, *The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations, 1949–1958* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1994).

³⁷ R.K. Jain, *Japan’s Post-War Peace Settlements* (New Delhi: Radiant, 1978), 372.

³⁸ AmEmbTok to DOS, 23 October 1951, 694.001/10–2351, Enc. in Perkins to Rusk, FRUS, 1951, VI, 1389.

³⁹ *sop.* According to Nishimura Kumao (Treaty Bureau Director), Yoshida had acted impulsively. Yoshitsu, *Japan and San Francisco*, 71–72. Both imply Yoshida was being sincere.

³⁹ Vice Foreign Minister Iguchi, when later “discussing these remarks with Ambassador Sebald, termed them ‘indiscreet’ rather than misleading or a political

The China Lobby in Washington was reportedly furious, believing Yoshida had reneged on his earlier promises.⁴⁰ At the same time, a State Department paper inverted the logic of the “Yoshida thesis” to argue that “[increasing Chinese] dependence on the Soviets for economic necessities is more likely to work in our favor than against us by hastening the day when China becomes disillusioned with Russian aid.”⁴¹ The so-called hard wedge strategy was born. Other officials feared that a Sino-Soviet rift might ultimately lead to the development of a Sino-Japanese “third-force.”⁴² Dulles was forced to make a fourth trip to Tōkyō.⁴³

A compromise was soon reached on the diplomatic front: Japan would recognize the Republic of China as a *government* of China rather than *the government*, and any peace treaty⁴⁴ signed would be restricted to the area under actual Nationalist control. However, preferred approaches to the Sino-Soviet alliance were now poles apart: Yoshida remained wedded to his belief that “Japan might be able to play an important role in weaning China away from domination by the Soviet politburo,” something Dulles regarded as no better than “political fantasy.”⁴⁵ In his view, with Communist China now representing the primary threat to Japanese security, the “hard wedge” strategy was the only realistic option.⁴⁶

For Yoshida, the resulting eponymous letter represented a postponement of his “thesis” not its abandonment.⁴⁷ His sole contribution was a reference to the Sino-Soviet Treaty—“a military alliance aimed at Japan”—as an added justification for Japan’s action. This was disingenuous

⁴⁰ Roger Dingman, “The Anglo-American Origins of the Yoshida Letter, 1951–52,” in *Perspectives on Japan’s External Relations*, ed. David Lu (Lewisburg, Penn.: Bucknell University, Center for Japanese Studies, 1982), 30–31.

⁴¹ David Mayers, *Cracking the Monolith* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), 103.

⁴² NIE-52, “The Probable Future Orientation of Japan,” (Office of Intelligence and Research (OIR) contribution), 27 December 1951, 794.00/12-2751, NA.

⁴³ A fortnight before Dulles arrived, in mid-December, Yoshida met with Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Dean Rusk, and promised him that Japan “would not enter into ‘direct negotiations’ with the Peiping authorities without the knowledge of the US.” Rusk then pressed Yoshida on his “thesis,” asking him whether he believed that “the Peiping regime might be on the point of changing its policy or its alignment with the Soviet Union.” Yoshida’s reply lacked its usual conviction: “He knew Japanese who had friends on the mainland and who might be of assistance to him in finding whether there were useful steps which he might take.” MC, Yoshida, Rusk, and Sebald, 27 November 1951, FRUS, 1951, VI, 1417.

⁴⁴ MC, Dulles and Iguchi, 12 December 1951, FRUS, 1951, VI, 1437–9.

⁴⁵ Sebald to Acheson, 14 December 1951, FRUS 1951, VI, 1450–51.

⁴⁶ MC, Dulles and Yoshida, 13 December 1951, FRUS, 1951, VI, 1438–9.

⁴⁷ For example, on 1 February, Yoshida said, “The relations with China ... have been intimate geographically and historically, and these relations ought to be

to say the least, for as we have seen the pact had never particularly perturbed Yoshida. It appears to contradict his fundamental belief in the inevitability of the Sino-Soviet rift,⁴⁸ and to finally presage his adoption of the United States' world view. Unless, that is, he expected the letter to be published, in which case it can be seen as a useful weapon with which to defend his reluctant decision domestically, in circumstances⁴⁹ where even Japan's Socialists were uneasy about the Sino-Soviet alliance.

The Japan-ROC Peace Treaty

Even at this late stage, Yoshida sought to avoid a total commitment to Nationalist China. He hoped to maintain working relations with both Chinas, but the⁵⁰ United States would not permit it, and Britain was too weak to intervene. Following the Senate's ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty, Nishimura Kumao, a close advisor to Yoshida on China policy, described to United States Embassy officials: "Japan's conviction that the Peking Regime is not and will not be really communist, in the sense of being directed by Moscow." He characterized the Taipei talks as "simply ... a local, minor settlement," where the United States should not force the pace "at the cost of prejudicing a possible comprehensive settlement in East Asia."⁵¹ A fortnight later, he described how Yoshida "had many times expressed the view that Japan as an old nation familiar with the Far East, could assist and even guide the US, which is inexperienced in foreign policy and has got itself in a 'circle' on the China question."⁵² These diplomatic probes produced no concrete results, however, and ultimately Japan signed a "peace settlement" that also recognized Taipei's jurisdic-

made better, with the lapse of time and indeed as soon as may be possible. However, this is now impossible, but again this does not mean that these relations have been severed for good. We will continue to pay attention to these relations and try to improve them." Murphy to DOS, "The China Policy of an Independent Japan," 13 May 1952, 693.94/5-1352, NA.

⁴⁸ In his explanation to the Diet delivered on 26 January, Yoshida added two further rationales: the support of Beijing for the JCP's efforts to overthrow the Japanese government and the fact that it stood condemned as an aggressor by the UN. DOS, OIR, 2 April 1952, IR 5812, "The China Debate in Japan," OSS/State Dept., *Intelligence and Research Reports, Japan, Korea, South-east Asia and the Far East Generally: 1950-61 Supplement* (Washington: UPA, 1979), and Jain, *Japan's Post-War*, 62-63.

⁴⁹ See J.A.A. Stockwin, *The Japanese Socialist Party and Neutralism* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1968).

⁵⁰ Richard Storry, "Options for Japan in the 1970s," *The World Today* 26, no. 8 (Aug. 1970): 325-33, Jain, *Japan's Post-War*, 62.

⁵¹ MC, Nishimura and Stokes, "Japan's China Policy," 8 April 1952, 693.94/5-1352, NA.

⁵² MC, Nishimura and Finn, 22 April 1952, FRUS, 1952-54, XIV, 1250-51.

tion over territories which in future might fall under its control. The Japanese public, which was overwhelmingly in favor of restoring full diplomatic relations with the mainland, gained the impression that Yoshida had finally turned his back on Beijing.⁵³

POST-OCCUPATION JAPAN

Japan Joins COCOM

During the next two years, Yoshida maintained a judicious silence vis-à-vis the Sino-Soviet alliance. This did not, however, calm American fears regarding his China policy. With the ink barely dry on the Taipei treaty, Robert Murphy, America's first postwar ambassador to Japan, was already warning Washington about "the indigenous policy tendency." While recognizing the constraints Japan's overwhelming dependence on the United States imposed, he asserted that

the Yoshida-Nishimura group ... is determined to pursue a positive policy toward Peking, with a view to establishing a relatively normal *commercial and diplomatic* intercourse as soon as possible ... argu[ing it] would be highly advantageous to long-range US interests because it would be accomplished by Japanese subversion of Chinese obedience to the Kremlin.⁵⁴

But Murphy also did not rule out the possibility that this was being used cynically as a "gambit in bargaining for increased economic assistance from the US."⁵⁵

The following month, on 1 June 1952, disregarding the hostility of the Yoshida cabinet, three opposition Diet members⁵⁶ signed the first unofficial Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement in Beijing. It was a modest effort, aiming for a total of £60 million in balanced trade. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) immediately responded by laying down

⁵³ An *Asahi Shinbun* poll conducted between 9–11 May 1952, found 57 percent supported normalization, with only 11 percent opposed (Sample 3000). Allan Cole and Nakanishi Naomichi, eds., *Japanese Opinion Polls with Socio-Political Significance, 1947–1957* (Medford, Mass.: Tufts University, 1958), 679.

⁵⁴ Murphy to DOS, 13 May 1952, 693.94/5–1352, NA. Italics added.

⁵⁵ Murphy to DOS, 13 May 1952, 693.94/5–1352, NA.

⁵⁶ Yoshida's government had earlier blocked participation in the Moscow International Economic Conference by a group of Japanese politicians led by Ishibashi Tanzan, Murata Shōzō, and Kitamura Tokutarō. Kurt Radtke, *China's Relations with Japan, 1945–83* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 99, 112, n. 45, and AmEmbTok to DOS, 7 March 1952, 794.00/3–1452, NA.

its own, very strict, conditions for trade with the mainland.⁵⁸ The Foreign Ministry apparently felt that MITI was still being too generous, for two days later it declared that "Japan selling production materials to Communist China means⁵⁹ contributing to increasing ... her political and military threat to Japan." That same week, it published a white paper attacking the unofficial trade agreement, and accusing Beijing of aiming to drive a wedge between Japan and its friends.⁶⁰

The Foreign Ministry won this particular battle, as later that month the Japanese government officially announced its desire to join COCOM—the U.S.-led body controlling strategic trade with the communist bloc. There followed three months of difficult negotiations, at the end of which Japan gained admission. This would have represented a significant victory for Yoshida, placing Japan's trade with China on an equal footing with Western Europe's, but for the fact that the Americans had insisted on additional bilateral assurances from Japan.⁶¹ Washington was forcing Tōkyō to abandon the "Yoshida thesis" for fear that

Japan may try to take advantage of US-USSR conflict; desiring to restore Japanese influence on the continent of Asia and to regain [the] advantages of China trade, Japan might conclude that an accommodation with communist-controlled areas in Asia would serve Japanese interests.⁶²

⁵⁷ Jain, *China and Japan*, 29. Immediately upon their return home they helped found a nationwide organization to be chaired by former Vice-Minister of Greater East Asian Affairs, Yamamoto Kumaichi: the Japan-China Trade Promotion Association (Nitchū Bōeki Sokushin Kai). *Kōwa Shinbun*, 5 June 1952. The treaty was deliberately denominated in pounds, and trade conducted in pounds, because of Chinese hostility for everything American.

⁵⁸ DOS, IR 5941, "Pei-p'ing 'Trade Agreement' and its impact in Japan," 30 June 1952, 693.94/6-3052, NA.

⁵⁹ It also described China's trade as "completely dependent upon the Soviet Union." Information and Culture Bureau, Foreign Ministry, "The Trade Policy of Communist China and the So-called 'China-Japan Trade Agreement,'" *World Report*, 7 June 1952.

⁶⁰ Radtke, *China's Relations*, 99 and 112, n. 52.

⁶¹ Yasuhara, "Japan, Communist China," 87–89.

⁶² NSC 125/2, 7 August 1952, FRUS, 1952–54, XIV, 1302.

New Leaders

The New Year reawakened hopes for change. Dwight D. Eisenhower, inaugurated as the thirty-third U.S. president in January 1953, privately “express[ed] ... the belief that there was no future for Japan unless access were provided for it to the markets and raw materials of Manchuria and North China.” His secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, disagreed however, arguing that the embargo could be maintained “for perhaps five years,” while Japan was encouraged to look instead toward the markets of Southeast Asia.⁶³

A few months earlier, Niizeki Kin'ya, in charge of the Foreign Ministry's East European Desk, had claimed that Moscow was concentrating its energy on “strengthening ties with its satellites, including Communist China.”⁶⁴ Similarly, respected academics, like Professor Ōhira Zengo of Hitotsubashi University, were heard to declare that “at present, Communist China can be called the most faithful, effective, genuine, model satellite of the Kremlin.”⁶⁵

The death of Joseph Stalin in March 1953 sparked renewed interest in prospects for a Sino-Soviet rift. Wada Shusaku, in charge of the Foreign Ministry's South Asia Desk, suggested that “it would be possible to wean China away from Moscow ... [if] Japan was to sever its ties with the Chinese Nationalist and French-controlled Vietnamese regimes and to seek to form a ‘cooperative bloc’ with the Peiping Government.”⁶⁷ Three months later, his boss, Wajima Eiji, now Director of the Asian Affairs Bureau (Ajia Kyoku) claimed that “the Chinese communist leaders had been and still were taking their orders, at least in [the] foreign affairs field, from Moscow.” Nevertheless, he felt: “it was only a matter of time before the Chinese reached the point when they would no longer find it to their advantage to cooperate so closely with the Soviets.”⁶⁸

Similar opinions were being expressed outside of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. A poll conducted that spring came up with the interesting finding that for every two respondents who expected the democratic camp to split first, five saw the communist bloc as the more vulnerable to

⁶³ NSC, 139th Meeting, [dated] 16 April 1953, Declassified Documents Reference System [Hereafter DDRS], 1987/2885.

⁶⁴ Niizeki Kin'ya, “Soren sekai seisaku no gendankai,” *Gaikō Jihō* 111, no. 1 (Nov. 1952): 64.

⁶⁵ Ōhira Zengo, “Katayotta Chūkyōkan o hai suru,” *Jiyū no hata no moto ni* 1, no. 3 (March 1953): 52. See also Hirasawa Kazushige, “Chū-So wa dō deru: Shinsekai senryaku e no tenkan,” *Daiyamondo* 40, no. 36 (11 October 1952): 48–50.

⁶⁶ For example, one commentator predicted that “After his [Stalin's] death, the Soviet pressure upon the satellites will inevitably become weaker and Communist China will become less subordinate to the Soviet Union.” Takaya Kakuzō, *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 5 March 1953 (evening edition).

⁶⁷ MC, Wada Shusaku and LaRue Lutkins, 5 March 1953, 690.94/3–1653, NA.

⁶⁸ MC, Wajima Eiji and Lutkins, 30 June 1953, 693.94/7–853, NA.

schism.⁶⁹ More specifically, Suma Yakichirō, a Progressive Party (Kai-shintō) Diet member, noted China's⁷⁰ abandonment of its pro-Soviet Liu Shaoqi line following Stalin's death. According to Ishikawa Shigeru, an expert on Chinese economics, one's views on the subject depended on one's background. Those who saw "Communist China perfectly following Soviet policy" tended to be Soviet specialists, whereas the view "common among China researchers says that communist Chinese nationalists are conscious of the rift in interests."⁷¹

The United States remained less confident. Remarkably, in view of subsequent developments, the State Department was worried that "the Soviet Union now may have a closer, more productive alliance with Communist China than we do with Japan."⁷² Although it was recognized that "the death of Stalin will create many problems of adjustment in China-Soviet relations," and their entente was vulnerable ideologically and nationalistically, it was nevertheless felt that "the Mao regime will continue its allegiance to the Soviet Union."⁷³

Korean Armistice

The termination of the Korean War in July 1953 initially led the Americans to reinforce their hard line against China.⁷⁴ In Japan the reaction was rather different. Public opinion was already⁷⁵ responding favorably to Beijing's "people's diplomacy" initiatives. In September, the Central

⁶⁹ "Which of the two camps will be split first?" "The communists will split first": 29.1 percent; "Democrats will split first": 11.8 percent; "Others": 16.9 percent; "Don't know": 26.2 percent; "Don't know Red China": 15.5 percent. Sample: urban 1,807; rural 1,246. Reply: 87.2 percent (rural data weighted double). *The World and Japan* 2 (15 August 1953), Enc. in Berger to DOS, 611.94/9-2253, NA.

⁷⁰ Suma Yakichirō et al., "Mō Takutō jidai to Nihon no kiki," *Maru* 6, no. 10 (October 1953): 78.

⁷¹ Ishikawa Shigeru, "Chū-So kankei o kettei suru yōin," *Soren Kenkyū* 2, no. 9 (September 1953): 21. An exception was Takeda Nan'yō, "Chūkyō—Soren ippentō no gendankai," *Soren Kenkyū* 2, no. 8 (Aug. 1953): 36-46.

⁷² Office Memo, Young (NEA), to Robertson and Johnson (FE), "US Policies in Japan," 9 September 1953, 611.94/9-953, NA.

⁷³ J. Barnard to Paul Nitze, "Vulnerabilities of the Sino-Soviet Entente", 3 April 1953, DDRS 1993/727.

⁷⁴ Chang, *Friends and Enemies*, 89-90.

⁷⁵ In 1953, the number of Japanese visitors to China totalled 139, up from fifty the previous year, and just nine in 1951. *Chūgoku nenkan* (Tōkyō: Ishisaki Shoten, 1959), 57. Moreover, an *Asahi Shinbun* poll conducted in June 1953, found that 38 percent believed Japan should be "neutralist" as opposed to 35 percent "pro-American," 1 percent "pro-Soviet," and 26 percent "other/D.K." The comparable figures for September 1950, were: 22 percent, 55 percent, 0 percent, and 23 percent, respectively. Douglas Mendel, *The Japanese People and Foreign Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), 43.

Executive Committee of the Left-Japan Socialist Party (JSP) went so far as to propose that a Sino-Soviet-American joint security guarantee for Japan replace both the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and the Sino-Soviet alliance.⁷⁶ More threatening to Yoshida, however, were the bonds being forged between those business groups interested in trade with the communist countries, Shigemitsu Mamoru's Progressive Party, and the breakaway Hatoyama faction from Yoshida's own Liberal Party (Jiyūtō).⁷⁷ On the eve of the signature of the Korean armistice, they helped pass a Diet resolution demanding that the government temporarily reduce its embargo to a level "as low as the Western European countries."⁷⁸ Although intended as an attack on the prime minister, it was seized upon by Yoshida as a useful weapon in his battle with Washington over the China trade. A formal request to shorten the list prompted the new U.S. ambassador in Tōkyō, John M. Allison, to complain that "Tokyo ... still basically holds to the theories of the durability of [the] communist capture of China and of the possibility of facilitating the alienation of Peking from Moscow."⁷⁹ Dulles's response was more accommodating, however.

In October, while a delegation from the Diet members' League was inspecting trade prospects in China (and signing a second unofficial trade agreement), Yoshida again sent his protégé Ikeda Hayato to Washington.⁸⁰ Ikeda's talks, better known for the compromise reached on Japanese rear-

⁷⁶ J.A.A. Stockwin, "'Positive Neutrality'—The Foreign Policy of the JSP," *Asian Survey* 2, no. 9 (Nov. 1962): 38.

⁷⁷ Radtke, *China's Relations*, 99, 101. In April, Kazami Akira, an independent Diet member, helped to bring them together in the Alliance for the Promotion of Normalised Diplomatic Relations with China and the Soviet Union (Nitchū Nisso Kokkō Chōsei Sokushin Dōmei). By the autumn it had developed into a general coordinating body: the National Conference for the Restoration of Diplomatic Relations with China and the Soviet Union (Nitchū Nisso Kokkō Kaifuku Koku-min Kaigi), and was led by Majima Kan, a medical doctor. "Nisso kōshō to sayoku no senden katsudō," *Nippon oyobi Nipponjin* 6, no. 8 (August 1955): 34–37.

⁷⁸ The resolution was sponsored by the recently revived Diet Members' League for the Promotion of Sino-Japanese Trade led by Ikeda Masanosuke, a leading light in Hatoyama Ichirō's breakaway Liberal Party. The league was by now the largest inter-party organization in the Diet, comprising not only all the socialists, but forty-plus progressives, and more than seventy members of Yoshida's own conservative Liberals. Qing Simei, "The Eisenhower Administration and Changes in Western Embargo Policy Against China, 1954–1958," in *The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953–1960*, ed. Warren Cohen and Akira Iriye (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 121–42.

⁷⁹ Allison to DOS, "American Leadership and Japan," 3 September 1953, FRUS, 1952–54, XIV, 1495.

⁸⁰ Jain, *China and Japan*, 29.

mament, also produced partial agreement on the trade issue.⁸¹ Six months later, on 8 March 1954, Japan and the United States signed the Mutual Security Assistance Agreement and within a few days the United States finally agreed to release Japan “gradually, as appropriate” from its obligations under the September 1952 agreement on China trade controls.⁸² It is not difficult to imagine that the former acted as some kind of quid pro quo for the latter. Yoshida’s success produced a 75 percent jump in Sino-Japanese trade, but this was not sufficient to satisfy his critics at home, let alone Beijing.

THE “YOSHIDA THESIS” REBORN

Difficult Delivery

By late 1953, the Japanese Foreign Ministry once again appeared rather dismissive of prospects for a Sino-Soviet rift. At the China Desk, Takeuchi Harumi told the Americans that he “did not think that there was any chance at [the] present time or in [the] foreseeable future of Japan or any other nation weaning Communist China away from its intimate ties with Moscow.”⁸³ His boss, Wajima Eiji, was less certain. He basically concurred with the majority view that “a general mutuality of interests in the Far East made continued Sino-Soviet ties a strong probability for some time to come.” But he also believed that if the Soviet Union resisted China’s emerging “peaceful coexistence” strategy, “the opportunity would present itself to approach Peking in an effort to widen whatever crack developed.” Apparently, Wajima was not alone; others in the Foreign Ministry “had considered significant the different manner in which the repatriation of Japanese had been handled during the past year by the Chinese Communist and Soviet governments.”⁸⁴ They had also “detected certain differences in the approach taken by the Soviet and Chinese representa-

⁸¹ Hosoya Chihiro, “From the Yoshida Letter to the Nixon Shock,” in *The United States and Japan*, ed. Akira Iriye and Warren Cohen (Lexington: Kentucky University Press, 1989), 23.

⁸² Memo, McClurkin to Drumwright, 14 April 1954, FRUS, 1952–52, XIV, 1634–35.

⁸³ MC, Takeuchi Harumi and Lutkins, 7 December 1953, 693.94/12–753, NA.

⁸⁴ He also mentioned speculation that “Russia might have given Peking pretty much of a free hand in the Far East and might in particular have allotted her the leading role in implementing communist bloc strategy toward Japan.” This “division of labor” theory was to prove very popular in the later 1950s as a way of explaining away conflicting Sino-Soviet policies in East Asia without recognizing the emerging rift. MC, Wajima Eiji and Lutkins, 21 December 1953, 693.94/12–2153, NA.

tives at Geneva.”⁸⁵ The Geneva Peace Conference held out the prospect of a new era of détente in East Asia. Opinion polls reported strong support for trade and even diplomatic relations with China from all areas of Japanese society.⁸⁶ Perhaps it is not surprising therefore that Yoshida chose this moment to relaunch his “thesis.”⁸⁷

In late May, Yoshida ordered both the Foreign Ministry and the Cabinet Research Office (Naikaku Chōsashitsu) to undertake a high priority study of the immediate prospects for a Sino-Soviet rift and what steps Japan might take to hasten the process.⁸⁸ We now know that this recently declassified and detailed report expressed “many doubts about whether Sino-Soviet relations are [characterized by] brotherly love, but they are mutually beneficial.” Hence, it predicted that only “when they are economically equal will it be possible [for China] to become ‘independent.’” Finally, the report’s authors concluded rather pessimistically that “Mao Zedong is totally committed to the Soviet Union ... [and] as long as Mao Zedong is alive Communist China will not become a second Yugoslavia.”⁸⁹ Without waiting for the results, however, Yoshida had approached Ambassador Allison, informing him that

by a judicious combination of diplomatic persuasion and pressure exerted from the Western Pacific island chain Peking could be weaned away from its dependence upon and alliance with the Soviet Union and the stage might even be set for the unseating of the Chinese Communist Regime. ... The Japanese ... because of their long

⁸⁵ Interestingly, Dulles suppressed news of “Peking’s displeasure with modest Soviet support ... [lest it] encourage Asian wishful thinking that China was more Asian than communist and that a reasonable accommodation could be reached with Peking.” 26 April 1954, FRUS 1952–54, XVI, 621.

⁸⁶ Wilbur Martin, “Some Findings of Japanese Opinion Polls,” in *Japan Between East and West*, ed. Hugh Borton et al. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations/Harper, 1957), 310–11.

⁸⁷ Yoshida later claimed that just after the fall of Dienbienphu (7 May 1954) he had once again broached with Dulles his plan to use overseas Chinese as agents to fight the communists in China. Kern to Robertson, 11 December 1958, 611.94/12–1158, NA.

⁸⁸ MC, Allison and Yoshida, 28 May 1954, Enc. in AmEmbTok to DOS, 794.00/7–2054, NA.

⁸⁹ “Chūkūyō no genjō to sono dōkō”, 8 August 1954, [A–0137/10/0009–89], Gaimushō Shiryōkan, Tōkyō. It should be noted that rumors circulating at this time claimed that “the Asian Affairs Bureau’s researches about the Soviet Union and Communist China are low-key.” The reason, it was suggested, was that anyone producing positive reports was blacklisted (*chūi jinbutsu*) and in such an atmosphere “no able officers like[d] to remain at the China Desk and those who do keep silent.” Mukohara Tatsuzō, “Gaimushō,” *Chūō Kōron* 69, no. 11 (November 1954): 98–99.

experience on the mainland could play a valuable role in promoting these desirable developments by working to reconcile American and British policies toward China.⁹⁰

The U.S. Embassy dismissed it all as a mere “restate[ment of] the hoary thesis, so dear to Japanese ‘Old China Hands.’”⁹¹ This assessment was confirmed by a former diplomat, Hirasawa Kazushige, when he unfavorably contrasted

the older generation of Japanese diplomats and politicians ... [with] younger informed Japanese bureaucrats [who] are aware that there is little possibility of splitting Communist China from the USSR in the next few years [because] Communist China’s economy and its plans for industrial development are closely geared to the Soviet economy.⁹²

The generation gap was not the only dimension to the Japanese split on the “Yoshida thesis.” An “interesting difference of opinion,” for instance, was said to exist “within the Foreign Office between the Soviet and China Desks.” According to Niizeki Kin’ya, in charge of the former:

All signs indicate that the Soviet Union and Communist China are currently bound by the closest ideological, economic and national security ties; there is nothing to indicate that any significant parting of the ways can be expected in the foreseeable future.⁹³

In contrast, Ogawa Heishirō, the new man in charge of the China Desk, claimed that “the possibility should not be ruled out, even within the next few years of a real divergence of Sino-Soviet interests, in the economic field at least.” Niizeki predicted a Russian unilateral initiative to normalize relations with Japan “before long,” whereas Ogawa thought that “the apparent inability of Russia to supply all the equipment and services which China desires in order to carry out her industrialization plans ... would lead Peking to adopt a more conciliatory policy toward Japan and the West.” Yet the differences should not be overdrawn. Ogawa was, after all, the main author of the pessimistic Foreign Ministry report commissioned by Yoshida on the Sino-Soviet rift. Moreover, in the long term, Nii-

⁹⁰ Berger to DOS, “Foreign Office Views on Geneva Conference and Sino-Soviet Relations”, 11 June 1954, 693.94/6–1154, NA.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² MC, Hirasawa Kazushige and Richard Lamb, 9 July 1954, 794.13/7–2054, NA.

⁹³ MC, Niizeki Kin’ya and Lutkins, 27 May 1954, Enc. in Berger to DOS, 693.94/6–1154, NA.

zeki thought that “serious potential tensions undoubtedly exist and Russia, for her part, probably feels real concern about the growth of Chinese military and industrial power.” Furthermore, Ogawa recognized that “security considerations and the reluctance of Peking to carry out a major readjustment of the country’s foreign trade, now so overwhelmingly oriented toward Moscow, could operate to prevent the Chinese leaders from proceeding far in [Japan’s] direction.”⁹⁴ Yet such intra-ministry differences were probably a factor in the decision by a gathering of Japanese diplomatic envoys in Europe that summer⁹⁵ to improve the system for collecting information on China and Russia.

In July, a multi-party Japanese delegation returned from a peace conference in Sweden via Moscow and Beijing. Nishimura Naomi, the Liberal Party leader of the group, was surprised at the “wide differences” he observed between the two. He suggested this might reflect differences between Europe and Asia, or the fact that “the Soviet Union is a grown-up country, whereas Communist China is a young one.” Not every member of the team shared this view, however. Nakasone Yasuhiro (Progressive Party), for example, concluded that “The Soviet Union and Communist China are one and undivided and have organized a strong united front.”⁹⁶ Three days later, Foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo—reversing the logic of the “Yoshida thesis”—claimed that because of the Japan-ROC Peace Treaty it was “much easier for Japan to normalize relations with the USSR than with Communist China.”⁹⁷

It was assumed at the time that Yoshida was not very happy at this.⁹⁸ Yet during August, Fukunaga Kazuomi of Yoshida’s Liberal Party and the Foreign Ministry’s Ushiba Nobuhiko were allowed to visit the Soviet Union to discuss trade and fisheries problems.⁹⁹ The Foreign Ministry also withdrew its opposition to a visit by a Chinese Red Cross delegation.¹⁰⁰ But most importantly, Ikeda Hayato, now Liberal Party secretary-

⁹⁴ MC, Ogawa Takeo [sic] and Lutkins, 1 June 1954, Enc. in Berger to DOS, 693.94/6-1154, NA.

⁹⁵ Memo, 25 August 1954, A 1838/283-731/3/11, AA.

⁹⁶ Nishimura Naomi, “Watashi wa akai kuni Soren, Chūkyō o kō mita,” and Nakasone Yasuhiro, “Fukami niwa yoru to yakedo,” *Jitsugyō no Nihon* 57, no. 21 (1 September 1954): 44, 47.

⁹⁷ Allison to Dulles, 24 July 1954, 661.94/7-2454, NA.

⁹⁸ Allison to Dulles, 30 July 1954, 661.94/7-3054, NA.

⁹⁹ “Shindankai ni haita Chū-So kokkō kaifuku,” *Ekonomisuto* 32, no. 45 (6 November 1954): 16-17, and James Morley, *Soviet and Communist Chinese Policies toward Japan, 1950-57* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957), 8.

¹⁰⁰ The delegation, led by Mrs. Li Dequan, was the first “official” visit by representatives of the PRC to postwar Japan. Following informal conversations with Ministry of Welfare officials, the delegation signed a new repatriation agree-xxx

general, made a speech to party leaders asserting that "This is not the time for Japan to choose outright between West and East ... Japan's attitude should be characterized by greater flexibility in foreign and economic policy."¹⁰¹ Ambassador Allison¹⁰² concluded in brutal terms that "Japan is for sale to the highest bidder."¹⁰² As usual, he was over-reacting. Ikeda's "trial balloon" was soon deflated. A report by his party's Foreign Policy Research Council (Gaikō Chōsakai), issued later in August, expressed support for increased trade with Beijing and associated visits, but specifically excluded early diplomatic recognition.¹⁰³

The Sino-Soviet Joint Declaration and the Fall of Yoshida

Despite the serious crisis developing in the Taiwan Straits, another multi-party Diet members' mission led by Yamaguchi Kikuichirō visited Beijing in early October, in an effort to undermine Yoshida's official China policy.¹⁰⁴ In wide-ranging talks with Zhou Enlai, the Chinese premier "expressed opinions on Japanese rearmament, economic independence, the historical influence of Sino-Japanese friendship, Chinese industrialization and peaceful coexistence, cultural exchange, the problem of Japanese recognition, war criminals, residents, communications, fishing, and trade problems."¹⁰⁵ The group was told that China wished to sign a peace treaty establishing normal relations as soon as Japan was truly independent, democratic, and free. It would then be possible to conclude a non-aggression pact.¹⁰⁶ Delegates generally agreed that "China was neither Titoist nor a satellite, but rather a junior partner advancing toward increasing equality."¹⁰⁷ For one writer, "This visit became the starting point for the rapid development of economic, cultural and other 'friendly' (non-offi-

ment. In addition, trade matters were discussed with Murata Shōzō of the Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade (JAPIT). More surprisingly, several meetings took place between members of the delegation and Ogawa Heishiro, head of the China Desk at the Foreign Ministry, an early supporter of the Chinese visit. Radtke, *China's Relations*, 102, 105, and 114 n. 83; A. Doak Barnett, *Communist China and Asia* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations/Vintage, 1960), 264, and Jain, *China and Japan*, 20.

¹⁰¹ Allison to Dulles, 11 August 1954, FRUS, 1952–54, XIV, 1698–99.

¹⁰² Allison to Dulles, 25 August 1954, FRUS, 1952–54, XIV, 1714–15.

¹⁰³ Fukui, *Party in Power*, 237.

¹⁰⁴ Allan Cole, George Totten, and Cecil Uyehara, *Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 228.

¹⁰⁵ Gaimushō, *Nitchū kankei kihon shiryō shū* (Tōkyō: Kasankai, 1970), 345.

¹⁰⁶ Barnett, *Communist China and Asia*, 265.

¹⁰⁷ *Tōkatsudō* 97 (10 November 1954), cited in Cole, Totten, and Uyehara, *Socialist Parties*, 228.

cial) exchanges between Japan¹⁰⁹ and the PRC.”¹⁰⁸ For Yoshida, however, it was the beginning of the end. The delegation’s visit had coincided with the signature by Mao and Khrushchev, on 12 October 1954, of a joint declaration reaffirming: “their readiness to take steps to normalize their relations with Japan.”¹¹⁰ In itself this was nothing new, but it now served as the focus for a conservative-socialist marriage of convenience that would topple Yoshida, and install his great rival, the aging and infirm Hatoyama Ichirō, in his stead.

Yoshida himself was away on a diplomatic world tour at this time. In Europe, he repeated the same message in every capital he visited: “Our aim must be to detach the Chinese from the Russians who were not natural friends.”¹¹¹ Earlier he had astonished his hosts, and “surprised and embarrassed” the Japanese diplomats present, by dreaming up a new scheme to help bring it about.¹¹² His plan called for “some sort of organisation in Singapore” to which “the US, UK, French, and the Japanese would send representatives to exchange information and discuss means for countering communist propaganda.”¹¹³ The British refused to support the scheme. He

¹⁰⁸ Radtke, *China’s Relations*, 104. It was also instrumental in reconciling remaining foreign policy differences between the Left- and Right-wing Socialist Parties, thereby accelerating the process of reunification which came to fruition twelve months later. See, for example, Tetsuya Kataoka, *The Price of a Constitution* (New York: Crane Russak, 1991), 138.

¹⁰⁹ While they were away, the organizational structure of the non-communist, but pro-communist-trade movement underwent something of a facelift. In late September, an important new body was formed, the Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade (Nihon Kokusai Bōeki Sokushin Kyōkai), with Murata Shōzō as president. Other leading members included such liberal politicians as Ishibashi Tanzan, Kitamura Tokutarō, and Fujiyama Aiichirō, and businessmen like Takasaki Tatsunosuke (president of Tōyō Seikan) and Kay Reinosuke (chairman of Tōkyō Electric). The following month saw the establishment of the latest version of the coordinating body founded by Majima Kan.

Now called the National Conference for the Restoration of Diplomatic Relations with China and the Soviet Union, it was to spawn prefectural conferences throughout the country. James Morley, “The Soviet-Japanese Peace Declaration,” *Political Science Quarterly* 72 (September 1957): 375; “Shinten suru tai nisso kokkō kaifuku undō,” *Ekonomisuto* 33, no. 9 (26 February 1955): 18–19, and Oga-ta Sadako, “The Business Community and Japanese Foreign Policy,” in *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*, ed. Robert Scalapino (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 179.

¹¹⁰ Cited in Shao Chuan Leng, *Japan and Communist China* (Kyōto: Dōshisha University Press, 1958), 7.

¹¹¹ “Record of Discussions at PM’s Dinner for Yoshida,” 27 October 1954, PREM 11/3852, Public Records Office, Kew [Hereafter PRO].

¹¹² Allen to Far Eastern Dept., 28 October 1954, FO 371/110418 (FJ 1075/1), PRO.

¹¹³ Blakeney (Washington) to Secretary for External Affairs, 3 November 1954, A 1838/283–730/3/19, AA. The Australians suspected that it was a “propaganda

repeated the proposal in Washington.¹¹⁴ Dulles politely called the new plan “a very interesting suggestion.” However, following Yoshida’s disrespectful bundling from office in December, the scheme was quietly¹¹⁵ buried, until resurrected by Yoshida’s protégé, Ikeda Hayato, in April 1963.

SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Perceptions

Yoshida’s China policy was rooted in three fixed ideas. First, that the Japan-U.S. alliance was much stronger than the Sino-Soviet one. Second, that “the Chinese communists were Chinese first and communists second.”¹¹⁶ And third, that through trade the West could infect Communist China with the values of capitalist democracy. Unfortunately for Yoshida, most members of the U.S. government did not share his convictions. Washington, in contrast, felt that Japan was more vulnerable to communist contamination through exchanges with the Socialist bloc than vice versa. And even if Tōkyō did not withdraw into politico-strategic neutrality, it was believed that trade with Japan could only strengthen the communist economies. The United States recognized that the Sino-Soviet alliance rested on strategic and ideological as well as economic common interests, but saw Japan’s international position as determined primarily by commercial imperatives. Hence, the Americans concluded that it was essential to prevent Japan from becoming economically dependent on the communist allies, and to “contain” the latter. With such a large perception gap, it should come as no surprise to hear Yoshida denouncing the American’s inability to understand China:

It is the British and Japanese with many years of accumulated experience in the problems of China who best understand the psychology of the Chinese people. America has not reached the point of truly knowing China.¹¹⁷

exercise ... designed to exert influence through the US on the rest of the free world to adopt more liberal trade policies toward Japan.”

¹¹⁴ US Summary Minutes of Meeting, Dulles and Yoshida, 9 November 1954, FRUS, 1952–54, XIV, 1779–80.

¹¹⁵ The specific U.S. objection was that “it would cut across the aims and objectives of the Manila Pact,” meaning SEATO, and they proposed instead “a high-level bilateral consultative body in Tōkyō.” MC, Sebald and Ambassador Iguchi Sadao, 30 December 1954, FRUS, 1952–54, XIV, 1816–17.

¹¹⁶ Hagiwara Tōru, Treaty Bureau Director, Foreign Ministry, cited in Yoshitsu, *Japan and San Francisco*, 68.

¹¹⁷ Yoshida Shigeru, *Kaisō jūnen*, vol. 1 (Tōkyō: Shinchōsha, 1957), 270.

Japan's China policy was directed at Washington (and to a lesser degree, London), rather than Beijing. Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru tried hard to reconcile his essentially post-imperial vision of China with the Cold War realpolitik of U.S. "containment" strategy. He hoped to persuade the Americans to allow Japan to keep open a channel to the Chinese communists, in order to accelerate their disenchantment with Moscow. But once the Cold War turned hot, with North Korea's invasion of the South, the contradictions simply became too great. By channel, Yoshida meant primarily trade relations, although he did attempt to fashion a peace treaty with Taipei that would afford Tōkyō the option of signing a separate treaty with Beijing at a later date. Still, Richard Nixon's assertion that "had [Yoshida] not retired in 1954, Japan might well have reopened [diplomatic] relations with China in the 1950s rather than the 1970s," remains speculative.¹¹⁸

Motivations

If we accept that Yoshida's perception of China was based on his prewar experience, that still leaves unanswered the question of whether it was this that really lay behind his China policy. After a career shot through with contradictions between words and deeds, there will always be areas of ambiguity: but two misconceptions can now be cleared up. First, that his "thesis" was simply a ruse to persuade the Americans to increase their aid to Japan or to relax the embargo against China. If that had been the case, then surely Yoshida would not have persisted with it long after it became clear that its effect on Washington was counterproductive. He would not have frequently lectured his advisors in the Foreign Ministry about how "Chinese ethnocentrism and superiority would inevitably lead to a clash or rivalry with Soviet leaders."¹¹⁹ Nor would he have expended so much domestic political capital attempting to block the expansion of Sino-Japanese trade. The opposite view, namely that Yoshida was in Washington's pocket—making a show of resisting the US-led embargo for the sake of domestic popularity, while selling out Japanese traders behind their backs—is equally fallacious. If that had been the case, then it would surely not have been necessary for Dulles and others to engage in such prolonged arm-twisting. Moreover, on those occasions when Yoshida sought to block the expansion of Sino-Japanese trade, he did so only in an effort to prevent political opponents at home gaining control of this po-

¹¹⁸ Richard Nixon, *Leaders* (New York: Warner Books, 1982), 133.

¹¹⁹ Fujisaki Masato, Treaty Bureau Section Chief, Foreign Ministry, cited in Yoshitsu, *Japan and San Francisco*, 68.

tentially lucrative relationship. Yet when the "Yoshida thesis" directly conflicted with Japan's political or economic survival, it was simply not his highest priority.

One might best characterize Yoshida's position as a kind of safety valve, playing up domestic pro-China-trade sentiment to the Americans and playing down the potential of China trade at home, and thereby preventing a confrontation where U.S. and Japanese national interests came into most direct conflict, i.e., over China. Like Janus, Yoshida had two faces, one for the Japanese and one for the Americans. This was unavoidable because he had two masters: he needed the support of the U.S. government as much as, if not more than, the Japanese electorate and his party colleagues. In short, the picture of Yoshida that emerges from this study is of a moderate pragmatist, an advocate of "soft power," pursuing a doctrine of suppressed nationalism.

Decision-Making System

Finally, there is the question of to what extent Yoshida could dictate Japanese policy toward China. He has gained a reputation for exercising a "one-man-rule," and certainly considered foreign policy his personal prerogative. Yoshida served as his own foreign minister under the Occupation, and thereafter gave the post to an ex-diplomat and loyal subordinate, Okazaki Katsuo. Yet even within the ruling Liberal Party, Yoshida did not enjoy a completely free hand, especially once Hatoyama Ichirō and his associates were released from the purge in 1951–52. Thereafter, they managed to steal the normalization issue and use it to effectively undermine Yoshida's leadership.

The 1950s was a period when bureaucrats supposedly dominated policy-making in Japan, yet the Foreign Ministry was not invulnerable to political pressure. Ironically, the ministry's ability to control Japan's developing relations with the PRC was severely constrained by the lack of official diplomatic ties. This enabled politicians, both within the government and without, to pursue their own agendas. All were examples of "amateur diplomacy" in the eyes of the Foreign Ministry professionals, but were nonetheless effective for that. The Foreign Ministry's position was further weakened by internal divisions and conflict with MITI.

Beyond this inner ruling circle, a number of other actors competed for a say in the policy-making process. Perhaps foremost among these were business interests. Yoshida was always alert to the demands of Kansai-based traders, who hoped to restore their prewar economic relationship with China. The divided Japanese Left also contributed to the revival of Sino-Japanese trade and helped to negotiate the repatriation of Japanese

nationals from the mainland. It enjoyed considerable popular support but could never command sufficient votes in the Diet or at the ballot box to offer a serious political challenge. Moreover, public opinion in general played a very small role in setting Japan's foreign policy agenda during this period.

Finally, American influence was overwhelming. Japan felt dependent on the United States for its security and prosperity, and naturally Washington exploited this fact. The habits established during nearly seven years of Occupation were slow to die. Tōkyō had very little influence over the policy process in Washington. As one scholar has pointedly observed, "Even if Yoshida was right, Japan lacked the power and economic position to hasten the rift."¹²⁰ In short, it was the U.S. "monolith" that was to cast the longest shadow over Japan.

Notes

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Japan Politics Group, Fourth Annual Colloquium, University of Sterling, Scotland, 9 July 1996. It forms the first part of a much larger project examining Japan's response to the rise and fall of the Sino-Soviet alliance, 1950 to 1964.

¹²⁰ P.A. Narasimha Murthy, "Japan's Changing Relations with People's China and the Soviet Union," *International Studies* VII, no. 1 (July 1965): 8.

JAPANESE RELATIONS IN NORTHEAST ASIA: CHINA AND SOVIET INTERFERENCE

Joachim GLAUBITZ

Japan and its neighbors on the continent, China, Russia, and Korea, have had extremely difficult relations at least since the second half of the nineteenth century. Due to this legacy, even at present the relations among these neighbors are not completely free of tensions. In the past, the most powerful antagonists were Russia and China. After the demise of the Soviet empire, China is left and seems to become an increasing concern for Japan.

China and Japan, the two politically most important and spiritually most influential countries in East Asia, share a long history of changing relations. This is true also for this century. Already one hundred years ago, China experienced the overwhelming power of an imperialist Japan which raised claims and rights of sovereignty on Chinese territory. As a result of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, China was forced to cede Taiwan to Japan. In 1905, as the result of Japan's victory over Tsarist Russia, it took away all the Kurile Islands and the whole of Sakhalin. Six years later, Korea became a colony of Japan and remained so until the end of the Second World War.

After the First World War, Japan became the colonial heir of Germany in China. In 1922, Japan invaded the Shandong peninsula, established a puppet state called Manchukuo a decade later, and in 1937 started an open war against China.

The outcome is well known: Japan lost the war. After the dropping of two A-bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it formally surrendered to the United States on 2 September 1945, and seven days later also to Chiang Kaishek.

The increasing tension between the United States and the Soviet Union after the Second World War deeply influenced the Sino-Japanese relationship. China, which came under communist rule in 1949, had no choice than to lean toward Moscow. In 1950, after lengthy and difficult negotiations, Mao Zedong and Stalin agreed to conclude a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, which was explicitly directed against Japan. When a few months after the conclusion of this treaty a communist-led Korean army crossed the 38th parallel on 25 June 1950 and invaded South Korea, tensions between the communist and the non-communist

camps reached a first peak. Since China became engaged in the Korean War the relations between Japan and China, fragile as they were at that time, further deteriorated. With the Peace Treaty of San Francisco signed in 1951, Japan got back its sovereignty; the occupation of the country was formally terminated, and at the same time a security treaty with the United States was concluded.

This constellation excluded any chance between Tōkyō and Beijing to establish official relations. Under pressure from Washington, Japan had to recognize the Nationalist government of Chiang Kaishek on Taiwan and to conclude a peace treaty with Taipei. Japan, the former enemy, became a close ally of the United States and an important strategic instrument against an increasing communist threat in East Asia.

Although Washington exercised a policy of containment of the People's Republic of China and decided to impose a severe trade embargo, Japanese business circles soon reestablished private trade relations with the Chinese communists. The interest in trading with each other was on both sides. In 1964, the Japanese side even approved to open unofficial trade offices. The government in Tōkyō with regard to China adhered at that time to the principle of the "separation of politics and economy" (*seikei bunri*). The Chinese, however, always tried to undermine this principle and to link politics and economy. They made attractive economic offers in order to get political concessions.

For more than two decades—from the beginning of the Korean war in 1950 until the restoring of an American-Chinese dialogue in 1971—the Sino-American confrontation blocked official relations of almost the whole Western world with Communist China. Among the very few exceptions one was significant: France. President de Gaulle, deliberately opposing Washington's policy, officially recognized the PRC in 1964. Japan as well as West Germany did not dare to do the same, although there were influential politicians in both states who wished to improve political relations with China. Tōkyō's as well as Bonn's foreign policy was too strongly dependent on the United States.

When Henry Kissinger, then President Richard Nixon's security adviser, returned in July 1971 from a secret visit to Beijing and Nixon announced that he would visit China in 1972, the government and people of Japan were shocked. It was this so-called Nixon shock which gave Japan's policy toward China a new start: Tōkyō began to rethink its relations with Beijing. China, by skillfully exploiting the situation, was largely able to impose its own conditions for normalization with Japan. This process reveals a characteristic weakness of Japan's policy vis-à-vis China.

Analyzing the sensational news that President Nixon will visit China in

early 1972, influential Japanese public figures and mass media became louder and louder in their demands for normalization in relations with China. The Chinese question soon came to dominate treatment of foreign policy in the Japanese press. The government realized that so far no Japanese policy on China existed. Prime Minister Satō Eisaku came under increasing pressure and was confronted with the urgent demand for normalization of relations with Beijing, if possible to preempt the United States.

China exploited the Japanese reaction. It presented the Japanese government with three conditions for the establishment of official contact, all of which concerned the status of Taiwan:

- the recognition of the government of the PRC as the sole legal government of the Chinese people;
- the stipulation that Taiwan should be regarded as an inseparable part of the territory of the PRC;
- the renunciation of the peace treaty concluded in 1952 by Japan and the government of Chiang Kaishek.

The Chinese leaders reiterated these conditions at all meetings with Japanese visitors.

Prime Minister Satō wanted to normalize relations with China, but he was unwilling to accept the conditions China presented. Beijing's reaction remained firm. It strictly rejected official contact with Satō's government while agreeing in principle to normalization. In this difficult situation the Japanese mass media created a mood of normalization euphoria, combining moral viewpoints with an emotional call for peace, which received widespread support. Carefully selected invitations to influential members of the Japanese elite helped the Chinese government to influence the formation of opinions within the governing party to China's advantage. The methods China applied were a classic example of the efficiency of its "people's diplomacy": by-passing the Japanese government system and turning instead to more "open-minded" groups and influential individuals. It was the aim of this indirect approach to influence governmental decisions in China's favor. The rash of invitations alone demonstrates the resolution of this people's diplomacy during the run-up to actual normalization: 1969 saw 2,643 Japanese visiting China, while only seven (!) Chinese visited Japan. In 1971 the figures were 5,718 and 74 respectively.¹

Satō, increasingly regarded as an obstacle on the path to Sino-Japanese détente, was finally forced to concede to this pressure and resigned on 6

¹ Ueno Hideo, *Gendai Nitchū kankei no tenkai* (Tōkyō and Ōsaka: Futaba Shoten, 1974), 271 and *Japan Times*, 17 Jan. 1972, 5.

July 1972. The most promising candidates to succeed Satō were Fukuda Takeo and Tanaka Kakuei. Both men favored the normalization of relations between Japan and China, but with one difference: while Fukuda let it be known that he would only negotiate without the imposition of preconditions, Tanaka had repeatedly made clear that he was willing to accommodate Beijing further. China's Premier Zhou Enlai had already expressed his pessimism at the prospects of normalisation in the event of Fukuda becoming prime minister. The precise influence of this assessment on the election of the new head of government in Tōkyō is hard to estimate today; however, taking the whole atmosphere in those days into consideration it was probably effective.

The approach adopted by China clearly shows the difference in status between the United States and Japan from Beijing's point of view. China was holding talks with a high-ranking U.S. government representative, i.e., Henry Kissinger, without setting preconditions, and even declared the intention of receiving the president of the United States. At the same time, the leaders in Beijing were piling up obstacles in the path of a Japan eager to establish official contact. Only after fulfilling conditions which, if not unacceptable, were certainly on the verge of being humiliating, was Japan offered the prospect of talks at government level. At the same time, by letting Tōkyō know whom China would prefer as prime minister it was interfering in Japanese party politics. From the Chinese point of view, too early a start of official talks with Tōkyō would have improved Japan's political image, above all in Asia, which ran counter to Chinese intentions. As a consequence, priority was given to direct talks with the United States, while Japan was put on ice to increase its willingness to agree to concessions.

The majority Liberal Democratic Party elected Tanaka as its new leader and thus simultaneously as the new prime minister. At a press conference, he declared that the time was ripe for relations with China to be normalized. After having formed his first cabinet on 7 July 1972, Tanaka announced that the process of normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China would be accelerated.² Only two days later, Zhou Enlai made a statement welcoming Tanaka's intention of normalizing relations with his country. The next day, Tanaka received an invitation to visit China from Zhou Enlai. He accepted the invitation. Beijing immediately reacted by officially reporting the Japanese prime minister's intention of visiting China, adding that Zhou Enlai welcomed him and invited him to

² Gaimushō, ed., *Waga gaikō no kinkyō*, Shōwa 48 (1973), vol. 17, (Tōkyō: [Gaimushō], 1973), 126.

visit. This followed the same pattern as the announcement of the visit by the American president. In Tanaka's case, too, it was important for China to announce publicly that the desire to visit originated not with the host, but with the guest.

In September 1972, Tanaka went to Beijing and established full diplomatic relations with the PRC. At the same time, official relations between Japan and Taiwan were severed; the 1952 peace treaty with Chiang Kaishek was declared null and void. This unprecedented decision has never been discussed in the Diet or by Japanese scholars of international law.

Looking back to these decisive events the question comes up, why was it possible that Japan yielded to China's demands giving up former positions. First, the whole issue had a lot to do with the international environment of those days. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the United States was heavily involved in the war in Vietnam, fighting an ally of China. The hostility between China and the United States appeared to be close to a military confrontation should China engage in Vietnam with its own forces. Under these circumstances Japanese politicians were convinced that their country because of its historical experience, cultural affinity, and current trade relations with China could act as a mediator between Beijing and Washington. However, this assumption turned out to be wrong. Contacts between China and the United States were a delicate matter; every step into the direction of official contacts had to be done in an atmosphere of mutual confidence not disturbed by curious journalists. Beijing and Washington very cautiously started to approach each other first via Romania, and later via Pakistan. Henry Kissinger kept apart from any public contact, took off for his secret visit to Beijing on 9 July from Islamabad. Besides Nixon and Kissinger, only a very few people were involved in the preparation of this trip. Secrecy was a precondition for the success of the mission. Therefore, none of the U.S. allies was informed in advance. Japan never played a role in this process. It was taken by complete surprise, and this considerably weakened its position vis-à-vis China.

Armin Meyer, U.S. ambassador to Japan at that time, heard President Nixon's announcement about his forthcoming visit to China on radio. His initial reaction about not having been informed in advance was bitterness, a reaction that was shared by many other Americans and Japanese in Tōkyō. Later, however, he admitted that this delicate mission could not have been handled in a different manner. His argument was that the Japanese were chronically unable to maintain confidentiality, and, as quoted by Kissinger, he added, that "Japanese policy was not undercut by ours

but only deprived of its desired opportunity to stay *ahead* of us on a road it had started traveling long before we did.”³

Another event that put pressure on Tōkyō’s China policy was the decision in September 1971 to pass the Chinese seat within the United Nations to the People’s Republic of China. So far, China was represented in the world organization by the Nationalist Chinese government (Republic of China) in Taiwan. Consequently, one Western country after another established diplomatic relations with Beijing. This development intensified the desire within Japan and especially within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to also start official negotiations with China.

Since Japan’s mass media reported without restrictions the mood of the Japanese people, Beijing’s political elite was in an advantageous position to watch how public opinion in favor of an early normalization with China became stronger by the month. Japanese mass media played an important role by creating a normalization euphoria. The consequences of this development were vividly described by a LDP Diet member who carried out extensive preparations for Tanaka’s visit to China. He wrote in retrospect: “Last year [1971], the atmosphere in Japan suddenly changed. The wind changed its direction completely. Because of the dramatic changes in the environment around us, such as the announcement of Nixon’s China visit and China’s recovery of its UN seat, all people began to turn their faces toward Beijing at about the end of last year. I was filled with deep emotion by this drastic change.”⁴

Beijing exploited this climate; it realized that it did not need to compromise on its demands for normalization. In China, ruled by a Communist party, there was no such phenomenon like public opinion that could influence foreign policy decisions of the government.

There was also another source of Japanese political weakness vis-à-vis China. It has its roots in the psychological essence of Sino-Japanese relationship. Japanese intellectuals are well aware of an inferiority complex in Japan’s attitude toward China. Etō Shinkichi, outstanding expert on China, explained this situation recently in an essay:

For more than two thousand years, Japan existed on the periphery of Chinese civilization. The Han people, who were the first in East Asia to develop agriculture, built a great civilization on the wealth it provided. For Japan, China was always a target of admiration and envy,

³ Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979), 762.

⁴ Furui Yoshimi, “Inside Story of Normalisation of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations,” in *Summaries of Selected Japanese Magazines* (Tōkyō: [Embassy of the United States], January 1973), 47.

the civilization of unsurpassed wisdom. Japanese suffered from a severe inferiority complex, but at the same time they struggled with a strong sense of rivalry—they were determined not to be outdone by the Chinese. These two conflicting emotions were inextricably linked in the Japanese consciousness.⁵

Concerning the mass media in the early 1970s and their extraordinary praise for everything Chinese, including the Cultural Revolution, Etō remarks that this was “a manifestation of the ‘love’ aspect of the love-hate syndrome.”⁶

This statement might not completely explain the weakness of Japan’s China policy. There is another point which should be added: the obvious lack of a position based on principles. Nakane Chie, Japan’s most distinguished sociologist, when asked in 1973 about her insights as to where Japan is heading internationally, stated with surprising bluntness: “To even think in that pattern is not Japanese. The Japanese way of thinking depends on the situation rather than principle—while the Chinese it is the other way around. The Chinese are the people who developed the classics and so can’t do anything without principle. But we Japanese have no principles. Some people think we hide our intentions, but we have no intentions to hide.”⁷

The change at the top of the Japanese government was important for China. Although the leaders in Beijing were seriously interested in official relations with Japan, they did not show too much interest; they wanted to achieve their goal without paying a high political price. The improvement of relations with Washington turned out to be a useful instrument to put pressure on Japan. Beijing’s interest in Japan at that time had two basic reasons:

- At the end of the 1960s, Sino-Soviet relations had steadily worsened. The Chinese leaders did not like to see increasing Soviet activities to lure the Japanese into an economic engagement in Siberia.
- For China’s program of modernization, Japan was an important potential source of technology and capital.

⁵ Shinkichi Etō, “Continuity and Discontinuity in Postwar Japan,” *The Japan Foundation Newsletter* XXIII, no. 2 (September 1995): 3–4.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Interview: Chie Nakane, “Japanese Have No Principles,” *Newsweek*, 15 October 1973, 60.

Only normalized relations with Japan would give China the chance to draw Japan away from Siberia, where it was going to invest and to utilize the enormous economic potential of its Soviet neighbor.

After normalization of Sino-Japanese relations had been completed in September 1972, Soviet reactions to this event were extremely negative. Moscow saw the Chinese leaders as the real driving force behind normalization, motivated by a thoroughly anti-Soviet plan. In the Soviet's view, China was attempting to involve Japan in its anti-Soviet policies and to convince Prime Minister Tanaka that the Soviet Union posed a "military threat." The Soviet leaders reacted with sharp anti-Chinese attacks since China was showing solidarity with Japan by supporting Japan's territorial claims against the Soviet Union—the demand for the return of four Kurile Islands. At the same time, Beijing attempted to slow the development of economic relations between the Soviet Union and Japan and to halt Japan's participation in the exploitation of natural resources in Siberia. China in fact tried to involve Japan in its anti-Soviet policy. In the context of this strategy, China stopped opposing the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty just before Tanaka's visit to Beijing. This was not all. China began to express positive views on the Japan-U.S. alliance and on Japan's efforts at defense, actually citing the threat posed by the Soviet Union as justification for this new position.

The territorial problem between Japan and the Soviet Union is a vivid example illustrating how the Chinese used Japan in order to keep relations between Moscow and Tōkyō rather cool. Mao Zedong had already been aware that the territorial problem was a thorn in Moscow's side. In 1964, he declared to a visiting delegation of the Socialist Party of Japan: "As far as the Kurile Islands are concerned, there is no doubt in our view; they must be returned."⁸ Even at the United Nations General Assembly in 1973 the leader of the Chinese delegation demanded that the Soviet Union "return the four islands to Japan."⁹

Why did China constantly support the Japanese position on this issue? The answer is simple: In order to prevent a solution of the problem. China could not have had the slightest interest in an improvement of Japanese-Soviet relations, let alone in a solution of the territorial problem as a prerequisite for such an improvement. Obviously the Chinese support came at times when it was least welcome to the Japanese. Generally a few days before high level talks between Tōkyō and Moscow, the Chinese strongly reminded the Soviets of the rightful Japanese claim. The Soviets subsequently accused the Chinese of disturbing Soviet-Japanese relations.

⁸ *Asahi Shinbun*, 14 July 1964.

⁹ *Peking Review*, no. 40 (5 October 1973): 13.

However, later in the 1980s the “resolute support” to Japan’s territorial claim ceased. In the meantime, Sino-Soviet relations had begun to improve, and Beijing no longer wanted to provoke the Kremlin. Tōkyō’s problem with Moscow had been used by the Chinese as long as it served their interests.

Another issue was also used in order to draw Japan into Beijing’s conflict with Moscow: China’s demonstrative attempts at building closer contacts with the Japanese armed forces including its interest in Japanese military technology, and its encouragement of Japan to greater defense efforts. The Chinese were very specific. Premier Hua Guofeng proposed to his Japanese counterpart Nakasone Yasuhiro that the Japanese air force should be expanded to protect shipping routes. Further, Deputy General Chief of Staff Wu Xiuquan recommended raising the percentage of GNP allotted to defense from 1 percent to 2 percent.¹⁰ This was in 1980. However a few years later, when Japan actually did slightly raise the 1 percent limit of defense spending, Deng Xiaoping reacted with unmistakable concern. The Chinese Communist Party newspaper followed with a critical commentary warning of a Japan which was a military power.¹¹ Thus from the middle of the 1970s to the beginning of the 1980s, Japan was used by China as a pawn in the Sino-Soviet conflict.

At that time another important issue served China as an instrument to complicate Japan-Soviet relations further: the project of a Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship. In the beginning of 1975, the Chinese made it clear that they wanted the text of the treaty to include a clause by which both sides would not only renounce any attempts at hegemony, but would also commit themselves to oppose hegemonist activities by any other states or groups of states. Moscow reacted to this with extreme sensitivity, interpreting this anti-hegemony clause—not without reason—as a move by Beijing to win Japan’s alliance against the Soviet Union.

For some time Japan hesitated to conclude the treaty with China. It was unclear about the political intentions which China was attaching to the establishment of the anti-hegemony clause. Speculation arose in Tōkyō as to whether perhaps one day the clause could be interpreted against the United States just as readily as against Japan and its economic influence in Southeast Asia. Although these doubts were never put aside, eventually, the Tōkyō government had no choice but to sign the treaty in late summer 1978. It did so in spite of repeated warnings from Moscow that the Soviet Union will take retaliatory measures against Japan.

¹⁰ *Mainichi Shinbun*, 1 May 1980.

¹¹ *Renmin-ribao*, 11 February 1987.

In analyzing Japan's attitude, the effects of another phenomenon in Sino-Japanese relations should not be discounted. This was Japan's differing perceptions of its two communist neighbors. According to Miyazawa Ki-ichi, foreign minister in the mid-1970s, the Japanese people naturally felt close links with China, but they were not able to experience such feelings for the Soviet Union.¹² Another influential politician, Sonoda Sunao, foreign minister at the time when the treaty was negotiated, made a similar remark: "When China and the Soviet Union are compared, the Japanese people somehow feel an attachment and nostalgia for China."¹³ Such sentiments had a considerable impact on Japan's policies toward China; they resulted in an all-too-great readiness to agree to normalization coupled with docile acceptance of the conditions set by Beijing, and this despite the danger of involvement in the Sino-Soviet conflict.

In the early 1980s, Beijing stopped using Japan against the Soviet Union because China's interest shifted toward an improvement in its relations with the Soviet Union. At this stage, the leaders in Beijing could feel satisfied with the results of their strategy:

- a basis for close economic cooperation had been laid;
- the long-desired Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Japan had been concluded, largely in accordance with the conditions set by the Chinese;
- the Soviet Union had been ousted as competitor for Japan's economic and political favors.

After Japan had terminated all restrictions that were enforced following the crushing of the democracy movement in 1989, all kind of relations have been restored. The exchange of high-ranking visitors is again on the agenda. This full rehabilitation was symbolized by the visit of the Japanese emperor to China at the end of 1992.

Emperor Akihito, the first Japanese monarch ever to visit China, is said to be deeply interested in Chinese culture. He played his delicate role with dignity. In the important part of his address in Beijing, he used more definite phrases than his father, Hirohito, did in order to describe Japan's behavior in the past. Akihito clearly stated "my country inflicted great sufferings (*kunan*) on the people of China. I deeply deplore this" (*kanashi-mi*).¹⁴ The emperor probably could not go farther since Japanese conservatives maintain that he is not entitled to apologize. In China the visit was officially regarded as an important event in the history of Sino-

¹² *Asahi Shinbun*, 18 September 1975.

¹³ *Mainichi Shinbun*, evening ed., 10 August 1978.

¹⁴ *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 24 October 1992.

Japanese relations; it marked the twentieth anniversary of the normalization of relations between Tōkyō and Beijing. The Chinese side, repeatedly praising China as the ideal economic partner for Japan, obviously connected with the emperor's visit the expectation of still closer economic co-operation.

In fact, Sino-Japanese relations are concentrated on the economy, on financial problems, and on the transfer of technology. China needs Japan for the modernization of its industry, of its economic system, for the construction of its underdeveloped infrastructure, and for financing of all these plans. What has been done so far demonstrates that Japan is the most important external factor of China's modernization. The bilateral trade in 1993, the year after the emperor's visit to China, reached a volume of U.S. \$39 billion, an increase of 54 percent since the previous year. In 1996, the trade volume totalled U.S. \$60.06 billion, some U.S. \$17.22 billion more than that between China and the United States. Japan has thus become China's largest trade partner for four consecutive years. Surprisingly, China is enjoying for a number of years a favorable trade balance (in 1996 \$1.7 billion), a rare achievement in trading with Japan. More than 20 percent of China's total foreign trade volume is with Japan. This figure indicates that Chinese-made products for export are becoming increasingly dependent on the Japanese market.

Further, China, among single countries, gets most of Japanese Official Development Aid. Japanese direct investment, however, was small compared with Japan's investments in other Asian countries, but it is rapidly increasing recently. In 1990, direct investment by Japanese firms in China amounted to only U.S. \$349 million. In 1995–96 the total was ten times that amount.

The funds China receives from Japan in the form of yen-denominated loans are vital to the country's projects for economic and infrastructure development. The loans have helped avert disasters that would have otherwise occurred as people tried to make do with insufficient resources. For instance, the city of Xian would most surely suffer an acute water shortage without the yen loans. It was only because Japan made funds available that the city government was able to build a reliable waterworks system and prevent the further collapse of ground in the historic city where residents in many areas had begun pumping ground water and caused the sinking of land.¹⁵

Central-government outlays for "basic construction" account for some 30 percent of the Chinese national budget. About 20 percent of these projects are at least partly financed by yen loans, the average contribution

¹⁵ *The Nikkei Weekly*, 17 February 1997.

being 40 percent of the total. This means that around 8 percent of China's public works are supported by yen loans from Japan.

When in May 1995, in a rare use of its economic clout to send a political message, Japan announced that it would cut its grant aid to China to protest Beijing's nuclear weapons tests, Beijing reacted with anger. Although the sum involved was relatively small—Japan's grant aid to China totaled only 7.8 billion yen (U.S. \$79 million)—Beijing's ambassador to Japan vehemently protested the planned reductions, asserting that this could harm bilateral relations. In March 1997, the Japanese government decided to renew its grant aid. The freeze was mainly a symbolic protest because Japan's program of low-interest yen loans, which make up the bulk of its aid to Beijing, was unaffected.

Beyond huge aid from Japan, China is very much interested in technology. Japan, however, is more reluctant than other countries to transfer know-how and placed certain restrictions on its technology export. Japan obviously does not want to nurture a strong potential competitor.

This leads us back to the issue of the deeper Japanese perception of China, but in another context. The external observer recognizes that there exists in Japan a mixture of respect and concern in regard to China. The respect for the great neighbor has its roots in its ancient culture, which was adopted by Japan. The concern or uneasiness is based on two circumstances:

- On the superiority of China, tacitly acknowledged by Japan. From this the Japanese assume that China in the long run will achieve its goal of becoming the dominating power in Asia.
- On the uncertainty about China's internal development. The possibility of turmoil, riots and anarchy—common events in Chinese history—is perceived in Japan as a serious threat.

The concern over future Chinese hegemony is based on the enormous physical and political differences between both neighbors: China has ten times the population of Japan; it is rich in strategic resources and energy, is armed with nuclear weapons, and has large conventional forces at its disposal. Besides, Beijing is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The Chinese military budget is growing since 1989 by 10 to 15 percent annually, and the modernization of the armed forces shows a tendency of great power interests: build-up of a blue-water navy, increasing capability of medium- and long-range missiles, expanding the range of the air force and improving its attacking power. Chinese purchase of Russian weapons systems, too, irritates Japan. Even if it will take a long time until China will gain a militarily dominating status in Asia, Japan already perceives China as an increasingly powerful neighbor.

Further, China claims huge areas of the South China Sea with its reefs and islands. Since important sea lanes of communication run through the South China Sea, Japan is vitally concerned about China's claim, which is also disputed by other countries, especially by Vietnam, the Philippines, and Taiwan. Three-quarters of the crude oil Japan needs are shipped from the Gulf region through the South China Sea. Besides, there exists a Sino-Japanese dispute over a small group of islands called Diaoyutai, or Senkaku, 175 km north of Taiwan. When Deng Xiaoping in 1978 visited Tōkyō, he called for a moratorium on the dispute, proposing to put a hold on it and to leave it to the next generations for resolution. Time and again the dispute has come up since then, repeatedly provoked by Japanese nationalists. On this issue, history seems to speak more in favor of China than of Japan which annexed the uninhabited islands in 1895, during the Sino-Japanese War.

The claims by Beijing and Taipei came up after the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) in 1968 reported on oil deposits on the continental shelf in the East China Sea. Whereas Japan holds that its right to the Senkaku Islands is indisputable, Beijing and Taipei remain adamant about their claims, citing maps and archives dating back to the Ming Dynasty. Since the U.S.-Japan agreement of 1972 on Okinawa, Washington has maintained that any dispute over the islands should be resolved by the parties concerned. In autumn 1996 a State Department spokesperson reaffirmed U.S. neutrality on the issue.

Although China officially criticizes the government in Tōkyō for provoking incidents in an attempt to seize the islands, it is reluctant to support nationalist activists in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and on the mainland. The leaders in Beijing are not interested in worsening relations with Japan, which plays such an important role in the modernization of China's economy. Besides, anti-Japanese demonstrations on the mainland could easily turn against domestic deficiencies of the Chinese society. Maybe the Chinese leaders are convinced that their country in the long run will become the dominating power in Asia, and then Japan will have to give up its claim anyway.

Japan is indeed not in an enviable situation. It still has a low political profile and a defensive military potential: 250,000 men, no conscription, and a tendency to further reduce the man-power. The lack of all strategic resources as well as crude oil, coal, and natural gas makes Japan strongly dependent on the security of vital sea lanes. Since Tōkyō does regard China's enormous physical weight not exclusively as an asset, there is serious concern that in China some day chaos could prevail. The potential of disruption has raised concern in Japan about possible huge numbers of refugees. Therefore Japan is deeply interested in a stable development in

China. Japan always justifies its economic aid to China with the argument of stability. Notwithstanding, Japanese experts on China are well aware that the social dynamism of this huge country could hardly be influenced from outside.

In fact Japan is afraid of both possible variations: the rise of China to a politically and militarily dominant power of the region as well as turmoil, disruption, and chaos with the negative consequence of an unstable and unpredictable China. The variation most welcome to Japan is a China that is stable, develops slowly, and does not become too strong with regard to its military power and its economy.

Although China is concentrating on increasing economic cooperation with Japan, its willingness to cooperate politically is disappointing so far. Tōkyō expects more openness in military matters. A dialogue on problems of security and defense which Tōkyō is seriously interested in, started in 1992 but has not yet brought about substantial results.

This attitude supports a certain suspicion in Japan toward China and its so-called friendship with its neighbor. During the last years, opinion polls in Japan show signs of a change in China's image among Japanese people. During the 1970s and 1980s friendly feelings toward China reached record highs, surpassed only by those toward the United States. In 1996, an opinion poll conducted by the Prime Minister's Office in Tōkyō revealed that more than half of Japanese have negative feelings about China. The waning of warm feelings toward China are explained by Japanese analysts with the recent territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands and with a series of nuclear weapon tests conducted by Beijing.¹⁶ However, the general perception of an increasingly powerful China with signs of nationalism also has an impact on China's image in Japan.

On the other hand, there is a remarkable irresponsibility among leading Japanese politicians in dealing with their country's past. In 1994, the Justice Minister Nagano Shigeto said in an interview that the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese soldiers in 1937 was a fabrication. Beijing protested and demanded "the Japanese government treat this matter with all seriousness."¹⁷ The minister had to resign, but the result was severe damage to the credibility of the Japanese government. He became the third minister to lose his job since 1986 over controversial remarks about the war. He was not the last one. The next affair occurred when another member of cabinet, Etō Takami, the director general of the Management and Coordination Agency of the Japanese government maintained that Japan did some good things during its colonization of the Korean Peninsula from

¹⁶ *The Nikkei Weekly*, 3 March 1997.

¹⁷ *International Herald Tribune*, 6 May and 9 May 1994.

1910 to 1945. This minister, too, had to resign, but at the same time Chinese President Jiang Zemin paid a state visit to South Korea. The day after the resignation, South Korean President Kim Youngsam and President Jiang held a joint press conference to blast Japan for failing to come to terms with its militarist past. According to Kim Youngsam, Japanese politicians since 1948 have made such remarks more than 30 times. President Jiang was reported to have angrily remarked that "no part of history can be erased."¹⁸ Japan's unwillingness or inability to face its imperialist past isolates the country psychologically from its two important neighbors, China and Korea.

The legacy of history has still a strong impact on the images Japan and China have of each other. The results of recent investigations on this issue in both countries show that the most prominent characteristics of the Japanese as perceived by China are "development" (*hatten*) and "aggression" (*shinryaku*) with 29 percent each; democracy (3 percent), tradition (6 percent), and friendship (6 percent), however, got very low ratings. The Japanese see their Chinese neighbors predominantly characterized by "tradition" (*dentō*, 23 percent), "control" (*tōsei*, 17 percent), "development" (17 percent) and "friendship" (12 percent); but "aggression" has a very low score (5 percent). Concerning the problems of the past, only 17 percent of Japanese but 28 percent of Chinese favor a "heartfelt apology"; for the Chinese this issue ranks at the top. The Japanese, however, seem to look more toward the future by stressing the "building of a new cooperative relationship" (61 percent) in comparison to 20 percent of Chinese.¹⁹

In view of these observations the question arises: What are the goals of China's policy toward Japan? There is an obvious tendency that China is striving for a dominant position in the region and for global influence. The only serious rival on the road to this goal in Asia is Japan; in the global arena it is the United States. Therefore, and because of its past experience, China wants Japan to confine itself to remain an economic power, which could be utilized to support China in its process of modernization. From a Chinese point of view, Tōkyō's political influence should be kept as small as possible.

China wants to avoid Japan becoming a militarily strong country capable of projecting its power beyond its vicinity. In other words, Japan must never again become a threat to Asia, notably to China. In this context, China is interested in keeping alive among other Asian countries the bad memories of Japanese imperialism and militarism. China skillfully uses

¹⁸ *International Herald Tribune*, 15 November 1995.

¹⁹ *Asahi Shinbun*, 22 September 1997.

Japan's past in order to shape its future. Because up to the present day Japan was unable to discuss publicly its past role in Asia, time and again China gets valuable support from politicians like Nagano, Etō, and others.

To achieve its goals, China needs an atmosphere of friendship, and the subtle Chinese diplomacy is very able to create such an atmosphere. The Chinese invitation of the Japanese emperor was an element of this strategy of tying Japan down to friendship. Tōkyō has little choice than to respond.

A complex issue of considerable importance between China and Japan is Tōkyō's relationship with Washington. On the one hand, the economic relations between Japan and China have reached a degree which makes it very difficult for Tōkyō to follow Washington if the U.S.-Chinese relations seriously deteriorate. On the other hand, there is the strong security alliance between Japan and the U.S. It would be highly unpleasant for Tōkyō to be forced to choose between keeping good relations with China or close security ties with the United States in case of a serious confrontation between China and the United States.

Beijing is aware that as long as the U.S.-Japanese security alliance holds, Japan is less likely to embark on a military path. But should this alliance unravel, then Japan may feel the need to build up an independent military capability. Since Beijing does not want Japan to play a major political or even a military role in the region, it can only wish that such a development will not come true. This might be the reason why China at present does not openly object the military presence of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. At the end of 1995, China's foreign minister hinted in an interview that Beijing does not oppose the Japan-U.S. security pact. But he added that in principle China does not agree with the stationing of troops on foreign soil.²⁰ Beijing obviously hopes that the bilateral security pact will keep Japan from becoming a military power. However, for fear of an expanded Japanese security role, China opposes recent U.S. efforts to reinforce the alliance.

Based on bad experience with Japan in the past, there is in China a deep-seated suspicion about the future development of this energetic neighbor. Eventually the on-going improvement of the U.S.-Japan security system is seen as "a step further toward military intervention in global and regional affairs."²¹ All this led to a severe attack on Japan unheard since the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations twenty-five years ago: "These acts suggest that militarism is raising its ugly head again in Japan, and that an

²⁰ *The Nikkei Weekly*, 20 November 1995.

²¹ *Beijing Review*, no. 9 (3–9 March 1997): 9.

economically stronger Japan is repeating its prewar mistakes and ignoring other countries' sovereignty and the feelings of their citizens."²² It does not matter whether this is true; the problem is that China's perception will have an impact on formulating its policy toward Japan.

At the end of this century, rivalry between China and Japan intensifies. On the one hand, a Japan maneuvering for power and influence could well be checked by Washington, which does not want to see its own dominant position challenged. In that respect the interests of China and the United States are identical. On the other hand, the United States and Japan are ambivalent toward the rise of China: they are attracted by the huge Chinese market, but do not like to see China become a competitor and in the long run the politically and militarily dominating power of the region. In this respect the interests of Japan and the United States meet. This complex triangular relationship will probably lead to repeated frictions among its members. Within this relationship China will do everything necessary to prevent any new threat from Japan from its very outset. At the same time, Beijing will continue to utilize Japan's economic potential for its national goals as much as possible. This determination will remain the principle of Sino-Japanese relations for a long time to come.

²² *Beijing Review*, no. 46 (11–17 November 1996): 7.

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